Have you wondered what a modern carrier battle would look
like? Of course you have! Well, wonder no longer. The Sixth Battle [1] describes the clash between Russian carrier task forces and a US carrier (fictional Forrestal class complete with ... yes! ... Tomcats!) isolated off the
southeastern coast of Africa against the setting of a Russian sponsored
invasion of South Africa.
The geopolitical situation is nicely setup without being
tedious and boring and offers solid context.
The land battle is described with engaging detail and personal interest
but the focus of the book is on the naval battle with the Russian carriers
(Kiev and Kuznetsov classes) attempting to support the invasion with land
attacks while simultaneously preventing the badly outnumbered American carrier
from interfering. The Russian plan to
isolate the US carrier group from reinforcement is brilliant and quite
plausible as are the American attempts to respond. In the end, the plot comes down to the battle
between the Russian naval and land based aviation and the American carrier
group and is told with a fantastic combination of suspense, realism, and
detail.
Along the way, the plot presents scenarios involving
chemical/nerve gas warfare and the use of tactical nukes in anti-submarine
warfare. The tactical nuke scenario, in
particular, draws the reader into the debate and gives a feeling for the
complexities of the decision making involved as well as the tactical
considerations and methodology of employment.
I know we have readers who are firmly convinced that tactical nukes
should be used and this offers a window into that scenario.
Anti-ship strike scenes assemble and make clear all the
factors that go into a strike and how they fit together. Essentially, they merge all the aspects
discussed on this blog, and which so many people struggle to understand, into
clear, detailed, riveting descriptions.
One can’t help but come away with a profound understanding
of why carriers should operate in groups of four. The sheer number of aircraft required to
carry out a strike is daunting and the relegation of so many aircraft to
supporting roles (CAP, BarCAP, tanking, EW, etc.) which results in shockingly
meager “full” strikes of only a dozen or so aircraft hammers home the very
small size of a single carrier air wing.
Of course, today’s downsized air wings have even fewer aircraft
available for actual strike action.
Disturbingly, today’s carriers could not possibly execute the actions
described in the book.
The book also offers a clear feel for the vast operating
area of the oceans when conducting naval/carrier warfare and the difficulties
in finding and engaging a surface group – another aspect that blog readers
often struggle to comprehend.
Yet another key facet of the book is that it grants an
appreciation for the force multiplication value of tactics as opposed to the
pure evaluation of individual weapons as so many of today’s naval observers and
analysts tend to do. The reader comes to
understand that people and tactics rank ahead of weapon specifications in
importance to overall combat effectiveness.
The value of EMCON and electronic warfare is quite evident
in both the detection efforts and the actual strikes and demonstrates how it
all ties together in the overall maneuvering, tactics, and combat.
The role of Tomahawk carrying ships such as the Burkes is noteworthy and,
again, emphasizes the need for large escort groups and the value of tactical
flexibility that numbers grant.
To summarize, in addition to being a hugely entertaining and
believable story, the author presents what amounts to a primer on naval battle
and carrier warfare. This book should be
required reading for followers of this blog.
The book is very well researched and offers great detail
without becoming tedious. A perfect
balance between detail and story telling.
Read it!
Note that you can borrow this book for free from the Internet Archive (archive.org). They have an online library you can borrow electronic versions of books from. Several million books are available including this one. All free.
ReplyDeleteTx!
DeleteCan we assemble four carriers in a task force? The war on Iran proves we struggle to keep two deployed for a war. We kept the Ford out 11 months and the Lincoln is still there at 7 months.
ReplyDeleteIt's why we really need 14.
Delete"proves we struggle to keep two deployed for a war."
DeleteYou're misunderstanding how carriers - or ships in general - are used in war. You're conflating deployments and war missions. You're correct that in peacetime we struggle to keep two or, occasionally, three carriers constantly deployed. However, in war, we won't deploy carriers/ships on a continuous basis. We'll assemble a task force of the necessary ships for a single mission, execute the mission, and return to base. Thus, ALL our carriers/ships will be available all the time. In war, we won't even execute routine maintenance. Everything but the bare minimum will be deferred until after the war. All of this was demonstrated in WWII.
We seem to be at war with Iran and unable to open the Strait.
Delete"unable to open the Strait."
DeleteThe military aspects of this are absolutely baffling. We are more than capable of keeping the strait open. I can only conclude that it is some kind of misguided, idiotic political directive that is preventing this.
CNO you seem very optimistic for what the USN can do if war breaks out. I remain skeptical as to the material condition of the fleet at the present as well as being adequate for any war taskings. Not to mention how a war tasking effects same. Ships and subs sit pier side for prolonged periods driving other units into double pumps or more. This is not sustainable. If you look at ship histories found at https://www.uscarriers.net/ you will see exactly what I mean. It is mind boggling how the concept of deploy, surge ready, maintenance, training to deploy cycle has been usurped by expediency. Doesnt bode well for the future. Hope Im clear. Read the current histories to find examples. They arent hard to find as the cycle breaks are quite ample across all classes of ships maybe most importantly carriers.
ReplyDeleteTo be clearer Im Refering to OPFOR.
DeleteMeant OFRP sorry. Optimised Fleet Response Plan as it is rarely adhered to.
Delete"CNO you seem very optimistic for what the USN can do if war breaks out."
Delete???? What has possibly given you that impression? This entire blog criticizes the readiness of the Navy. Go back and reread the entire blog and then change your statement to reflect that reality.
"Optimised Fleet Response Plan as it is rarely adhered to."
DeleteI did a post on the failure of this plan and have frequently criticized it and pointed out its failings. Again, what could possibly lead you to think I view as anything but an abject failure? Have you read even one of the thousands of posts on this blog?
Ok It seems after further research that i should have done first that this is being done on purpose. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2024/04/08/navy-tests-concept-to-shake-up-traditional-carrier-strike-group-model/
ReplyDeletehttps://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/01/18/fleet-forces-team-tackles-decoupling-destroyers-from-carriers/
Among others. Sorry to waste time. Although the pier queen paradigm stands as far as I can tell.
I have no idea what you're talking about.
DeleteThis through me off: “Thus, ALL our carriers/ships will be available all the time. In war, “
DeleteYes I have read and knew your position. Sorry to have wasted everybodyd time and cluttered up the thread with my inane ramblings. Please delete my comments on this thread. Sorry again!!!
You appear to be confusing the current peacetime model of Navy operations and maintenance with a war model. When war starts, EVERY ship and submarine in the Navy will be rapidly brought up to operational status and sent to the war. Routine maintenance will be terminated for the duration. This is exactly what happened in WWII. Every ship gets thrown into the mission availability pool. At the end of the war, many/most ships will be quickly retired.
DeleteYou are right I am “confused”. I dont see how the USN can bring “every” ship up to speed. But not to worry. I will keep reading and learning. And not go off half-cocked about you seeming to change your position and about material already covered. Maybe someday the light bulb will go on.
ReplyDelete"I dont see how the USN can bring “every” ship up to speed."
DeleteEvery ship in the fleet will be made as combat-ready as possible, as quickly as possible. Routine maintenance will be eliminated, corners will be cut, standards will be lowered, etc. in an effort to get ships into the fight. This is exactly how it was done in WWII. Every ship fights until the war is over. Every ship we had or built during WWII fought until the war was over. There's no mystery about this.
Now, that doesn't mean every ship will be fully loaded, fully crewed, totally ready on day one. We'll do rush repair jobs, non-critical items will be left undone, and we'll push ships into combat. Consider the example of the Yorktown and her three day repair effort before Midway. She was far from perfect but was made barely ready in time. This is what we'll do to get every ship into the fight.
"seeming to change your position"
I'm still not sure what position you thought I might have changed. Feel free to ask questions.
It was all my misunderstanding you and what you were trying tto convey. I get it now . The Big Question is how long before the USN cant fight a war? Another: Have we already reached that point in practical terms as regards against a nation with actual competent naval forces ie thinking maybe like China? For how long with ships of dubious combat value as is? Or am I being too dramatic?
ReplyDelete"how long before the USN cant fight a war?"
DeleteWe can ALWAYS fight a war. The question is can we win? You start every war with what you have on hand and then, as rapidly as possible, you build what need to continue the war.
"Or am I being too dramatic?"
Well, you're asking the right questions. Now, do your research and get to the point that you can answer your own questions!
A lot of treasure is spent on the USN. I am not seeing value much less superiority. But Maybe Im getting to far off from the book review. Can the USN actually do what the book surmises? I find it hard to believe the USN could assemble four carriers together with a rquisite number of escorts. Probably should just read the book. But if its premises are actually undoable it might be an effort in futility. Ill endeavor to get acopy.
ReplyDelete"I am not seeing value much less superiority."
DeleteThen you're not looking at the Navy objectively. For example, and assuming you're comparing us to China, the US submarine fleet is far superior to China in numbers, quality, experience, undersea mapping, combat tactics, etc.
Similarly, the US carrier fleet is far superior to China's. I don't even need to bother listing the reasons why.
The US surface fleet suffers a bit in comparison although, again, the edge in experience, combat testing of weapons, and tactics goes to the US. China may well be superior in numbers and modernization.
"Can the USN actually do what the book surmises?"
The book's scenario involves only a single carrier, not a four-carrier group. That said, our shrunken air wings, today, would preclude the actions described in the book.
"I find it hard to believe the USN could assemble four carriers together with a rquisite number of escorts."
In the abstract, of course we could. We have nine functional carriers and 80 or so Burkes so, yes, we could assemble a four-carrier group and the requisite escort force. Could we do it by tomorrow morning? No, but that's not a realistic expectation. Could we do it for an upcoming mission in a few weeks or so? Yes.
Ok. I concur with you to an extent. I have been and am being overly pessimistic. But Im not sure the USN could assemble a large force in a “few weeks”.
DeleteQuestions remain:
Do we have enough weapons to load out a large force?
Recent commentaries hint low inventories as is. With limited capacity to replenish.
And would it largely be one and done if even possible? Given manufacturing constraints.
Im not trying to argue with you.
Just trying to clean up my preconceptions and misconceptions.
Your forbearance has been exceptional and greatly appreciated. Albeit wholly undeserved.
As I have become far too pessimistic for my own good?
" Im not sure the USN could assemble a large force in a “few weeks”.
DeleteYes, we could. Not all 280 ships in the fleet but enough for a good task force ... yes. More ships would follow quickly.
"Do we have enough weapons to load out a large force?"
Absolutely, yes. When you hear about shortages, it doesn't mean we're down to our last ten missiles. It means we're down to inventory levels that no longer allow us to sustain an ongoing war. Currently, we probably have 1,000 - 3,000 of each type of missile. That's far more than enough to load a single task force or even several.
"With limited capacity to replenish."
That's correct and that's our real problem. We can't manufacture large quantities to support a major war.
Wait a second. The book was written in 1992!!! The USN was in transition at the time. Burkes not yet available. But Ill take yourcword for it and read it..
ReplyDeleteThe book does, indeed, use Burkes as well as Knox, Perry, Spruance, and Ticonderoga class ships. Remember, the USS Burke was launched in 1989 and commissioned in 1991 so class members would have been available in the books time frame. Interestingly, the book offers specific month/day references but not year so we don't know exactly what time frame the author envisions - presumably, mid-1990s or thereabouts.
DeleteThe problem is we struggle to build anything now. The run up to WWII saw the USN already building. To be sure war time efforts dwarfed prewar efforts but I fail to see the US recreating yhe Arsenal of Dexmocracy.
ReplyDeleteBurkes are what 5 years behind and subs years behind as well and the drum beat is for two a year but only getting one.
Without a doubt, our shipbuilding rates are slow and we've identified this problem repeatedly. However, we are also building with zero urgency. When war comes, our sense of urgency will increase, of course, and we'll streamline and expedite construction. Unfortunately, that will still leave us short of what we'll want.
DeleteBear in mind, much of our slowness is not due to inherent shipyard limitations (though those exist) but to bureaucratic and budget delays. When war comes, budget won't be a factor and one assumes we'll cut the bureaucratic delays.
I was of the understanding it was mainly because of “inherent shipyard limitations” as regards Virginia and Burke classes. The backbone of the USN. As I understand it they are fully ordered and funded. But the shipyards are far behind, some maybe more of that due to covid , as well as labor shortages and physical planyt limitations that preclude the necessary planned drumbeat. Or am I mistaken?
ReplyDeleteFrom GAO July report:
Delete“Navy and industry partners are addressing industrial base challenges decades in the making and additional improvement is ongoing.
Working closely with industry and Congress, the Navy is investing heavily in facilities, workforce development, modernizing shipyards, increasing wages, and
strengthening the supplier network to increase capacity and ensure return on investment, according to the program office.”
Indeed from the same report a billion has been invested in the Burke shipyards.
This about the 3+ years Virginia delays:
Delete“Late material deliveries from suppliers and limited availability of experienced workers due to competition in the labor market drive these trends. The Navy plans to improve performance by investing billions of dollars in the supply chain and shipbuilder wages, among other mitigation efforts.”
But along with this I understand the physical plants arent up to the task either.
On Burkes:
Delete“ GAO also found the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 Flight III destroyers are now 55 months behind schedule – up from 41 months in last year’s GAO report. The delays are due to issues hiring a “robust” workforce amid the current wages, supply chain issues, and frequent design changes, GAO said.”
The GAO hasnt flagged the physical plants albeit the USN has as I stated above invested in upgrades to these shipyards. But it seems labor and supply chain slowness is mostly responsible. But much has been written on the pack of modern US shipyards compared to other nations.
From April CBO report:
Delete“ Whereas in the 2000s the shipbuilding industry took 5 to 6 years to build destroyers and submarines, the shipyards now need 9 to 10 years, on average, to build those ships.”
From CBO:
Delete“ (The Navy has also provided some financial support to the nation’s surface combatant builders, though that amount represents just a fraction of the amounts it plans to invest in submarine construction.)”
So in conclusion there are many variables involved. I havnt touched on the USN bureaucratic issues. But funding doesnt appear to be an issue indeed the USN has supplied billions extra to the shipyards apart from ship contracts. But labor and lack of competition in suppliers have created the worst bottlenecks. 70% of suppliers are single-source.
DeleteBut even with that physical space and acdearth of modern equipment at shipyards are a hindrance.
Delete“Streamline sndcexpedite”? Now would be a fine time and not to soon to start. But I suppose it will take war. Hope that isnt too late and therefore ineffective.
DeleteWhile posting those blurbs I had a strange feeling you had just discussed the GAO report and indeed just a few days ago. My bad again. Maybe you should just ban me from commenting as I to often forget what had already been discussed.
Delete“inherent shipyard limitations”
DeleteWithout a doubt there are some capacity limitations but, if you dig into the problem, you realize that much of our slow pace of production is self-imposed due to, for example, incessant change orders, every one of which delays production and wild variations in contracting which prevents shipyards from building capacity due to uncertainty or government mandated slowdowns/delays due to budget/accounting manipulations or government delays in providing GFE, and so on. Remove all those and our production rate increases drastically with no actual change in the shipyard.
Consider the case of the now cancelled Constellation which was already years behind schedule. NONE of the delay was due to any inherent limitation of the yard. It was 100% due to the Navy designing, redesigning, and issuing thousands of change orders. There were extended periods where the yard had to cease construction activity while waiting for the latest changes to be turned into actionable blueprints and designs because the Navy refused to leave the design alone.
DeleteConsider the commercial US shipbuilding. We don't build thousands of ships per year but what we build is delivered quickly and at the agreed upon price because construction doesn't start without complete plans and, once started, doesn't change. GAO has identified this problem with the Navy repeatedly and the Navy continues to violate every best practice there is.
How many LCS was industry told were needed? 55. How many were built? 32
DeleteHow many Zumwalts was industry told were needed? 32. How many were built? 3
This is why industry can't build capacity. They're rightfully gunshy about building capacity for programs that just wind up being cancelled or drastically curtailed. Again, that's 100% the Navy's fault, not any kind of inherent limitation of industry. If the Navy would provide a realistic, RELIABLE shipbuilding plan to industry then industry could ramp up production. However, when industry knows with near certainty that a shipbuilding order will be canceled or curtailed, they're understandably reluctant to commit to spending money on capacity that may never be used.
One last point, smaller, single purpose ships can be built faster but the Navy steadfastly refuses to build smaller, single purpose ships. Thus, we have an all-Burke surface fleet with very low production rates.
You know, don't you, that the Navy terminated Burke production for several years in anticipation of the next generation surface ship that never happened. Again, industry was left with no motivation to increase capacity because the Navy changed their plans. Industry was then asked to suddenly increase Burke production. Are you surprised that industry couldn't do that overnight? Of course not. The Navy, not industry, has mismanaged shipbuilding.
Oh I agree with you on “mismanagement”. To be sure the everyone but the USN knew by the mid- oughts that DDX was a non-starter. And in 2011 and 2012 no Burkes were laid down.
DeleteAnd the “mismanagement” also drives labor issues and the dearth of suppliers due as you say constant change of plans in number of ships to be built. But the incomplete and ever changing ship plans cause instability.. It is a wonder anything gets built.
DeleteYou just had a blig on the Flower class. But the USN really wanted (wants) ships that can insependently deploy and are interchangable. The Burke IIA kinda meet that requirenent unlike I/II. Three even more so. But the IIIs are really a Tico replacement albeit inferior in acnumber of ways except radars. The USN simply is on a bad path.
ReplyDeleteHadnt heard about this anywhere:
ReplyDelete“ government mandated slowdowns/delays due to budget/accounting manipulations or government delays in providing GFE, and so on. ”
All thoroughly documented in the public record. I'm not going to bother listing and citing them in a comment. You can investigate that for yourself. As one example, carrier production has periodically, and just recently, been drawn out as an accounting measure to produce lower yearly costs (which caused schedule delays and higher total costs).
DeleteMy intention BTW wasnt to besmirch industry much less defend the USN which I have been critical of since my days on submarines 50 years ago. Where I experienced first hand the incompetence and waste inherent in the USN. Being an SK was eye opening . It took me deep nto the workings of every division and department and allowed me numerous opportunities to cross train as sonar operator, QMOW and torpedo handling in addition to other mundane tasks as helmsman/planesman including for battlestations and pulling into and out of ports, line handling, small boat handling, helo evacs, security watches, below decks watches i n port among other collateral duties. Had a number of heart to heart talks with the CO and XO heady stuff for a non-Nuc the CO pretyy much hated me the XO embraved me. A strange dichotomy.. Loved Submarines hated the Navy. Especially the constant pitting of non-nucs vs nucs. I would have no part ovf that and readilly fought it being close friends with a number of nuc trained.
ReplyDeleteIve gone so far afield on this thread. But you continued to answer me. It all started with a small misunderstanding that somehow I let mushroom with inane wandering and more misunderstandings. Butthanks for not bashing me toohard. I actually inow more than Im proving. But somehow got confused and the more i tried to fix it the worse it got. Just not very clear tiday. Sorry will be better in the future.
Oh and I on purpose didnt bring up Costellation. The poster child for all the USN wro
ReplyDeleteWrong headedness. Supplanting LCS
Delete