As we all
know, the new aircraft carrier, the USS Ford, has had many problems, delays,
and cost overruns due, mainly, to the Navy’s use of concurrency in attempting
to develop new technologies at the same time as production. Predictably (well, for everyone but the
Navy), the attempt has failed. The EMALS
launch system and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) have been two notable
failures. However, there is another new
technology that has been just as problem plagued but has not received as much
attention – the ship’s Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE). These elevators are used on carriers to move
munitions from the ship’s magazines to the flight deck and handling areas for
subsequent loading onto the aircraft.
The elevators are quite small compared to the main aircraft elevators.
One would
think that small weapons elevators would be straightforward, well known
technology and one would be correct.
However, the Navy opted to abandon the well established elevators of the
Nimitz class and, instead, develop a brand new electromagnetic elevator that
works similar to the EMALS catapult system.
As with the EMALS, development has been difficult and the Ford was
delivered with non-functional elevators, all 11 of them.
Here’s more
evidence of the lack of elevator installation upon delivery of the Ford. A NavSea official stated,
The Post Shakedown Availability is
planned for 12 months, with the critical path being Advanced Weapons Elevator
construction … (5)
Note the
use of the word “construction” as opposed to repair or fine-tuning or
modification or something similar. The
elevators appear to have simply not been installed or, at least, not in
anything resembling a usable form!
And,
The Navy announced plans to repair
the ship’s 11 “Advanced Weapons Elevators” — all of which have been
non-functional since the carrier first took to the water.
Currently, two of those
malfunctioning elevators are being used to help “to identify many of the
remaining developmental issues for this first-of-class system,” the Navy says.
They expect to bring the full suite of elevators online with this round of
repairs, but were sure to include in their statement that all the elevator
systems “should have been complete and delivered with the ship delivery” in May
2017. (1)
If the Navy
acknowledges that the elevators should have been “complete and delivered with
the ship delivery”, why did the Navy accept the ship? They should have refused delivery until the
elevators were installed and functioning.
To review, the
elevators were initially developed by Federal Equipment Company (FEC) along with
MagneMotion and Northrop Grumman Newport News.
FEC received a contract from Northrop in 2005 to build 11 elevators for
the Ford aircraft carrier. To be clear,
these are the smaller weapons elevators, not the three large aircraft
elevators.
On paper,
the elevators are quite impressive. Of
course, paper claims always are!
FEC’s Advanced Weapons Elevator
demonstrates a 24,000-pound lift capacity, with 150% overload capacity.
Designed to move at 150 feet per minute, it accelerates to full speed in 2
seconds. The state-of-the-art elevators increase capacity over 200% and speed
by 50% compared to the legacy elevators.
Features include motor thermal protection,
emergency braking, and [a] "smart control system" that estimates the
payload weight. (2)
FEC has
built a test facility housing a full scale elevator with 32 feet of travel. (2)
The
Advanced Weapons Elevators are similar to the EMALS catapult system in that
they use linear motors and magnetic effects to move the object - the elevator,
in this case, instead of an aircraft.
Here’s a
brief summary of how the elevator works: (3)
- Linear motors are attached to
each corner of the elevator
- Magnets inside each motor
interact with electric coils lining the shaft
- A current pulses through the
coils, lifting the magnets and platform
- Magnets hold the elevator in
place
Of course,
all this capability comes at a cost. The
AWE is around twice the cost of existing Nimitz class weapons elevators. (3)
Interestingly,
the government (Naval Surface Warfare Center) posted notice in Feb 2018 of
their intent to award a sole source contract to Hunt Valve Actuator (Virginia)
for an elevator unit, installation, parts, support, logistics, etc. (4) I don’t know if this means that the Navy has
gotten fed up with FEC and decided to switch suppliers or if they’re simply
developing an alternate source (then why the sole source designation?) or some
other reason.
Aside from
the idiotic use of concurrency, which the Navy seems absolutely wedded to in
the face of repeated, overwhelming evidence of its failure, there are other
potential issues with the electromagnetic elevators.
 |
| Advanced Weapons Elevator |
Electromagnetic Shielding.
One of the major faults of the EMALS catapult system is that it uses
very large and very powerful electric motors which, unbelievably, are not
electromagnetically shielded. Former CNO
Greenert once referred to them as “electromagnetic beacons” when discussing
emissions control (EMCON) protocols. The
stray electromagnetic radiation will keep anyone who’s interested well informed
about the Ford’s location.
The
question arises, are the AWE elevators shielded? If a major component like the EMALS is not
shielded, it is highly unlikely that the elevators are. Of course, given the size and emissions of
the EMALS, the additional stray emissions from the elevators are unlikely to
matter much.
This is just
another example demonstrating that the Navy has forgotten how to design ships for
combat.
Repair.
Yet another major fault of the EMALS catapult system is that single catapults
– there are four – cannot be repaired without taking all of the catapults
down. The electrical supply system was
designed in such a way that a single catapult cannot be electrically isolated
for repairs. The catapults are all up or
all down. The inability to isolate and
repair a single catapult is a breathtakingly stupid flaw for a combat
system. The question is does this same
flaw apply to the weapons elevators? I
have no idea but it’s a question that demands an answer.
In summary,
the weapons elevators are an all too common example of what is plaguing the
Navy today. The desire to rush
non-existent technology into production is causing cost overruns, schedule
delays, and serious credibility issues.
If the Navy would only show a little patience and let new technologies
mature in the lab, where they belong, they would come out far ahead in the long
run.
________________________________________
(1)News Rep
website, “Repairs on the USS Gerald R. Ford engines and elevators to cost
another $120 million”, Alex Hollings, 16-May-2018 ,
(2)Federal
Equipment Co. website,
(3)WVXU
website, “The Navy's Next Generation Of Weapons Elevators Was Designed Here In
Cincinnati”, Ann Thompson, 9-Apr-2018 ,
(5)The
National Interest website, “The Reason the Navy Is Exploding Bombs Near Its New
Nuclear Aircraft Carrier”, Kris Osborn, 14-May-2018 ,
Should rename her the USS Rumsfeld's Folly
ReplyDeleteWas it really necessary for the elevators to be EM? I mean, I never have heard that there was a problem with lift or speed for the elevators. Was this just some fancy tech for the sack of some fancy tech because it's really not obvious what was wrong with the old elevators and not really obvious why they need so much more "capability"?
ReplyDeleteMaybe it was to make them more reliable. lol
DeleteMore and heavier weapons, more sorties
Delete"Maybe it was to make them more reliable."
DeleteI appreciate a bit of humor and that's hilarious! Outstanding!
"More and heavier weapons, more sorties"
DeleteThe Ford's claim of more sorties has been totally debunked. The claim of more and heavier loads is valid but do you have any evidence that previous elevators were causing a problem? I follow this stuff closely and I've never heard even a hint that the Nimitz elevators were causing delays in arming aircraft.
Don't fall into the trap of just repeating Navy claims (most/all of which turn out to be false!). Dig out the evidence to prove or refute the claims.
The major goal for the USS FORD was the elimination of Ship Service Steam. That IMO was the impetus that drove NAVESA to replace as many systems as possible with EM tech. While it does create a great deal of space, as CNO has noted it is extremely difficult to maintain. Something they would have figured out if they had put one or two of these systems onboard the USS ENTERPRISE before retirement.
Delete"elimination of Ship Service Steam. ... Something they would have figured out if they had put one or two of these systems onboard the USS ENTERPRISE before retirement."
DeleteExcellent point about the underlying motivation for the Ford. Also, excellent point about prototyping prior to committing to production.
"The Ford's claim of more sorties has been totally debunked"
DeleteTrue, but that doesnt change the reason.
The EM lifts were chosen because it was believed they would allow more, heavier and faster weapons loads.
That were are a whole host of none EM heavy lift systems with proven reliability, seems lost on the Navy
"The EM lifts were chosen because it was believed they would allow more, heavier and faster weapons loads."
DeleteThis example (elevators) illustrates a concept that the Navy seems to have absolutely no grasp of and that is how an overall "chain" works.
The Navy was focused on sortie rates. We'll set aside the fact that carriers are not sortie rate limited. To make a sortie happen requires a "chain" of events which include maintenance of the aircraft, fueling, munitions loading, mission planning, pilot prep/briefing, and many other things. In every chain, there is a limiting factor that determines the speed of the chain. It does no good, for example, to have instantaneous teleportation of munitions directly from the magazine onto the aircraft's weapon racks if the aircraft then sits there for hours while aircraft maintenance is performed, the mission is planned, etc. In this example, munitions movement was not the limiting factor - something else was.
So, was munitions movement the limiting factor, previously? I don't know but, logically, it seems highly unlikely.
Therefore, if the Navy was claiming that these EM elevators would improve sortie rates they were either totally unaware of how a chain works (quite likely) or they were just making up justifications (lying - also likely).
USA has 2000 lbs bombs (MK84) and you add the kits to make it smart, JDAM, PAVEWAY,etc....I'm unaware that there is anything heavier in inventory. In the past 17 years, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya,etc,etc...all we hear is how difficult it is to find targets that justify the MK84 because it's so powerful compared to the objective and since then, looks to me that we have mainly developed smaller and smaller bombs with just better guidance and wing kits to create some stand off distance. So where is this heavier load coming from? It would be really interesting to see USN numbers on that, Im sure they are classified but having read operations when USN operated in Vietnam, GW1 and since 9-11, I can't recall EVER hearing about ops being delayed because they couldn't load up weapons....
DeleteOne thing that is worrisome is how many of these potential failures are scattered around the carrier? We know of the BIG problems like the cats, arresting gear,etc but I never heard about this into NOW with CNO writing about it.
ReplyDeleteHow much is the USN hiding?
You never heard about it and yet without weapons elevators a carrier is useless as the aircraft can't be armed! Your question cuts to the heart of the matter. Indeed, what else don't we know?
DeleteAstute question!
GAO 17-575 - Advanced Weapons Elevators— In January 2017 the Navy said that testing of the Advanced Weapons Elevators was only 35 percent complete and that the shipbuilder would complete construction and testing of 2 of the 11 elevators by ship delivery. The Navy is working to resolve a problem with the elevator doors in order to continue with testing.
ReplyDeleteThe GAO 17-418 July 2017 reported - Program officials stated only 2 of the 11 advanced weapons elevators will be installed prior to (Phase "I") delivery.
July 15, 2018 Ford returned to its build shipyard, NNS, for 12 months additional work to install additional equipment before Phase "II" delivery, GAO estimated cost at $780M. Work will consist of installing combat systems, not listed for Ford, but for Kennedy CVN-79 listed as the remaining electronics and ordnance equipment, including the Ship Self-Defense System, weapons systems, and Enterprise Air Search Radar), plus complete deferred work (This deferred work included building 367 compartments that were de-scoped from the shipbuilding contract, installing 12 GFE systems not completed during construction, installing 10 modernized systems, and completing at least 147 other work deferral requests) and correct remaining discrepancies identified during sea trials, Navy stated most work will be on the Advanced Weapons Elevator construction and Advanced Arresting Gear upgrades. On completion Ford will conduct further trials and testing, including full-ship shock trials, prior to its first deployment.
Re. EMALS, April 2014 the Navy discovered EMALS was imposing unacceptable stress/load levels within the wings of F-18s when carrying external fuel tanks/stores during testing in Lakehurst, Navy stated it would only require a software upgrade, software upgrade now planned to be installed during its year long sojourn at NNS only four and half years later.
The Navy was required to use the full delivery date when reporting to Congress after the 2017 NDAA , but it was still entering ships Zumwalt and Michael Monsoor into the Naval Vessel Register upon HM&E delivery rather than final delivery. This year’s FY 2019 NDAA put a stop to that practice, forcing the Navy to only add ships to the Naval Vessel Register’s list of battle force ships upon final delivery, when the ship is actually capable of contributing to fleet combat operations, no Phase "I & II" delivery. In the FY 2019 NDAA, lawmakers stated that the Navy should “deem ship delivery to occur at the completion of the final phase of construction,” and that all materials submitted to congressional committees should use that format, rather than including an earlier partial-delivery date.
As mentioned before the Ford is the most costly Navy ship ever, in then year budgetary dollars for Phase "1", $12.9 B, actual $ Navy estimated $15B in 2014 though no actual $ figure released, and due to problems encountered during interim sea trials that has had to be increased, plus the cost of Phase "II" looking at $16B ship and if you add in the R&D of over $6B a $22B ship (Ford R&D $5.7B plus the EMASLS R&D was funded from the separate NAVAIR budget).
https://news.usni.org/2018/08/21/navy-battle-force-tally-dips-2-new-ship-counting-rules-postpone-zumwalt-destroyers
Hi CNO
ReplyDeleteAn interesting comparison might be made with the QE Class Highly Mechanised Weapon Handling System."The HMWHS is the first maritime application of shore-based commercial warehousing processes using automated systems with all-electric control, adapted for safe transport and stowage of munitions in a warship environment. Munitions can be delivered, in bulk, to the point of use at rates that could not be achieved manually, whilst minimising the manpower requirement in what is traditionally a labour-intensive process, thus delivering reduced through-life cost, as well as a saving in onboard living accommodation requirements."
Adapting from proven commercial technology to reduce risk certainly better than EM which has been around for ages but hardly widely adopted. I haven't heard of any issues with this system as yet.
I know nothing about the QE system but a couple of questions come to mind.
Delete1. Is there a test organization in the RN similar to our DOT&E that publishes public reports so that you'd even know if there were any problems?
2. Is the system easily repairable in combat?
3. In the event of damage or failure, is there a manual means of moving munitions, as a backup?
4. In most (all?) automation efforts, the man-hours saved in the immediate task are more than offset by increased - and sophisticated - maintenance, programming, software support, electrical support, increased power consumption requiring additional power operators, etc. Is this the case here?
5. Are the reduced manning levels (if they are reduced overall?) compatible with damage control requirements in combat? Reducing manning is not worth losing the ship due to lack of damage control manpower!
6. How does the construction/install cost compare to whatever legacy system was previously used?
1. Defence Select Committee reports and the National Audit Office. As she is still on sea trials(in the States right now) I doubt they have produced anything on performance yet.
Delete2. I couldn't be sure of that, only a layman's observation that i appear of robust construction and based on proven tech albeit not that has been taken to sea before.
3. The systems are separate, muscles could bridge a break in the system no idea of the time delay involved though, too many variables.
4. Supposed to require 30 crew, one of the issues identified in sea trials is the need to increase the core crew size. Don't know if it is related to the HMWHS. Fortunately QE's were built with a significant accommodation excess.
5. See 4. But a rather separate debate to Weapon handling system.
6. Haven't seen a cost breakdown I would suspect I high upfront cost/marinisation
cost but reduced through life costs. Also designed to handle more than it's 70's era predecessor.
The broader point I think is that conceptually the HMWHS finds a better balance between innovation and risk than the FORD approach, whose reach appears to have exceeded it's grasp.
If you can find a way to access it you might find it interesting to watch a BBC documentary series; Britain's Biggest Warship which covers the first phase of sea trials. It is really rather good for something on TV about the Navy.
Interesting. Perhaps you'll keep an eye on this and update us from time to time?
DeleteMy memory may be playing tricks on me, but about 25 years ago I was briefly on the USS Tarawa where I remember being told by one crewman that a gaping, disused shaft running down from the hangar deck was the legacy of a novel high-tech weapons elevator that was ultimately abandoned as no one was ever able to get it working properly.
ReplyDeleteSome googling fails to find anything relevant, but perhaps someone else has a recollection with more (and more relevant) detail?
Googling I did introduce me to Total Package Procurement - of which the Tarawa was one product - a failed systems acquisition policy from the mid-60s which seems to bear at least a little resemblance to concurrency.
I've not heard of the Tarawa elevator issue but it certainly sounds plausible.
DeleteGood reminder about the TPP.
The US Navy has lost the plot. Is it staffed by enemies of the state and if not why are their skilled engineers so abundantly suppressed. Perhaps the executive are in hock to GA. They created this stupid unproven technology for EMALS and the Admirals were all spellbound by the sheer reputation GA once deserved. WHY WHY WHY. Are they ALL so ignorant? They down a duff crop and now starve. Had they heeded my warning in 2000 they could have had a unique success. They were told, they were shown, they even agreed we had the best linear motor ever tested at Lakehurst and yet buried their heads in the sand. More ass than stallion.
ReplyDeleteW D