Friday, June 18, 2021

Chinese Type 056 Corvette

The Chinese Type 056 corvette is a numerous series of general purpose, lower end ships – as the name, corvette, implies – that is suited for operations in and around the first island chain where long range and endurance are not a requirement.  Reports put the number built at around 72 during the period 2012-2019; an impressive production run that ended in Dec 2019.  Contrast that to the anemic US LCS production run.

Type 056 Corvette


Type 056 Corvette Specifications

Length, m (ft)

90 (295)

Displacement, tons


Speed, kts


Range, nm

3500 @ 16 kts






AK-176 76 mm gun


4x YJ-83 (C-803) anti-ship cruise missile


8-cell FL3000N anti-air SAM


2x triple 324 mm torpedos


2x 30 mm




Flight deck for 1 medium Z-9 size helicopter




Type 347G fire control radar


Bow sonar




The vessel has a compact, stealth design that, visually, appears fairly uncluttered and should be fairly stealthy.  The ship uses diesel power and the stern has a waterline mounted ‘ducktail’ flap, similar to that installed on US ships, which improves fuel efficiency.


Various electronics include multiple decoy launchers, jammers, and optical sensors.


The armament and sensors of this small vessel puts the LCS, which is twice the size of the 056, to shame and reveals what a waste of money and resources the LCS is.

8-Cell SAM Launcher

 A second version of the 056, the 056A is specialized for anti-submarine (ASW) duty with the addition of towed array and variable depth sonar (VDS) and looks to be fairly close to what ComNavOps has called for in the form of a small, dedicated ASW corvette.  The degree of quieting applied to the ship is unknown.  Wikipedia lists 50 of the total 72 corvettes as being the 056A ASW version.  Such a fleet of vessels, operating in the somewhat restricted waters inside the first island chain will make it challenging for US subs to operate in the area.


YJ-83 Anti-Ship Missile Launcher

Other variants include Coast Guard and export versions.



The 056 corvette is a well designed ship which is especially suited for patrol activities inside the East and South China Seas.  The armament is quite respectable for the ship’s size.  The ASW version is nicely equipped with towed array, VDS, hull mounted sonar, ASW torpedoes, and a helo.  Considering the quantity of ASW versions built, this ship will make it difficult for US submarines to operate inside the first island chain.


While we can’t know, for sure, the Chinese intentions, this appears to be a ship that was designed as a E/S China Sea patrol and ASW vessel and the design appears to be well suited to the purpose.  This is a good example of defining a role (CONOPS) and then designing the ship to fit that role – exactly how ship procurement should happen.  This class can stand as a lesson to US Navy leadership about how to design and build a ship.


  1. It's not a memorable ship or anything, but building 50 ASW corvettes is one of the things that say "We're serious about ASW".

    1. It is also built for a game with the home field advantage. If the helo needs a hangar send it ashore. We'd need something bigger than the Abu Dhabi and I'd even say larger than Sa'ar 6 since it has no sonar. I come up with Gowind 2500 or Sigma 10714 these days.

  2. China has built nicely, modern, powerful with both armament and sensors, cheap corvettes for its still being modernizing Navy. Sure they could place instead of 8-cell FL3000N anti-air SAM smth better like this one for 24-cell AA SAM. Look at the link below.

    The price varies from 200 to 210 of million dollars per ship.
    Also it should be added that their hull mounted sonar can search and track submerged objects up to a range of 14,6-27 km. Have no knowledge of his mine searching capability. The variable depth sonar does the same to the range of 14 km. And the Passive-Only Towed Array Sonar System has the range up to 130 km.
    Type 056 can match with ever created ASW corvette that world navies do have. Even with frigates and destroyers. It only lacks anti torpedo defense systems like the Turkish Ada class corvette have. And an anti-submarine rocket launcer like the RBU-6000.

    1. Where do you get that price per ship estimate?

    2. Read different sources.

    3. That is the highest I've seen. It got me hunting and I found this. Seems to provide details on how they got to 100 millionish

    4. According to wikipedia, so take that with a grain of salt, Argentina is planning on paying for 5 (2 china built, 3 domestic) for $50 million each.

      Beyond the wikipedia mention, that's from 2014, no further news that I could find on that particular deal.

    5. It is necessary to keep several things in mind when trying to assign a cost to foreign (China, in this case) ship costs:

      1. Govt subsidies - This is not a post so I'm not going to list sources. Suffice it to say that there is plenty of evidence of govt subsidies of all manner at work in the Chinese shipbuilding industry.

      Consider one theoretical example. The US GAO reports that the Zumwalt program cost around $24B and that half of that was R&D and the other half construction. In China, the 'R&D' for a Zumwalt would/could have been entirely govt funded and provided via cyber-hacking of other countries. Thus, there would be no R&D cost for a Chinese ship as the govt would have 'obtained' the R&D and provided 'free'. Thus, in order to compare a Chinese Zumwlat to a US Zumwlat, we'd have to either double the Chinese cost or halve the US.

      Beyond that, the Chinese govt owns or partially owns many defense related companies and directly or indirectly subsidizes them. Thus, the equipment costs are heavily under-accounted.

      And so on …

      2. When looking at the cost of Chinese export ships and planes, bear in mind that China heavily discounts such offerings in order to obtain long term strategic advantages. This is very similar to the Chinese 'lending' practices that are used to create ultimate massive debt and strategic advantage.

      That said, China absolutely practices shipbuilding policies that drive the cost of construction down. Number one is probably the impact of quantity. Yard overhead is split among many ships each year instead of the one or two ships that a yard in the US might build. Closely related is the speed of construction which, again, reduces the cost of capital and duration of overhead allocation. These practices are to be admired and emulated.

      All that said, there is simply no way to factually and accurately assess Chinese shipbuilding costs other than to say the costs are substantially under-accounted while also noting the positive aspects of their shipbuilding practices.

  3. I'm sure these corvettes are cheaper than LCS, but an LCS that has NSMs appears to be more capable in most areas, at least on paper. RAM > FL3000N. NSM > YJ-83 and the LCSes have been shown carrying more than 4. The LCSes have helicopter hangars, and deploy with helicopters (what few that have deployed) vs just a pad for the Chinese corvette.

    The Type 056 has a hull sonar and LWTs, but it's unclear how capable they are. More capable than the LCS which currently has no sonar, for sure.

    The Chinese have obviously gotten more use out of their vessels and they have many more of them. But if we're just comparing spec sheets, the LCS (with NSM) is better in several areas and worse in others.

    1. LCS-2 with the budgeted survivability upgrades has lots of potential. The breed itself much more than that. They need freed up to own their own ships and getting the gear for them. The ASW system should be plug and play and the gear bought out of the normal budget like its an emergency item. Of course, this is all a day late and a dollar short. It would be good to have an office of "Using what we have better."

    2. "but an LCS that has NSMs appears to be more capable in most areas"

      Let's be clear about a comparison between the 056 and the LCS. To begin, the LCS is pushing a hundred feet longer and is twice the displacement. To even suggest that the LCS is on par with a ship half its size is, alone, a scathing indictment of the LCS.

      The LCS is NOT armed with the NSM. A couple/few ships have appeared with it (not sure if it's even integrated into the combat management software yet - I suspect not) and that's it. Someday the LCS fleet may be armed with the NSM but that's a future development, if it even happens (budget issues cast doubt on that).

      The LCS has greater aviation capability but not by much. The LCS can carry a single helo and one UAV. The 056 operates a single helo with maintenance and servicing facilities but not an actual hangar (not needed given the ship's area of operation).

      The 056A is far superior in ASW with better, and more, sensors, ASW torpedoes, hull sonar, helo, and is undoubtedly quieter (compared to the LCS water jet acoustic beacons). The LCS, lacking a functional ASW module, has no sonar, no towed array, no ASW torpedoes, and one helo.

      The 056 is smaller (smaller signature) and appears stealthier although, admittedly, that is purely a visual assessment as opposed to having any actual data aside from the fact that smaller size equates to smaller signature.

      And so on …

      As I said, to suggest that the LCS and 056 are at somewhat the same level is acknowledging a massive failure of the LCS.

    3. "LCS-2 with the budgeted survivability upgrades has lots of potential."

      I have no idea what survivability upgrades you're referring to?

      There is a hard-wired limit to how survivable the LCS can be. You might want to read "LCS Survivability"

    4. "There is a hard-wired limit to how survivable the LCS can be. You might want to read "LCS Survivability""

      I had entirely forgotten about that!
      There's just so many things that got messed up when it comes to the LCS...

    5. What intrinsic armament does the LSC have? The NSM has only been outfitted on the Gabby Giffords. It fired one in a test in 2019 and as far as I can tell that launcher remains empty. The budget has the Navy buying 38 more NSMs in 2022, 4 more ships worth.
      Other that the NSM, they have a 57mm, 2/30mm that are for surface targets only, 11 SeaRAM and 8 Hellfire.
      Even with the NSM, the LCS is merely a match for the Type 056.

    6. "and 8 Hellfire"

      I'm not sure how widely the Hellfire has been installed, if at all. Do you have any numbers on that?

    7. How is that even relevant when we have 1 LCS fitted with NSM as we speak? Please do not talk to me of "potential". empty racks on 2 more still don't change the equation.

    8. and you can buy half a dozen for what an LCS costs.

    9. ComNavOps: "I'm not sure how widely the Hellfire has been installed, if at all. Do you have any numbers on that?"

      Nope. No idea how many LCSs have Hellfire. I could find no definate numbers, so I was kind of giving them the benefit of the doubt.

      Without the Hellfire LCS is at the mercy of a Type 056.
      Plus PLAN has enough Type 056s that this wouldn't be 1 v 1, but rather 2 or 3 v 1

    10. "Hellfire"

      I just found an article that states that a Hellfire module (Surface to Surface Missile Module - SSMA) was installed on LCS Detroit in 2019. I don't know whether it was active and integrated into the combat system or just a non-functional on-board test as was done for the NSM.

      The same article stated:

      "The Navy has just awarded Northrop Grumman a deal for two more SSMMs for the LCS fleet, bringing the total number to four."

      The article is dated late Mar-2021 so there would appear to currently be a maximum of two ships with Hellfire installed, maybe less if any of the SSMAs are being used for testing, and two more SSMAs coming from NG sometime in the next year or so.

    11. 4 (2 more) by the end of 2022. Also, not record here.

    12. It appears that the installation on the Detroit was a prototype, not a production version and, presumably, will or already has been removed. So, no LCS currently have Hellfire installed, it would seem.

      And, if the Navy retires 6 LCS as they have requested, the number of installed Hellfire might be even less depending on how the Navy opts to distribute the modules and designate the remaining LCS.

      Four appear to be on order. From AndyM's link,

      "Northrop Grumman is under contract to build four SSMM systems so far. The Navy has a requirement for 12 SSMM systems."

      So, it appears that only a maximum of 12 ships will ever have Hellfire (as part of the ASuW module). Given that the Navy only planned to have eight LCS (four on each coast) configured as ASuW and that 2 of those 8 are designated training ships, it appears that only 6 deployable LCS will have Hellfire, 2 will be for training, and 4 will be ?spares?.

  4. Can;t get the link to other procurement right now as they seem to be down, but I keep it on a spreadsheet. Yes these are all things which should have been spec'ed from the start:
    SEWIP Blk II Lite 5.889 2022 LCS-2
    CDLMS 3.679 2022 LCS-2
    Mk 20 EOSS 2.285 2022 LCS-2
    Mk 160 GFCS 2.265 2022 LCS-2
    UPX29A 1.973 2022 LCS-2
    TSCE 1.764 2022 LCS-2
    Mk 53 NULKA 1.666 2022 LCS-2

    1. While these are nice items to have as far as combat capability, none affect survivability as defined in OPNAVINST 9070.1 which defines survivability as the ability to take damage and continue to fight. The later 9070.1A substituted a fuzzy, feely, non-specular, verbal diarrhea description of survivability which is utter nonsense and was implemented as a result of the criticism of the LCS and was designed specifically to get around actual, hard, written survivability specifications. The items you list would fit nicely into that document and would allow the Navy to claim that the LCS is fully survivable … despite nothing having changed from the original non-survivable ship. The ship is still designed and intended to be abandoned at the first significant hit.

      Read the "LCS Survivability" post linked in the comment above.

    2. Have you had a chance to read the newer 9070.1B that was released in 2017? I haven't been able to find it in public domain but I would imagine it would be an interesting post to compare between the 2, setting the stages for future FFG(x), or DDG(x) design requirements.

    3. "Have you had a chance to read the newer 9070.1B"

      Yes. It's just a churn (rewrite without changing anything of substance) of 9070.1A. Here's a link to a copy of 9070.1B:


    4. "9070.1B"

      Neither 9070.1A or B actually say anything. It's just flow charts and tables of characteristics without actually establishing any requirements or standards. It's a perfect example of how we've moved from short, simple, concrete requirements learned in combat to touchy-feely, non-specific "guidance" that says and does nothing.

  5. Nothing much to add, it just hurts to see China execute a simple ship program, bet nothing fancy, probably nothing really new, all weapons and systems just straight from other programs in a neat, tight little ASW hull...and they built 70ish of them in under 10 years! We can only dream anymore of USN being able to execute a program like this! Sad!

  6. Type 056 (also 056a) heavily relies on network to function. Its fire control radar has very short range, only good for its 76mm gun. YJ-83 missiles rely on network to guide. It has helicopter deck but no hanger. 056 is far from use out its displacement. It is how 056a added towing sonar without any problem. Its 76mm gun perform both offensive and defensive roles. In defense, it can fire ammunitions with controlled explosion to discharge many tungsten balls to intercept missiles and attack aircrafts. Radars and sensors in network (land based, air based, other ships' radars, etc.) provide targets and guidance for YJ-83 missiles.

    While exports (above article listed many weapons on export models), you generally see upgrades such as better radar, more weapons, ... etc.. Key reason is in China, 056 are costal defense force but in other nations (most poor ones), modified 056 become their main naval powers.

    Compare 056 and LCS is meaningless as they are designed under different strategy:

    LCS was designed to attack near coasts of nations without strong naval forces and support land invasions. Type 056 was designed as coastal defense force work with other land, air, and sea based Chinese military network. For instance, LCS supports launch Navy Seal special force invasion but type 056 has no this function.

    1. @Anon, I think you are forgetting that one of the missions of the LCS was ASW so it is very appropriate to compare a Type 056 to an LCS, especially the ASW versions...

      I would say that the mission set isn't all that different between them in general. They all both supposed to be simple, practical frigates really, with somewhat, not completely the same missions but pretty close, one seems to have succeeded a lot better than the other. If nothing else, Type 056 seems to be able to go to sea on a regular basis, something some of the LCSs haven't mastered yet!

    2. "LCS was designed to attack near coasts of nations without strong naval forces and support land invasions."

      The fact truck-mounted antiship missile launchers (including launchers of American design, like the "coastal missile defense system truck" the the Danish Navy once operated), are commonly used to counter potential invasion forces, means the LCS was doomed before it set sail.

      And what "land invasions" can the LCS support with its short range? Mexico? Canada? Any place in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, will either be undefended (meaning the LCS is "overqualified" and thus, has no purpose other than waste money for publicity stunts) or will be heavily defended, with truck and air-launched missiles to bombard the very ports the LCS will operate from- ports the LCS cannot defend, due to its weak radar and short-range air defense weapons.

      "Type 056 was designed as coastal defense force work with other land, air, and sea based Chinese military network."

      The PLA at recognizes its limits, designed and deployed the Type 056 within those limits, meaning the design is useful to it.

      The LCS? The very concept behind it was stupid, dooming the ship before it set sail. The USN has to operate far from American shores, meaning it needs long-range ships to reduce the vulnerability of the very ports its ships operate from. Southeast Asian nations will gladly host the LCS if they're an ally in a Sino-American conflict, but if they're neutral? Then they'll forbid the USN from operating from their ports, to prevent us from drawing them into this conflict (which will also see the PLA attacking these ports); meaning USN ships will have to operate from Japan and Australia (whose ports are further away from China, giving defenders more warning and preparation time in event of a PLA attack); meaning the LCS is useless, as its short range prevents it from reaching the operation zone (don't mention UNREP, ships are too vulnerable to attack while tanking, and the LCS's short range means they must make themselves vulnerable performing UNREP while within reach of Chinese defenses).

    3. On ASW, 056 has bow sonar while 056a added towed various depth sonar. I haven't seen a fully function ASW module really developed for LCS (if you saw, please update me). LCS has two helicopters. Just them can perform ASW.

      LCS had planned dedicated missiles. The development module called XM-501. It is a NLOS-LS network based system. More details in following link:

      Basically, it is very suitable for special force invasions if R&D was successful. Both Army and Navy were interested and participated in R&D. Sadly, failed. LCS was later to use Hellfire for stopgap and then installed NSW on some Independence class.

      LCS was NOT designed to fight a powerful nation from day 1. 90-91 Gulf War and Soviet Union's collapse prompted Navy to design a battle ship to fight weak nations at their door step thus "littoral" was used - not US coast but enemies' coasts.

      You can find numerous boasts of small number special forces from LCS (mostly exercises).

    4. "means the LCS was doomed before it set sail."

      You're mostly incorrect about the original concept of the LCS. However, setting that aside, your point illustrates the problem - and folly - of designing a ship without a well conceived Concept of Operations. Unfortunately, the Navy continues to design ships without a CONOPS despite the abject lesson of the LCS.

    5. "means the LCS was doomed before it set sail."

      You're just reciting old information that is common knowledge. Please offer something of value or refrain from commenting.

    6. "Basically, it is very suitable for special force invasions if R&D was successful."

      Don't you mean "special forces INCURSIONS"? "Invasion" implies the force is meant to take and hold ground- something special forces cannot do, as they rely on a team's small size and its inherent stealth to infiltrate, perform their missions, and exfiltrate before enemy defenders can detect, pin down, and destroy them. The LCS is too small to deliver forces powerful enough to seize and hold a beachhead.

    7. Yes, incursion is a better term. I watched video on special forces sail from a LCS. Its two helicopters can also transport troops.

      If the Netfire NLOS development had succeeded (see above link for details), the special forces could provide guidance for XM-501 missiles to hit land targets.

      Type 056 has no this kind of land invasion capability but it is not designed for this purpose in first place. Type 056 is designed for coastal defense (working in land-air-sea networks); LCS is designed for coastal invasion.

    8. LCS was designed to do no such things, it has zero land attack capability, and could do nothing to support an invasion other than function as the high speed transport it actually is.

    9. LCS' original design had this in mind. The Netfire (or Cyberfire) NLOS system had this in mind. I put above link here again (although this article focus on the Army version, both Army and Navy ended in failure):

      If you look back in 90s and after 911, Navy talked a lot on support land invasion. LCS' "littoral" means other nations' coasts, not defend US'.

    10. There seems to be some confusion as to what the original intended role (CONOPS, sort of) of the LCS was.

      The LCS had three functions: ASW, ASuW, MCM. It was to use these functions to clear the way for other, larger vessels to enter the 'littoral' zone. It was to do wo by clearing mines, clearing submarines, and dealing with any small vessels. Thus, it's role in an invasion, if there was one, was to clear the 'littoral' operating area. The LCS, itself, would NOT function as some kind of amphibious assault ship. It's job was to support and protect the other ships.

      As an adjunct function, the NLOS, with it's 20+ mile range and networked, loitering munitions, could have provided some land attack capability in support of ground troops.

      Of course, none of those capabilities have yet come to be and most have been downsized and down-spec'ed along the way.

      I hope this clears things up.

    11. "The LCS had three functions: ASW, ASuW, MCM. It was to use these functions to clear the way for other, larger vessels to enter the 'littoral' zone."

      Helicopters can perform ASW and MCM, and have limited ASuW capability. I can't help but wonder if the USN should've either refitted older amphibious assault ships to better support rotary wing aviation, or build new ones- even "helicopter carriers" like those the JMSDF operates- to perform those roles, instead of trying to "skip a generation" with the LCS program.

  7. In unrelated news: today, Ford is getting shook up, finally!

    1. According to the below article, not all the critical systems are either installed or operational.

      So whether or not these critical systems are affected by the shock wont be known, unless additional shock tests are done once these systems become operational.

    2. I'm already looking forward to Ford's "early retirement".

    3. "According to the below article, not all the critical systems are either installed or operational."

      The Navy has recently established the practice of removing equipment from ships prior to shock trials if the Navy suspects that the equipment would be damaged by the trials. Of course, that totally defeats the purpose of shock trials but, hey, that's the new Navy.

      You'll recall that the Navy removed guns and other equipment from the LCS prior to trials and then cut the trials short and reduced the magnitude of the shocks. Why even bother doing a trial?

    4. I believe that was one of the first articles I posted on, thou under the moniker of "Andrew S."

    5. To refresh your memory about the LCS shock trials, see LCS Shock Trials

    6. While off the main topic, I just came across a rather lengthy and in depth, blow by blow account of the failures, delays, and cost overruns on the Ford. No telling how accurate the figures that are stated are, but it seems worth the read to understand the process and problems as they developed...

  8. Israel's Saar 6 has much more fire power at expense of range.

    Israel's need is different to China. 056 is only for coastal defense and China has many other ships for other purposes. Saar 6 is Israel's largest battle ship.

    If you like strong fire power on a ship with displacement slightly less than LCS, it is Saar 6.

    1. I know people are hot for the Sa'ar 6, but...
      - No sonar
      - Where is the boat?
      - Both the C-dome and Barak-8 cells really only amount to a weight similar to 2 RAM launchers with the Blk II (like the German ships)

      I really think the Mexican 10714 or Gowing 2500 comes a lot closer. Really the Milgem/Ada has a lot going for it, but I don't know how we get hold of the design. Swap that second boat for a towed sonar and that ship would be great. H-60 with ASIST, swap the Harpoon for NSM, Go with Mk 110 unless someone wises up to keep the 76/62.

    2. Per Wiki, the Sa'ar 6 is suppose to have 2 x 324mm torpedo tubes, so I wouldn't be surprised if it does have some type of sonar.

    3. You would think it would have some type of sonar but I've been unable to find any mention of it despite extensive descriptions of every other weapon and sensor it has. So, odd as it seems, maybe not?

    4. Well, the German corvette its based on doesn't have one either. Given their new issue of armed UUVs they are facing, I bet they do something. If you have the MH-60R and torpedoes, might as well have the tubes to stow more torpedoes and keep them at the ready.

    5. "- Where is the boat?"

      Are you asking about a ship's boat? There is one located port side, midships, in some sort of davit/launch mechanism.

    6. German yes, Israeli, no. Not that I've seen or see.

    7. Ah, you're right. I can see life raft cannisters but no visible ship's boat. However, I can't find many (any?) pictures of the ship fully fitted out so maybe one will be added or perhaps it's hidden internally behind a flush mount door? Or, maybe there isn't one!

    8. Even though type 056 has helicopter deck, it doesn't have helicopter hangar thus only good for helicopter to temporarily dock on it. 056's export version such as P18 does have a hangar. If you look at 056's photo, a hangar can be installed if they want.

      Type 056 can be viewed as one designed for China's coastal defense thus while export, several upgrades are added. This is because nations purchase this corvette generally need to use them as frigate to perform functions beyond coastal defenses.

  9. While true costs and effectiveness are unknown, it looks like a well executed shipbuilding plan that produced a very capable ship!!

  10. I am kinda fascinated with the Chinese shipbuilding culture. It seems like for every systems they don't have at the moment, they get the next best thing until it is ready. More to that point, they are not slowing down but they are budgeting for more and more, continuously learning from everyone in the process.

    It's easy to imagine that the US plays the role of Japan in a future Pacific war and China takes on the role of the US with their scale of shipbuilding industry. Very ironic!

    1. There are certainly some parallels!! Ive often thought that. Their build rates and facilities continue to grow, and we have to assume their skills and quality do also, with all the effort their investing to create a first class navy.
      Meanwhile, my USN newsfeeds tell me about another LCS keel being laid, and the Navy's budget request is asking to retire 7 CGs next year instead of 5, at least one of which is right now half way through her modernization!!
      We'd really better our collective naval act together, if its not already too late...!!!

  11. This is the kind of ship which we should have doing FONOPs, patrolling, and some Naval Diplomacy around the world during peacetime. Nothing big or threatening, with plenty of room for dinner parties with visiting dignitaries. The officers could all be language qualified and receive solid training from Naval Intelligence to help be their eyes and ears.

    In the event of war, they are still very useful patrolling secondary theaters, performing coastal or chokepoint ASW, or helping to do merchant raiding.

    With the Corvette fleet doing all the deployments (backed up by an Independent Cruiser over the horizon), the Battle Fleets could stay in our home waters practicing their missions & maintaining the equipment to 100% readiness.

    1. Type 056 is the kind of ship any Western nation and especially USN should be able to execute "in it's sleep", this isn't rocket science: everything is off the shelf developed already, no new tech, clean LO hull,etc,etc...AND build a bunch of them for cheap!

      BUT NOOOOO, USN can't do that!

    2. The funny thing is in the rocket world nowadays, there are less and less of the unknowns and one could accurately predicts the reliability if given the specs and the data. Case in point, SpaceX has been successful in experimenting and flying new space ships and also NASA to a smaller degree. The worst thing for me personally is SpaceX embracing the tradition of increment designs that Rickover has pioneered and the basis of EVERY successful designs since existent.

      So even if it's rocket science, the US Navy surely lacks behind in the project management department.


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