In any opposed amphibious assault scenario, the Marines will be landing light infantry, unsupported by armor, artillery, or naval gunfire. The enemy will have artillery, rockets, missiles, and mortars. Unfortunately, and bafflingly, the Marines have no Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) capability. They will be heavily outgunned and with no viable defense.
Even the Commandant’s ridiculous platoon size hidden units would, presumably, require some type of C-RAM defense unless he considers the units to be sacrificial pawns.
Let’s look a bit closer at the C-RAM issue and let’s start by taking a look at some of the available C-RAM systems.
Centurion C-RAM – This is the land, C-RAM version of the Navy’s Phalanx CIWS. It uses a 20 mm gun firing 4500 rpm and uses M940 ammunition designed to self-destruct beyond 2,000 meters to minimize collateral damage. The unit requires a 35 ton trailer mount which makes getting a unit ashore during an assault problematic. Centurion is claimed to have a 70-80% success rate. (1)
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| Centurion |
Israeli Iron Dome – This is probably the best known and most combat tested C-RAM system although it’s mainly (only?) an anti-rocket defensive system. I’m unaware of any counter-artillery or counter-mortar capability. The system uses missiles rather than guns. Israeli sources claim ridiculously high success rates, up to 90%+. These claims are highly doubtful and are most likely just public relations claims based on manipulated data. Nevertheless, the system has had hundreds of successful intercepts.
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| Iron Dome |
MANTIS – This is a Rheinmetall German Air Force C-RAM system intended for base defense. The system consists of six 35 mm guns each firing 1000 rpm of AHEAD programmable ammunition and linked to a central control and two sensor units. As such, the unit is not mobile or portable.
Mantis
Porcupine - This Oto Melara system typically consists of four firing units, one central control post for target designation and weapon control, and a 3D radar system "track while scan type" for surveillance and target tracking. Each remote firing unit consists of a 20 mm M61A1 Gatling cannon, its ammunition handling system and an infra-red (IR) tracking system. A single firing unit covers an area of 400x400 meters.
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| Porcupine |
With some understanding, now, of available C-RAM systems, let’s consider some aspects of C-RAMs in an amphibious scenario. C-RAM systems have many problematic issues in an amphibious assault application, including,
Cost Per Shot – Any system that involves missiles, such as the Iron Dome, is on the losing side of the cost curve. Mortar and artillery shells are almost free by comparison. Given that an engagement for a gun-based C-RAM system would involve hundreds of rounds per incoming projectile, the cost for even ‘cheap’ gun rounds quickly adds up.
Short Range – Most systems incorporate guns which are quite limited in range. The Israeli Iron Dome is notable in its significantly longer range due to the use of missiles instead of guns but that comes with a significant cost and engagement sustainability limit.
Sensors – You can’t shoot down what you can’t see. All C-RAM systems need to radiate continuously which provides the enemy with the location of the system – well, the sensor portion of the system, at any rate. C-RAM systems have been developed to deal with terrorist, third world scenarios where the enemy does not have the ability to pinpoint the sensor’s location and destroy it. A peer opponent would have no trouble locating a continuously radiating sensor and eliminating it.
Saturation – In an opposed landing, it is reasonable to assume a steady and heavy rain of artillery, mortars, and rockets. This would almost certainly cause oversaturation of any existing C-RAM system. Imagine the sheer number of shells from just an artillery barrage. Most C-RAM systems have enough ready ammo to engage only a few targets before requiring reloading. The susceptibility to saturation is due to the limited magazine depth. This suggests the need for significant numbers of C-RAM units in order to be effective.
Magazine Depth – All the systems have quite limited ready ammo limitations and reloads look to be difficult and time consuming in the context of an opposed landing where one might reasonably expect a sustained, steady rain of artillery, mortars, and rockets. This is especially true for missile based systems. Reloading under active combat conditions is not easy or safe in most systems.
Mobility/Portability – As indicated in the example systems described above, none of the systems are even remotely portable or mobile within the context of an amphibious assault, meaning that none can be transported ashore during the initial stages of an assault when they would be most needed. By the time the assault site is secure enough to make transport ashore viable, the need will have passed.
Conclusion
Current C-RAM systems seem to have been designed as static base defense systems intended to deal with occasional, brief attacks rather than sustained combat. Therefore, none are suitable for use in amphibious assaults or even the Marine’s small, missile shooting units. Of course, the Marines have publicly stated that they're out of the opposed landing business … and yet they continue to procure ACVs and operate AAVs from amphibious assault ships so ...
The limitations of existing C-RAM systems are blatant and obvious, as discussed above. Recognition of the limitations leads directly to recognition of the characteristics that an amphibious assault C-RAM system should have.
- Mobile (vehicle based)
- Light weight
- Long range
- High volume ready ammo
- Easy and/or automated reload
- Extensive magazine capacity
- Individual sensors as opposed to a central shared sensor so that one destroyed sensor doesn’t incapacitate many ‘shooter’ systems
If we’re going to maintain the fiction of amphibious assault capability then we need an amphibious C-RAM capability to support it. Of course, with amphibious assault being a fictional capability maybe the C-RAM requirement is moot?
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In my book, I mention the need for the Marines to employ C-RAMs and tanks aboard LCUs to provide cover fire for the landing force.
ReplyDelete"Another weapon system needed for LCU gunboats is the new Centurion C-RAM anti-missile system. (pictured) This is a mobile ground-based version of the proven Navy ship-based CWIS system that fires a radar-guided 20mm gatling gun. These have proven successful at shooting down small rockets and mortars in Iraq. It also has an optical/IR site for manual firing at any target. As LCU/Tanks and AAVs approach shore, a modern enemy may launch anti-ship missiles, anti-tank missiles, guided mortars, armed drones, and attack helicopters. Several LCUs with C-RAMs embarked should be able to shoot down most threats and rake shore targets with fire if needed. C-RAMs may also be carried topside on ships to augment missile defense, especially aboard cargo ships that have no defensive systems."
https://www.g2mil.com/lcugunboats.htm
Thanks for the link. I hadn't seen that one. I'll take a look.
DeleteThe only problem with a ship based system is that the coverage depth onto the land is very limited. Various reports put the range at 500-2000 m. It would be excellent for the initial landing but as the ground forces move inland, they'll quickly outrange the C-RAM coverage.
If they're going to do forcible entries (which seems questionable now, according to the Commandant) they need a mobile C-RAM that can be transported ashore and move across unimproved terrain - in other words, a vehicle mounted system. An Abrams C-RAM variant might work as it's armored, survivable, and we have thousands in storage. Of course, transporting Abrams ashore is a challenge in its own right!
@G2mil: “I mention the need for the Marines to employ C-RAMs and tanks aboard LCUs to provide cover fire for the landing force.”
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The best way to support the landing force is to put proper weapon systems on a small combatant hull – these are not 1940s era manual AA guns, they need electrical, cooling, maintenance, and other auxiliaries, not to mention integrating the system(s) into overall tactical picture.
None of these CIWSs are quite the ‘stand-alone systems’ that are advertised - even CIWS has some integration into the CICs of most ships. Phalanx weighs six tons w/o the electrical and cooling - Centurion absolutely dominates that HEMTT 8x8, which is one of the largest trucks used by our military (those tires are ~53” diameter).
Mounting land weapons on ships has a spotty record (e.g. the German Monarch program mounting a 155mm SPG turret on a frigate).
I am also a huge fan of large mortars over something like a direct fire tank turret. Systems like AMOS are spectacular, and there are naval mountings that could justify the huge price tag (~4 million Euros).
I think a division (4-6) of SES vessels *along the lines of* a Norwegian Skjold could do the job of isolating and protecting a regimental sized beachhead in advance of a brigade or division. They could easily integrate weapons like Iron Dome or CIWS, and they can work right up to the shore and easily keep up with LCAC/SSCs. https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/skjold/
GAB
Given the footage, I'd say the Israeli intercept rate is probably correct, given it focuses on destroying rockets most likely to hit something while ignoring wayward rockets.
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, the performance capability of these rockets, mostly Soviet era, are very limited.
Separate note, operating C-RAM or similar systems in congested airspace would be problematic. If memory serves me right, I believe a CWIS accidentally targeted a blackhawk in Iraq. Thankfully, it also decided not to fire upon it.
"I'd say the Israeli intercept rate is probably correct"
DeleteDepending on which report you choose to believe, the reported success rate ranges up to 98%!!!!! That's ridiculous and doesn't match the reports of the numbers of rockets landing in guarded territory.
I suspect that the issue is reporting methodology. For example, you could launch five missiles, have only one hit, and report 100% success at destroying the target which would be true but highly misleading in terms of individual missile success rates. Some of what I've read leads me to believe this is what Israel is doing and that the individual missile success rate is much lower than reported. Let me be clear, while I have reason to believe what I've just described is correct, it is still unconfirmed speculation on my part.
This is somewhat similar to the initially claimed success rate of Patriots in Desert Storm defending against SCUDs. The initial claims of 90%+ were later reduced to as low as zero.
The hamas rockets might as well be balloons. They're slow, non-maneuvering projectiles with a CEM in kilometers.
DeleteThe iron dome interceptor fly past the rockets, then loop back around for a tailgate intercept. Something that would be nearly impossible against modern munitions.
My understanding of how iron dome operates is based on risk assessment. A rocket may enter its coverage zone but be low risk, thus ignored.
So yeah, total intercept compared to rockets launched probably won't be 90% cause most rockets weren't worth intercepting.
If hamas started using scuds or more modern munitions, I'm sure the numbers of intercepts would drop significantly.
Additionally, a simple INS guidance system on similar rockets, would probably overwhelm iron dome if used in similar quantities as the dumb rockets.
Delete"So yeah, total intercept compared to rockets launched probably won't be 90% cause most rockets weren't worth intercepting."
DeleteThat's understood. The success rates are based on missile launches, not number of attacking rockets. However, it depends on how you define 'success', as I noted in the previous comment.
I agree with you that successful hit rates may change if the metrics used also change.
DeleteWhat I was trying to convey, was the hamas weapons are low efficacy, so iron dome has a inflated success rate.
"a simple INS guidance system"
DeleteOf course, that would greatly increase the cost of the rockets, prolong construction time, decrease numbers, and open the system up to outside cyber attacks (recall the centrifuge hack?).
To illustrate the impact on cost, a 'simple' guidance system would require movable fins of some sort, an onboard computer/chip system, a hardened carry system for the computer components to withstand launch stress, some kind of movement sensor, and so forth. The rockets would require a much more sophisticated assembly process and outside computer and control components would have to be acquired and transported which costs more money.
What's more cost effective, an attack with no effect & just wasted resources or something that actually yields results?
DeleteThe IDFs ability to resupply with iron dome interceptors is higher then Hamas's to get more 1940/50s type rockets made in Iran.
Infact, I would speculate that German V1 weapons would be more effective if it wasn't for the non mobile infrastructure required. I don't believe they had any complicated computer systems, except a gyro and timer.
Sidenote, undoubtedly you've heard a cloud network was attacked and disabled. Will we be seeing an upcoming article from you on that?
Ironically, Hamas has started using incendiary balloons in order to get around iron dome...
Delete"Israeli Iron Dome"
ReplyDeleteUp to now, despite many nations showed interests and examine the system, NONE has yet purchased.
They all find one issue - it is not suitable today's war with another regular army.
Iron Dome is designed to intercept low tech rockets with cheap missiles. The missile carries only 3kg explosive and explosion is controlled to only one side. In each missile, its radar detecting range is less than 1 mile.
The system's radar is good thus sold a few but no missiles sold.
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Both Navy and Army worked on XM-501 NLOS system. Navy version was planned as LCS' attacking missiles. The project ended in failure and cancelled in 2011.
Rather than use single detecting radar, the system employ network. For instance, a Navy Seal may find an enemy target. He uses his GPS/laser detector to send his own location and the target's location to the network. A missile can then be fired based on the network's information for guidance to hit the target, The Seal could even secretly provides laser homing for the missile. Therefore, it is called NLOS.
Neverminded, the project failed in cancellation.
Worse, China displayed a system based on this concept in Zhuhai Air Show for export. It named missiles of the system CM-501XX (several types of missiles). China continues showing them in other international arm shows, include this year's IDEX. This year, China adds CM-502 missiles into the system. Since this system heavily depends on network technologies, you can know why US has little tolerance on Chinese companies like Huawei.
Sounds like NLOS could've worked, but doing so required technology that took an additional decade or two to develop. The US Army and Navy obviously didn't have the patience.
DeleteAt that time, wireless network was not as mature as today, for instance, high latent times made missile guiding problematic, etc. Nevertheless, R&D team could not solve this problem then but Chinese could and completed soon after.
DeleteIt has been more than two decades that most smart high graduates refuse STEM as their majors.
Why are there just such gaping holes in firepower all across the Navy and Marines? Things like this seem so obvious. How could they be missed?
ReplyDeleteWait, wait, don't tell me.
Its done on purpose.
DeleteIf the Navy had battleships then counterbattery fire would obviate the need for this system. With its armor, the battleship wouldn't need it either.
ReplyDeleteBattleships are useless without guns and ammo. The factories that built the Iowa class battleships' guns and ammo, closed DECADES ago; new factories will have to be built, to make them useful again.
DeleteDon't talk nonsense about simply using existing guns, as firing them WILL result in wear and tear that must be remedied via regular maintenance, even replacement- in short, existing guns will eventually become useless, and require replacement.
"counterbattery fire would obviate the need for this system."
DeleteIt might lessen the need but wouldn't eliminate it. In an opposed landing, there would likely be far more mortars (and vehicle mounted, mobile ones!) than could be countered. Modern artillery ranges might well put the artillery beyond the range of ship counterbattery fire.
"new factories will have to be built"
DeleteOf course they would!
There once was a stock of spare battleship gun barrels but I don't know if they still exist. Regardless, new ones would have to be built, as you point out.
However, new factories are not a major problem. We built new factories to construct the LCS. We build new factories all the time. That's hardly a stumbling block. It's just an up front, one time, added cost.
Another problem: Keeping these factories open. The US military keeps letting factories that build vital components for its weapons systems, to go out-of-business, which then increases the costs of maintaining legacy systems- hell, it allowed shipyards that built its warships to close down, meaning we can NO LONGER simultaneously build new ships and maintain those we already have!
DeleteAlmost all large caliber fast firing guns face the same issue - cooling. Therefore, 5" guns can fire at much higher frequency on a naval boat than on land because of use sea water for cooling.
ReplyDeleteLook all modern army 155mm guns, they give two firing speeds - initial (usually first minute) and sustained (usually much lower than the first minute). Cooling issue prevents them from keep firing on high frequencies.
China used to display a multi purpose dual 76mm guns in Zhuhai Air Show for export. As I read, they sold NONE. The system drew many interests because it can fire 400 rounds/minute. The system can be used for air defense (special ammunitions) and land assaults.
Keep problem --- you need to carry lots of cooling water or in a battle field where water is readily available.
RE: the Phalanx. I believe that once upon a time the army had a mobile anti-aircraft system (the M163 VADS) consisting of the regular vulcan cannon (used on fighter planes) mounted on an M113 personnel carrier. Maybe something like that would work. Of course that was many years ago so it had an optical aiming system. Maybe just mounting the Phalanx on that new armored amphibious vehicle might work?
ReplyDeleteThe M163 was never considered to be all that effective as an anti-aircraft platform, primarily due to its primitive targeting system.
ReplyDeleteApparently they were used to escort convoys in Vietnam and were quite effective at breaking up ambushes, as you could imagine.
The Phalanx would squash the M113 APC, but I wonder if it could be mounted on an M1 Abrams chassis that can handle 70 tons?
Not sure if the stability would work, but that's what those engineers are paid to figure out.
These things can be done if you want to.
Lutefisk
We have a proposed AA variant of the M1 Abrams in the 1990. It's called the M1/AGDS(Air-Ground Defense System).
Deletehttp://ftr.wot-news.com/2017/05/14/triple-a-anti-air-abrams/
Now, we also have been procuring the SHORAD variant of the Stryker. Maybe it's possible to update the weapons on the Abrams through that.
Cooling prevent many weapons from continue firing at high speed. This is a common problem.
ReplyDeleteCIWS are designed for final stage interception. They only fire few seconds on a missile penetrated other means of interception. They usually don't have water cooling. For instance, China's stellar type 1130 CIWS can fire at ~11,000 rpm. It has no cooling and standard ammunition (30mm) loading is ~1000. It is not used in battle but only final stage defense.
"Cost Per Shot – Any system that involves missiles, such as the Iron Dome, is on the losing side of the cost curve."
ReplyDeleteBut, that analysis doesn't include the potential loss of property (or life) should that mortar, artillary round, or rocket find its target. And, Iron Dome's missile interceptors have far greater range and maneuverability than any gun-based system.
I think the argument is that, if the interceptor costs orders of magnitude more than the offensive weapon, you can always overwhelm it simply by buying more offensive weapons. That's always been the argument against anti-missile defense against peer competitors, for example.
DeleteOne C-UAV/C-RAM system, is the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), it was reported in July 2019 the Marines took out an Iranian drone in the straits of Hormuz at a 1,000 yards using MADIS in EW mode from deck of the USS Boxer.
ReplyDeleteMADIS carried on two Humvee's with IOC this year, 200 plus systems planned, capabilities, four Stingers and 30mm cannon, 7.62x51mm six-barrel rotary machine gun, EW (Sierra Nevada Modi III for spoofing the drone’s navigation system, jam its communications by separating its data link, or defeat fuses and weapons’ triggers), sensors EO/IR optics and 360-degree radar (RPS-42 Israeli RADA) with a C2 suite, system similar to the new Army Stryker IM-SHORAD
What have not seen mentioned is use of a high powered microwave, HPM, by Marines or Navy, an electromagnetic pulse fired in the direction of the drone/s or missiles to burn out their electronics, HPM advantages are that it can kill groups/swarms of drones, limitations with HPM are that in future drones/missiles could come with electromagnetic pulse protection designed in and also HPM subject to the 4th power law, in order to double the range the transmitted power would have to be increased by 16 times (as with radar and lasers), do wonder about IR signatures created by the high power generators required to power HPMs for enemy missiles to home in on.
DARPA funding the MORFIUS HPM drone, Army funding the THOR HPM, Air Force funding the PHASER HPM system to defend airfields against an attack by swarms of drones ("Air defense and electronic warfare systems deployed at Russia's Hmeymim air base in Syria have shot down or disabled over 100 drones during terrorists attempted attacks on the military facility over the past two years", Russian spokesman September 2019, Wikipedia) and the MDA also funding advance work on a HPM for defense against hypersonic missiles. If Navy funding a HPM have not seen a mention of it, one area where the Navy and Army spending big is on lasers.
"C-UAV/C-RAM system, is the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS)"
DeleteI'm not aware that MADIS has C-RAM capability. My understanding is that it is an AAW system. Have you seen information that indicates C-RAM?
You are as usual totally correct :), my mistake as on checking MADIS is a "Short-range surface-to-air shoot-on-the-move air defense weapon; short range electronic warfare C-UAV air defense weapon; protection for the maneuver force for targeting UAVs, low-flying, high-speed fixed-winged aircraft, and helicopters"
DeleteHey, no problem. It might be possible to modify the MADIS (mostly a software mod?) to perform C-RAM using the 30x113 RWS although the effective range is short (Wiki give the M230 30x113 effective range as a bit less than a mile). Certainly, the mobile aspect is appealing although the absence of armor on the vehicle is a drawback.
DeleteThe main threat of RAM is during the landing, when ships, troops and equipment are all bunched up on the beach. This is a relatively small area, so a layered system of C-RAM on small combatants or landing craft probably makes the most sense.
ReplyDeleteCenturion for short-ranged mortars and artillery. Iron Dome (or equivalent) for the mid-range rockets and artillery, and traditional ESSM/SM-2/SM-6/SM-3 for SRBM/IRBM/ASCMs.
Ensure adequate counter-battery radar and fires are available to destroy/suppress systems once they fire.
Once forces disperse inland, RAM becomes a more traditional threat, dealt with using traditional methods.
Part of the iron dome is not just intercepting only the rocket that going to hit an area with civilian, it is also sending alert to civilians in those era, and having a protected room. Source wikipedia : "According to the 1951 civil defense law, all homes, residential buildings and industrial buildings in Israel are required to have bomb shelters. However, several homes or residential buildings may make use of a single shelter jointly."
ReplyDeletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_defense_in_Israel
So just dedection+passive defense+lack of any good aiming by the enemy rocket does a lot to reduce the cost in life in Israel. But it is less technologically fancy so less advertising is done about it.
An account by someone living it : https://www.martin-van-creveld.com/under-fire/
Excellent points and thanks for the reference to civil defense, something the USA has lacked for decades.
DeleteGAB
Now how much of it can be adapted to a defense of an airbase is questionable. But it could reduce the human cost at the very least. It might have some use for general backline duty and front line duty for protection against artillery, aircraft attack. But you need to think of making it hard for the enemy to fake it.
DeleteWhile Iron Dome is good to protect civilian from low tech rockets, it is not suitable for battle fields with modern weapons. This is as I mentioned earlier that NONE has been sold despite many contacted Israel. Its intercept missile has only 3kg explosive designed to explode on one side. Also, the missile's sensor's detecting range is less than 1 mile. The missile is designed to be cheap but they can only intercept low tech rockets and shells.
DeleteThere are several systems can do much better jobs and suitable for today's battle fields. Of course, missiles are more expemsive.
I was talking about integrating early warning system (either by sound or more electronic system with cryptés signal). It can à single way signal so receiving Troup don't emit signal. It can give extra time to reach a safe position before an aritlllery or airplane bomb arrives.
DeleteLD-2000, a land based C-RAM derived from China's type 730 CIWS. China is promoting it for exports in trade shows. It fires 30mm rounds at ~4,200 rpm.
ReplyDeleteHowever, China doesn't export any system base on her star type 1130 CIWS which fires ~11,000 rounds per minutes (also 30mm).
After failure of development of next generation of Phalanx CIWS (designed to be 7,000+ rpm), Navy is more interesting to use Sea RAM(RIM-116) as final missile defense. I don't know if there is a land version of RIM-116.
China also has a final close-in defense missile - HQ-10. Its export version is called FL-3000N. China also promotes it for export in trade shows.