Does This Look Like A Realistic, Useful Exercise? |
Here’s what a useful amphibious exercise should be …
The exercise should start only if significant, adverse weather
is present. That’s probably how it will
be in a real war so let’s start dealing with waves, rain, and wind.
An actual and significant opposing force (OpFor) should
contest every second of the exercise including the approach into the area. Let’s involve the Air Force and give them free
reign to try to stop the amphibious force using any tactics they can think
of. Interservice rivalry and pride
should provide all the realism and creativity we need. Let’s include manned aircraft simulating
cruise missiles (since we don’t have enough drones to do anything
worthwhile). Let’s give them free reign
to begin attacking as far out to sea as they can detect the amphibious force
(there’s your 25-50 mile stand off !). Let’s
have them conduct attacks on any forces that land and see how we perform
anti-air defense (hint: we don’t have anti-air capability!).
Let’s include an opposing submarine force and see if they
can penetrate and sink the amphibious ships.
Then, let’s set up a division size OpFor (yeah, good
practice for the defenders, too, in commanding and controlling a large unit –
something we don’t practice at all, anymore) to defend the beach and, again,
give them free reign to devise their own tactics. Let’s give them engineering units to
construct obstacles, trenches to be crossed, and fortifications (good practice
for combat applications of engineering instead of building schools in third
world countries) and see how the amphibious force deals with them (I bet they
won’t have a clue).
Let’s emplace extensive simulated minefields and make the
assaulting force deal with them (what a cluster* that will be!).
Let’s give the defending force a full complement of
electronic warfare capabilities. Let
them jam, decoy, disable GPS, cyber attack, and any other tactic they can think
of and make the assaulting force operate in a degraded electronic
environment. Let’s see what (and who!)
can work under those conditions and what can’t.
Let’s have referees permanently remove ‘dead’ ships,
aircraft, and personnel from the exercise – no ‘reanimations’. We can, and should, repeat the exercise, in
its entirety, as often as necessary to ensure that all units can participate
start to finish. Those that keep getting
killed and can’t participate are either trying to execute flawed tactics or they
have incompetent commanders. Either way,
it’s something we should identify as opposed to our current practice of reanimating
dead units over and over again with no penalty.
If they’re consistently dying, that’s telling us something!
With the above defensive efforts, we should have a lot of
induced confusion (What do you mean, my MLP sea base is sunk?! I’ve only got one! What am I supposed to do now??) but let’s not
stop there. Let’s add additional layers
of confusion and chaos.
Let’s apply lots of smoke.
There will be lots of smoke from explosions and burning equipment in a
real war so let’s get used to our vision and our sensors being degraded.
Let’s use lots of flash-bang explosives. A real war is going to be incredibly noisy so
let’s start learning how to communicate when you have to scream into the radio.
Let’s have referees arbitrarily misdirect landing vehicles
to the wrong areas – you know, just like will happen in a real assault – and see
how units recover and reorient.
Let’s have ‘dead’ vehicles and equipment get left where they
are, constituting additional obstacles for subsequent units.
Let’s have referees arbitrarily insert incorrect orders into
communications - you know, just like will happen in a real assault – and see
whether the receiving units can figure out for themselves what to do.
Let’s remove half of all the supplies delivered to the beach
to simulate actual combat usage which is always 2x-5x the predicted rate and
see how we deal with ammo and supply shortages.
All right, that’s enough to get us started. Seriously, what do you think would happen if
we did this? I know exactly what would
happen. We’d immediately find out that
most of our doctrine is unexecutable.
Most of our tactics will be seen as flawed. None of our plans will work. We’ll have great difficulty loading,
launching, and coordinating AAVs due to the weather. Most of our equipment will be found
susceptible to electronic warfare effects.
Our communications will be compromised.
All of our commanders will be confused and begin issuing contradictory
orders. We’ll find that we lack all
kinds of useful equipment. None of our equipment
will work as advertised – some will be useless and some will be less effective
but still somewhat useful.
This Is What We Should Be Simulating |
In short, the exercise would be a total debacle … exactly
what we want! That’s how you find out
what really works and what doesn’t. That’s
how you learn.
Let’s do it, let’s fail, and let’s get better.
There is only one major change I would make. Rather than trying to add all the adversity at once, I would only add one or to extra problems at a time. Once the additional problems are overcome during an exercise add more adverse conditions on the next exercise till we can fight reasonably well.
ReplyDeleteIn concept, there's nothing wrong with your approach but it would make for an awfully extended and expensive way of going about training. Remember, I'm not describing a tiny exercise involving a handful of units. I'm talking about major exercises involving many units and all the services! Your approach would have us assemble massive numbers of assets, run the whole exercise at a very simple level until we get it right, then repeat the entire massive exercise again while we add in one more complication, then do it again … and again …
DeleteIt's simply unaffordable.
Now, there's nothing wrong - and everything right! - about conducting much smaller, individual exercises where we slowly work up the level of complexity and confusion. But, sooner or later, you have to throw it all together and see what happens. One of the major sources of confusion in any exercise is the sheer number of assets. How to control them? How to coordinate them? How to get them all fueled, as needed? How to deconflict them?
Also, for a massive exercise like I'm describing, it's the ultimate in free play, unscripted combat. Scenarios are not, and should not, replay exactly the same way. Each iteration should be markedly different. Thus, repeating the exercise wouldn't even ensure that we run into the same problem we saw last time so we won't know if we solved it by repeating the exercise. Of course, we could script the exercise to force the occurrence of the desired problem but then the exercise loses its value.
So, yes, go ahead and work the individual issues at the individual unit level but, eventually, you have to throw it, and them, all together and see what happens. The D-Day, Normandy, invasion rehearsals offer some good insight into training although even those were somewhat limited out of a desire for secrecy. Having no actual war in hand, we don't need to be limited by secrecy. We can go ahead and practice everything we want!
What I was envisioning was a series of smaller exercise to actually validate and prove techniques and procedures. For example, I never heard of that being done for dealing with mines, even when I was in in the 90's. If they don't have validated TTP's then on that large exercise, if it's done right, the only thing that will happen is a lot of flailing (failing) followed by finger pointing and burying the results.
DeleteOh absolutely, there's no point running a major exercise until all the pieces have, at least in theory, been establish and learned. Once the pieces are supposedly in place then the major exercise will reveal all the problems associated with integrating all the separate capabilities and units. Also, the free form play will reveal all the unanticipated problems that were never revealed by the smaller, scripted exercises.
DeleteSo, yes, if that's what you're envisioning then I'm completely on board and you're completely on the mark.
"no point running a major exercise until all the pieces have, at least in theory, been establish and learned."
DeleteI would point out, however, that the Marines/Navy claim to be able to mount an amphibious assault today, with no additional training needed. They officially claim that they know all the pieces. That being the case, we're ready to run a major exercise right now. Of course, it would be an absolute disaster but that's kind of the point - to run it and identify the problems.
Let’s have referees permanently remove ‘dead’ ships, aircraft, and personnel from the exercise – no ‘reanimations’. We can, and should, repeat the exercise, in its entirety, as often as necessary to ensure that all units can participate start to finish. Those that keep getting killed and can’t participate are either trying to execute flawed tactics or they have incompetent commanders. Either way, it’s something we should identify as opposed to our current practice of reanimating dead units over and over again with no penalty. If they’re consistently dying, that’s telling us something!"
ReplyDeleteI have some thoughts on this, but before I go further I think it's better for us to be on the same page. What do you envision your excercise above as? Is it more of a validation excercise meant to stress-test amphibious assault doctrine? Or do you see it more as a training excercise, like Red Flag or NTC rotations?
It's what I described. I have no interest in debating what label to put on it.
DeleteI'm just seeking clarification, because my understanding of your excercise layout leans more to the stress test, rather than an ongoing, repeated training excercise. There's a subtle, yet IMO significant difference in how we're going about it.
DeleteIf it's a stress test, then sure, by all means, participation one and done, and if you're killed, you're killed and you sit out the rest of the excercise. No arguments there.
That said, I think the approach at Red Flag and NTC has merit. It's ultimately a giant teaching moment: yes, the aggressors win at the start, but the aim is to get the participating units to the point where they can defeat the aggressors, and they do that by debriefing what went wrong, and respawning defeated units to give them a chance to apply the lessons learned (and "kill" them again if they keep fucking things up). Respawning killed units goes against the realism aspect, yes, but it's a compromise I'm willing to accept in order to have teaching moments. And repeated teaching moments are going to have an effect; back when SAC first participated in Red Flag they sent bombers painted bright anti-flash white, flying high altitude routes with zero deception flight plans and evasive maneuvers. After repeatedly getting scores of bombers "shot down" by the aggressors, SAC was forced to implement reforms, with bombers being painted in camo and practicing low level penetration flights and deception flight plans.
If the US is really serious about amphibious assault, then let's not just be one and done with the excercise above. Let's take a page from Red Flag and make it a yearly thing, a serious exercise that is both dress rehearsal and post-graduate study for war.
But the elephant in the room factor, IMO, is that for all the rhethoric of amphibious assault, I don't think the USMC and USN leadership is actually serious about an amphibious assault. The Air Force and the Army are serious about Major Combat Operations, and have spent the last 4 decades holding dress rehearsals. The Navy and Marine Corps have just been having a table read.
" let's not just be one and done with the excercise above."
DeleteWhat in the post or anything I've ever written would lead you to think I believe an exercise should be a one time event?
I'm just reinforcing your point, for the benefit of others reading the comments. All too often, there's insufficient follow through with things, a certain belief that doing something once will be enough to solve the problem.
Delete"An actual and significant opposing force (OpFor) should contest every second of the exercise including the approach into the area. Let’s involve the Air Force and give them free reign to try to stop the amphibious force using any tactics they can think of. Interservice rivalry and pride should provide all the realism and creativity we need."
DeleteI meant to touch on this earlier - this would be of benefit to the Air Force. Maritime strike is one area in which the USAF lags behind the USN and USMC - for the longest time, the only Air Force aircraft wired for Harpoons were a select few B-52s*. The United States is the only nation accessible from sea whose air force's tactical aviation has no leanings towards maritime strike, and I think that's something that needs to change.
*Harpoon can by carried by F-16s, as seen by the multiple export customers that have Harpoon integrated with their F-16s, but the USAF has never pursued integration for its F-16s.
The Air Force is integrating the LRASM with its B-1 bomber. I believe the 34th and 37th Bomber Squadrons at Ellsworth have been certified to carry the anti-ship cruise missile and can carry up to 24 missiles per aircraft.
DeleteAdditional integration plans include the F-15E, F-16, F-18, B-2, an B-52. I don't know what the integration status of those aircraft are.
Yeah, things are moving in a step in the right direction from the way they went before. The next step should be to then start training squadrons in this role.
DeleteWas talking to my SG MINDEF procurement acquaintance last week, and he opined that LRASM is probably integrated with the F-35 as well, since Singapore would only have committed to their F-35 buy once maritime strike was an assured capability.
LRASM does not fit in the F-35 weapon bay. It can be carried externally but has not been integrated into a software build, yet.
DeleteThis what they do in red flag. They even deposit the crews in the desert and then try and rescue them. The problem I see with the above scenario is the issue of air superiority. I do not think an amphibious invasion is even possible without first gaining air superiority. I therefore do not feel strongly that opposing airforces be included. The last amphibious invasion that attempted this was the falklands invasion at bluff cove. The defending aircraft were at the limits of their combat radius. The reason it was successful is that the bombs the defenders dropped had faulty fuses. If they had been fused correctly the invasion would likely have failed with large numbers of casualties.
ReplyDeleteWell, in Red Flag they also let the Aggressors respawn mid-air in order to simulate overwhelming numbers, but that kinda has to happen given the numerical advantage BLUFOR has in Red Flag and funding issues meaning there's only 1 aggressor squadron at Red Flag atm (65th AGS was shut down during sequestration, but is now going to be stood up in the future with the F-35 serving as a threat surrogate for Chinese and Russian stealth fighters).
Delete"They even deposit the crews in the desert and then try and rescue them"
DeleteI'm sure that they do, weeks in advance, its decided that a specific F18 will be shot down at a specific location, its crew will land at a specific place with a specific set of injuries and rescue will be mounted, which will no doubt succeed, because thats what happens when you script an exercise weeks in advance.
"The problem I see with the above scenario is the issue of air superiority. I do not think an amphibious invasion is even possible without first gaining air superiority. I therefore do not feel strongly that opposing airforces be included."
The enemy gets a vote
It would be nice if they conveniently lined up their aircraft on the tarmac to be destroyed by standoff weapons, or fought an air war they don't need to fight, but they wont.
They will husband their assets until an opportune time to strike, and then they will then throw everything at you.
The Falklands Airwar began on the 1st of May, Argentina believed the invasion was under way and threw everything they had in to play, for a week, until they realised it wasn't.
They didn't mount any other major attacks for anther two weeks, during the landings.
"The reason it was successful is that the bombs the defenders dropped had faulty fuses."
The fuses weren't "faulty", they worked perfectly, they wouldnt allow bombs to detonate if the aircraft was in the blast radius, Argentina was just dropping them from too low a height.
"This what they do in red flag."
DeleteGood for Red Flag. Irrelevant for Navy/Marine amphibious exercises.
" I do not think an amphibious invasion is even possible without first gaining air superiority."
DeleteYou raise a good issue. We have come to believe that air superiority is our birthright and this is simply not going to be true in a war with China. We have to either remove lots (damn near all!) of combat options from the playbook because we can't guarantee air superiority or we have to learn how to function without absolute air superiority.
One of the first realizations is that we won't achieve air superiority. At best, we'll be able to establish temporary, transient air equality. Thus, we need to learn how to fight our way to the invasion location, learn how to continuously defend the fleet from air attacks, how to provide air support to the ground forces in the face of counter air (we've never practiced that!), how to defend our ground forces from enemy air support, how to provide AAW for ground forces (currently we have almost no ground AAW capability), and so on.
I think you're suggesting that we 'hand wave' the issue of enemy air away with the simplistic and utterly unrealistic and unachievable pronouncement that we'll achieve air superiority before the assault commences. I'm not trying to be mean about this, just pointing out that we need to adjust to a new reality when fighting a peer enemy: we won't ever establish absolute air superiority. China has more aircraft, closer to the theatre of operations than we do (a suggestion that we need more carriers?) and that pretty much guarantees them air equality, at worse.
"The fuses weren't "faulty", they worked perfectly, they wouldnt allow bombs to detonate if the aircraft was in the blast radius, Argentina was just dropping them from too low a height."
DeleteWhat a great example of a failure of, and need for, realistic training. The Argentine pilots had, presumably, trained to drop bombs but, quite obviously, never done so under stressful, realistic conditions which would have forced them to fly low and they would have realized that their tactics were incompatible with the munition.
We're constantly doing the same thing. We 'train' under perfect, scripted exercises instead of in free play, high stress, realistic conditions where we'll be able to find out what actually works and what doesn't.
If we don't vastly improve our training, we'll be Argentina in the next war. WWII torpedo exploder issue, anyone?
Just replace old dumb bombs with modern ASMs...what happens when the bad guys starts shooting not 1 but 5 or 10 of them at a TF? Has anybody really trained for that? I bet that would be a shock to that TF. In Falkland war, losing Sheffield was a shock to the TF. We need to lose a ship or 2 and keep going on with the exercise....
DeleteWhich leads to something in the post, how much are we really prepared mentality to take loses? I understand the idea behind "regeneration" but it creates bad habits. When you lose people but they come back right away, that's not realistic. Plus what happens when you lose a top leader or a ship, in real live, are you going to get a replacement right away? No but we kind of practice like we will...we need to practice taking some serious hits, not replace them and keep moving forward.
"They even deposit the crews in the desert and then try and rescue them."
DeleteAs noted, knowing ahead of time that you'll be conducting a single, planned, scripted rescue is only slightly better than useless. Let's have the force be faced with unanticipated rescues of an unknown number in unknown, multiple locations and watch as we scramble to identify and allocate rescue resources while balancing those scarce resources against mission accomplishment and have to plan and execute rescues on the fly, against unknown enemy forces. You know … just like in real combat.
"What a great example of a failure of, and need for, realistic training. The Argentine pilots had, presumably, trained to drop bombs but, quite obviously, never done so under stressful, realistic conditions which would have forced them to fly low and they would have realized that their tactics were incompatible with the munition."
DeleteAbsolutely
"Let's have the force be faced with unanticipated rescues of an unknown number in unknown, multiple locations and watch as we scramble to identify and allocate rescue resources while balancing those scarce resources against mission accomplishment and have to plan and execute rescues on the fly, against unknown enemy forces. You know … just like in real combat."
And lets have the enemy mounting their own capture/kill missions to pick up the shot down pilots as well.
Sadam in 91 had no trouble contesting the rescue of shot down airmen, he even won some of the races.
I wonder how many times Pedros in training have had to contest with Delta/Ranger/SEAL "drinking their milkshake"
What I said is that only when air superiority is acheived can an amphibious operation be undertaken.
ReplyDeleteYou're either wrong or you're willing to remove half (most?) of our combat playbook from consideration because, against a peer defender like China, we'll never get absolute air superiority. I described what and why the air situation would be. We either have to develop the tactics and doctrine to deal with less than ideal air power conditions or we have to give up most of our combat playbook.
DeleteConsider the example of Guadalcanal. We didn't have air superiority - we had approximate air equality which meant that on any give day, at any given moment, either side might have the momentary air advantage. Despite this lack of absolute air superiority, the invasion went ahead and managed, with great loss, to eventually secure Guadalcanal.
We can do the same today but we have to modify our doctrine and expectations.
Unfortunate as it may be, we don't appear to have the equipment, experience or the inclination to rectify our shortcomings in peer-peer scenario. In all likelihood, any significant, contested amphibious landing attempt will need air superiority, if not air supremacy to succeed due to attrition. Until we develop the force to be able to survive and thrive in a high casualty event, it's just a waste of funds and resources.
DeleteIn terms of red flag, when they adjudicate they have been shot down they drop them there. Not planned in advance.
ReplyDelete'They did not undertake a major attack while the invasion was taking place'
ReplyDeleteJust not true. The invasion started 25 may and the air attacks started two hours after dawn.
No sure who this is in response to? A deleted comment?
DeleteOf course this is a great idea. The damage ships received, along with cancelled landings during Trident Juncture are examples that show our inability to perform. The recent Phillipine exercises that were "humanitarian assistance" oriented is an example of our misplaced priorities. SERIOUS warfighting training, against a free-handed OPFOR, in the worst conditions, is the only way to learn our weaknesses, and strengths (if any)... The old pre-WWII FLEX scenarios were huge learning events that nit only developed tactics, but equipment. They gave us an invaluable jump start on things before the war. We are at a parallel point in history right now, and should take note of it. "Those who forget history......"
ReplyDeleteGreat idea, but the safety nazis would shit a brick. Not to mention the environmental nazis.
ReplyDeleteMilitary training always has an element of risk. What strikes you as especially unsafe?
DeleteFor starters, it would have to be OCONUS. Due to all of the least tern nesting areas and kangaroo rat habitat, attempting to execute a division level amphibious exercise wouldn't have the maneuver space on Camp Pendleton. Safety factors (Camp Pendleton scenario) would include smoke obscuring I5, "dead" vehicles and personnel at risk from maneuvering forces (I can tell a few sea stories about being "dead" at NTC in the middle of a Armor BDE attack!) The electronic aspect of the exercise interfering with civilian electronics, God forbid Karen can't watch Keeping up with the Kartrashians!. Not that I personally against an ultra realistic training evolution because I participated in my share of launching out of the well deck of an LST close to shore for amphibious exercises.
DeleteThe realities of training today seem to place risk management and environmental considerations above realism and effectiveness.
"The realities of training today seem to place risk management and environmental considerations above realism and effectiveness."
DeleteThere you have it. Succinctly put.
We haven't done realistic amphib training in decades. The only thing we have going for us is that neither has anyone else. We need to get to the kinds of exercises you are suggesting, but we can't go straight there. What we need is about a 5-year phase-in, where we set milestones for each year, step up the difficulty, and review progress and revise the schedule at each year. Expecting the Navy to do that realistically and objectively is wildly and overly optimistic. I agree that the risk Nazis and the environmental Nazis have totally destroyed what was left of realistic training.
ReplyDeleteI wouldn't limit it to amphibs either. I don't think our ASW training is anywhere close to where it needs to be. Not really familiar enough with Navy air and submarines to comment. My perception from afar is that they are way closer to where they need to be than is the surface Navy, but I could be totally off base there.
Agree but do we have 5 years before a war with China? I used to scoff at that notion, nowadays, not so sure....
Delete" The only thing we have going for us is that neither has anyone else."
DeleteCareful with that statement! I get that you're making a generalized statement about the state of training among all militaries, however, let's think about it perhaps a bit more in depth than you intended.
For starters, 'anyone else' doesn't need to do amphibious training or, at least, not the degree of a major operation. China is not going to invade any US defended territory under any war scenario I can think of, thus, they have no need to train for it.
There is the Taiwan scenario, of course, which will require an amphibious assault though of a bit different kind.
Any small countries that China might assault (Vietnam, for example) would fall into the category of a virtually unopposed, unloading exercise so, again, no need for amphibious assault training to any great extent.
Now, with the above in mind, we should recognize that China has been training intensely for amphibious operations, at least in comparison to what we're doing which is almost nothing. I frequent a couple of Chinese military sites and they show a steady stream of amphibious exercises and they're far more intense and realistic than anything we even pretend to do.
Lastly, China is developing some pretty good amphibious assets ranging from brand new clones of our amphibious ships, duplicating our Marines, and developing some impressive amphibious tanks. They're pretty serious about amphibious operations.
So, "the only thing we have going for us" may not actually be the case. I'm afraid we're well behind the curve compared to China.
By the way, just a bit of perspective … If we truly need a 5 year phase-in (you're likely correct!) just to get to the point where we can begin to conduct worthwhile EXERCISES, then we are really in the garbage pit right now and the last few Marine Commandants should be court-martialed for dereliction of duty since amphibious assault is the Corps' entire reason for being.
"Any small countries that China might assault (Vietnam, for example) would fall into the category of a virtually unopposed, unloading exercise so, again, no need for amphibious assault training to any great extent."
DeleteA little bit of local perspective here: a lot of Western commentators seem to think that China's amphibious force is aimed at SEA, but that's not an opinion shared by this corner of the world. SEA defense circles opine that China's amphibious force isn't really aimed at SEA, but for Africa. Which makes sense, given all the imperialistic adventures that China has been getting up to. Would China like to turn ASEAN into it's client states? Absoltely - ASEAN combined is projected to be the world's 4th largest economic bloc by 2050. But China also knows that militarily flexing on ASEAN will just tilt ASEAN into greater defense spending and unite ASEAN against China, which is something China doesn't want, because it seeks to exploit ASEAN's disunity by playing all sides against each other.
Generally, a SEA-wise breakdown of resistance:
- Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore can oppose a Chinese landing by intercepting the amphibious group with naval warships and land-based fighters out at sea, and a defending force on the target beach.
- Malaysia doesn't have enough fighters to threaten an invasion fleet at sea, but is capable of defending the beach and contesting the landing. (Theoretically, anyhow. Assuming that the Malaysian Army actually has ammo, instead of the funds for ammo purchase being embezzled by the former Prime Minister and the former defense minister).
-- If the BN coalition led by PM Najib had remained in power, there wouldn't be any invasions because he would have sold the nation to China as a vassal state, and China would have moved in and started using our bases to station their forces here.
- The Phillipines' ability to contest the landing is debatable, it could go either way, but things get very difficult for them once the Chinese APCs and assault guns hit the beach, so they have to contest the beach as hard as they can.
- Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar will not contest as they're effectively Chinese client states.
- Brunei is utterly fucked and is reliant on being good neighbours with SEA to defend itself.
There is no country in China's region that they are likely to attack that could mount more than a token defense. Any landing would be, essentially, unopposed by the time the landing actually occurred.
DeleteThe situation is even more pronounced in Africa. There is no one would who could offer even token resistance to a landing.
As stated, the need for amphibious training is markedly less than for the US although that doesn't mean that China won't and isn't training hard for it, anyway.
A somewhat more likely place to start would be some realistic sims, possibly drawn from historical records (this would allow for ready made opfors, conditions, and objectives). I've always thought that an assault on Iwo Jima vs the original defenders would be interesting. I'm not sure we could win, even with the tech disparity, because our casualty sensitivity is so much greater.
ReplyDelete"A somewhat more likely place to start would be some realistic sims,"
DeleteRespectfully, that would be the place to end, not start! I assume you're suggesting that sims would be a good way to learn strategy, operations, and doctrine - and it is. However, just as you wouldn't teach a child calculus before they've learned basic arithmetic (although that's exactly what some schools are trying to do; bit, I digress...), neither would you waste time teaching sailors/officers high level strategy, operations, and doctrine before they've learned how to sail a ship without colliding with giant cargo ships, getting lost, running aground, or not knowing how to anchor. Once we can demonstrably sail our ships without posing a danger to ourselves or those around us, then we can venture into strategy, operations, and doctrine, as you suggest.