Note: while the principles are
universal, the following discussion is focused on a war with China Russia Russia
We’ve
discussed forward basing and closely tied in to that is the concept of aircraft
sortie rates. The problem is that most
of our bases are so far from the anticipated operational areas that we are
sortie rate limited due to distance. For
example,
- Distance from
- Distance from
- Distance from Whiteman AFB (
- Distance from Kadena AFB (
For these
cases, at a cruise speed of 300 mph, a round trip sortie time is a minimum of
- Whiteman –
- Kadena –
Throw in
aerial refueling time, non-linear waypoints, some loiter time at the target,
etc. and those sortie times increase by 25%-50%. The result is clear. For Guam , in a Chinese war, you get one sortie per day and that’s
assuming no unusual maintenance delays due to battle damage or even routine
mechanical failures. Even Kadena only
provides two sorties per day, if no significant maintenance is required between
flights. For the B-2 bomber fleet, you
get one sortie every three days, at best.
Okay, if
those distances are too great for useful sortie rates, what distance would be
acceptable?
In order to
have useful sortie rates for fighters or strike aircraft, we need no more than
6 hr sorties – and that’s pushing it.
Even 6 hr sorties means 3 hr transit times and that length of time
sitting in a cockpit begins to degrade pilot performance due to physical
discomfort. A much better sortie time
would be around 2 hrs with 1 hr transit times.
At a cruise
speed of 300 mph, a 6 hr sortie translates to 900 miles distance to base while
a 2 hr sortie translates to 300 miles distance to base. Examine the map below and note the red rings
which are centered on the South China Sea . The inner
ring represents a 300 mile radius and the outer ring shows 900 miles. A base that can support useful sortie rates
must lie inside the 900 mile ring and, preferably, around the 300 mile
ring. It immediately becomes apparent that
there are very few basing options within that area.
Okay, this
is looking bad but we kind of knew this so what’s the point of this post?
Well,
there’s another closely related aspect to sortie rates that is rarely discussed
and that is response time.
When a
naval group in the South China Sea gets in trouble and calls for air support from Guam , it’s going to take over half a day
to get there and that’s if the aircraft launch the moment they get the
request. Realistically, by the time they
prep the aircraft, set up tanker schedules, plan the mission, etc. it will be
around a full day before help can arrive.
There are
only two solutions to response time.
- Move the responder closer to
the area of interest.
- Maintain a constant stream of
responders in/over the area of interest so that there will always be a
responder available.
Let’s look
a bit closer at these two options.
Move Closer.
Moving a base closer is difficult.
As the US Philippines
Closer
basing also carries with it the greater likelihood of attack and the US Guadalcanal due to Japanese attacks.
It’s one thing to lose F4F Wildcats that were a dime a dozen but it’s
another thing, entirely, to lose $100M F-22/35s on the ground.
Closer
basing can also be obtained by using mobile bases, meaning aircraft carriers
and battleships. The disadvantage in
this is the inherent limited endurance which will manifest itself as munitions
limits. This can be overcome by a
combination of robust at-sea replenishment and planned rotations of fresh ships
while exhausted ships retire and replenish.
The other obvious problem with this is that the locations of the ships
eventually become predictable and the risk, especially from submarines,
increases.
Battleships
(or any form of naval gunfire support) are, of course, the epitome of timely
and effective response time assuming they are within range of the area of
interest.
Constant Stream.
Given the transit distance and resulting very short loiter times in the
area of interest, maintaining a steady stream of aircraft would be challenging,
to say the least. The sheer number of
aircraft required to maintain a constant, say, dozen aircraft in a single area
of interest would be on the order of several dozen, at least. To put it in perspective, to maintain a dozen
F-22s over Taiwan South China Sea from Guam would require at least half our
total F-22 fleet – and given the historically demonstrated low availabilities,
that’s probably extremely optimistic!
What is
evident from this discussion is that the US
You need to recalculate your examples to use a more realistic cruising speed. ~400KCAS (460mph) is a better starting point. It will vary depending on aircraft, load, and weather.
ReplyDeleteA 6 hour sortie is more like 1,400 miles (1,200 nmi).
A 300 mph average speed is an attempt to factor in slower refueling "stops", non-linear waypoints, assembly times, etc. I knew that no matter what speed I picked, someone would comment saying that I should have chosen a higher or lower speed. You know what, though? It doesn't change the point of the post! Whether the range rings move a little bit in or out is utterly irrelevant.
DeleteBy the way, the NATOPs manual for the F-18, Fig. 5-2, Specific Range chart, shows the optimum cruise speed to be around 300 mph depending on the exact weight, drag, altitude, etc.
DeleteIf you think your number is more realistic then go argue with NATOPs.
That's at sea level. Nobody cruises on the deck. Look at 25-30,000 ft. Fig 5-59, for example. Anywhere from 5-600 mph, drag dependent.
DeleteI'm sure it's somewhere in the annals, but how do you feel about the F-111? Or maybe more broadly (instead of that program specifically), a medium attack/bomber aircraft with some anti-air capacity? Would this offer a possible partial solution?
ReplyDeleteNo, you haven't missed anything. I've never commented on the F-111. My opinion would depend on what mission you have in mind for it. You ask, would this offer a partial solution? Partial solution to what? Simply getting an aircraft to an operational area is not the issue. It's getting a USEFUL aircraft to the area. If you want to conduct air superiority in the area then you'll need the best A2A fighter in the world to get to the area. If you want to conduct stealthy, deep penetration strikes then you'll need to get the world's best stealth strike aircraft to the area. And so on.
DeleteSo, what mission are you contemplating the F-111 for? If you answer that question you can probably answer your own question!
Well, I guess I am asking if an airplane must be world-class to be successful. I have heard you lament the short ranges of fighter and attack aircraft today compared to yesteryear. In truth, I have often felt the same way. But, it seems like physics dictates any additional size (for fuel or ordinance) is going to require putting yourself at a disadvantage in dogfighting. I really don't know the solution, or what is feasible in actual combat. I was just wondering if you thought making bigger aircraft was feasible for fighters or attacking aircraft without compromising their abilities.
Delete"I guess I am asking if an airplane must be world-class to be successful."
DeleteWould you expect a less than world class athlete to win an Olympic event? Of course not. They wouldn't stand a chance! Would you expect an F-18 Hornet (a less than world class fighter) to beat an F-22 (the premier fighter aircraft in the world today)? Of course not! How about an F-15 Eagle? Still not!
So, there's your answer. If you want to dominate a mission then you need the world's best aircraft for that particular mission. Now, if you're willing to accept losing, say, five F-15s to achieve a single F-22 kill then maybe an F-15 is good enough. America doesn't tend to believe in that kind of negative exchange rate, however.
Now, to your question about size and dogfighting. You're correct that, as a general statement, the bigger the aircraft the worse its pure dogfighting ability is. So, what's the solution? Why, don't dogfight, of course!
The F4F Wildcat couldn't dogfight with the Japanese Zero and yet it (and its pilots!) managed to more than hold their own because they adjusted their tactics to avoid turning dogfights.
If we need a large aircraft to give us the range we need, then we need to adjust the aircraft's tactics so that we don't have to dogfight. For example, a large fighter with a very powerful radar and a very long range missile (does this sound familiar? - hint: F-14 Tomcat) could simply launch from long range and then turn and run. With enough of them, you'd be able to establish aerial supremacy.
Perhaps we should be focusing on the missile rather than the aircraft?
Or, perhaps we should be focusing on maximizing range in a smaller aircraft (unlike the F-35)?
Perhaps we should be maximizing the aircraft's on-board ECM so that it can survive and kill without being a pure dogfighter?
Perhaps we should be focusing on more aircraft carriers with somewhat shorter range, pure fighters (like a naval F-22 with additional range). Let the carriers move closer to the operational area and make up for some of the aircraft range shortage. This is one of my strong recommendations.
And so on. There are many possible approaches.
Did that answer your question?
Yeah, that is helpful. Thanks
Delete@Joey: Piggybacking slighty off what ComNavOps mentioned wrt to F-14s, the long range BVR salvo was half of the meta; the other thing the F-14 and F-15 could do, being large fighters with powerful engines (well, ok, the D-model Tomcats anyhow) was to do boom and zoom tactics. An A-4 will kill an F-14 in a turning fight because of how small and nimble it is (it has a 720 degree per second roll rate! :O), but that advantage is negated if the F-14 does boom and zoom and keeps the range open, playing to its strengths.
DeleteThere are also other tricks you can do with larger aircraft - for example, the F-15 has a lifting body fuselage, generating extra lift to support the aircraft; this, combined with two powerful engines, means that the F-15 can turn and burn and boom and zoom in a fight while carrying the max AAM load; the F-16 and F/A-18 can't do that.
Basically, all things in aviation are tradeoffs. As a general rule, the larger your aircraft is, the more kinematic penalties it suffers, but as the F-15 and Su-27 show us, it's possible to design heavy fighters to mitigate those kinematic penalties, and larger fighters mean more payload and room for growth potential; the F-16, F/A-18 and MiG-29 are all light fighters and excellent dogfighters, but they suffer in terms of range and payload vs the F-15, F-14 and Su-27 (which also have the room for bigger, more powerful avionics).
@ComNavOps: You mentioned ECM. It's interesting to see how developments in ECM are going, although there's a lot less available on the open sources to glean.
DeleteA point of vulnerability for China and most air forces in the region is that they're using plenty of fighters with legacy pulse-doppler radars; as Cope THunder 2004 showed, modern ECM can defeat pulse-doppler radars, hence the move by everyone serious towards AESA radars, which are less vulnerable to the same tricks because of the physics of how they work. China has been working on developing their own AESA radars, but they're still lagging behind the US - this is an area the US will have, for the time, an advantage: Block 3 Rhinos onwards have AESA radars, USAF is doing a phased AESA radar upgrade for selected F-15C squadrons, and F-22s and F-35s are running AESA radars. Looking at Europe, the Rafale and Typhoon are going AESA as well.
Modern ECM systems are also pretty scary in what they can do. Vs pulse-doppler radards, Barracuda and SPECTRA can do subtle jamming - not just the loud brute force jamming that drowns radars in noise, but quieter, subtler defensive ECM that disrupts radar returns and dissipates the strength of the returning signal, meaning that at longer ranges the dissipated radar returns drop below the adversary's noise threshhold, and the adversary must get closer to detect the aircraft (let alone locate and get a strong enough return for a firing solution). For a strike mission, this gives a larger area of uncertainty for your package to operate in; for A2A combat, this means the Rafale/F-22/F-35 gets more chances to fire the first shot, with the lower emissions of an AESA radar and defensive ECM allowing one to see further while having less chance to be detected. Which ties in to how air combat has shaken out in Vietnam: situational awareness is key. Lose sight, lose the fight.
Of course, I don't expect this state of affairs to remain set in stone: CHina and Russia are working hard on their own AESA radars and ECM, and at some point are going to catch up, and things will even out - but that day is not today. Not yet, anyhow.
I don't think sophisticated ECM (the next big thing is going to be AESA ECM) is going to totally protect the aircraft, but it's still something worth pursuing. Looking at aircraft development trends it's a total package: ECM for subtle defense, good kinematics for ACM positioning, AESA radar to see further without being seen, RCS reduction to gain more of an edge - even the unstealthy Rafale has RCS reduction measures, giving it an RCS 1/10th of the predecessor Mirage 2000.
Boom and zoom has likely had its day
DeleteIt worked when radar and missiles were short ranged.
Running out of missile range is easy when that range is short, if they can target you at 50miles and the missile has a decent KP at 100 miles.
The f15s top speed is 25miles per minute
If you need to be 5 miles away to get out of radar lock, that's 12seconds of free flight, not that hard to arrange.
If you need to be 50 miles away, you would have to break off and run 2 minutes before the other guy turns and shoots, a much more difficult feat, not impossible, clouds, a friend to keep busy ect, but far from a sure thing
While Kadena is a while away from the South China Sea, it is much closer to China's eastern seaboard and well within range for a wide variety of meaningful military and industrial targets. That forces the ChiComs to station large portions of their own air force and air defense units to cover those regions rather than deploying them to your "trouble zone" in the South China Sea. It would be better if Kadena was much more heavily fortified, but that can be correctly just like the shipyard issue.
ReplyDeleteObviously it all depends on where the operational area of interest is but it still doesn't change the overall premise of the post. Hey, I had to pick somewhere to set an operational area and the middle of the South China Sea is a reasonable one. Taiwan would be another.
DeleteBut, to repeat, it doesn't change the premise. Guam is nowhere near anything of interest. Whiteman is nowhere near anything. Kadena might be near areas of interest and, as such, is likely to be neutralized either due to Japanese neutrality or simple attack since if it's near the area of interest then the enemy is near it.
What about the Falkland war scenario where the Brits converted cargo ships into temporary flattops for STOVL planes.
ReplyDeleteGet a bunch of lilypads (a container ship costs about $100M, or the price of a F-35B, or ready a bunch of hardened plates to be welded on to conscripted cargo ships during war time) and frogs (i.e. F35Bs) to disperse and dilute the A2AD threat.
You're aware that a F-35 in pure vertical takeoff mode can't carry much in the way of weapons or fuel, right? An F-35 with a couple of Sidewinders or whatever they can lift vertically off the deck and with short range/endurance won't help much.
DeleteHow would these aircraft be maintained and repaired? We can't achieve 50% availability of our F-22/35s right now and that's with large bases, lots of tech, contractor support, and huge spare parts warehouses. What will be the availability of a few F-35s on scattered cargo ships?
A2AD (and anti) is about base availability. There is not one solve-all solution to that, therefore 'lilipad & frogs', as an extension to Brit's idea, can be a 'cheap & numerous' solution to otherwise 'expensive & few' traditional solution of long-distance AB or carriers. And if and once the power that be thinks 'pads and frogs' ideas are do-able, I'm sure they will figure out the logistic of how to use them, right? (e.g. a network of pads to hop in/out of theater for maintenance & repairs, or come up with a wartime-sortie-package-of-arms&repairs on these pads to guarantee certain sorties out of these pads). If you can land/takeoff, everything else is 2ndary.
DeleteTim
DeleteThe Brits didn't convert cargo ships in to carriers
We considered, not sure if we actually did it, making on landing on a cargo ship, sailing south, making one take off from a cargo ship, and then landing and operating from a carrier
A harrier carries 3400kg of fuel
That's not the sort by of thing you can do with a thrown together system.
How are you planning to get 500lb bombs from your cargo hold to your aircraft, carry then?
The engine weighs 1800kg, how are you planning on changing one?
@Tim: While Harriers were flown and landed on Atlantic Conveyour and other cargo ships refitted as transport ships, the Royal Navy never seriously considered using them as jeep carriers. The main purpose of the ships was to ferry aircraft to the Falklands, where the Harriers would then transfer to the light carriers.
DeleteThere are some nations that have converted cargo ships into getto helo carriers (I'm reminded of the Malaysian Navy's KA Bunga Mas Lima, but otoh the Malaysians themselves want to get rid of their ghetto ships and go for direct proper LHDs).
"If you can land/takeoff, everything else is 2ndary."
DeleteNo, it really isn't. Landing/takeoff is about the least important aspect of aerial firepower. Far more important is maintenance (that's how you get multiple sorties out of an aircraft), repair, spare parts, fuel, mission planning and coordination, munitions, etc. - all of which are hugely complicated (most impossible) by attempting to operate a bunch of cargo ships, each with one or a few aircraft.
You really need to think through how a war is waged and what matters. The romantic notion of individual aircraft rising out of hidden bases or lilypad ships is utterly ridiculous. You can hand wave the problems away, as you did, or face them and realize that these notions are pure fantasy.
War is all about logistics and a bunch of lilypad ships simply can't work the logistics. Approach this as a military professional would and you'll quickly drop the fantasy notions.
The more I think about the Falkland War, the more I find similarity of 'Taiwan scenario (imo, the only place where China will go to war against the US)'. Both sit next to a mainland opponent, both defenders(or its backer) have to rely on navy to wage meaningful air war, both attacker/defender are about peer-level combatants given the 'averaging effect' of geography(distance & sortie time) & force-available, and both(in the end) the islands must be re-taken physically.
DeleteIn the Falkland war, the Brits went into harms way, took its licking, and slugged out in air/sea/land. Now, look at the scenario CNO is laying out- it seems the USN is preparing to wage war from a 'safe distance'..well..that's the goal of A2AD and China can keep stretching that 'safe distance' longer and farther. In essence, China is dictating how a westpac war should be fought. If the USN wants to fight the Brit-in-Falkland, that means go into harms way, lay everything on the line and slugged it out- that means the USN has to dilute China's missile targets and up the number of 'mobile airfields'.
Now, the British Navy (the longest professional and illustrious naval tradition in the world) didn't mind the idea of hack job of converting cargo ship to increase number of flattops (in addition, Atlantic Conveyor took the exoset intended for the real carrier).
Therefore, if Nimitz and Fords are too expensive to be risked, and Jeep carriers (with catapult and cable-recovery system) still costing $5-6B a pop (still too budget busting and too expensive to risk), then something cheap & expendable flattop option must be there, therefore, the ideal of bunch of converted commercial ship (a baseline $100M haul/engine package, modified with hardened deck and elevator...the whole thing can't be more than 500M per). As for short range F-35B, well, since the intention is to sail into harms way anyway (and prepare for the licking), it does not matter.
With unlimited budget, we can go with 4-super-carrier CBG and a fleet of modern battleships as door kicker; but we don't.
"bunch of converted commercial ship (a baseline $100M haul/engine package, modified with hardened deck and elevator"
DeleteYou're failing to grasp just how complex a modern stealth aircraft is and what it requires to operate it. A "carrier" needs protected maintenance spaces (hangar), machine shops, electronics shops, stealth surface maintenance shops, spare parts storage, mission planning computers and spaces, comms for mission planning and coordination with other "carriers", munitions magazines, munitions elevators, aircraft control "tower" and radar, and ... do I need to keep going or do you finally grasp the magnitude of what you're envisioning? You can't just slap a square of steel on a cargo ship and call it a functioning carrier. You're also failing to grasp just how limited the weapons and fuel load is for a F-35 operating in pure vertical takeoff mode.
On a related note, did you know that none of the Navy's logistic supply ships can transfer an F-35 engine and that only the USS Ford can accept one? One of the major projects is how to cram an F-35 engine into a COD aircraft because a normal, crated engine won't fit! This is another of those mundane details that no one thought to ask about when the Ford and F-35 were being designed.
"the whole thing can't be more than 500M per)."
CNO, you keep telling me the planes are 'too much this and that for modern carrier'. I can't imagine if F4F/6F/Corsair were dictating what Essex Carriers should be (or Phantom with the Forrestal class), did they? Sounds like this is more of a fundamental rather than operational or logistic issue. If the USN had to walk back 2 gen of warship (Zumwalt and LCS) and reset, then perhaps it should (re)think about what's being carried on the deck.
DeleteCNO, off topic, I'm really looking forward to, if you can flip the chess board, and see/fight how China will evolve and adapt to whatever USN comes up with (of course, within boundary of not giving away the shop). Can you play a PLAN navy brain?
"I can't imagine if F4F/6F/Corsair were dictating what Essex Carriers should be"
DeleteI have no idea what you're asking. Of course the aircraft dictated the carrier design. The Essex class had to be bigger, have catapults, etc. to better handle the new aircraft that were appearing. The same with the appearance of jets after WWII. We had to design new carriers to handle the jets. The aircraft always determine the carrier design. This is too obvious so I suspect you're asking something else but I don't know what.
"Can you play a PLAN navy brain?"
DeleteI've been describing repeatedly what the Chinese will do. They're not hiding it. They're building a carrier force because they see the value in mobile air power bases. They're building both a defensive navy (Aegis-like cruisers) and an offensive submarine force. They intend to defend strongly while attacking via submarines. Complementing this is a heavy dependence on ballistic missiles and long range bombers/cruise missiles.
This is all obvious so, again, I don't know what you're really asking.
Can't find a Chinese-CNO (getting into faults and follies of their building up of a counterpart navy) to latch on to, I suppose if you can put on a red hat, you might divine (or predict) what's what with experienced eye. And yes, I don't exactly know what I'm asking, the same way I didn't know What-I-didn't-know before I stumbled onto your blog.
DeleteThe key aspect to analyzing any navy/military is understanding their overarching geopolitical objectives. A navy/military exists to support those objectives. By knowing the objectives, you can fairly easily predict and understand the resulting military force structure. Conversely, by knowing the force structure you can back "calculate" the geopolitical objectives.
DeleteFor example, an island military that has no amphibious force clearly has no territorial conquest geopolitical objectives. Conversely, if they have a massive amphibious force then they probably have territorial seizure as an objective.
I have a half and half analysis of the Chinese. I have an imperfect understanding of the Chinese geopolitical objectives and a fairly good grasp of their naval/military force structure. It's obvious to me that China has an expansionistic geopolitical strategy (claims on other country's lands, for example). Looking at the other half, the navy/military force, it's obvious that they are building a force well beyond any purely defensive force. They're building a massive amphibious force of ships, marines, armor, etc. And so on.
I know you disagree with my analysis but the key is that it is an ANALYSIS, not a feeling. My analysis of the Chinese navy/military leads, inexorably, to conclude that they intend to use it offensively which means conquering territory.
Of course, if they can achieve their conquests without shooting then they'll gladly do that (Philippines, for example, or Taiwan) but you don't build a massive amphibious force unless you anticipate seizing territory.
I can analyze the Chinese navy but you won't believe it because you don't believe the logical conclusion that China is expansionistic.
Let me ask you, why do you think China is building a massive amphibious force? Try, if you can (it's hard!), to set aside your beliefs about China and look at it as some hypothetical country that you've never heard of. Why would any country build a massive amphibious force?
Why they build massive amphibious force?
DeleteFirst and foremost: Taiwan, but only if there is a major US-China dustup, or Taiwan goes de-jure independence.
Next? Maybe NK coast (if NK implodes, and it's free-for-all; however, it doesn't not seem likely now given how Kim3 has lassoed SK and the US recently.)
I don't see others (including that pile of useless rock called Senkakus)
The rest, I think China will try to buy their way in. SCS is done, I don't think PLA will try to take VN islands by force.
It is not clear why the South China Sea would be the focus of a conflict between the US and China. What act of agression do you envision them committing that would focus the conflict in that region? If they attack one of the countries that border the sea, then I would expect that country (and probably its near neighbors) to provide bases in exchange for US intervention. Outside of that scenario, why would our first priority be to establsih air superiority over the South China Sea?
ReplyDeleteThe importance of Guam will have nothing to do with air superiority. It will be a base for nightly strikes against the Chinese coast. Their coastal provinces hold a huge percentage of their industrial base and are very vulnerable--far more so than our bases. Creating a credible threat against their industrial base would serve as a powerful deterent.
To that end, a tactical strike aircraft in the class of the F-111 would be a real asset, and indeed a necessity in a Pacific war. The proposed FB-22 is a worthy candidate for an up to date successor to the F-111.
In short, I don't see this as a war where either side is going to focus on air superiority, at least not initially. Unless that is it is focussed on Japan. But that is another scenario entirely.
So if you want to stick with a South China Sea scenario, I think you need to explain how you see it unfolding.
"So if you want to stick with a South China Sea scenario, I think you need to explain how you see it unfolding."
DeleteA war with China will not be a land war. Instead, it will be all about aerial operations (and some naval) and, therefore, air superiority will be vital to allow Air Force bombers, cruise missiles, carriers, surveillance aircraft, etc. to act. Depending on exactly how a war unfolds and what China's objectives are, the South China Sea is a very likely nexus for operations.
You understand that I had to pick some point to illustrate the concept, right? Whatever point I picked, someone was sure to comment and say that I should have picked some other point. The particular chosen epicenter is almost irrelevant to the premise of the post.
If you don't like the South China Sea, pick your own epicenter and mentally move the range rings. It doesn't change the premise of the post.
"Guam will have nothing to do with air superiority. It will be a base for nightly strikes against the Chinese coast."
DeleteNow that's an interesting proposition. Why don't you expand on that? What kind of strikes? By what assets? How will these strikes be mounted from a base that is, itself, under constant attack? How will we handle the logistics of supporting Guam for such a massive endeavor? How will these assets make it to launch/drop range of the Chinese coast without air superiority? How will we defend Guam without air superiority?
"It is not clear why the South China Sea would be the focus of a conflict between the US and China"
DeleteIt would represent a huge step change in US, and everyone else's policy, to open a second front.
It's a black swan at this point
There is nothing stopping it, but it hasn't happened since the second world war to my memory.
"If they attack one of the countries that border the sea, then I would expect that country (and probably its near neighbors) to provide bases in exchange for US intervention."
DeleteBases arent just empty fields
An airbase needs a long, hardened runway
They need vast stockpiles of fuel, also hardened.
Same goes for ordinance
Repair shops, spare parts, tools, toilets, water, power, catering, housing, security, from both enemy special forces who want to kill your pilots, and Simple Steve, the well meaning local who want to look at the planes and accidentally blows up your fuel dump.
And after all that, you need to actually operate it
All of you crew have to learn the layout, so when fighter A lands on Runway 1 and takes taxi way 2 to hard standing 3 it doesn't run over a fuel truck at junction 4.
The Air Force did a study about the opening month of the Second Iraq War that was published in the July 2003 issue of Air Force Magazine. With 51 bombers (B-1, B-2, and B-52, how many of each wasn't specified), the Air Force conducted 505 sorties in the 30 days between March 19 and April 18, 2003. Now, this was done with months of preparation and a lot of tanker support.
ReplyDeleteThis averages out to about 1 bomber sortie every three days. The B-2 flew 36-hour missions, and depending on how many were used, might skew the average high.
"Now, this was done with months of preparation and a lot of tanker support."
DeleteThanks for the supporting data. I don't follow AF matters that closely so I wasn't aware of it.
That sortie rate also didn't have to account for battle damage. In a peer war, presumably aircraft will acquire some battle damage which will negatively impact sortie rates. Even simple skin damage is a major event. This isn't the days of WWII where they could slap some duct tape over a hole or rivet a tin plate in place!
I was looking for some historical references for comparison and that popped up in my search. Iraq was a more permissive environment compared to what we could expect with a near-peer like China. And, you're right to note that battle damage will adversely affect sortie rates.
DeleteHaving all the right mainentance equipment and maintaining that equipment in the field plus the availability of spare parts will also impact sortie rates too, especially in the long term.
"Having all the right mainentance equipment and maintaining that equipment in the field plus the availability of spare parts"
DeleteYou are so very, very right about this and few people realize just how important this is. Our F-22 fleet availability is around 50%, currently. The F-35 fleet is the same or worse. That's with peacetime, no combat damage, plentiful contractor support, and all aircraft being located in the continental US with ready access to spares and support. What will it be like when these aircraft get deployed on the other side of the world and parts are in short supply and contractor support is non-existent? Our availability rates will drop to 20%!
The permissive environment that you point out applies to contractor support, as well. In a non-permissive environment (war) that contractor support disappears. This applies not just to aircraft but to ships as well. Contractors sail on all our ships to maintain advanced electronics. War will throw the Navy back on its own resources and that will be a rude awakening that we are not prepared for.
If you don't want "rotational forward presence of a BG/CSG" and very large USAF Composite Wing presence on those few bases we do have access on, in order to deter our adversaries because they are too expensive to operate capital ships, we don't have not enough carriers, aircraft, etc.; this is the strategic dilemma you are faced with and because of it you cannot win... When you cannot win outright (our history since WW2) you must "play defense"... and become like all the rest...You got to "$ pay $ to play".
ReplyDeleteYou've got to have a Navy/USAF capable in strength and numbers. You can qualitize with new technology that actually adds capability all you want but you cannot win unless you have the right stuff.. basing just gives you a vulnerable fixed base easily neutralized.
When did we actually have what we seek today? What did we have out there, lets say, 1989. What about this "capability" on display? I submit even those ships (CVNs/CGs,DDGs, FFGs) and aircraft were as/more capable, performance wise, in many more categories than todays versions:
https://www.rallypoint.com/answers/what-is-the-largest-fleet-assembled-since-ww2
We cannot resurrect this "capability" of 1989 ever again but we can model off it by investing in those core weapons systems- ships/aircraft that work, instead of pursuing miracle/technological solutions only...
Either that or we become like France...slowly and painfully...
b2