What do the
Zumwalt and LCS programs have in common?
Well, lots of things – all bad!
However, for the purpose of this post, the thing they have in common is
that despite having commissioned ships in the class, neither has their main
batteries installed and functioning yet.
Zumwalt
- 1 built and commissioned Oct
2016
- 1 built (tentative
commissioning date Jan 2019)
- 1 building
As you
know, the Zumwalt was literally designed around the Advanced Gun System (AGS)
that was intended to rain precision firepower at ranges of 70+ miles. As you also know, the Navy has cancelled the
only munition the AGS was capable of firing, the Long Range Land Attack
Projectile (LRLAP), due to runaway costs and failure to meet range requirements.
A
functional AGS does not exist. The
Zumwalt have no functional main battery despite being a commissioned warship. We spent $24B to build a class with no main
battery. That’s some major league
incompetence!
LCS
- 5 Freedom class commissioned
- 9 Freedom class built or
building
- 7
- 8
As you
know, the LCS’ main battery is the modules – those swappable permanent
modules that contain one of the LCS’ three main functions: Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), or Mine Countermeasures (MCM). Without one of the main battery modules, the
LCS is just a patrol boat and not a very good one at that.
-
There
is no functional MCM module.
-
There
is no functional ASW module.
-
There
is no useful ASuW module - it has been scaled back to the point of uselessness.
The first
LCS, USS Freedom, was commissioned in 2008.
It is now ten years later with 29 LCS commissioned, built, or building
and still no useful, functional, main battery.
A decade after commissioning and still no modules. Wow, that’s some major league incompetence!
That is two
major classes of surface warfare vessels and the two most recent classes to be
built that have now been commissioned with no main battery.
That bears
repeating.
The Navy’s
two newest classes of surface vessel have been commissioned with no main
battery.
How does
this happen? How does the Navy accept
and commission a ship that has no main battery?
How has no one been fired? How
has no one been charged with fraud? Has
anyone’s promotion at least been delayed by a couple of months?
Okay, aside
from simple complaining, what can we learn from this?
Well, the
Zumwalt and LCS have another point in common regarding their main batteries –
neither battery actually existed in a functional form when the Navy committed
to building the ships. The Navy assumed
they could develop the batteries while the ships were building. This is the concurrency that we’ve railed against
and has been proven, repeatedly, to be a failure as a procurement method. Concurrency has failed every time it’s been
attempted and yet the Navy is still married to the concept.
It’s one
thing to begin construction of a ship when the deck buffing machine is still
under development but it’s insanity to begin construction of a ship when its
main battery doesn’t exist. Even the
“fitted for but not with” philosophy, as bad as it is, is better than building
with concurrency in the main battery.
I don’t
know what it takes for the Navy to learn lessons. Apparently, it takes more than the utter
failure of two major ship classes (and the F-35, EMALS, AAG, Advanced Weapons
Elevators, etc.)!
Well Admiral Syring is doing just fine as is Admiral ret (Forced) Goddard. Along with all of the numerous Captains running the LCS program that went on to make Flag.
ReplyDeleteWhat gets punished stops, what gets rewarded continues, and everything else is a crapshoot.
Navy Heal Thyself.
The AGS ammo is expensive due to quantities of scale, the AGS mostly works (C- grade), which puts it ahead of the outright failures. 14 Zummies with 500K$ AGS ammo would be
ReplyDeletemore useful than 14 slightly armed LCS.
While this is true, the reason the Zumwalt buy got cut so drastically was because the meta changed. LRLAP letting you hit out to 190 kilometers does several things for you in the 90s: it lets you bombard the Balkans from the Adriatic, it lets you provide naval gunfire further in from the shore, and it allows you to park yourself 25km away from the shore, outside the percentage threat of shore-based SSM, and commence fires.
DeleteBut now the proliferation of ESM, drones, long-range SSMs mean that the safe spot is now much, much further back, making the Zumwalt kinda pointless. If your gun shoots 190km, but you have to be 100 km or from the shore, welp. Your fires are not going to be timely, aren't going to be responsive enough. Your accuraccy suffers the further out you are, requiring the use of guided rounds. And if you're going to be spending 1 million bucks a round, or even $500k, maybe it would be better to instead spend that million dollars on Tomahawk, which has 1700 km range, a thousand pound warhead, GPS guidance and terrain following. More accurate, more powerful, more subtle.
"the reason the Zumwalt buy got cut so drastically was because the meta changed."
DeleteNo, that's mostly after-the-fact rationalizing. The Zumwalt cuts were mainly due to runaway costs associated with the new technologies (radar, guns, hull, power, etc.). I have found no contemporaneous evidence that the Zumwalts were cut due to changing requirements/threats. That's a compelling narrative but one that is unsupported by any evidence. If you have any evidence, I'm quite open to it.
"Your fires are not going to be timely, aren't going to be responsive enough."
DeleteAt, say, 100 miles range, a AGS projectile exiting the gun at 2700 fps would require 195 sec to reach the target (a bit more, actually, since the projectile doesn't travel a flat, horizontal path but we'll consider it so for ballparking). That's 3-4 minutes. As calls for fire support go, 3-4 minutes is extremely responsive and timely! Even doubling that for a ballistic arc, the time is still quite good.
ComNavOps- Respectfully, I agree with Wild Goose. He is not "after-the-fact rationalizing", but I submit that perhaps you are. You ask for evidence? How's this - "Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches Volume 1", a RAND report by Dr. Irv Blickstein and others with impeccable credentials. Specifically, I direct your attention to tables 3.1 through 3.4 of that report and the associated figures, which show with data that the quantity reduction drove cost overruns, dwarfing all other causes. Also, read from the bottom of page 27 through the top of page 28. This describes Facts (US Navy statements for record) which support Wild Goose's contention that the "Meta" changed. I participated in DDG 1000, and I wholeheartedly agree with you that we shot the moon wrt new technology, and we should not do any procurement like this ever. Lots of lessons to (hopefully) learn. But until Roughead said "I need more 51's, not 1000's", the program had room to maneuver to keep cost in check. I'm not saying that the risk of the amount of New Tech would not have given the program fits, but qty reduction made that irrelevant, and that happened first. Nunn-McCurdy was a full-body grand mal. The RAND report was published in 2011. Bottom line, it truly sucks for programs when the Navy (at the CNO level) changes its mind in an instant. If you don't think it happened that quickly, go back and look at the budgets and supporting testimony. That is the contemporaneous evidence. One year DDG 1000 is Absolutely Vital to the Navy's plan (Mullen CNO) next year Roughead upends the program of record apple cart, making congress scratch their heads. And that happened as detail design was completing and production of first ship was beginning.
DeleteOne clarification - the "Meta" change that Wild Goose talks about was not the "Meta" change that I cited. That was BMD mission being more important than Land Attack.
DeleteWhistlepig (One of the more colorful usernames I've come across!), yours is an excellent comment - the kind I encourage. You've laid out a position and presented data to support it.
DeleteNow, let's see if it holds up under closer examination!
read from the bottom of page 27 through the top of page 28. This describes Facts (US Navy statements for record) which support Wild Goose's contention that the "Meta" changed."
Using your reference report, on pg.27 is this quote,
"The initial reductions in planned quantities from the 32-ship class originally envisioned for DD-21 to the ten ships included in the Milestone B baseline were due to affordability."
This could not be clearer. The initial cuts were due to cost. Those cuts then lead to additional cost increases which led to more cuts - classic death spiral.
Here's more,
"There were significant cost risks still at Milestone B, and the program was potentially underfunded (i.e., Navy compared with CAIG funding estimates). Those risks translated to an affordability concern ..."
Again, cost was the deciding factor in the initial cuts.
Now we get to the part that you may be correct about. Again from the report,
"The quantity change from ten to three that resulted in the critical Nunn-McCurdy breach to PAUC and the significant APB breach to APUC were due to perceived
changes in the emerging threat and mission priorities."
So, ACCORDING TO THE NAVY (I'll come back to this), the qty decrease from 10 to 3 was due to changing threats.
To sum up, the qty decrease from 32 to 10 was due to cost and the decrease from 10 to 3 was due to changing threats.
So, you're partly right and partly wrong, as (conditionally) was I. Wild Goose was completely wrong in stating that drones and SSMs were the reason for the qty decrease. His explanation is incorrect and is, in fact, after-the-fact rationalizing.
Now, to return to a point above, the Navy's explanation for the decrease from 10 to 3 was changing threats - BMD, specifically. I contend that the runaway costs that had already caused a decrease from 32 to 10 and which the Navy could see were going to further increase the cost of the remaining 10 due to the smaller quantity were the basis for the Navy wanting to drop the Zumwalt altogether. Navy leadership is in the business of putting hulls in the water (another way of saying pursuit of budget) rather than combat capability (how else can one explain the LCS?). With that in mind, the Navy saw that they could get more hulls via the Burkes than via continued Zumwalts. They Navy floated the idea of zero Zumwalts but settled on 2 (supposedly termination penalties dictated finishing 2 - don't know if that's true?). This theory is, admittedly, speculation on my part but quite reasonable, logical, and supported by much peripheral evidence. If I'm correct, then the Navy's changing threat story was just a convenient excuse floated to appease a Congress that would have been very upset to see the Navy flip from the "most important ship in the Navy" to "we don't really want any" in the space of one year, as you pointed out.
Let me repeat - you've offered a very good comment. It was well written, informative, backed with evidence (though your own source refuted the bulk of the meta change idea), and furthered the discussion. I encourage you to keep writing this kind of comment. I look forward to more of your thoughts on any subject!
" participated in DDG 1000"
DeleteI would love to hear more from you about the DDG-1000 program, what your role was, and what lessons you believe the program experience and result has to offer.
ComNavOps: Now who's being argumentative? ;)
DeleteI mean, I literally said above that "the reason the Zumwalt buy got cut so drastically was not just costs, but also because the meta changed." I _did_ acknowledge that costs are an issue, but the changing meta also played a part in that.
The official documents talk up alot about how cancelling the Zumwalts is cost cutting; the bit about the changing meta is me rephrasing a discussion I had with an acquaintance of mine (armamaments engineer & artilleryman, later worked procurement for the Singapore military and did analysis shit). The tl;dr is that:
- the percentage threat in the 90s was shorter ranged making the Zumwalt more viable for naval gunfire because it can fire shells from impunity out of range of the shore.
- the percentage threat has now increased due to the proliferation of drones, ESM, offboard sensors, which means that a safe distance is now 100 nautical miles away, and fires at that range will not be responsive enough.(Admittedly his opinion as a artilleryman.)
- Amphibious assault meta has now changed from fires at a distance to sterilising the shore, dashing in, and unloading as fast as possible, which means the Zumwalt no longer has a role or purpose.
Sure, costs were a part of it, but given the way the Navy has defended other big ticket items over the years (Nimitz, Ford, F-35), I'm inclined to think that if the Navy _really_ wanted to keep the Zumwalts, if they'd really had a role for them, the defense would have been a lot more strenuous.
It's not an unreasonable position to hold that there was more going on that just financial triage.
*facepalm*
DeleteGoddamn brainfarts.
The first sentence of my first post is supposed to read:
"While this is true, the reason the Zumwalt buy got cut so drastically was not just costs, but also because the meta changed."
Brain-to-finger interface failing on me >:[
No, here's your quote from your comment,
Delete"the reason the Zumwalt buy got cut so drastically was because the meta changed."
There's nothing in that statement about cost. At the very least, quote yourself accurately.
Regarding changing threats versus costs, if you read my [long winded] reply to Whistlepig and look at the reference he cites, you'll see that the initial cut from 32 to 10 was purely due to cost. The cut from 10 to 3 was, according to the Navy (I go on to dispute that), due not to drones or SSM but to BMD requirements.
Delete"Now who's being argumentative?"
DeleteI'm ensuring that main points are factual. I don't care whether someone rounds off a number - that would be argumentative - but I do care when major points are inaccurate so I correct them.
As I've stated before, if you want to continue to comment you may need to do a little homework. Check your facts, find a source, verify your memory, and so on so that corrections are not needed. You clearly have the passion for this. Now, you just need to add a little extra work to bring the accuracy level up.
I also encourage you to address the larger issues. For example, setting aside the cost versus threat issue, why not address the validity (or lack thereof) of the 50-100 mile standoff concept? Is it valid? Does it make a difference given the threat and the defensive systems? How can the standoff be reconciled with amphibious assault requirements? And so on. There's the meat of this type of discussion.
"There's nothing in that statement about cost. At the very least, quote yourself accurately."
DeleteI like how you ignore my realisation that I've typed up improperly. :V
"I also encourage you to address the larger issues. For example, setting aside the cost versus threat issue, why not address the validity (or lack thereof) of the 50-100 mile standoff concept? Is it valid? Does it make a difference given the threat and the defensive systems? How can the standoff be reconciled with amphibious assault requirements? And so on. There's the meat of this type of discussion."
DeleteYou can't reconcile a 100 mile standoff with the requirements for amphibious assault; this is partly what killed the USMC's EFV. The EFV does 29 miles per hour in the water; at a standoff of 100 miles, it's going to take it over three hours to hit the beach, at which point the Marines inside are going to be battered and bruised and seasick and in no condition to fight.
The other alternative idea was then that if launching landing craft isn't going to work, then use helos to fly in the troops to the beach: the Osprey does 277 mph, the Super Stallion does 173 mph, that makes transit times a lot more tenable with a 100 mile standoff (hence LHA-6 being built without a well deck). But the problem with that is the survivability of helos making opposed landings, and there's only so much lift you can do, and ultimately you're dropping a light infantry force on the beach without any heavier supporting firepower: the Super Stallion can't sling lift an Abrams. There's a reason the America-class amphibs are getting a well deck back, starting with LHA-8.
The thinking now seems to be dropping a shitload of firepower on the beach to sterilise it, then dashing "close" (i.e. 15-25 miles) and unloading the landing force as fast as possible, then getting the fuck out of dodge.
This assumes, anyhow, that making an opposed landing onto an occupied beach should be done. It depends on the level of how occupied said beach is, I suppose. Landing troops on the Chinese mainland? Probably not possible given the concentration of force China can bring to bear. Landing troops on occupied Taiwan or Japanese islands to help dislodge the Chinese? I think that could be viable - the Chinese don't have the amphibious lift for bringing in enough forces to rolfstomp the Taiwanese military. (Yet.)
But I feel MEUs would be more relevant if they were dropping their troops in the Phillipines to support the PAF's operations against rebels and terror groups. Sure, it's not big ticket serious war, but that's a tangible military contribution to an ally nation that you're trying to tilt away from China. What's China done for the Phillipines? Been somewhat less beligerent. What's the US done for PH? Fought MILF and Abu Sayyaff. (On the other hand, not wanting to get drawn into Filipino!Vietnam War is a reasonable sentiment.)
"The first sentence of my first post is supposed to read:"
DeleteAs it happened, my response was composed and published while you were publishing yours. Just unfortunate timing. The solution, of course, is to be accurate the first time which is the general nudge I've been suggesting for you - a bit of homework prior to publishing. I look forward to passionate, accurate comments!
"The other alternative idea was ..."
DeleteThere's nothing wrong with this entire comment, however, it's just background rehash that's well known to everyone. Rather than background, I'd like to see you offer solutions or point out problems/strengths that haven't been generally noted before, or recommendations for better approaches or ... in other words, give us some original thought that furthers the discussion.
The closest you came to something original was the Philippines suggestion for the MEU but you then, correctly, note that isn't relevant for actual war.
Given the current doctrine, how can a MEU be relevant in war? What does the MEU/MEF/MEB need to be relevant? What doctrinal changes? Can they even be relevant? Why are they pursuing aviation-centric assault if it isn't survivable? And so on.
Don't give me background. I already know the background. Give me solutions, recommendations, alternatives, original thought.
A note on background: There's nothing wrong with reciting background as long as it leads to something new. Set the stage with background and then offer the original thought that comes from that background. Loosely, that's the basis for most of my posts - some relevant background to set the stage followed by an original solution/thought/recommendation.
I'm not actually convinced an MEU is relevant in a war, at least in the classical role envisioned for it. Or rather, it depends on how the wars will be fought. The last time i recall an actual opposed landing was Korea, I believe.
DeleteSome thought that I have seen the USMC bandy about is to take a page out of the Chinese playbook, in that you would drop marines with SSM batteries onto various small islands that the Chonese would have to get past. The idea is not that the SSM troops would sink every chonese ship that passes by, but that you'd have enough islands seeded with SSMs that the Chinese would have to be cautious, and either spend time snd munitions to recon and sterilise each island, or avoid said islands - both of which delays the Chinese navy and complicates their warfighting. It's interesting I think to note thst the JGSDF is also planning on doing the same thing.
Like I alluded to earlier, I don't see the Marines doing a landing onto Chinese soil. Where I think MEUs are going to see use is with assisting allies (Taiwan, Japan, maybe Vietnam) that have been invaded: the MEU provides reinforcements for the fighting, or assists allies in retaking captured islands. I mentioned the JGSDF earlier: they're setting ip their own amphibious force because Japan also has plenty of small islands that the Chinese could capture to use as SSM batteries, and the Japanese thus need a counter to that.
Somin this respect, an aviation-centric approach may work, because if you're planning to fight Chinese Marines... well, we've both talked about the lack of organic SHORAD in the MEU; the Chinese Marines are just as worse off as the USMC in that regard. I'd actually argue they've got worse logistics issues, given that China doesnt have the same amphibious assault capability the US has. So it's light infantry vs light infantry, but the Chinese marines ohly have some helo sipport at best, and nothing in the way of serious air defense - F-35s and Cobras will eat them alive.
This assumes, anyhow, that one gets to foghtmonly the Chinese marines. :V
"drop marines with SSM batteries onto various small islands"
DeleteOkay, now there's a thought we can work with! Now, how would these small units get "dropped" onto these islands? SSMs aren't exactly small and easily transported. Presumably, they would also need a radar for targeting and, to be effective, it would have to be over-the-horizon or else they would be limited to about 15 miles or so (the horizon). An alternative would be drones for targeting but now you need over-the-horizon comm systems and drone control stations.
Once you start operating radars, comms, control signals, etc. you start becoming very "visible" to the enemy and subject to easy destruction.
How do you address these issues?
"Chinese Marines are just as worse off "
DeletePossibly true, for the moment, but the Chinese are rapidly expanding their amphibious forces and are adding some very nice light armor and firepower to their amphib force. In a very short time, their amphib forces will surpass what we can muster.
ComNavOps; thanks, I concur with your summary,"the qty decrease from 32 to 10 was due to cost and the decrease from 10 to 3 was due to changing threats”. It was my mis-read of Wild Goose's Meta comment that made me chip in to begin with. I was thinking about the BMD Meta, as I clarified right after my first post. That’s not what he was on, as you pointed out. Point taken to read more carefully! To both you and Wild Goose, no intent on my part to irritate, and hope it isn't taken that way. I suspect we agree on a lot. The reason I threw in my two cents was that your "cost" logic didn't fully capture what I saw. Here are a few opinions to consider:
Delete- 1000 is the most difficult (ship) acquisition ever attempted, in EVERY way; new tech content, Acq Strat, Acq Plan, program support, etc. We should NEVER do a ship or major system this way again if we can help it.
- The Navy changing its mind and withdrawing support for the DDG 1000 requirement (BMD over precision MARCOR support/land attack) over the course of a year absolutely Hammered the program, took away much flexibility, drove the program into a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Looked at another way, if the program had been 10 ships, one could think LRLAP would be bought. And test results showed the gun system worked. Now, it can’t be demonstrated because we didn't buy the ammo. If this is not upsetting, check for pulse!
- Cutting class to three ships has been horrendous to manage - on top of the hardest program ever, you have flagging sponsor support, lack of budget to address issues, no new construction pipeline to dampen out tech issues/logistics support, uninterested vendor base, unique training requirements, etc. At least the submarine Navy developed a plan to address their ‘drop in quantity’ moment, which had a different cause (SEAWOLF/end of cold war). The analogy is instructive - they created a follow-on program that retained the goodness of SSN21 (New Attack Sub/VA), and an affordability slogan which resonated (2 for 4 in 12). Surface Navy? Ehh, not so much...contingency planning is not their forte, apparently. Finally coming around in discussions of FSC, but late.
- Changing direction after championing a program for decades (first studies done for SC21 started in 1994) is almost impossible to walk away from. Yes, ComNavOps, on your termination thoughts. The contractors had contracts with parameters filled in, and they were not at fault for the Navy changing its mind. In that circumstance, what happens is a termination for convenience, or T for C. And the government is liable for Big Bucks under a termination settlement. If that sounds like something you would not want to be remotely close to, you would be correct! Gobs of Contracts and Legal people negotiating how we pay for no ship – OMG. See FAR part 49 and 48 CFR 52.249-2. This, plus the gigantic amount of sunk costs expended on the program prior to truncating the class, made it politically and practically impossible for the Navy to walk away from with nothing to show for it, which is what would have happened if the program was cancelled. Honestly can't fault them for not walking away; the sin is not having enough imagination and drive to roll it into something useful before now. We will have three complex surface combatants without a (portion of) main battery to your point, and a dubious and not well conceived mission. Oh well, NORTON SOUND has been gone a long time, and now we potentially have three replacements.
- FYI, not arguing that the change of mind was wrong, or that the Navy shouldn’t have gone the direction they did. That is the purview of the CNO and operational Navy, as influenced by threat analysis and NSS to services, among other things - and cost is a huge consideration. The apparent stranding of so much money and effort is what frosts me, and I think it could have been mitigated better or avoided. And hindsight is always 20-20 so that was very easy for me to say :)
Cheers! Appreciate the thoughts from both of you.
Whistlepig (can't get over that!), as you undoubtedly know, one of the recurring problems plaguing naval acquisition is the Navy's abdication of in-house design. Design responsibility has been thrown out to industry. Industry may or may not be competent (LCS manuf's who had never built a warship before, for example) and may or may not design an optimal warship as opposed to an optimal profit ship. As best I can tell, the first example of this was the Spruance class (see the book, Electronic Greyhounds). The results have been decidedly mixed with many more misses than hits.
DeleteOn top of this is the use of some very questionable contract methodologies (no warranties, cost plus, etc.).
If you have any experience along these lines, do you have any specific thoughts to offer regarding design and contract practices?
"Honestly can't fault them for not walking away; the sin is not having enough imagination and drive to roll it into something useful before now."
DeleteIf you haven't already, you might want to check out the post, The Third Zumwalt
This addresses some what-if scenarios for alternative uses for the Zumwalts. Any thoughts?
@Whistlepig: no worries man, keep rocking on.
DeleteMy style of discussion is a bit more hammer and tongs than ComNavOps - I don't mind a good argument (I just wish I had all the time in the world to devote to such arguments :|).
@ComNavOps: Currently if you look at what the Japanese are doing, the idea is apparently to use landing craft to deploy SSM trucks to islands (the JMSDF has LCACs), and to use small radars for cueing (the JGSDF's radar for the Type-90 and Type-12 SSM is basically roof-mounted on a jeep). The Japanese claim the Type-12 can receive midcourse guidance from other platforms - presumably they're going to be relying on their MPAs and other drones to give them over the horizon targeting data.*
DeleteThat said, even without radar, for OTH shoots there's still the option of programming the missiles to fly to a waypoint and then going active and engaging on their own. All the launch team would need is a SATCOM: if their orders are to dig in, and fire only after receiving orders, and they stay radio silent the whole while, that significantly reduces emissions and and traffic, so there's less for SIGINT to pick up.
You're right that without offboard sensor platforms, the island SSM units will be limited to the radar horizon, but given the delaying nature of island SSMs, I can see where that might not be an issue for them. You can't draw the opposition's attention onto those small islands if they don't realise you're shooting from those small islands. In a way, I can see some parallels with mine warfare: the objective is not to get kills on the opposition's ships (though that's very welcome), but instead to restrict their movements and slow things down.
*(While this could be used offensively, I think this has more to do with how the JGSDF's primary employment of SSM is defensively, in coastal batteries. Russian sources assess that the E-2 can detect surface targets at ranges of 450km; that means the Japaense could keep their E-2s some 200-300 km inland, under SAM and fighter coverage, while still having eyes out to sea and feeding targeting data to the coastal batteries.)
Of course, the big problem with the USMC trying to do things like this is the US doesn't have truck-mounted SSMs; coastal artillery basically died after WW2 and the US hasn't really considered coastal defense because anybody who'd want to try attack the US has the moat of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans to cross, which gives plenty of space and time to be seen coming. :V
The simplest, I think, would be to buy NSM trucks from Kongsberg, but because it's the simplest answer it won't be the chosen answer. :V
"In a very short time, their amphib forces will surpass what we can muster."
Yes and no. In the short term (within the next decade or so) I don't see China's amphibious forces surpassing the USMC, if only because the PLAN priority for now is their blue water fleet buildup. The Chinese Navy is one of the largest navies in the world, but its vessels are generally behind the curve. One way to look at their shipbuilding over the last decade or so is that they've been looking at everyone and trying to tech up, catch up to the curve, and figure out what works for them; they've now gotten to the point where they now know what works, and want to build more of it. After that? It depends on their priorities, whether they're satisfied with their naval buildup.
My take on the chinese naval buildup is that the priority is going to be their CVNs and naval aviation, then the surface fleet, then the amphibious force towards the end. I don't this is going to change for at least a decade, maybe more, given that they're aggressively trying to recapitalise their navy.
"deploy SSM trucks to islands"
DeleteOkay, that's some informative, original thinking along with some supporting background. Good. I don't agree with the gist of it but my agreement is not a requirement.
The question you left unanswered is the most important one - how do we get these Marines, truck mounted SSM batteries, radar, drones, comm units, and control stations to an island? They can't be air transported, as far as I know. The only ships capable of such transport would be the big deck amphibs or, maybe, a JHSV, depending on where/range. Neither is survivable in the A2/AD zone without a major battle group as escort and that will eliminate any element of surprise/concealment. Further, if we can survivably operate a major battle group there, do we need one small land based missile unit?
"E-2s some 200-300 km inland, ... feeding targeting data to the coastal batteries."
DeleteI think there's little chance of that happening. E-2s are air-battle space managers and in a China war will be FULLY occupied in the desperate struggle for aerial parity as well as their own survival (very long range A2A missiles - the Chinese have already 'marked' the E-2s as prime targets and A2A missiles with several hundred mile range). E-2s are simply not going to have the time to coordinate sea battles.
Even if an E-2 detects a sea target it's highly unlikely that they'll be able to communicate directly with a land Marine unit (heck, our F-35s can't talk to our ships or any other aircraft except via old, detectable, Link 16 ). Comms require more than just a radio. Both ends of the transmission must be a specific match and I'm pretty sure the Marines don't have E-2 compatible comms.
So, an E-2 would have to send a message to headquarters which would have to circuitously route the message to the Marines. By the time all that occurred the targets would have moved on.
So many people think that all military units can seamlessly communicate instantaneously with each other across infinite distances and this isn't even remotely the case as has been proven in every combined arms operation ever attempted.
On the plus side, if all those problems could be overcome, your analogy to mines is interesting. Another relevant analogy might be WWII PT boats (limited range, limited sensors, limited success but an ever present threat).
See if you can answer the 'how to get there' question. If you can, you'll be a good ways towards a viable operation.
"The question you left unanswered is the most important one - how do we get these Marines, truck mounted SSM batteries, radar, drones, comm units, and control stations to an island?"
DeleteTo be honest, neither the USMC or PLAN has actually seriously addressed this question (at least, to my knowledge). :P It cuts both ways against them.
As far as my understanding of Japanese thinking goes, they know (or think they know :V) which of their islands are the most likely to be in the way of an invasion force, and so they're banking on getting there and setting up first, using their LCACs and LSTs. On the other hand, the Japanese aren't playing with the same distances as China and the US. As an example: let's assume that the Chinese for whatever reason want to make an amphibious landing on the Japanese home islands. They've got a straight shot from China's eastern seaboard and can go through the Eastern Sea and skip past Kagoshima. But if the JMSDF can put SSM batteries on Toshima, Nakanoshima, Yakushima, Mishima, Kuchinoshima, Tanegashima, and the smaller islets in the area, that allows them to threaten a PLAN force. They might not have enough SSMs to sink an invasion fleet, but they wouldn't necessarily need to; just be enough of a nuisance that the invasion fleet either stalls out sterilising all small islands in their way, or else makes significant detours: either way, the objective of slowing the invasion force is achieved. The invasion force can't do much invading if it takes so long to arrive that the JGSDF can fully mobilise and bring overwhelming combat power to the beach they want to land on.
I agree that dropping small SSM teams isn't going to work if you're already engaged in combat, which means that the only way to get them in place is to be there early. Which just complicates the effectiveness of this tactic, because you need to then predict where you're going to fight and then you need to get there first and drop your units.
Looking at the map and geography, I don't think this tactic is going to be so relevant for a fight around Chinese waters (outside of Taiwan pre-positioning SSM batteries on Penghu, Wangan and Qimei, perhaps), but I think it could well be more of a thing in the Spratlys and SCS and the Phillipines, because there's a shitload of small islands down there. Plenty of places to hide.
With regard to E-2s, that was a theoretical example for the Japanese context, coordinating an airborne sensor asset with coastal SSM batteries on the Japanese mainland. To be fair, I don't think they're going to use their E-2s for that; the logical option would be their P-1s, but this assumes that they've got the datalinks to put that into place - Cooperative Engagement Capability is an area in which the JSDF as a whole lags behind the USN, although they are trying to catch up and build their own equivalent capability.
The funny thing, I think, is that we're actually in agreement on seeding islands with SSM trucks. The problems of communication, datalinking, and target acquisition need to be solved for the USMC to make this work - which is going to be a challenge because the US doesn't have any truck SSM capability; it's only this year that Raytheon and Kongsberg did work to fit NSM launcher 4-pack to the US Army's HEMMT. Then there's also the issues with keeping airborne sensor assets alive in contested airspace - I'm of the opinion that it's going to be somewhat easier for the JSDF to do that since it's fighting closer to home, vs China and the US keeping MPAs and drones alive while the fighting's going on.
"So, an E-2 would have to send a message to headquarters which would have to circuitously route the message to the Marines. By the time all that occurred the targets would have moved on."
DeleteI dunno, it depends. Playing Devil's Advocate here: Say the sensor asset (could be an E-2, could be an MPA) picks up the hostile flotilla and gets a bead on their speed and bearing, and transmits that to HQ which transmits that to the SSM truck team. Let's say that takes 8 minutes. A ship moving at 20 knots will have traveled 2.67 nautical miles, or 4.94 kilometers, in that time. Depending on how wide the field of view is for the SSM's radar seeker, that might not be enough distance to get away from SSMs fired at the general direction of said ships with their seekers set to active to go hunt for their own targets.
Would it be successful? Unlikely. But then the point is not to score kills, the point is to harass the opposition and thus delay them.
*shrug*
Tbf I'm not entirely convinced on this.
"the invasion fleet either stalls out sterilising all small islands"
DeleteThat's not how a wise commander would do it. The small islands/missile trucks would be located and cruise/ballistic missile'ed into oblivion and the invasion fleet would never even slow down. Combined arms.
That's the part that I fail to understand in modern military thinking - that small units with, essentially, no defenses, will, somehow, remain untouched to launch missiles or whatever it is they're tasked to do. No one has yet explained how such units will survive more than a day.
"only way to get them in place is to be there early."
DeleteHave you thought this through? We don't own any of the relevant islands so we're going to be, literally, invading foreign countries. That's not going to play well in terms of international politics. China could declare war on us in the guise of 'liberating' the countries we've invaded and they'd be able to form a political coalition (called the UN) against us!
"Let's say that takes 8 minutes."
DeleteThat's hilarious! Have you ever encountered any bureaucracy, military or civilian, that can take in information, analyze it, make a decision, and act on it that quickly? It would take hours, at best, to accomplish!
Look at the recent seizure of our boats by the Iranians. We had messages and indications of problems but were unable to HQ-act in any relevant, timely manner.
There's endless example after example of combat situations that required quick action and didn't get it.
I know you'd like to believe things happen that quickly but that's not even remotely close!
""The question you left unanswered is the most important one - how do we get these Marines, truck mounted SSM batteries, radar, drones, comm units, and control stations to an island?"
DeleteTo be honest, neither the USMC or PLAN has actually seriously addressed this question "
You still have not answered the question, at least for the US. Or, perhaps you did answer the question by concluding that it can't happen.
So, you seem to be saying - and I agree - that the concept of small units dispersed on islands is not feasible. Okay, that's the end of that fantasy. Now, you and I need make all the other wishful thinkers out there see reality.
"if the JMSDF can put SSM batteries on"
DeleteHave you done the math on how many missiles would be required to be a serious threat to an invasion fleet? I think you'll be surprised. I don't think it's possible to place enough SSM units without turning them into major bases. Do the math and let me know what you conclude.
"That's not how a wise commander would do it. The small islands/missile trucks would be located and cruise/ballistic missile'ed into oblivion and the invasion fleet would never even slow down. Combined arms."
DeleteTrue, but there's that whole cost benefit analysis for missile expenditure. Sterilising every potential SSM island means expanding the arsenal; using MRBMs tips the chinese hand that an invasion is coming, while every cruise missile you use on an island is one less cruise missile available for other targets. And not all of the Japanese islands are uninhabited - I'm not convinced Chinese commanders are going to open fire on inhabited Japanese islands just on the chance those islands are siting SSMs.
"No one has yet explained how such units will survive more than a day."
I'm not entirely sure the JGSDF expects the island SSM units to survive more than a day. It's sacrificing men and material to delay the enemy. I'm reminded of something a Singaporean friend told me once; his unit was a helimobile infantry battalion that was supposed to insert behind Malaysian lines to act as a blocking force in the event of war. His warload was 3 times as much ammo as in peacetime... and 1 day of rations.
PLAN and the USMC... I dunno. Ultimately every soldier is expendable in war; the onus is on his commander to spend those lives judiciously and responsibly.
"Have you thought this through? We don't own any of the relevant islands so we're going to be, literally, invading foreign countries. That's not going to play well in terms of international politics. China could declare war on us in the guise of 'liberating' the countries we've invaded and they'd be able to form a political coalition (called the UN) against us!"
I have. The fact of the matter is that this also applies to the Chinese themselves, so the Chinese are just as much constrained as the US in this matter. It depends on how many fucks there are on any side to give.
Doing this in the Spratlys... well diplomatically it'd be kinda sorta a free fire zone. China considers the SCS and the Spratlys its territory, international feeling is that none of the islands are anybody's property because of the competing claims... Japan at least has an easier time of it in that they own the islands they would site SSMs on.
"That's hilarious! Have you ever encountered any bureaucracy, military or civilian, that can take in information, analyze it, make a decision, and act on it that quickly? It would take hours, at best, to accomplish!"
I'm of the opinion that's more of a training and doctrinal issue, and you can shorten decision and response times (I've seen it happen for myself in my own workplace) if you get everybody focused and understanding what to do and beat their heads in until they do it. Although I *did* say I wasn't entirely convinced. ;D
"You still have not answered the question, at least for the US. Or, perhaps you did answer the question by concluding that it can't happen."
DeleteThe answer is already there: amphibs and landing craft. The problem is that the answer is incomplete: there aren't _enough_ amphibs and landing craft to do a massive seeding of SSM trucks all over the place. Japan can at least charter ferries for some of its larger outlying islands that have docks, and since its fighting defensively it can use its amphibs for SSM seeding, as opposed to the USMC and PLAN where SSM trucks will fight for space with the embarked Marines and their equipment.
the tl;dr is that the US, China and Japan have the capability to seed islands with SSM trucks, the big problem is that they don't have enough sealift to do a massive seeding of islands. On the other hand, that might still be enough for the Japanese, since they're playing defensively: announce that they have seeded an unknown number of islands in XYZ region with SSM trucks and anybody coming to invade is going to eat missiles. Not that much unlike mine warfare and declared minefields.
"Have you done the math on how many missiles would be required to be a serious threat to an invasion fleet?"
I meant to type trucks, not batteries. :/ The JSDF is rather more opaque to me because the majority of OSINT sources are in Japanese, and I've been unable to find good information in English. If we look at the Norwegian setup, a battery is at least 11 vehicles: 3 SSM trucks, 3 local command vics, a battery command vic, a radar truck, a reloading vic, and a mobile workshop. That's 10 vehicles for 12 SSMs. If you strip that down you might get maybe 4 vics for your small island: 2 SSM trucks, a radar jeep, and a command truck. No point carrying reloads or workshop for a unit that's going to die in a day or so. :V
Maybe that's not a base, but it's definitely a motor pool, lol.
8, even 24 SSMs, are those a serious threat? Probably not. It's not serious enough to threaten an invasion fleet, it's not going to sink the entire fleet, but then, it's not supposed to: it's a blocking force meant to delay invasion. Similar philosphy as to mine warfare, but with surface to surface missiles. My interpretation of the Japanese thinking is that they're aware they're not going to score much kills, but they are willing to spend men and material to delay an invasion and buy time so that they can mobilise the JGSDF and counterattack the invasion force as it lands, and every cruise missile the invasion fleet spends on hitting any island potentially seeded with SSM trucks is a cruise missile it can't use for shore bombardment to support its landing force.
"The answer is already there: amphibs and landing craft."
DeleteWe're going to seed islands with amphibious ships and landing craft? In China's defensive zone? How many of those defenseless amphibs are going to survive the attempt? Let's round it off and say none. We'll sacrifice our entire amphib fleet to seed a few marginally useful missile trucks?
Of course, we could send lots of Burke escorts but then we'd turn a minor effort into a major naval battle under unfavorable conditions (no air cover).
Of course, we could make a major air effort to provide cover but then we'd turn a minor effort into a major, major meeting battle. To seed a few marginally useful missile trucks?
You're hand waving the issue of how to emplace these small units deep inside enemy air/water space. The reality is that I don't see any way it can be done. If it's done in "peacetime", the Chinese will be able to observe each placement in detail and the units will die instantly when war starts. If it's done once the war has started, the amphibs/landing craft will die before they ever get to where they need to be.
You need to think about this in the reverse. If we saw defenseless Chinese amphibs/landing craft approaching our shores/islands would we allow them to land their units? Of course not! They're not stealthy. We'd see and sink them long before they got where they were going. If in peacetime, we'd observe and pinpoint the units locations and destroy them in the first 30 seconds of a war.
Don't hand wave, think this through opertionally and tactically. How is an amphib going to make it's way to a landing spot without being observed/destroyed?
"You're hand waving the issue of how to emplace these small units deep inside enemy air/water space."
DeleteYou only asked how said SSM trucks were going to be offloaded onto the islands, not whether they were going to successfully arrive there. :V Plus, I _did_ say that answer was incomplete. ;D :P Again, you're correct that everything you've said cuts both ways against the US and China. Ultimately I don't actually think the idea of seeding small islands with SSM batteries is going to work, not with the current level of technology.
I did acknowledge this tactic isn't going to be relevant for a fight in Chinese waters: the geography doesn't support it, the Taiwan Strait is effectively a no-go area for the USN, and the only islands you could put SSM batteries on are near Taiwan, so if anybody's gonna play "seed the SSM trucks" it's going to be China or Taiwan doing it, not the US (with all the disadvantages that we've alread discussed.
Potentially this might be more viable in the Spratlys, or around the Phillipines, because the Chinese do not have the same level of sensor coverage in the SCS as they do in their waters. But ultimately I don't think China and the US can really make effective use of this tactic. Japan IMO can get a somewhat more effective use of SSM trucks on islands, but with the caveats that it's for a given value of effective, it's possible only because the geography favors Japan, and at best is still just a delaying/harrassment tactic.
I get what the thinking is - conceptually I'm now reminded of the CAPTOR mine, but instead of dropping an encapsulated torpedo outside a harbor to trip up warships, you plant missiles. But the logistics of it and the current level of today's technology... I really don't see it happening.
IMO the only way to make SSM seeding viable is with VTOL heavylift transports like The Bus from Agents of SHIELD, that fictional VTOL-capable C-17. More expendable than an amphib, and faster, to boot: fly out, debuss radar and SSM truck(s), fly away. But that's going into science fiction territory.
"I did acknowledge this tactic isn't going to be relevant for a fight in Chinese waters: the geography doesn't support it"
DeleteOkay, that was a long way to go to reach your ultimate conclusion but you got there. Now, given your conclusion, how do you explain the Marine's fascination with exactly this concept? Why are they spending time, effort, and money on something you've concluded is not viable? Either you or the Marine Corps is wrong. Which is it?
Assuming you believe the Marines to be wrong, what should they be spending their resources and time on? What would be a viable use of Marines in a Chinese war?
"Okay, that was a long way to go to reach your ultimate conclusion but you got there. Now, given your conclusion, how do you explain the Marine's fascination with exactly this concept? Why are they spending time, effort, and money on something you've concluded is not viable? Either you or the Marine Corps is wrong. Which is it?"
DeleteMy man, i got there a day ago, lol. :V I literally said the geography doesn't work for a China conflict and might work for an SCS conflict.
In fairness to the USMC, this is an _idea_ being bandied about. They haven't really been investing effort and money on SSM seeding. Sure, Kongsberg and Raytheon intend to demonstrate NSM firing from a modified HEMMT at RIMPAC, but that's an _Army_ program and is part of the US Army's efforts to revive coastal artillery, which pretty much died after WW2.
Like I've said before, I really don't see the Marines doing an amphibious landing on the Chinese coast. I don't think the classical Marine mission of amphibious assault is going to be as relevant in a war with China - depending on where that war happens, anyhow. If it's a dustup in the SCS between Chinese and American CVBGs? The MEU is irrelevant to that fight. Potentially the MEU could be used to capture the Chinese bases in the Woody and Paracels islands to use as staging points for aircraft, but this assumes 1) the Chinese don't have measures in place to sabotage the bases to deny them to the US, 2) the fighting for the bases doesn't end up wrecking the very bases you want to capture, and 3) the Chinese won't just decide to nuke said bases if they know the US is capping them.
The other use of an MEU, I suppose, is to reinforce allies who are still in the fight, but the only scenario I can consider for that is if China tried to invade Taiwan to remove it from the board, and the Taiwanese military manages to stall them; in this case the MEU would act as reinforcements for the Taiwanese military's attempt to dislodge the PLA. *shrug* In this case it would still be an opposed landing, somewhat; the beach would be friendly, but Chinese aircraft and ships would try to interdict the landing (though they'd also have to deal with the Taiwanese at the same time).
Unless China goes crazy and decides to go on an invading spree, I just don't see a purpose for an MEU in a war with China - that's going to be a naval war, fought on the seas with ships and aircraft: I sincerely doubt the Chinese are going to do a repeat of the IJN's island fort strategy. And an amphibious landing makes sense if you want to force open a beachhead to allow follow on troops to come in and capture enemy territory, but nobody sane in the Pentagon wants to try capturing China. Look at all the headaches the occupation of Iraq caused, and that was a relatively smallish nation; it's not going to work with China. At the same time, I don't really see China as being keen to invade and capture other nations; they're not really interested in that.
Though, come to think of it, there's the option of keeping the MEU around SEA to be ready to intervene to stabilise ASEAN nations in the event of Chinese agent provocateurs stirring shit up and trying to start coups (although this is a super outside scenario and I personally think it's rather outlandish myself :V).
DeleteTheoretically you could station the MEU in SEA to keep an eye on the region, as a reminder to the ASEAN nations that while the US's focus is on China, don't get up to any funny business. For all the problems with the F-35B, it's still a significant capability gap over the fighters the ASEAN nations have in their arsenal.
For the benefit of the peanut gallery: The ASuW module on LCS went so long without a missile because the initial plan was that LCS would use a new missile, N-LOS, which was being jointly developed by the Army and the Navy. The Army then pulled out of N-LOS development (and if you think the Navy has been bad on its development programs, the Army has decades of failed developments that make LCS and Zumwalt look good :V), and the Navy didn't want to fund NLOS solo, so it went scrambling for an alternative: first trying to adapt the laser-guided air launched Griffin missile, and then Longbow Hellfire. The latter at least had some slight logic to it; unlike Griffin, it used a milimeter-wave radar seeker so it was a lot more viable against moving targets vs the laser-guided Griffin (it's one thing to paint with an airborne laser, and another thing to paint with a shipbased laser), and you could then use Longbow Hellfire to arm both LCS and the helo. Not the idea weapon, but still better than nothing. And then after all that nonsense about trying to get Longbow Hellfire to work, the Navy finally decides to go to NSM.
ReplyDeleteThat the Navy wasted time and money faffing about on its choice of missile before finally choosing NSM is, I submit, less of the fault of the LCS program per se, and more the fault of Navy leadership not knowing what the hell they wanted.
IMO the ASuW module could have been the fastest fielded module if not for the missile fuckups. The main building blocks of the ASuW module are the closest things to COTS there are: all that was needed was purchase, installation, testing and validation. It's not like the ASW and MCM modules, where they try to shrink destroyer sonars to fit a corvette and develop a new light airborne minehunting sensor and underwater RPVs for subhunting and minehunting. 57mm gun? It's been a Bofors staple for years, it's a known quantity. Bushmaster Mk II 30mm guns? The US and other nations have been using them for decades in various applications. NSM: also a known quantity.
To some extent it seems the Navy *may* have learned from the LCS debacle, when it comes to the FFG(X) program. EASR radar aside, the USN has specified a lot of what is essentially COTS equipment for FFG(X) (although ultimately the proof will be in the pudding).
Delete"30mm guns? The US and other nations have been using them for decades"
DeleteWhile the land version has been in use, the attempt to navalize them for the LCS has been challenging. DOT&E has reported on corrosion issues, mechanical movement and aiming, and other issues related to naval mounting. I haven't seen any reports lately so I have no idea whether they've solved the various problems yet.
There is a long and fascinating history of failed attempts to navalize land weapons.
"While the land version has been in use, the attempt to navalize them for the LCS has been challenging. DOT&E has reported on corrosion issues, mechanical movement and aiming, and other issues related to naval mounting. I haven't seen any reports lately so I have no idea whether they've solved the various problems yet."
DeleteCan you cite the report or point to a direction. The Israel Rafae Typhoon 30mm system looks solid (and their mini Typhoon) both look to be fairly self contained.
Check the DOT&E Annual Reports. I don't recall the specific year(s) off the top of my head. As one example, here is a quote from the 2012 DOT&E report,
Delete"The 30 mm guns and associated combat system exhibit
reliability problems. The Navy established a Failure
Review Board to identify and correct deficiencies in
30 mm gun performance."
"While the land version has been in use, the attempt to navalize them for the LCS has been challenging. DOT&E has reported on corrosion issues, mechanical movement and aiming, and other issues related to naval mounting. I haven't seen any reports lately so I have no idea whether they've solved the various problems yet."
DeleteFair enough, that would do it. I was thinking of the Typhoon and and Chinese mountings - they obviously prove that a hull mounted 30mm gun works, so you would think a 30mm gun mounted on the helo hangar would have less issues. It's not like it's rocket science here. :V
A few comments
ReplyDeleteJust last June the Navy identified ~ 300 planned alterations that must be made to the LCS with the changes ranging from quick fixes to more time-consuming modifications. The LCS fleet introduction and sustainment program manager is only responsible for the back-fit modifications, while the seaframe program office is responsible fit the forward-fit alterations.
Previously Navy stated Hellfire for LCS is a significant strategic and tactical step, testing and integration commenced on LCS 5 in August of 2017, resulted in 20 successful hits out of 24 total attempted missile and would be operational in 2020. Though it now appears to be Navy is having a change of mind by only buying a token number 23 Hellfires in FY2019.
It was only in May 2017 that the Navy selected Raytheon to develop a new VDS for the ASW mission module in preference to buying the in production and successful Thales VDS.
July the Inspector General Inspector reported that though Navy had declared IOC on three systems of the MCM mission module on investigation IG found they weren't meeting requirements.
Though Congress authorized procurement of 33rd, 34th and 35th seaframe they have cut back drastically on MM funding, ASW $7.4M, Navy requested $57.3M, SUW cut by approx half and MCM cut 21% to $121.1M, state of MM development doesn't justify spend.
The Defense Secretary Mattis and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford in April were looking at using LCS in supporting counter-narcotics operations in U.S. Southern Command, something SOUTHCOM boss Adm. Kurt Tidd has asked for. It is to be hoped that comes to fruition with the LCS fleet being struck off the Navy battle force tally, just dreaming.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/09/18/congress-to-buy-3-more-lcs-than-the-navy-needs-but-gut-funding-for-sensors-that-makes-them-valuable/
While the AGS is the hyped-up system for the Zumwalt, it still has 80 VLS cells, which I would argue are the true main battery. After all, no one suggests that a Burke or Tico's main battery is the gun. 80 VLS cells on a low-observability platform is still useful, even if the cost for the Zumwalt has ballooned far beyond reasonability.
ReplyDeleteThe Zumwalt's entire reason for existence is the AGS. It is not even debatable that the AGS is the main battery.
DeleteNow, the secondary VLS offers a decent capability, though mostly defensive rather than offensive, and very poor value for the $8B+ cost of the ship.
Why simply say the AGS was a failure and put in a gun that could fire the Excalibur rounds? How expensive would a refit be to two not very working ships - why not just the Mk 45? If you can afford a pointless LCS you can afford to make the Zumwalt functional. Its surprising the Navy managed to justify making the AGS useless and also not installing the planed 57mm guns.
DeleteYou have to realize that the Zumwalt was, literally, designed and built around the AGS. Every aspect of the AGS is unique. The system is mammoth and fully automated from strike down of munitions to handling/movement to magazine storage to loading and firing. There is nothing that could be reused and the entire ship would have to be gutted. Installing another gun could be done, for sure, but it would be insanely expensive.
DeleteThe planned 57 mm guns were abandoned in favor of the 30 mm guns. Speculation and limited data suggest that the LCS experience with the badly flawed 57 mm guns led to the decision to use the 30 mm instead.
Found this on the LCS and the 57mm gun
Deletehttp://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Science_and_Technology/16-F-0250_(REPORT)_Unclassified_Report_on_the_Littoral_Combat_Ship_(LCS)_req_by_Sec_123_of_HR_3979_NDAA_for_FY15.pdf
Its horrific. I can't believe any USN officer in the Pentagon would actually allow the LCS to sail let alone be built (although I they are port bound for now). Somebody mentioned here that the Perry's on board sonar was not great but at least it was there if say the towed array failed or got damaged. In other words it was still retained multiple ASW detection methods and attack options.
The LCS seems riddled with a mass of single point failures with respect to combat.
You are right about the 57mm gun system the sensor system/gun director seems to fail rather often in tests and is lucky to hit a single small with manual intervention. I wonder though is a failure of the gun or the overall ship.
Anyway back to the Zumwalt. Its already hideously expensive. I don't see why a crash program to get any working 155 shell developed should not have been simultaneous with the cancellation of the super special ammo. The ideal of having 2 155mm deck ornaments is beyond silly.
The number I keep seeing quoted is 250 million for a refit of the 2 existing ships. An Excalibur is a lot cheaper than the LRLAP. Cancel the 3 new LCSs and you can afford that better 2 working ships are than 5 nonworking ones. Kill the LCS altogether and buy the LRLAP and a stockpile. The logic seems simple.
To add sure the LRLAP would be expensive but the navy seemed to playing games by putting the cost all in just the 2000 rounds or so needed for the (3) ships to be loaded once. I guess if all you ever expect is to look at them that makes sense.
DeleteBut what if you planed to stockpile 10,000. In any it seems a shame unlike the F-35 it seems like it performed well in tests w/o massive amount of BS to hide defects.
"The LCS seems riddled with a mass of single point failures with respect to combat."
DeleteYou've correctly identified that single points of failure are weaknesses in combat. However, to be fair, the smaller the ship, the more likely it is to have single points of failure simply due to size limitations. A patrol boat can't help but have single points of failure compared to, say, a battleship. I'm not necessarily defending the LCS, just adding a note of reality to the single point of failure concept.
"Its horrific."
DeleteA succinct summation!
"seems like it performed well in tests"
DeleteThe LRLAP did not meet range requirements in testing and, in fact, did not even come close. Accuracy was also suspect although actual data is hard to come by. Navy explanations for the termination of the LRLAP note both cost and performance problems.
Delete(sorry bout the delete I can't type well on my phone)
Fair. I agree but in a mission mode the LCS should have more redundancy given the cost and size in that mode. I would be OK if the ASW (now to be dedicated type) could not do more than basic self defense in any other area. Crews get tired an make mistakes stuff gets broken, weather and even non critical battle damage knocks stuff offline. After reading the LCS review what I see is even as a dedicated ASW platform its a ship with one sonar or alt least a collection of towed items), one helicopter and no torpedoes or ASROC(*). Whatever faults on the Perry I count two sonars (could it not deploy the 3 tiered LCS system) At least the design intent to operate 2 helicopters and torpedo tubes. And a realistic crew size to allow damage control. Again I amsure towed sonars are better but the LCS ASW relies on three different towed arrays and just its helicopter to deliver an attack. If USN crews are so overworked they run aground, and hit multiple different civilian ships in the last couple years I would really like to see an honest test of an LCS all towed system with a tired crew against a Visby. We pay the most that should be the balance of if we buy or not.
* yes obviously the Perry did not either but the Turks proved the hull could sustain VLS capability.
"The LRLAP did not meet range requirements in testing and, in fact, did not even come close. Accuracy was also suspect although actual data is hard to come by. Navy explanations for the termination of the LRLAP note both cost and performance problems."
DeleteI did not catch that. The Performance when I looking. But I take your word. On cost though the still looked like the USN was looking for a reason to kill it by applying all cost to artificially low number of munitions.
"On cost though ..."
DeleteBear in mind that the the LRLAP was failing to meet its performance criteria. The cost of the round was going to continue to increase as the manufacturer added more capability to try to meet the performance requirements. So, the "abort" cost of $800K-$1M per round (depending on whose estimate you choose to use) was not the max cost but the minimum! The "real", eventual cost was probably going to be $1M-$1.5M which is Tomahawk cost range. At that point, why not just buy Tomahawks which are worlds more capable? I think this is likely what the Navy was thinking as the costs continued to mount.
I can see that. But than one has wonder why stockpiles are low and the pacing of upgrades to the Tomahawks are so slow. I also wonder why the older TAS-M version was formally withdrawn. I get the general fear of BVR and mis targeting and how accurate it really was. But why signal to the Chinese and Russians and everyone you just put away a capability w/o a replacement.
DeleteI still think a crash program of any kind would have justifiable to get any ammunition into the AGS. Or maybe a New navy commercial reminding potential sailors that hopefully the folks in the gulf won't remember the Zumwalt's 155mm guns can't shoot at the ever evoked small boat swarm. But man it looks cool with its low radar profile in this video.
Parrott rifle were a nasty habit of bursting but they did actually shoot and could in most cases be repaired to some extent. I wounder what Farragut would say abut a squadron of Zumwalts and LCSs
"But than one has wonder why stockpiles are low and the pacing of upgrades to the Tomahawks are so slow."
DeleteThat's easily understood. The Navy views its mission as putting hulls in the water so as to maintain budget slice. Buying Tomahawks takes funds away from new hull construction therefore we don't buy Tomahawks unless we absolutely have to.
As always, follow the money!
I think I've read that congress ordered the navy to buy a couple more LCS's then they wanted but at the same time zero'ed out the module construction.
ReplyDeleteTypical if true.
Not quite true or, at least, not quite the implied level of stupidity. Congress actually did something smart to go along with the stupidity of extra LCS's. The Navy is attempting to buy non-functional, developmental modules and Congress simply told them no, they weren't going to fund modules until they were done with development and certified ready for use and ready for production. That's actually outstanding and I fully support and applaud Congress!
DeleteI agree. But want to bet on the Navy moving the goalposts for 'certified for use and ready for production'?
DeleteI mean, isn't the Zumwalt 'certified for use and ready for production'? ;-)
"I mean, isn't the Zumwalt 'certified for use and ready for production'?"
DeleteIt is or, rather, was and Congress slapped the Navy down on that with legislation forcing them to remove the Zumwalts from the battle force counting until they were actually ready.
Still, you're correct that the Navy will always attempt to play games to get around Congress instead of obeying the will of the people. It's just one more example of the moral bankruptcy of the Navy leadership.
The LCS program is even worse given that the Navy plans to use first two of each variant for training. The first four ships represent an investment of about a $2.5 billion.
ReplyDeleteSomeone should forward these questions to the Navy OIG and maybe the New York Times. At some level, this abdication of procurement leadership must be considered criminal.
ReplyDeleteI have an acquaintance who believes that a couple of Admirals being led off in handcuffs for fraud would go a long way towards restoring accountability and realistic expectations in defense acquisition programs. His theory is that this would be better than all the "reforms" in the world. I find his reasoning compelling.
DeleteThat is why I was extremely disappointed to see the Navy reduce the homicide charges against the Burke Captains to minor slaps on the wrist.
Unrelated note - what do you think of the apparent disconnect between the Marine's stated doctrine of 25-50+ mile standoff for amphib assault and the stated max "range" of the AAV of 2-3 miles? Closely related, how is the new ACV going to help that situation given that it has the same "range" (debilitating seasickness) limit?
Hi CNO,
ReplyDeleteHave a question about this "gutting" of the AGS:
"You have to realize that the Zumwalt was, literally, designed and built around the AGS. ......... There is nothing that could be reused and the entire ship would have to be gutted. Installing another gun could be done, for sure, but it would be insanely expensive."
Imagine an upside down tree- with a core trunk, and branches. Why couldn't you cut around the core, and a certain distance out, say 5 metres? Sure you'd leave some of the branch ends, but then there's space.
At the USNI news site, a guy who said he was working on the Zumwalt design said if the 9m deep AGS were removed, there's be space for 2 x 64 cell VLS, possible 3x. I've been trying to look through the comment section to find this, but can't so far.
A Zumwalt with 200 LVS cells, and a 5 inch gun would be better.
Andrew
Interesting, so turn them into at least something that might mitigate the capability gap caused by the retiring of the the SSGNs. Whatever the cost seems better than more LCS
Delete"if the 9m deep AGS were removed, there's be space for 2 x 64 cell VLS"
DeleteI don't know about the dimensions but, setting that aside, the AGS SYSTEM is immensely bigger than that. The overall automated munitions handling system literally spans almost the entire length of the ship!
Could just one isolated portion of the system, the gun itself, be removed and a VLS dropped in place? I don't know but I would guess it's possible. That would leave behind a LOT of dead space and equipment.
I'm quite skeptical about a 64 cell VLS fitting in the empty space. In fact, I'm pretty sure it wouldn't. Possibly a 8-32 cell VLS might. Without referring back to my references, an 8 cell module is somewhere around 6 ft x 12 ft. Arranging 8 of those (for a 64 cell unit) would require somewhere around 24 ft x 24 ft. That's way more space than just the area of the AGS gun. You'd have to "carve" out more room. Whether that additional room is available, I have no idea.
Conceptually, I can probably be done but the cost would be enormous!
Similar thinking applies to replacing an AGS with a 5" gun. It's not just the gun space but also the magazine and munitions handling that has to be added. The existing magazines are totally incompatible with any other gun system. Again, it can be done but the cost would be enormous!
"turn them into at least something that might mitigate the capability gap caused by the retiring of the the SSGNs"
DeleteBearing in mind, of course, that the SSGNs have the advantage of the best stealth currently possible. A Zumwalt is a far cry from that level of stealth.
This is essentially a very expensive version of the arsenal ship. The main argument against the arsenal ship is that it places far too much of our limited missile inventory in a single, vulnerable ship.
The Advanced Gun System is exactly what it says, it's a gun system.
DeleteNot just with an autoloader to load the gun, but an autoreloader to reload the loader.
Warhead, case, charges and primer are all automatically and individually taken from deep storage, automatically assembled, autiautomatic loaded and fired.
You can load the system with its 500 rounds in component form, weld the doors shut, and encounter no issues.
Sure, you could rip it out, but you can't put another gun easily, but the ship has no storage for the shells, and no way to move them the nonexistent magazine to the imagined replacement gun.
You could mount the normal guns magazine where the AGS magazine was, but that was sized for a fantastically complicated and efficient auto system, you would need to develop a new shell handling system, which for three ships, just isn't going to happen.
"This is essentially a very expensive version of the arsenal ship. The main argument against the arsenal ship is that it places far too much of our limited missile inventory in a single, vulnerable ship."
DeleteThat argument only works because we have such a small stockpiles of critical weapons that we have no capacity to surge production of. That amounts to crating a playing field to get the result you want.
I still think if they have no main gun and given they cannot do ASW or even a credible job as Surface combatant than the 3rd ship should be killed ASAP. 2 I suppose can just be remanded to being test bed ships for lasers and such. Or (below) I would be happy with an expensive arsenal ship.
I know you gonna reiterate its about hulls, so tell congress how you are saving money to buy real frigates and now a few more. Once in the Pentagon do you get badge for building ships or something?
@Domo
No I really get that. But the reality is they cannot do the job they were supposed to do. The USN seems only vaguely interested in finding an alternative ammunition. They come out the same lets slash crew expense and them them sink with a crew insufficient for damage control. I guess the same theory behind the LCS. They can only really nominally provide for their own self defense.
I don't see a problem with ripping them apart to make a stealth arsenal ship. Sure it expensive but steaming about with radar bright Burkes and CVs it should be the last thing a missile locked onto admits a mass of decoys and jamming.
Hi CNO,
ReplyDeleteOff topic but what do you think of this article/concept?
If you meant to include a link, there's nothing showing. Try again.
Deletehttps://warontherocks.com/2018/09/how-the-marines-will-help-the-u-s-navy-and-americas-allies-win-the-great-indo-pacific-war-of-2025/
DeleteSorry I meant this.
Absolute, fantasy garbage but, hey, what do you think? Maybe I'm missing something?
DeleteWell seems like a place to bring it up CNO. I know the liquidation of the Spruance is pet peeve here. I agree. But if we are talking guns. It was designed to have one of the 8"/55 Mark 71 guns. They by everything I can find performed well and even demonstrated a laser guided shell. The Navy seems have argued rocket assisted 5" shells were just as effective. Thing is as far as can see no such shells every came into general use. Am I missing something on that point? Its only in last few years that I can find any indication that the USN is looking for more advanced shells for its 5" guns.
ReplyDeleteIn any case why can't the new Burks be modified to have the already developed mark 71?
The Burkes have been examined for the Mk71 and it would fit. However, there is some question about the structural strength of the Burkes which were built quite light. The class has had to have reinforcing plates added to the hull just to deal with the everyday stress of sailing.
DeleteAs far as 5" advanced shells, there have been a few developmental efforts. The ERGM was a notable one with rocket assisted extended range and GPS/INS guidance. It began in the mid-1990's and went through the usual cycle of test successes and failures, escalating costs, etc. It was cancelled around 2008, if I recall correctly after a string of failed tests. The NavWeaps site has good writeups on the various 5" munitions.