A reader, ‘BM’, recently offered a comment about the Marine’s small, missile-shooting units that sparked some interesting thoughts regarding the logic of the entire concept.[1]
To ever so briefly review the Commandant’s concept, he envisions small units of missile-shooting Marines hidden on islands scattered throughout the enemy’s zone of control and exercising sea control in order to assist the Navy.
The objective is clear, if highly questionable. However, we’ll set the wisdom of the objective aside and focus on the logic of the execution.
Reader ‘BM’ posed the question, "how is [a Marine missile unit] better than a flotilla of ships sailing around to actively hunt enemy ships?"
I offered the reply that the Commandant's response would be that a flotilla of ships will be quickly spotted by the enemy and attacked whereas his small, missile units will be able to operate undetected. He has basically stated this in so many words.
That lead to recognition of [one of] the gaping logical discontinuities with this concept. The Commandant believes that ships will be easily spotted. Indeed, his vision takes the detection of enemy ships as a given – witness the fact that he hasn’t even devoted any thought to what kind of detection and targeting assets will be needed and yet – and this is the discontinuity - he believes that his own ships, the LAWs, will operate undetected, transporting Marines through enemy waters, and flitting back and forth to conduct resupply and relocation.
So, Navy ships would be quickly spotted and the Marines will quickly and easily detect enemy ships for hundreds of miles around (without, apparently, even requiring any special surveillance assets !) and yet the Marine’s own ships, the LAWs, will be able to sail through enemy waters (at 14 kts !) for days at a time, penetrate enemy controlled seas, beach and spend hours/days unloading a large assortment of vehicles, supplies, equipment, gear, and troops, and be able to resupply and transport Marines from island to island in a cat-and-mouse game that the enemy will never detect and never catch on to.
You can't have it both ways. Either ships can be easily spotted, both the enemy’s and our own LAWs, in which case the Commandant’s entire concept falls apart or they can't, in which case the Commandant’s entire concept of spotting enemy ships and attacking them falls apart. Either way, the concept falls apart due to the logical discontinuity.
 |
| LAW - It's either invisible or it's not. You can't have it both ways. |
Frighteningly, this kind of logical discontinuity is the norm in military thinking today. We’re enthusiastically running down paths that exist only on the basis logical disconnects. We’re building a force whose foundational principle is that everything we do will work and nothing the enemy does will work. This is delusion taken to an extreme and it is preventing the development of realistic doctrine and tactics and the creation of a force structure that will actually work..
_______________________________
Aren't there any adults in these organizations?
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
Your title offers a solution. Be prepared to be both things at once. Build MUSV as roll on roll off. Load it with HIMARS when needed. Load it with NMESIS when needed. Load it with NASAMS when needed. People keep talk about shooting these off LPD or LCS flight decks. This solution is way more numerous, cheaper, faster, and harder to detect.
ReplyDeleteUmm ... I'm not sure exactly what you're driving at, here. If you're talking about shooting various land weapons from a vessel, you need to think through issues like targeting and marinization. A land weapon on a ship will be corroded and useless in a week.
Delete"People keep talk about shooting these off LPD or LCS flight decks."
I'm not sure that any knowledgeable person is.
The latest MUSV has link-16 and can integrate and train wiith the Aegis combat system. Marine gear sits pre loaded in those open air well decks for a deployment. Maintainers got to maintain.
DeleteI'm not sure, but I think we're talking about shooting ships from an MUSV instead of from an island. Thus, the MUSV would have to be in Chinese controlled waters. No Aegis ship is going to be cruising around enemy waters and, if it is, then we don't need an MUSV because we'll have a Burke task force.
Delete"Marine gear sits pre loaded in those open air well decks for a deployment. "
If you're talking about Marine gear on ARG ships, the gear is marinized (AAV/ACV, for example). There's also a huge difference between a sheltered, dry deck inside a ship's well and an open deck on an MUSV.
Hasnt this whole concept been supposedly wargamed?? If so, then who wrote the rules, and who refereed?? How did such a lopsided concept pass through faux combat without being shot full of holes??
ReplyDeleteClearly a case of the trials being conceived to form a desired outcome...
If it was seriously wargamed, they used an industrial sized barrel of fairy dust on the logistics portion of this screwed up plan. Just like COMNAVOPS states..if ships can be seen and taken out y the enemy...how does this LAAW concept actually work? Lets just say that the concept of this LAAW works (it doesn't but "fairy dust") we drop off 75 Marines and a HUGE amount of material on an island. You have seen the NEMESIS, Have you seen the set up to launch Tomahawks? MASSIVE. How do they have more than 8 missiles? How do they get more? How do you feed the Marines? Shelter them? Medical? How long will they be there? How do they target? How..How...How...How...
DeleteYou are correct in your statement "Clearly a case of the trials being conceived to form a desired outcome.."
Another question to be asked to the Commandant is is sea control their task. The Marines is an basically an infantry unit. Since when did people start hunting ships with infantry. The USN should simply ask the Commandant to take a chill pill.
Delete-BM
"is sea control their task"
DeleteThe Commandant looked at the coming war with China and concluded that the Marines had little to offer in that fight. He decided to remake the Marines so that they could contribute to the fight by 'returning the Marines to their maritime roots'. The specific method he chose was the missile-shooting scheme. He believes this is how to assist in the maritime portion of war with China.
One can buy into all this or not but that is the explanation. It is noteworthy that, to the best of my knowledge, no one asked the Marines to redefine themselves. That's something the Commandant did solely on his own. The Marine's transformation is, truly, a one-person quest.
And just to revisit an unanswered question, exactly which islands are we talking about?? Id love to see a list and a map showing me where this whole concept has any relevance to shrinking a denial zone, or to restricting Chinese movements in any meaningful way that will help in our (assumed) assistance of Taiwan...
ReplyDeleteYeap, I recall asking that same question when first this Berger crap came out.....still haven't gotten an answer.
DeleteRight?? Im gonna suggest that its because there is no list of islands, and if there is, its full of places that while existing, don't actually have any relevance towards an SCS/Taiwan fight... But ill wait...
DeleteTHANK YOU! I've been asking the same thing. What islands are these Marine units going to shoot from and what Nations do they belong to? And are those Nations on board with declaring war on the PRC?
DeleteYou're missing the point of the Commandant’s scheme. It's intended to appeal to politicians who can't read maps or tell the difference between different foreign places, and think that reality is defined by action movies and Twitter. It's perfect political relations for the QAnon tranche of congress-beings, and allows USMC senior officers to take beach holidays as "work."
DeleteJust got back from trip to Africa so couldn't comment for awhile....
ReplyDelete1. CHINA is eating our lunch in Africa. There was a time USA knew how to use soft power, now it seems every problem can only be solved with 2,000 lbs PGM.
2. Previous post on forward bases, I honestly wouldn't invest much money and effort on any of those small islands. To me, forward bases, fuel, spares, airfields,etc should be Australia, Japan and Hawaii. Everything else beyond that will be pulverized by Chinese attacks, why make it easier for them? Let them waste ammo. Then we can pick and choose when we counter attack with our mostly intact forces that are held back.
3. Not sure how a static position is more "stealth" than a moving ship BUT once USMC have fired their ASMs, they better be ready to move out and how much time does that take? Not sure Berger has every talked about the importance of TIME and moving out?Time flies, its going to take at least a few hours to move out, embark and move away with LAW that only cam make 14knots....and China won't spot them?!? One argument i heard was LAW and USMC are so small, its not worth the effort or it takes away too many forces for Chinese to prosecute....hmm, not buying that for obvious reasons...
4. Another big problem i have with Berger direction is it really reduces USMC to very light infantry with some ASM capability. Basically become very single mission oriented. We all know what happened with Cold War, we prepared for 50 years for WW3 against Soviets and ended up fighting Sadam in a desert. We have become so focused on fighting China in some sort of WW2 remake of Guadalcanal that what happens if that doesn't happen but we end up somewhere completely different and different skill set and weapons are needed!?!? USMC is up the creek then....
"what happens if that doesn't happen but we end up somewhere completely different"
DeleteProxy wars in, say, Africa, are a very likely scenario.
We still have the army with their rapid reaction forces and JSOC. We already have forces in Africa on various anti-terrorism/training missions.
DeleteSince the USMC leadership seems to have decided it isn't really needed in a war (since this island anti-ship idea is nonsense), why not return the USMC to being the "Small Wars" force to the Army's Peer/Big War force? The Small Wars are important, constantly/consistently happening, and historically something the USMC historically had a lot of experience in. They often require different equipment and doctrine than a Peer War, and someone will have to fulfill this requirement. Right now we seem to be relying on using special operations units for all the traditional Small Wars jobs and it's usually either overkill, underkill, or at best needlessly wearing down our most highly trained and equipped assets while leaving our main forces without a chance to gain the valuable real-world experience that creates and maintains effective institutional knowledge.
ReplyDeleteIf you want an island to fight from in a China/Taiwan war the only island that's big enough to let your troops seek some security by using mobility is Taiwan itself. Otherwise as NICO says your best bets are Japan and Oz.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand if you expect a war in Africa there will always be Madagascar.
"fires off 60,000 artillery rounds"
ReplyDeleteI've deleted this thread as a ridiculous, unsubstantiated work of fiction. Further, it has nothing to do with the subject of the post and does not move the discussion forward. If you'd care to provide supporting documentation, feel free to repost.
If people kept up with the Ukraine War, the British studied this issue months ago and concluded that the US/West has "forgotten" how to produce sufficient amounts of ammo to fight peer wars, unlike Russia and China:
ReplyDeletehttps://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare
Note that this professional journal quotes US missile production as "The US currently purchases 110 PRISM, 500 JASSM and 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles annually,". The article estimates that the Russians probably had 4,000 missiles in Feb 2022 and were building more all the time. So if the Russians have no problem building 4,000 missiles, how many can the economically larger Chinese have?
Additionally, since WWII, Russian doctrine stresses using cheap heavy artillery strikes to soften up ground targets, NOT expensive aircraft/PGMs like the US. The Russians use their missiles and aircraft mainly to attack specialized or strategic targets -- no "truck-plinking" or "scud-hunts" like the US.
"tube artillery fires about 6,240 rounds per day"
DeleteInteresting to note that the article you cite estimates a daily usage of 6,240 rounds per day versus the previously claimed 60,000.
"Russians probably had 4,000 missiles in Feb 2022"
This estimate by the author is pure speculation. As he states,
"The initial stockpile in February 2022 is unknown"
The estimate, however, seems quite reasonable but it is the total inventory as of Feb 2022, NOT A DAILY OR YEARLY PRODUCTION CAPACITY.
As stated in the article,
"in 2016 the production runs were estimated at 47 missiles "
As also noted in the article, Lockheed Martin produces 2,100 missiles per year with production rates increasing.
From studies of historical yearly production rates, it is clear that the US has inventories of a few to several thousand missiles of each type of missile it uses, depending on the specific type.
I have not studied artillery shells and rockets but inventories are, presumably, in the many tens of thousands or more. This is supported by the quantities of munitions the US has acknowledged shipping to Ukraine.
This all seems like obvious and readily available background information. So, what is it that you're trying to demonstrate?
Is it that the West has reduced munition production rates too far? That's a public and accepted fact.
Is it that wartime consumption of weapons is always far beyond peacetime estimates? That's a historical fact.
Is it that China has industrial production capacity for weapons? It does, as does the US.
I'm at a loss to see what you're attempting to demonstrate. Feel free to elaborate.
That RUSI article was excellent. It certainly confirms that the US, and indeed Western industrial base is nowhere near adequate to fight a large-scale, protracted war with China. That shouldn't be much of a surprise to anyone.
DeleteAs has been beaten to death, there is a scaling penalty associated with highly sophisticated weapons and munitions. You have very few companies with the capability to manufacture them, and a very long lead time to rectify that problem.
If the Russo-Ukranian war drags on, the West is going to have a supply problem supporting Ukraine. But even that is going to look like a drop in a teacup compared to the manufacturing and logistics problems that will be encountered in a war with China that escalates past an initial brush-fire phase.
I don't really see a solution, as it seems certain the political will to change, or even recognize the scale of the problem doesn't exist.
George
"or even recognize the scale of the problem doesn't exist."
DeleteSpot on! That's the crux of the problem. We're in denial.
I think its worth looking at what may happen in the event of a large scale US-China war. Assuming that sophisticated munition production cannot match the usage rate, what happens next?
DeleteIt brings to mind that quote attributed to Albert Einstein, where at a dinner party he was asked what new weapons might be used in WW III. His reply was interesting. “I don’t know what weapons might be used in World War III. But there isn’t any doubt what weapons will be used in World War IV.”
“And what are those?” a guest asked. “Stone spears,” said Einstein.
Now obviously the reference is to the damage done by a nuclear war, but it may also apply to a really large scale conventional war with an opponent like China. We may find that we are having to fall back on less and less sophisticated weapons as we simply can't manufacture the good stuff fast enough. I can foresee a period of many months or even years when the use rate far exceeds the replenishment rate. That could well be disastrous and it applies to everything from smart artillery rounds, to aircraft, to warships.
Just say an article where the Russians apparently turned a closed mall into a small manufacturing plant for simple UAV, the really small ones aren't that hard to make really.
Delete"Funny" how after a few months of war you could end up with this really odd mix of "sophisticated" small modern UAV or anything you can mass produce right now! and just your regular infantry ammo, dumb artillery shells,etc and all the other super duper weapons are pretty much all used up. I could see something like that happening with a China USA war, probably that trend would happen even faster! It could come to whatever you can mass produce at the time needed and not necessarily how good the weapon is, just how fast can u ramp it up!
People, the issue of wartime munitions expenditures and wartime production rates is nothing new. We've discussed this many times and noted that we do not have the industrial capacity to produce at rates sufficient to replace our expenditures. See, "Wartime Production Plan"
DeleteThe Navy's refusal to maintain a reserve fleet is just one of many examples of the US failing to recognize the implications of our inability to gear up our industry for war in any useful time frame.
"I'm at a loss to see what you're attempting to demonstrate. Feel free to elaborate."
DeletePeople (yourself included?) were stating that China can't have produced thousands of missiles in the past to use to keep the US from intervening in a Taiwan invasion and could not be producing more now. This is the same misconception people made about Russia in Feb 2022.
The RUSI article showed that even very early in the war BEFORE they went whole-hog into attrition war (grind the Ukrainian army into powder with huge amounts of artillery and then advance your infantry over their ashes so that Russian losses are absolutely minimized) the Russians were firing 7,000 artillery shells and 30+ missiles per day, 7 days per week, every week. As other readers indicated, the number of rounds/missiles expended by them has only gone up significantly since then (10,000+ plus missiles now?) in pursuit of this tactic. Despite US government claims since March that the Russians "will run out of ammo tomorrow", serious international forecasts indicate that they can likely continue these expenditures indefinitely.
This being the case, why are we "sure" that China with a bigger economy than Russia does not have thousands of missiles now and are producing many more given their view that taking Taiwan is existential to China's territorial integrity to redress the "century of humiliation"
"why are we "sure" that China with a bigger economy than Russia does not have thousands of missiles now"
DeleteWho has said that China does not have thousands of missiles, now? Please provide a quote from someone.
One sure way to have a comment deleted is to argue something that hasn't been said.
Ships are not the only way to deploy forces. The US military has played with fast deploying HIMARS from C-130s. Here is an example from the Marines: https://www.army.mil/article/201298/marines_at_dugway_test_shoot_and_scoot_himars and from the Air Force/Army: https://theaviationist.com/2021/10/24/mc-130j-himars-gotland/
ReplyDeleteI like the concept. But, this only works when there is an airfield, roadway, or a clearing long enough, and wide enough, for a C-130 to land and takeoff.
DeleteIf they can see ships....what stops them from seeing a lumbering cargo plane? Especially in a contested or Dominated area.....anything that flies or sails into that area will be a bullet magnet.
DeleteAgree with CoffeeMan. Come on, not like you going to use only 1 C130, even being very optimistic, you probably need at least a dozen of them and Chinese not going to notice all that traffic? Not notice the dirt airfield? Even that hypothetical SF version with floats, you still probably going to spot it with the tracks of all the vehicles at disembarkation point....
ReplyDeleteThere are a number of methods the marines might employ to avoid the problem of vulnerability in enemy contested waters:
ReplyDelete1) The ASuW units can be pre-emptively placed in theatre ahead of time. Think Marine Littoral regiments based in Korea, providing anti-surface cover throughout the east yellow sea, or in Okinawa deterring an amphibious invasion, or in the Ryukyu islands where they might attack PLAN ships east and north of the Taiwan mainland that are attempting to enact a blockade of that island. Or in Singapore, where they might cut off access to the strait etc...
It's also not unreasonable (especially in Korea and Okinawa) to think that the regiments would have plenty of provisions and missile stocks stocked up ahead of time.
2) The logic of "if a surface task force hunting down enemy ships is vulnerable, then a LAW resupply convoy is equally vulnerable" doesn't always hold. This is especially true if we are talking about surface and submarine units equipped with relatively short-range harpoons and NSM's (which after all, is the surface/submarine equivalent to NMESIS). If a surface task force wanted to sink ships in the Taiwan strait, it might actually have to enter into the strait, but a LAW convoy can drop off a marine regiment east of Taiwan (which can then move into position at the west coast). The same situation (west/east dynamic) applies to Korea.
This means that the US navy would need to de-contest less water area (just the waters east of Korea and Taiwan) to eliminate or substantially reduce the vulnerability of a marine LAW convoy in comparison to a surface task force attempting to achieve the same aim. And it's not at all unreasonable to believe that the waters inside the first island chain would be way more contested in comparison with the outside in any war with China.
3) Long range maritime strike weapons, like the new block V tomahawk (which the marines want to acquire), can be fired and resupplied entirely outside the zone of enemy control.
It might be argued that the strategy of the marines is vulnerable because it relies on cooperation with allies, but that holds equally true for the army and air force as well!
Ultimately, there are easy ways to circumvent your criticisms. In general, if you think you've discovered a serious problem with an operational concept, first consider that you might not have really understood what the proponents of that concept are saying, before just assuming that they are total idiots who missed a pretty obvious point.
"based in Korea, providing anti-surface cover throughout the east yellow sea"
DeleteOf course, the only missile the Marines have operational, at the moment, is the NSM which has a limited range. The Marines MIGHT, someday, have operational Tomahawk missile batteries but those present massive transportation and logistical problems, themselves. The same very limited range applies to any potential launch point. All of this, of course, ignores the targeting issue.
I have no idea what you were trying to convey in your second point. It was incomprehensible. You might want to try again.
I would point out that if we have thousand mile anti-ship Tomahawks, we don't need tiny, hidden, missile-shooting Marines. We can load up SSGNs/SSNs and all the detection and logistic problems go away.
"If a surface task force wanted to sink ships in the Taiwan strait"
Seriously? You're the only person I've ever heard suggest that a surface group could enter the Taiwan strait, off the coast of mainland China, and have any chance of survival, let alone accomplishing a mission!
In general, if you think you've discovered a simple solution to the challenges of an operational concept, first consider that you might not have really understood what the problems with that concept are, before just assuming the critics are total idiots who missed a pretty obvious point.
"Seriously? You're the only person I've ever heard suggest that a surface group could enter the Taiwan strait, off the coast of mainland China, and have any chance of survival, let alone accomplishing a mission!"
DeleteI suggested no such thing, I merely pointed out what the equivalent surface task force would have to do in that hypothetical scenario, which is the same general scenario you discussed in your original post (where a surface task force attempts to fulfill the same ASuW role as a marine littoral regiment).
You are actually buttressing my argument, which is that a marine littoral regiment and surface task force don't face equivalent risk. In my hypothetical example of Taiwan, a marine unit could shoot into the Taiwan strait (highly contested waters) while being resupplied with material dropped off the east coast of Taiwan (not so contested waters). Whereas a surface task force equipped with the same type of missiles (harpoons and NSM's) couldn't shoot into the Taiwan strait without engendering unacceptable risk.
This means that the marines can do something (shoot NSM's) that the navy can't replicate with the same degree of risk. The navy would be forced to instead rely on stocks of more expensive long-range maritime strike weapons like the LRASM to achieve the same effects.
So, to repeat my argument more succinctly. I am saying that:
1) With adequate stockpiling and prepositioning, a littoral regiment can achieve a strong first/second/third strike without resupply. You might not have to resupply in enemy contested waters to achieve at least some significant effects.
2) Just because a littoral regiment is fighting in enemy contested waters doesn't mean it has to be resupplied in enemy contested waters (as the examples of Taiwan and Korea were meant to show).
2 is important, because it shows that your reasoning about the "logical discontinuity" is wrong. In the marine case (in scenario 2), the LAW's would be operating in less contested waters when compared to the hypothetical surface task force that reader BM brought up.
About the tomahawks:
I'm not sure why you think the same detection problems don't apply in the SSGN case. In any case, there is still arguably advantages to redundancy. But more importantly, neither the surface navy nor the SSGN's are currently intended to fulfill the long-range maritime strike role. Not to say that they can't but equipping them for that mission would come at the detriment of their other mission sets (like AAW for the surface ships and land attack for the SSGN). So, it still might not be a bad idea to equip the marines with the tomahawks.
"I suggested no such thing"
DeleteOn the contrary, here is your quote:
"If a surface task force wanted to sink ships in the Taiwan strait, it might actually have to enter into the strait"
Own your words.
"same general scenario you discussed in your original post"
Did you read the post? The post is about the Marine's concept of small, hidden, missile-shooting units. It was not about surface groups roving the Taiwan strait.
You seem to have a fundamental misunderstanding about the entire concept. The ONLY missile the Marines have ready access to, for the foreseeable future, is the NSM which has a 100 mile range. Look at a scaled map. You cannot operate in Korea or Japan or anywhere else for that matter, and impact operations in Taiwan. So, not only will resupply be an issue, so will the original transportation to whatever location you choose to operate from.
By the way, while Taiwan might well be part of a US-China war, the Marine's concept is NOT pegged to Taiwan. In fact, the concept is just a generalized first island chain operational area.
"The ASuW units can be pre-emptively placed in theatre ahead of time."
Given the limited range of NSM, no, they cannot be pre-emptively placed because there is no EFFECTIVE location where they could be placed that we have basing or territorial rights to. Again, look at a map.
Regarding pre-placement, Korea is highly unlikely to take sides against China unless directly attacked. That being the case, they are not going to allow the US to conduct military operations from their territory.
And, as always, there is the targeting issue which no one has yet addressed. We just have no ability to target ships within the context of the Marine's concept.
Your entire comment suggests a desperate need to examine a map and, in particular, note distances.
"The Marines MIGHT, someday, have operational Tomahawk missile batteries . . ."
DeleteUSNI, May 25, 2022, "The Navy on Tuesday issued Raytheon a $217 million contract to build 154 Tomahawk missiles for the Navy, Army and Marine Corps, the Defense Department announced. The contract is to buy a total of 154 Block V Tomahawk missile systems, with 54 systems going to the Marine Corps, 70 to the Navy and 30 to the Army, according to the May 24 Defense of Department contract awards."
At least the missiles are on order. When they get them and how and when they are deployed remains to be seen.
ComNavOps,
Delete"On the contrary, here is your quote:
"If a surface task force wanted to sink ships in the Taiwan strait, it might actually have to enter into the strait"
Own your words."
It's a conditional. "if it's raining, then I would grab an umbrella", doesn't imply that I actually think it's raining. The point was to show that the level of risk is not equivalent, and not that the surface task force should actually take that risk.
"Did you read the post? The post is about the Marine's concept of small, hidden, missile-shooting units. It was not about surface groups roving the Taiwan strait."
I was talking about this:
"Reader ‘BM’ posed the question, "how is [a Marine missile unit] better than a flotilla of ships sailing around to actively hunt enemy ships?"
I offered the reply that the Commandant's response would be that a flotilla of ships will be quickly spotted by the enemy and attacked whereas his small, missile units will be able to operate undetected. He has basically stated this in so many words."
About the range issue:
If you read through my post, I offered a number of locations where the 100nm range of NSM's can still be plenty useful, it wasn't just Taiwan. As for Taiwan, they could be forward based on the Ryukyu islands and still attack PLAN ships to the northeast and north of Taiwan attempting to blockade the island, or they could in conflict be shipped to the Taiwan mainland, assuming we could de-contest the waters east of the island.
I feel like I already addressed your points and that we're mostly talking past each other. So, this will probably be my last reply if you don't mind.
"If you read through my post, I offered a number of locations where the 100nm range of NSM's can still be plenty useful, it wasn't just Taiwan. As for Taiwan, they could be forward based on the Ryukyu islands and still attack PLAN ships to the northeast and north of Taiwan attempting to blockade the island, or they could in conflict be shipped to the Taiwan mainland, assuming we could de-contest the waters east of the island."
DeleteJapan administers the Ryukyu Islands. What happens if Japan declares neutrality in a hypothetical Sino-American War? Then the Marines can't legally station missiles on the islands- Japan won't let them, as that will invite a Chinese attack against the missiles there!
THINK MORE. The US State Department has a LOT of work to do, to convince potential allies to actually ALLY with us in a war against China.
"build 154 Tomahawk missiles"
DeleteThese are NOT the Maritime Strike Tomahawk. Those do not yet exist. As noted in the USNI News article about the purchase,
" The missiles “will be in the Block V configuration which features a NAV/COMMS upgrade that maintains the capability for in-flight updates and improved navigation. Future Block V capabilities will include the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) variant ... "
"Reader ‘BM’ posed the question, "how is [a Marine missile unit] better than a flotilla of ships sailing around to actively hunt enemy ships?"
Delete'BM' clearly was comparing ships to Marines for the remote ship-sniping mission, not sailing into Taiwan Strait. That's something you made up.
Given the range limitation of the NSM, basing on pre-positioning and warehousing on Korea or Japan is not feasible. Only the small islands scattered throughout the E/S China Seas can offer even partial viability and that is exactly the Marine concept and it requires LAW transport and resupply.
And, to conclude, no one, yourself included, has yet offered a viable targeting concept. A million mile missile is useless if all you have is 12 mile (horizon) targeting.
And that should conclude this discussion.
I think its a few trains of thought.
ReplyDelete1. Yes all planes ships will be found in major sweep
2. The ability to see all will change as forces air/navy make major pushes. During those major shifts one side may control while other is blinded.
3. Planes cannot give presence refuel rearm limits.
4. Ships cannot give presence can be seen and forced into rearm or be destroyed.
5. Large forces deployed bases will have same problem as ships.
The Marine idea is they can deploy small forces in those blinds spots and hide them during op side control. They can then add to the weight of the next sweep and or with passive surveillance be eyes to see opportunity or caution.
It is heavy risk once found but war is allot about risk. A HIMARS and some drones few dozen men vs sending a ship I guess.
Best outcome would be unmanned equipment used but considering during those sweeps sway of control your probably going lose coms control I get the need of it being manned.
"The Marine idea is they can deploy small forces in those blinds spots and hide them during op side control."
DeleteThat's news to me. I've seen nothing describing that. Do you have a reference?
Just my take from what I have read on it no official reference seen. I assume its there logic is based on the conditions that will be in such a peer war using your island reference.
DeleteBest use would probably be more like they are deployed to possible battle areas were local forces will be lacking during those blind spots. Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, x small nation in region. Such capabilities would really augment those forces ability.
Do you have a reference they are going send their ships into the meat grinder DDG wont go no prep no plan because they believe them invisible?
forgot to put name C-Low
Delete" they are deployed to possible battle areas were local forces will be lacking during those blind spots. Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, x small nation in region."
DeleteThe problem is how do they get there during a war especially given that the plan is to transport them in small, very slow, non-stealthy, defenseless transports? This is [one of] the parts of the concept that appears completely unworkable and neither the Marines nor outside observers have been able to explain how this will happen.
For sake of discussion, let's assume that Marines did, somehow, magically, make it to these isolated locations. Other than using binoculars to see twelve miles or so out to the horizon, what/how will the Marines conduct their surveillance? If they use radar, they'll be quickly pinpointed and destroyed. If they use small UAVs they won't have any range and, again, will be quickly spotted and backtracked to the Marines location and destroyed. They can't operate large UAVs without constructing airfields which will be quickly spotted and destroyed. How are they going to conduct their surveillance? This is another of those unaddressed issues.
How to get forces there. I don't think anyone will control 24hrs the front. China will be able to surge forces to overwhelm our forces and we will do the same gaining control for a time. The numbers needed will not be able to be sustain over the duration and the middle times will probably be regular patrols of different forces of both sides at sametime.
DeleteDuring those times forces can be repositioned or inserted. Consider how Stealth planes route to strike targets. You maynot be able to safely route a full convoy, carrier strike group but a few helicopters, C130, or even a small medium ship very likely.
Passive would be small UAVs and listening for the othersides emissions. Such emission pings when tagged with others can tell you allot. Modern weapons like Israels long range loitering suicide drones can do allot with a general radiation spike. Small drones have proven themselves to pretty elusive to modern radars in the close more less ability to track from launch.
Targeting. How are HIMARs targeted now? Outside platforms deployed to area both during contested control were both sides are patrolling but not enough force to control for either and during your sides control. During the othersides control it would be more hiding and listening. There is allot of platforms that could maybe see a enemy but not be able to also carry the weapons needed to strike.
I the idea is basically using drones UUV UAV to be eyes that either survive by either being small cheap enough to sacrifice or larger that stay distant enough to see but not be targeted. The putting the lead on target part is then the problem so dispersed shooters with long range weapons. The small group of marines on rock or hiding in some jungle with a truck could be one of those shooters.
Dispursed shooters on the ground are not easy to find history shows. The force required to find destroy them will be just as vulnerable but more at risk because it will take multiples emitting allot for the search since they will have a general area to search not just sneak into and wait.
Its doable. Its risky. But brass tax the ugly truth is that if such a small detachment basically a truck and a few dozen men can be deployed get a kill on a primary target SAM, warship, or even loaded mil resupply cargo ship, even if they are killed as a result its acceptable loss ratio.
The ugly truth this idea is revealing is unlike in recent decades were our goal is 0 loss, in peer war its that loss is a given its about making the enemy pay more in big picture for that loss balance.
I see the marine plan as doable, I see the possible benefit. I get the idea as another tool in the tool kit, in the prism of PACOM I see a few scenario were it could pay dividend. I don't agree the whole marines should be gutted for it thou. I still see allot of need for ole school marine power. Say China occupies some of those 2nd island chain nations or part of they are currently buying influence in. They will need to be retaken to secure our rear lines. Missile marines won't be that kit.
You are engaging in some major hand-waving of problems.
DeleteFor example, using UAVs for surveillance/targeting. If the enemy is around to be found, then a UAV is going to be quickly spotted and backtracked to its source which is the Marines and they will be destroyed. In addition, a UAV will have to continuously broadcast its data which will be detected. As I mentioned previously, very small UAVs, which is all that Marines could operate, will have very short ranges and won't accomplish much.
I don't see the kind of back and forth operations you're envisioning as being likely. Whichever side has the superior firepower will control the territory. It's possible that over time the balance of firepower could switch but that would not be a continual back and forth occurence, it would be a one-time event. I cannot, off hand, think of any example of a back and forth naval control scenario in modern history.
You're also glossing over the effectiveness of a handful of missiles. Unless the target is a lone, undefended merchant ship, which is possible but unlikely, a handful of missiles will not effective. Chinese warships have extensive defenses. We believe our ships can handle a handful of missiles so we have to believe that Chinese ships can, too. History and technology suggest that it will require a concentrated missile 'barrage' to get through a modern ship's defenses.
"How are HIMARs targeted now? Outside platforms deployed to area"
This is hand-waving. There won't be any outside platforms in enemy controlled waters - at least, none that will survive long enough to provide targeting.
_ "how is [a Marine missile unit] better than a flotilla of ships sailing around to actively hunt enemy ships?"_
ReplyDeleteIt's about missiles. You can not recharge VLS with new missiles instead of launched ones at sea right after launching. Ship have to back to the port for this. Port can be somwhere far away.
Missile TEL can get new missiles right on position somwhere in the jungle.
And also marine missile battery can not be destroyed by one enemy's anti-ship missile like a ship.
"Missile TEL can get new missiles right on position somwhere in the jungle."
DeleteAnd how will the marines get the missiles to the jungle? Via other ships, e.g., amphibious assault ships (whose helicopters have to lift these missiles off the decks and into the jungle), the "Light Amphibious Warship" (which has to beach itself so the marines can move the missiles from the beach to the jungle)- both of which can be targeted and sunk before they can get the missiles to the marines, unless they sail in heavily defended convoys.
Stop accepting Gen. Berger's nonsense as the Word of God, and THINK MORE.
"And also marine missile battery can not be destroyed by one enemy's anti-ship missile like a ship."
There are other types of missiles besides antiship missiles- land attack cruise missiles being one that can, and will be used against the marine missile battery. A near miss can still damage the missile and its launcher, preventing the marines from using the latter.
" You can not recharge VLS with new missiles instead of launched ones at sea right after launching. Ship have to back to the port for this. Port can be somwhere far away.
DeleteMissile TEL can get new missiles right on position somwhere in the jungle."
This is factually incorrect and absurd on so many levels.
A ship - a Burke, for example - has 90+ VLS cells that can be filled with anti-ship missiles. There is no need to refill after an attack on an enemy ship. Unless taking on an entire enemy fleet single-handed, a ship can conduct dozens of attacks before needed to reload. In contrast, in the Marine's concept, each small unit would have only a half dozen or so missiles.
There is no reload 'somewhere in the jungle'. Reloads require some type of warehouse/magazine to store the missiles, heavy equipment to move and load the missiles, and, likely roads for the launch vehicles and reload equipment to reach each other. Most jungles don't have roads.
"marine missile battery can not be destroyed by one enemy's anti-ship missile like a ship."
A thousand pound warhead cruise missile most certainly will destroy a Marine unit. In contrast, a ship of Burke size is very unlikely to be sunk by a single missile hit. Further, a ship has extensive active and passive anti-missile defenses whereas a Marine unit would have none.
Please don't attempt to publish a comment of this poor quality again. It won't stand.
_This is factually incorrect and absurd on so many levels.
DeleteA ship - a Burke, for example - has 90+ VLS cells that can be filled with anti-ship missiles. _
96. But this is impossible to load all VLS with anti-ship of missiles.
Burke must be capable to repel missile or air strike, therefore a lot of SM-6 will be required.
Sometimes it will be necessary to attack land target, and few dozens of VLS cells will be loaded with land attack cruise missile.
There is no way to load all cells with one type of missiles.
Typically Burkes will have from 30 to 40 land attack AND some future anti-ship missiles in VLS, and some will have 8 Harpoons in Mk.141. It makes Burke a rouge equivalent of marine littoral regiment in available missile salvo.
_There is no reload 'somewhere in the jungle'. Reloads require some type of warehouse/magazine to store the missiles, heavy equipment to move and load the missiles, and, likely roads for the launch vehicles and reload equipment to reach each other. _
Missile truck and compact crane, that is all. Look at HIMARS units, they have transporters for 6-missile pack and launchers. Same will be for NSM armed anti-surface uinits.
Marines will go on shore with their missile stock.
Later logistics really will be complicated, but same will be for the ship.
_A thousand pound warhead cruise missile most certainly will destroy a Marine unit._
If unit will not be disperced in the area.
_In contrast, a ship of Burke size is very unlikely to be sunk by a single missile hit. Further, a ship has extensive active and passive anti-missile defenses_
True, but what about 90+ ASMs? Burkes will need to carry SM-6 in VLS cells. You can't have reliable air defense and strike capabilities in the same time.
You seriously need to come up to speed on naval warfare, in general, and US Navy Burkes, in particular, if you wish to keep commenting. For example, every missile in a Burke's VLS load has an anti-ship mode, including ESSMs. Given that ESSMs are quad-packed, that makes for, potentially, an enormous number of anti-ship missiles WHILE RETAINING THE FULL AAW CAPABILITY. Standards and ESSM are not ideal, large ship sinkers but that's not really the Marine's concept. They envision 'sniping' at lone ships or merchant ships rather than engaging an entire Chinese fleet.
DeleteTrucks, whether launch vehicles, missile transport vehicles (like forklifts), or reload vehicles are not going to be able to drive around a jungle or any raw island, to any great extent.
You also seem to have a misguided notion that a single Burke is going to wage a naval war all by itself. If the Navy were serious about performing some kind of anti-ship 'sweep' it would assign a task force of ships with many hundreds of missiles of all types, dwarfing any Marine small unit capability.
You also seem to have a misunderstanding about the size of the Marine units. The Commandant has stated that the units will be around platoon size. They simply can't bring more than a few vehicles with them. More than a few will constitute a large gathering and will be easily spotted. In addition, the LAW transport is limited in transport capacity even if it could survive to reach its destination.
I've got to be blunt, here. Your level of knowledge is far too low to be commenting. Please avail yourself of the archives and the many fine background websites that are available to come up to speed. I cannot allow further low quality comments.