Wednesday, May 29, 2019

Praise the Gods of Acquisition!

In a totally unexpected development, Lockheed has announced that it is dropping out of the competition to build the Navy’s frigate.(1)  That leaves Huntington Ingalls Industries, Austal, Fincantieri, and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works.

The decision to drop out of the competition is quite surprising because ComNavOps had believed that the competition was heavily slanted to favor the Lockheed Freedom class LCS ‘frigate’ and that the LCS ‘frigate’ was a lock to be selected. 

One can only speculate on the reason for the decision but a hint comes from the USNI News article.

…the company told the service it felt the Freedom design would be stretched too far to accommodate all the capabilities required, one source told USNI News. (1)

This suggests and sort of confirms what we have been saying all along, that the Freedom LCS variant has severe, inherent limitations as a ship that can’t be fixed even by stretching the design in length.  Issues such as non-existent weight growth margins, weak structural construction, excessive vibration due to the weak structural design, self-noise issues, compartmentation issues, badly designed internal layouts, aluminum structure cracking, meta-centric height deficiencies (stability problems), etc. are ‘baked in’ to the design and can’t be corrected by lengthening the ship or adding a few extra weapons.

With all the LCS problems in mind, this is tremendous news and can only be considered a good thing as it removes a very poor option from the frigate candidate pool.  That leaves one exceptionally poor competitor, the Austal ‘frigate’ which, like the Lockheed, is just a version of the Independence variant LCS.  Like the Lockheed Freedom variant ‘frigate’, the Austal Independence LCS ‘frigate’ has built in flaws and weaknesses that simply adding a few more weapons can’t overcome.  We need to get the Austal entry removed, now.  The remaining three options are, at least, acceptable frigates although ComNavOps still sees no need for a frigate, at all.

This is some of the best news ComNavOps has seen in recent times.  Praise the Gods of Acquisition!



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(1)USNI News website, “Lockheed Martin Won’t Submit Freedom LCS Design for FFG(X) Contest”, Sam LaGrone, 29-May-2019,
https://news.usni.org/2019/05/28/lockheed-martin-wont-submit-freedom-lcs-design-for-ffgx-contest

42 comments:

  1. Does this mean Austal will drop out too?

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  2. Austral to my knowledge is still under investigation for alleged Financial Irregularities that in its self should be a disqualification if nothing else besides it's a crappy ship also

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  3. My favorite has been Fremm from day one but after seeing the Spanish designed from Bath Iron Works it has jumped ahead IMHO

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  4. Lockheed also has their fingers in the FREMM pie, which is the near-default choice by everyone.
    They will have the existing LCS yard do some production, at least for some sections. I also wouldn’t be surprised if they got a Billion dollar deal to convert the LCS yard to full FFG assembly.

    Austal will most probably go bankrupt when they don’t get the FFG contract...or so they will say to Congress who will buy more of their LCS to “maintain the manufacturing base” and prevent the plant closing.

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    1. Austal could make ASW corvettes or the Next Avengers,
      you know ships a fighting Navy needs.

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    2. That's what I'm thinking maybe staying busy converting each and every independence class to the mine warfare suite that should take a awfully long time just by itself those aluminum hulls ain't made for fighting

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  5. In another happy note the CIC has said he going to order the next carriers to be steam, not EMALs.
    Still not sure how the Navy couldn’t get something to work that amusement park roller coasters have been using for years ;)
    All kidding aside, we need something dependable, not experimental.

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    1. Trump says a lot of things that don't happen. The Navy will fight this, tooth and nail. We'll see but I doubt the Navy will revert to steam.

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    2. I know it's not the topic BUT something hit me when I read that BD article yesterday on FORD and still having problems with the elevators and EMALS...

      “The reliability concerns are exacerbated by the fact that the crew cannot readily electrically isolate EMALs components during flight operations” thanks to the energy storage system being shared between several systems on the ship. This leads to a “time-consuming” process to share the energy, and “spinning down the EMALS motor/generators takes 1.5 hours by itself. The inability to readily electrically isolate equipment precludes EMALS maintenance during flight operations,” the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation wrote.

      So we all have been talking about how you can't isolate 1 catapult from the other 3 catapults and you have to wait for the whole thing to spool down so sailors can work on it. Well because of the whole "sharing" power thing, does this mean EMALS has to wait for other ancillary or important systems to shut down and/or power to be rerouted?!?

      Maybe it's just me and I never liked my electrical classes but this seems a lot more complicated than just flipping a switch and turning off EMALS and ancillaries, sounds to me you have to manage other systems (make sure they stay on!) and reroute all the power and don't screw other systems up. No wonder it takes 1.5 hours!

      That sounds super practical....

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    3. The language strongly suggests that electrical power is shared from a common point to 'several systems' beyond just the EMALS. What those other systems are and how important they are is an open question. My April Fools post about the weapon elevators all being tied together and triggering the catapults is beginning to sound less like humor and more like reality!

      We've talked about being unable to isolate a single catapult for repair but what about the reverse? Do we have to shut down the catapults in order to work on one of the 'several systems' that shares power with the EMALS? We could lose catapult capability because the Captain's muffin toaster needs repair and it shares power with the catapults??? Okay that's a ridiculous example but the concept is valid. We seem to have many items tied into a single point of failure/delay. That's poor design on a warship.

      On a related note, my very vague understanding is that the EMALS (and AAG?) use very large flywheels that must be spun up and down gradually over extended periods.

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    4. I'm equally or more horrified by the continuing catastrophic problems with the steam turbo-generators.

      The Captain will not be happy if he doesn't get his muffins!!

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  6. I saw the article mentioning the dropout from the FFG(X) competition and had the same reaction!!! (One down, one to go!!)
    To accept any LCS variant would be sheer idiocy!!
    As far as having a need for a new FFG, I feel its only purpose should be dedicated ASW. We need anti-sub assets we can actually afford to send out for ASW, and train primarilly for it. But it still sounds like theyre trying for a mini-Burke....

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  7. The Independence Class has had fewer problems compared to the Freedom Class, even considering the move to all aluminum. The Freedom Class was originally designed as a superexpensive yacht. The Independence Class was designed as a ferry. As such it has a lot more room that competitors. The purpose of using a commercial design was to keep costs as low as possible to afford the numbers needed. I assume that there are disadvantages to the Austal commercial design that cannot be overcome by reasonable redesign. Expansion room and low cost are advantages baked into the design.

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    1. Which begs the obvious question, "why the h*** are we buying yachts and ferries for our Navy?????
      As far as keeping costs down, sure... Id accept that if the ships actually were capable of doing somthing....anything....

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    2. "The Independence Class has had fewer problems compared to the Freedom Class"

      I don't know that that's the case. The Independence variant has received less publicity than the Freedom, that's true. However, you might want to read the DOT&E 2016 Annual Report on LCS as an indicator of the types of problems the Ind variant has.

      I also note that the Ind variant has largely been idle whereas the Freedom variant has been more active and, thus, more studied and reported.

      From the Wiki article,

      "On 9 December 2009, the Navy announced that the ship had completed its first INSURV inspection. The inspection found 2,080 discrepancies, including 39 high-priority deficiencies, but concluded that all could be resolved before the Navy accepts the ship as scheduled. The ship was delivered to the Navy on 17 December 2009, and the service officially accepted it the next day. However, the ship was found to be incomplete and a second round of acceptance trials was scheduled for 2011."

      I think Ind class has had just as many problems but far less public coverage.

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  8. The LM Freedom based on a superyacht designed to take the Atlantic Blue Ribbon with massive power, 50kt semi-planning hull, what the Navy said they wanted for LCS, think they were on crack when they spec'd that. The draw back of semi-planning hulls is at normal speeds they have very, very high resistance compared to a standard displacement hull and why LCS Freedom class has so short range.

    The FFG latest spec is 26 kts threshold and 28 kts objective, plus upping VLS cells from 16 to 32, LM talked of increasing hull displacement from Freedom max 3,500t to 6,000t+ it would have had to have been a new standard displacement hull design and new propulsion system to meet the spec and higher survivability standards. For a new 6,000t+ hull the time/cost plus required naval architectural tech which LM did not have in house were against them and as only one of five competitors expect what made LM pull out, was surprised that LM said they would not bid, as in theory after current phase over any design/shipyard can bid for FFG contract in 2020, thought LM might bid with Brit Type 26 as they did in winning the Canadian frigate competition for the CSC.

    The Austal bid for the FFG with Independence appears to be with only with minor modifications from their LCS hull, lengthened from 418' to 456', 38 feet extension, ten frames, to fit 32 VLS cells now spec'd and the propulsion system totally new as all diesel, CODAD and CPPs, no GT/diesel or waterjets as in LCS variant. Surprised at limited extension in length as LCS Independence class only 3,150t , increase in displacement looks limited, think reason Austal stating range only 4,000nm, which with Navy 'in extremis' fuel reserve of 30% minimum would not be enough to cross Atlantic without refuelling let alone the Pacific. The other disadvantages is its built in aluminium not steel, Navy has a history of problems with aluminium structures in ships, Ticos etc and maybe the 104 feet width of the trimaran design taking too much space in ports and drydocks.

    The Navantia/BIW F100 and Fincantieri FREMM both approx 7,000t displacement ships and ~ 6,000 to 7,000nm range, the big operational advantage of FREMM is that its propulsion system has silenced diesel electric drive so ship's own noise not degrading sonar signal from VDS and MFTAS for ASW ops, F100 is diesel + GT, Navantia lost out to Type 26 in Australia for their Hunter ASW frigates even though they previously won in Australia with the F100/Hobart AAW class.

    Ingalls have released no details of their FFG based on the USCG NSC would guess having to go under major re-design as it looks too small at 4,500t/418 feet verse FFG FREMM 7,000t/496 feet with 85% common design to Italian FREMM.

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    1. One of the concerns about Navantia winning on Hobart and losing on T26 was apparently a labor problem in Australia plus the usual cost overruns and delays etc. Believe it or not T26 could still win just as it has in all of the others Canada and Australia

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    2. " thought LM might bid with Brit Type 26"

      Per the Navy bid specs, the Type 26 is not eligible as it is not a pre-existing vessel, in service.

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    3. My understanding the parent hull in water limitation only applicable to Conceptual Design Phase contracts, bidding in 2020 for actual FFG build contract is open to all even those who did not win a CDP contract and no mention made of parent hull in water, as long as frigate built in US shipyard.

      Saying that would be very surprised if winner not selected from remaining four designs that won CDP contracts.

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    4. You're correct that the build contract is open to all but, as far as I know, the pre-existing hull requirement has never been lifted. If you can find a reference to that effect, that would be appreciated.

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    5. From the recent RFP,

      "The frigate in question is not to be designed from the keel up as a "clean sheet." Rather, defense contractors are to propose using an existing "parent design" vessel that has already "been through production and demonstrated (full scale) at sea," and modify it to suit the Navy's needs."

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  9. I have a question.

    Why weren't the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class included in the competition? They build 3 of them for about $900 million, total, or about $300 million per ship. They seem very capable at 6600 tons, with a 30 knot top speed, and carry 4 × Mk 41 VLS with up to 32 SM-2 IIIA surface-to-air missiles, 2 × Mk 56 VLS with up to 24 RIM-162 ESSM, 8–16 × Harpoon Block II SSM, 1 × Oerlikon Millennium 35 mm Naval Revolver Gun System CIWS, 2 × OTO Melara 76 mm, and 2 × dual MU90 Impact ASW torpedo launchers.

    Now there are some things I don't like. They carry only one helo, but their sister Absalon class (same hull) carries two, so two could probably be accommodated. They don't have a towed array, but there appears to be room to equip them with one. They have pure Diesel propulsion, and I would prefer CODLAG for quieter and economical operation, but the Diesels are pretty economical and their engine rooms seem to have a lot of extra space. They are built to commercial damage control standards rather than military. And a large part of their cost savings may be attributable to building large sections in Latvia and Estonia, where we would want to build them here.

    There would be costs associated with all of those, and some of them might not be worth the cost tradeoffs. But worst case, it would be hard to imagine all of them doubling the cost, and that would still be way under what we are looking to pay for the new frigate.

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    1. "Why weren't the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class included in the competition?"

      Simplistically, no manufacturer opted to enter them. The Navy can't force a ship to be entered. Maybe they couldn't find a US company to team with? No idea.

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  10. "Simplistically, no manufacturer opted to enter them. The Navy can't force a ship to be entered. Maybe they couldn't find a US company to team with? No idea."

    This points up something that I think you've mentioned before. There are a couple of Internet videos of interviews with senior Danish naval officers about how they developed this class. They didn't wait for industry to come to them with ideas. They got together, figured out exactly what they needed and wanted, designed it, and then found shipbuilders to bid on building it for them. Without intending political commentary--for the record, I am a strong free market capitalist--but decisions like this need to be driven by operational and combat needs, not profitability.

    The problem obviously is that our Navy doesn't seem to have anybody to make these decisions. Our procurement people seem intent of rubber-stamping whatever shiny gadget gets put in front of them by a defense contractor, on their way out the door to take a lucrative position with that contractor.

    My thoughts about solving this problem include some prohibition on the revolving door. Say, you sign off on a deal with a particular contractor, and if within five years of signing off you accept a position with that contractor, you forfeit your retirement.

    That still doesn't address the need to develop the capability to do the kind of work the Danes did. I would like to consider borrowing something from the Royal Navy. As I understood it from my active duty experience operating with them, they split their surface line officers into two types--deck/warfare officers and engineering officers. In shipboard organization, their 1st Lieutenant (equivalent to our XO) and their 1st Engineer both report directly to the CO. Only deck/warfare types are eligible for command at sea. Engineering types command shore stations at comparable levels of seniority. The deck/warfare types are much more intensely trained as watch standers, and that should reduce or eliminate Fitzgerald/McCain situations. The engineering types form a cadre of basically marine engineers; thoroughly knowledgeable and experienced in how ship systems actually work, and thus well equipped to perform the ship design work. They’ve made some mistakes, to be sure, but considering the extent to which they are even more hamstrung by budgetary restrictions than we are, they have produced some pretty useful ships. And clearly the Danes made it work under very austere budget limitations.

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    1. Your approach of a separate engineering path is fine but engineers don't know how to design. They also don't know the higher level strategic, operational, and tactical needs. It would do no good to have a ship that is perfectly functional (good engineering input - every system works perfectly) but is ill-suited for the task. That appreciation of the design philosophy (as opposed to spec'ing machinery) can only come from operational level thinkers. We used to have this nailed. We used to use the General Board for the conceptual design (what kind of cruiser? what trade-off between firepower and armor? what range? what speed?) and BuShips for the actual design. The resulting design was then let out to shipyards to bid and build.

      The answer is quite simple. We need to reconstitute the General Board and BuShips. If you haven't, read the old post on the Board and BuShips.

      All that said, I'm completely in favor of separate engineering and command paths but not for the reasons you gave.

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    2. I think you are suggesting a General Board populated primarily by deck/warfare types to define wants and needs, and a BuShips populated primarily by engineering types to define platforms and methods. If so, I agree totally. The Navy decides what the Navy needs and the Navy decides how best to do it. Another advantage would be the possibility that various shipyards could each build some of a class, rather than each class being linked to a particular yard with all the politcial ramifications that brings.

      As for the separate deck/warfare and engineering tracks, this would very definitely be a collateral rater tan primary reason.

      Bottom line--the Navy needs to get back in the driver's seat on procurement.

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    3. If you're not familiar with them, check out the General Board and BuShips personnel composition. The Beauty of the General Board was that it was outside the Navy chain of command and could consist of anyone though typically it was Admirals either retired or near the end of their careers with no further career aspirations and thus not affected by internal Navy politics. Other members could be drawn from anywhere as needed. This group had the time to consider the larger picture of ship requirments and laid out the general characteristics of the various ship classes.


      Having active duty, lower rank personnel on the Board would be counterproductive. They would have other concerns (career, command, Navy politics, etc.) than just ship design. Plus, they likely wouldn't be in a position to be knowledgeable about the larger strategic picture that would drive operations and ship design.

      Let's also bear in mind the role that the Fleet Experiments played in feeding 'data' to the Board to be factored into the next designs.

      BuShips actually designed the ships and had naval architects, designers, engineers, etc. The key for BuShips was that it represented the pinnacle of a ship designer's career and, as such, the people stayed in the job for extended periods rather than rotating out after 6 months or a year. If they designed an LCS, they would be around 5 years later to be fired. But, because they were professional ship designers who had come up through the ranks of ship design, they wouldn't design an LCS!

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    4. It seems to me that we need a progression:

      Figure out the global risks that we face.
      Figure out a grand strategy to deal with those risks.
      Figure out tactics to implement that strategy.
      Determine what kinds and how many resources we need to implement those strategies.
      Specify a CONOPS for each of those resources.
      Then design the resources to fulfill those CONOPS.

      We seem to be focused more on becoming enamored with each new shiny toy and its supposed (but unproved) capabilities, and then forcing some sort of strategy around it. That seems exactly backwards.

      The Fleet Experiments seem critical to me. Put a Ford out there against a realistic Orange force, and figure out what to do when the EMALS doesn't work. Won't take many of those to revise some thinking. And maybe take some careers along with it.

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    5. "We seem to be focused more on becoming enamored with each new shiny toy "

      Our so-called professional warriors have substituted technology for strategy.

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  11. Would it not have been possible for an upgraded & faster FFG7 Perry class variant to be in the FFGX competition? Except for a few quirks & problems, weren't those ships pretty good at doing a frigate's job? The Italian & Spanish entrants for the FFGX competition look more like destroyers than frigates...

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  12. Checking the various articles about the FFGX, it looks like the USN is looking for a multi-role ship that's as capable as a Burke to a certain extent but at just half the price or lower..something like a pocket Burke. Is this right? What's interesting is the case of the LCS..a warship type that was supposed to take care of the job of an LCS & a frigate, but seems to be stuck with being a type of coast guard unit.

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  13. I think an upgraded & modernized FFG7 can easily do the job of the FFGX. Ref. the versions in the below link -
    https://qphs.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-8b1b309f92d7ca9dff8c4e987ba1fbf5
    If they want one with the EASR & a certain amount of stealth, they can go for something like the 3rd version shown at the bottom of the image. I've included a Hellfire VLS to deal with small fast attack craft for that version too, as I've shown it as the top of the line model. That 3rd variant will also be wider than the original design by at least 5 feet, though the 1st 2 versions don't necessarily have to be. What do you think?

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    1. I've already repeatedly demonstrated that a frigate is not what the US Navy needs. That aside, a modernized and upgraded Perry would have to be so heavily altered as to be a brand new vessel. It would need a completely reshaped hull and superstructure for the minimum degree of stealth required today, VLS, new sensors, much better sonar, new towed arrays, etc. It would have nothing in common with the original Perry other than the frigate classification. With that in mind, sure, a modernized Perry would be a candidate.

      Most people forget that the original Perry had the equivalent of 40 VLS cells, much more than today's frigates, but it was in the form of a single arm launcher with a 40 missile magazine. It could also launch Harpoons!

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  14. Yep, it'll definitely need to be a brand new vessel. By modernized & upgraded FFG7, I didn't mean modifying the old existing mothballed units. Those units can be sold to allied/friendly countries like Taiwan etc. for a reasonable price, if possible. If you see the pics, you'll be able to observe how different the ships are from the original Perry class. They're outfitted with 32 cell MK41 VLS among other things & even the 76mm gun is not amid ships on the superstructure, but is mounted on the bow. The stealth version will even be 5 ft wider & hence larger than the original Perry class.
    Com, it looks like the USN is bent on getting the new frigate thanks to the stupendous performance of the LCS & it doesn't look like that'll change.
    The single arm Mk13 launcher system on the old FFG7 could carry 40 missiles, but that system is old/obsolete for this era of swarm attacks where you'll need to move fast at multiple hostiles/targets either in defense or offense & that can be done better with VLS like the Mk41, 57 etc. Also, the Mk41 VLS can hold quad packed ESSMs which greatly increases the ship's weapons load unlike the Mk13.

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    1. I'm not suggesting a return to the single arm launcher. Merely noting that the Perrys had greater missile loads than today's frigates.

      Also, before you write off a trainable launcher completely, you should recognize that it has some advantages especially in a swarm type scenario. The ability to point the missile directly at the target vastly shortens the engagement cycle. A vertical launch missile (AAW or Hellfire or whatever) has to launch vertically, reach a peak altitude, tip over, acquire its target, and then accelerate. Vertical launch missiles have a somewhat shorter range due to the vertical launch and consumption of fuel in so doing. The Navy struggled with the vertical launch Hellfire for these very reasons although they seem to have solved them.

      Finally, an arm launcher isn't exactly slow. The firing cycle is around 7 seconds or so, if I recall correctly. There aren't all that many scenarios where firing cycles need to be faster than that.

      Again, I'm not suggesting a return to arm launchers but it's noteworthy that we've forgotten the advantages they offer.

      To return to your Perry proposal, if you recognize that a modernized Perry would be a completely new and different ship than, sure, but there's no point referring to it as a Perry derivative. It would have nothing in common. Any of the world's modern frigates would have just as much in common and be just as valid so I'm not sure what your link to the Perry is?

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  15. Yes, the trainable launcher does have it's advantage of point & shoot, especially for close-in action. That's why I've also included weapons systems like the Sigma Seahawk gun with the Thales LMMs, 21 cell RAM launcher, new 76 mm rapid gun with Leonardo's Vulcano ER capability, 40 mm guns, Mk32 torpedo launchers & the Phalanx B1B. These are all trainable point & shoot systems for close-in knife fights. The VLS will be used for long & medium-short range action.
    Eventhough they are totally new ships with a lot of differences with the old Perry class, the ships in the image are
    still variants or evolutions of the Perry, hence the link to the same. May be they can be referred to as FFG7X or FFG8 or something & with a class name like the Defiance or Avenger etc. or may be named after notable persons/cites..or some sea creature even..

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    1. I note that your Perry mods are non-stealthy, in the extreme! If you're going to the trouble of extensively modernizing every other aspect of the Perry, why would you not want to give it at least the minimum degree of stealth that slant shaping the hull and superstructure bestows? The Perry's slab-sided hull and superstructure are almost radar enhancers!

      Stealth has become the minimum price of admission to the modern battlefield. Non-stealthy assets will have exceedingly short lifespans.

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    2. The trainable launcher is also potentially advantageous in the horizon engagement scenario. With a radar horizon of, say, 20 miles, the engagement window is very short. You might want to do the math on approach speed of a high subsonic and supersonic missile. The time required to vertically launch, peak, tip, acquire, and accelerate is time we don't have inside the horizon. Most people seem to think that a VLS system means that we can launch dozens of missiles at an incoming target, if needed. That's simply not the case. In any realistic scenario, we'll be lucky to get off perhaps four shots. We may have a thousand VLS cells on a ship but the math dictates that only around four missiles can engage. I've covered this extensively so you might want to check the archives and/or do the math for yourself.

      With the very limited engagement window, a trainable point and shoot launcher has a decided advantage. Given the vertical launch wasted time, I suspect that the single arm cycle time is equal or superior to VLS. VLS, on the other hand, can launch near simultaneous missiles from each VLS cluster.

      Of course, the overall process is limited by fire control channels, radar clutter clearance (debris from exploding misses), and tracking loss due to aerial debris, among other factors.

      The switch from arm launchers to VLS was nowhere near as obvious and advantageous as most people think. The main advantages are elimination of the single point of failure of the arm launcher, elimination of the mechanical complexity/failure of the arm and missile handling, and ability to use sealed, containerized missiles.

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  16. Did you check the previous comments? I mentioned the 3rd variant at the bottom as the stealthy type. It's not completely stealthy like a Visby coz I do want the ship to look a little brutal & like a warship instead of some kind of sleek pleasure boat. The 1st 2 variants are cheaper non-stealthy options..

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  17. Trainable launchers have the advantage of speed over VLS only if they are already loaded & ready to fire or if the targets are few & pretty close. If the trainable launcher has to go into position, straighten it's arm, load the missile & then turn again to point, the ship will most probably have very little time left, especially in this time of supersonic weapons & multiple attacks. They were ok for the 70s-90s era. These days, a VLS can launch more weapons in a minute than a single arm launcher. The VLS also aids in stealth & like I previously mentioned, a VLS like Mk41 has the capability to launch quad-packed weapons like the ESSM which gives the ship more punch than a single arm launcher. Also, as you mentioned, if the arm develops some mechanical issues & stops functioning, then the ship will be in real trouble. These are some of the reasons why everyone is going for VLS these days.

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