Threat Surrogate Status

We’ve often discussed the Navy’s myopic focus on new, shiny, sexy ships like carriers at the expense of logistic vessels, drydocks, depot maintenance, shipyard improvements, testing facilities and equipment, etc. – you know, all the things that actually make a navy function and contribute to readiness. 

One of the specific problem areas is threat surrogates.  While we’d like to test Aegis against a Chinese or Russian missile, we usually don’t have any available to us.  Thus, we have to use threat surrogates – another, similar, asset that can mimic the real threat to a sufficient degree as to allow meaningful and useful testing. 

This seems simple enough.  If we don’t have a particular Chinese missile, we should be able to modify and mock up some existing missiles to simulate the Chinese missile’s flight profile, on-board ECM, speed, terminal maneuvers, seeker/sensor radiations, etc.  While the one-off, hand modified nature of such a threat surrogate will result in a high cost compared to the cost of the base production missile, the cost is virtually free compared to the Navy’s overall budget or the cost of the acquisition program it is intended to be used in.

For example, if we want to develop and deploy a new submarine sonar, a program that would cost billions to research, develop, and install, the cost of a diesel sub surrogate – a modified torpedo, in essence – would likely be a few million dollars which is round off error in the math of the billion(s) dollar sonar program.  We’d have to be idiots to try to scrimp and forego acquiring the needed threat surrogates to thoroughly test our systems just to save some fraction of a fraction of a percent of the cost of the parent program, right?

Well, sadly and unbelievably, that’s exactly what the Navy is doing.  They’re routinely refusing to acquire the threat surrogates needed to test our shiny new systems.  Here’s some quotes on the subject from the 2017 DOT&E Annual Report.  I’ve included the page numbers with the quotes so you can read them yourself because I’m pretty sure you’re not going to believe the degree of stupidity these shortcomings demonstrate.

What’s one of the major threats to the Navy?  Why it’s shallow water non-nuclear submarines (SSK), of course!  Obviously we must have threat surrogates for those, right?  Wrong.

No assessment can be made against operationally relevant midget and coastal diesel submarine threats because the Navy does not have any test surrogates that accurately represent these platforms. (p. 152)

Continuing with submarines and sonar, the undersea warfare combat software needs torpedo threat surrogates to test against.  We’ve got hundreds (thousands?) of torpedoes.  How hard could it be to tweak some into enemy torpedo threat surrogates for something as important as testing the main undersea combat control software?  I’m sure we must have torpedo threat surrogates, right?  Wrong.

A representative threat torpedo surrogate is needed to adequately assess future AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 variants.  (p. 152)

Along the same lines, the LCS ASW module has various pieces of equipment intended to detect and defeat submarines and torpedoes.  We must have torpedo threat surrogates for use in testing the LCS ASW module, right?  Wrong.

Current test surrogates have significant limitations representing threat torpedoes.  (p. 191)

Aegis is the foundation of our entire naval defense capability.  We don’t even need to ask whether the Navy has provided for an Aegis surrogate test bed ship, right?  Wrong.

To adequately assess the Probability of Raid Annihilation requirement for the self-defense mission for Flight III DDG 51 destroyers/ACB-20, the Navy must provide … an Aegis-equipped Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) where the ship’s full self-defense kill chain can be tested.  (p. 139)

Our close range air defense is the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).  I’ll bet we must have an adequate anti-ship missile surrogate because I know we have drones, including a supersonic one, right?  Wrong.

The Navy has not completed the following previous recommendations:

Develop a Multi-Stage Supersonic Target adequate for use in a phase of RAM Block 2 FOT&E.  (p. 209)

Develop an improved steerable antenna system for its ASCM surrogates. (p. 209)

The America class LHA uses the standard Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) installed on all amphibious ships.  The SSDS is the standard for all amphibious ships and has been around for quite some time so we must have fully developed threat surrogates, right?  Wrong.

… the Navy has not resolved the following previous recommendations related to LHA 6 ship self-defense:

Develop an open-loop seeker subsonic ASCM surrogate target for ship self-defense combat system operational tests.  (p. 212)

Develop an adequate Multi-Stage Supersonic Target (MSST) and electronic warfare target surrogates for operational testing.  (p. 213)

You’ll recall that the Navy fielded a torpedo defense system on carriers in response to an Urgent Operational Need (UON) requirement.  If any system would have adequate threat surrogates it would have to be a carrier protection system developed for a UON, right?  Wrong.

The Navy has not accredited the surrogate torpedo targets used for testing as representative of any real-world threat torpedo.  (p. 225)

I can go on listing the threat surrogate deficiencies but you get the idea.  For reasons that totally elude me, the Navy steadfastly, adamantly, stubbornly, and stupidly refuses to fund and acquire the requisite threat surrogates to allow adequate testing.  There’s simply no excuse.  Compared to the cost of the parent acquisition programs, the surrogates are free.  This is just inexplicable stupidity on a scale that defies belief (geez, I seem to say that in a lot of posts, don’t I?).