The Two Fatal Mistakes
An anonymous reader recently commented that the Navy made two fatal mistakes:
the LCS and the Zumwalt programs.
The reader’s rationale was that the failure of those programs disrupted
the Navy’s coherent, future force structure plan and the failure then led to
many secondary negative effects and impacts.
The comment offered a fascinating and insightful view of how the Navy
came to be in the condition it now is.
As I thought about the reader’s comment, I came up with my
own pair of fatal mistakes: minimal
manning and the Burke program. I know …
it’s hard to narrow the Navy’s endless stream of major mistakes down to the two
biggest but here’s my rationale.
Minimal Manning – There’s not even any debate about
the negative impact of minimal manning (see, “TheOptimal Manning Experiment”).
Even the Navy has now acknowledged that they went too far and that the
manning program caused fleet wide maintenance problems, deferred maintenance,
and, ultimately, caused the premature retirement of entire ship classes due to
maintenance problems that eventually exceeded the Navy’s ability – or desire –
to repair. To put it simply and bluntly,
minimal manning devastated the fleet.
Burke Program – I did a post on the enormous negative
consequences of the Burke program (see, “Burke – TheAnchor Around the Navy’s Neck”).
To summarize, the Burkes are now an anchor around the Navy’s neck and
the perceived ‘safety’ of building more [now obsolete] Burkes has prevented the
Navy from developing new classes of more effective ships. The entire Navy is now slave to an obsolete
ship design. It’s as if the pre-WWII
Navy had continued to build more Pennsylvania class battleships instead of
moving on to aircraft carriers, Iowas, and Fletchers.
Let’s have some fun with this. What are the two fatal mistakes the Navy has
made that led to the current hollow, shrinking, combat-ineffective navy of
today? There’s not really any wrong
answer and, in fact, there’s a whole lot of right answers! What are your choices for the two fatal
mistakes and why?
Would it be cheating to say, "concurrency"? Hah.
ReplyDeleteThat's a completely valid fatal flaw. It produced an entire LCS class that was a colossal failure and waste. It produced hundreds of non-combat capable F-35s. It produced the Ford class which is still struggling to become operational and may never achieve full operational capability.
DeleteOne wonders why the Navy has not replaced our mine sweepers.
DeleteNot sacking / court martial of 90% of the 4/5*s for gross dereliction of duty. Allowing a civilianised culture of entitlement/ division to develop at Annapolis at the expense of professional training and culture.
ReplyDeleteThe growing trend world over to make everything multirole rather than horses for course
ReplyDelete-BM
Allowing the broad-specialisation communities (Submarine, Surface, Aviation) to splinter into ship-class communities that fight for budget irrespective of their importance to the Navy's overall mission. I suspect that most of the recent changes of plan grow out of dominance battles between the various Program Executive Offices and the various PMS organisations within them. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Sea_Systems_Command_Program_Executive_Offices
ReplyDeleteShouldn't the CNO be mediating those disputes and ranking the overall priorities? We seem to have had a string of exceptionally poor and weak CNOs.
DeleteThe CNO should, indeed, be controlling matters. But it's easier for them, both in dealing with their subordinates and in dealing with the politicians who provide the money, to act as if everything is going well, American cannot be defeated, and everyone can have what they want. Thirty years without a "credible" naval opponent will cause a lot of rot, and that masks the rise of an actually credible opponent in China.
DeleteA few years ago, I was reading Parshall and Tully's book "Shattered Sword," which reviews the context of the Battle of Midway in some detail, I kept seeing analogies between the Pacific War of 1941-45 and a possible new war between the US and China. But the US is the Japan-like power.
DeleteIt has the most advanced equipment and training, but its ability to build lots more equipment and train lots more people rapidly is very questionable. It has the better aircraft carriers, but cannot afford to lose any of them. China has more people, a better manufacturing base for lots of things, and a government that’s fairly united.
The USA seemed in 2019 like it might well start a war, in response to a constant nibbling of Chinese action in the South China Sea, an unfavourable trade balance, and unstable and unrealistic politics. Japan started its war, in response to US measures short of war, an unfavourable trade balance, and unstable and unrealistic politics.
US senior command is very politicised, with many factions pre-occupied with things that aren’t directly about military effectiveness. So was Japan.
Americans tend to deny the possibility of loosing a war. So did Japan.
The analogy is not exact. Japanese mystic racial nationalism had a strong grip on Japan’s military during WWII, and American white nationalism isn’t very important in the US military, as yet.
John Dallman, that is an excellent analysis and a valid concern. Considering how much blood, sweat, time, and money was wasted in various armed conflicts the US fought since 1945, I'm convinced Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan won a pyrrhic victory, by making US government leaders think the nation must serve as a "world police" and constantly get involved in pointless wars, instead of returning to isolationism.
Delete" instead of returning to isolationism."
DeleteIsolationism is appealing to the American psyche but is a flawed concept. Eventually, no matter how hard to try to ignore it, the world comes knocking with financial problems, terrorism, expansionist dictatorships, evil empires, etc. If you wait to address the problems until they've made it to your doorstep, it will be much harder to deal with. The time to put the fire out is when it's an ember not when the entire house is engulfed in flames.
Of course, it's necessary to deal with the world efficiently and effectively which is something we've largely failed at. Still, the answer isn't isolationism, it's more intelligent engagement.
"Still, the answer isn't isolationism, it's more intelligent engagement."
DeleteThe lack of intelligence is the problem. Not only do our government leaders lack intelligence in one sense, i.e., wisdom, they often lack it in another, i.e., crucial information on potential problems, the causes and solutions to these problems. Rushing into a situation without the necessary intelligence, ALWAYS harms US interests in ways that make isolationism seem a better option.
I understand your frustration but true isolationism will fail worse than what we're doing now. Russia and China would begin invading countries at will. Iran would cause no end of problems exporting terrorism and the middle east would be a non-stop war zone. Iran would complete their nuclear weapons program and use it to blackmail the world. Piracy would run amok. And so on.
DeleteThe first mistake would be trying to build single multi-functions ship instead of multiple single-function ships. The former has the problem of trying to do everything at once with inefficiency and huge cost. The latter has benefit of each ship able to focus on their primary function while other ships can focus on other primary functions more efficiently and cheaply.
ReplyDeleteThe second mistake is how the navy is more interested in revolutionary rather than evolutionary. While coming up something revolutionary shouldn't be neglected as it may provide new method, that is all there is. Not to mention how something new takes time, money, and effort to actually develop enough to be in use in actual battlefield. And yet the Navy is trying to bring forth something that isn't proven on to the field. The example of this would be laser, railgun, and etc. While laser and railgun would be useful once proven, even in best scenario, they would just be one of many methods of attacks that may be suitable in one situation and not suitable in other situation. They would not replace cannons and missile entirely.
Those are two excellent candidates for fatal mistakes!
Delete"The first mistake would be trying to build single multi-functions ship instead of multiple single-function ships."
DeleteThe Mk 41 VLS allows any ship so equipped, to change her function by changing out the missiles she's armed with, invalidating most arguments for single-role vs. multirole ships. The sensor suite equipping a ship, and the focus of her crew's training, remain valid arguments; but if a ship is over specialized, she will find herself in many scenarios where she's useless as anything but a decoy to draw enemy fire. We can partially mitigated the problems with sensor suite and crew training, e.g., stationing an antisubmarine helicopter aboard an air defense ship.
"The Mk 41 VLS allows any ship so equipped, to change her function by changing out the missiles she's armed with,"
DeleteNo. We only have two VLS missiles, as far as basic function: anti-air and anti-surface (whether land or ship) attack. A VLS has a fixed number of cells. All we can do is change the ratio of missile types between the two functions. Every cell that's dedicated to one function subtracts a cell from the other function.
The Burke, for example, is an AAW platform, pure and simple. It's entire sensor suite, stealth (to the extent it has any), weapons, and training are focused on AAW. Loading a few cruise missiles doesn't change the function of the Burke although that will detract from the AAW capacity. Being able to launch a few cruise missiles is just a secondary capability. It doesn't change the primary function.
The problem is that by adding ASW to the Burke to try to make it multi-function, we've hugely increased the size of the ship (hangar, flight deck, helos, additional crew and berthing, etc.) and the cost (a third of the total ship length is devoted to helo/ASW structure) which reduces the total number of ships we can afford. Multi-function comes with a severe penalty in cost and numbers. In the end, because the Burkes never train for ASW, they'll never be used in that role which means every Burke we build is a significant waste of money and a detriment to fleet numbers.
"if a ship is over specialized, she will find herself in many scenarios where she's useless"
You've completely missed the core concept. Ships don't fight alone. It's why we have fleets and task forces.
Because single function ships are so much cheaper, we can afford to build many more ships of all types. Thus, if a pure ASW vessel finds itself in a AAW situation, there will single function AAW ships available to step in AND THEY'LL BE OPTIMIZED FOR THE ROLE. That's the true value of single function ships: each one will be optimized and trained for the function and they'll be able to do it very well, unlike a Burke trying to do ASW and just getting itself torpedoed.
This was all proven out long ago. In WWII, we had task forces with a mix of various ship types to fill the various roles. You're trying to create a nonsensical scenario to make a mistaken point. No ship is going to fight alone. That's not how navies work.
This concept isn't really even debatable. We're seeing the logical result of multi-function ship design. Our ships are unaffordable and, as a result, the fleet is steadily shrinking. I just posted the Navy's proposed ship retirements and the numbers are horrifying. That's because we're building $3B Burkes (yes, that's the real cost after all the Navy accounting games) and we can't afford to build more than about four combat ships per year. That, alone, proves the multi-function concept is a dead end because the multi-function US Navy is, literally, dying trying to maintain the concept. Eventually, taken to it's logical conclusion, we'll have a navy consisting of a single, mammoth, trillion dollar ship that has every function every conceived ... and our navy will be utterly useless.
I reckon complacency has got to be one of the fatal mistakes, it has certainly plagued everyone since the end of the cold war. Without the very real and persistent threat of a peer adversary and the manner in which the cold war ended (not to mention the supposed "victory" of Desert Storm right after), armed forces around the world (especially the U.S since they are the "victors") came off a high and got complacent. Standards were relaxed, corruption of all form seeped in and allowed to take root over the years. Critical thinking ceased becoming the standard and it became ok for common sense, logic and all else that entails to go out the window. Sadly it's just very human isn't it? It is however still irresponsible. In fact it's gotten so bad that according to your blog the USN today is actually ACTIVELY trying to weaken itself by dispensing of basic things like testing a vessel to ensure full functionality prior to accepting them.
ReplyDeleteI would venture that the concentration of function to be the second fatal mistake however it seems to already have been discussed by others so in the spirit of discussion I shall venture an alternative.
The second fatal mistake can be said to be derived from the first, that is the USN allowed an environment that did not deter the concentration of the arms industry. Today the USN have got maybe two or three companies to turn to for options and ideas. Should all of them prove to be poor and are not competitive with each other it is very difficulty for a small company to get a shout in. I remember in my early childhood when there were plenty of American companies represented on a single american aircraft carrier. Today you have the F-35.
- Loc
Very good ! Good explanation/analysis.
DeleteAny suggestion what we can do about complacency?
The apparent inability for anyone in the US navy to open a can of paint.
DeleteWho on earth would want to serve in a Navy that seems to think so badly of themselves?
And do you really think these rust-buckets are scary to the people that are supposed to be scared?
And we wonder about early retirements when the sailors aboard these vessels can't be bothered to take care of them?
"Any suggestion what we can do about complacency?"
DeleteThat's a very difficult question, one many wish there is an easy magic solution because it is so widespread in all walks of life.
I believe the answer, or a part of it at least, is in staying grounded and staying true to the reason for existance (mission/mandate etc). This will require constant work such as constant review and evaluation, regular learning from mistakes, reinforcement of ideals and values. There must always be regular self reflection and discussion as an entity. At the end of the day the navy have to ask the question, why are we replacing the old known and working class of ship with this new odd looking one? Is it serving the purpose and thus fulfilling mandate for us to exist? If so, are we doing it in a way that is also serving that mandate in the best, most efficient manner possible? If not then a rethinking needs to be done and that theory tested and scrutinized.
The navy could have shrunken in size responsibly during the peace dividend and could have stayed relevant. It could have retired the spruence and perry classes and replaced them with General Purpose Frigate that was built with tested and proven machinery and hull, applied modern structure, equipment and electronics, a couple of 3 inch guns, a simple modern variant of mk 29 launcher for ESSM, some harpoons, a couple of CIWs and bolt down some good old crew served 20mm oerlikons and if it cost $250M each that could be the vessel doing your anti piracy patrols that took up most of the post cold war deployments. Even ComNavOps won't complain as much if those were used for the useless FONOPS! That GP FF class could be the workhorse while the Navy test, prototype and evaluate new vessels for mass production should the need arise FOLLOWING an established CONOPS. That's how the limited budget SHOULD have been handled.
Instead the peace dividends got you lots of $1+B Burkes, the DDG 1000s, the LCS, the F-35s.. no proper long range missiles, no proper anti ship missiles, no proper naval gun for anything particularly useful..
- Loc
I would say the biggest mistake is failure to define mission clearly. Yes, we get all kinds of purported mission/vision documents with lots of quality graphics, but they are all collections of bureaucratic gobbledygook that don’t actually say anything. Until you know mission, you can’t define CONOPS competently. IMO we have suffered as a nation from the lack of a clear national grand strategy and mission for about 30 years. During the Cold War we knew very clearly who was the enemy (the Evil Soviet Empire) and what was the mission (stop them). That led to some mistakes (Vietnam was a poorly taken decision, at least the way we executed it). But when the Berlin Wall fell, we didn’t have the foggiest clue what to do next. Failure to define mission clearly has led to a bunch of awful procurement decisions, and we may be seeing the beginning of the end of the Marine Corps for inability to define a viable mission. I would postulate that we are in Cold War II, this time the enemy is China not Russia, this war is going to be won or lost more on economic power than military power, and so far we are losing—badly.
ReplyDeleteI’d say the second biggest mistake is putting the admin/overhead cart ahead of the combat/operational horse. This seems to be an inherent flaw in peacetime military organizations, but it is a serious problem with wide-scale harmful impacts. Perhaps it is a natural outcome from the lack of clearly defined mission.
Good choices !
Delete"when the Berlin Wall fell, we didn’t have the foggiest clue what to do next"
This is an often overlooked, key point. Peace is when you prepare for war. Along those lines, when the Soviet Union fell it gave us a period of time that we should have used to revitalize the military and, more importantly, reset our geopolitical strategy and work on the groundwork that would/should have led to many decades of future peace. Instead, we blew it. Really great point.
Where to begin? Choosing incompetent CNO's count? What about reversing course and go back to being A-Political? Instead of jumping right into full-bore acquisition and production (see the Ford-class) of a ship class, weapon system. etc you build a prototype or take a current ship nearing its service life and test the equipment and systems on that vessel.
ReplyDelete"Where to begin?"
DeleteIndeed !
"build a prototype"
Yes !
Hard to top the "complacency" and "failure to define a mission/strategy/goals" posts above, but I'll try to highlight one novel overriding problem: leadership being disconnected from reality.
ReplyDeleteMinimal manning is causing maintenance problems and reducing the effectiveness of damage control? Not if we bury the reports!
A new ship or aircraft or weapon won't pass tests? Easy solution, quit testing!
The untested ships don't work when we start serial production and take deliveries? No problemo, just issue waivers for the defects and pretend to deploy them!
We don't have carrier aircraft capable of executing the missions that we are most likely to need to do, and our insistence on getting rid of VF and VS and VA in favor of everything-VFA is causing what capabilities we do have to atrophy? Simple, just keep talking about how great a boon "necking-down" has been and it will become true!
So you see, our Navy is actually a fantastically capable force, so long as you live in The Land of Make-Believe. It's only when you ask the brass to do unreasonable things - like operate on the actual planet Earth - that you run into problems.
Contributing to the Burke fatal mistake would note the limitations of its gas guzzling all GT propulsion system, exposed by the graphic for the proposed new DDG(X) which quotes 50% greater range, 120% more time on station with 25% reduction in fuel usage.
ReplyDeletePS Understand the Burke range requirement was for 6,000nm at 18 knots and was to be achieved by installing RACER (Rankine Cycle Energy Recovery System) being developed concurrently with the design of Burkes 1984/5. It would have used the high temperature exhaust from the GT's to produce high-pressure steam powering a turbine to produce an additional 6MW+ per GT, but program was cancelled because of major technical development problems. The sad result Burke range limited to approximately 4,500/4,600 nm.
So, turning this 180 degrees, anything the Navy's done well over the last generation?
ReplyDeleteWhat ever part of the Navy has evolved the RIM-24
Deletethru numerous versions, understands evolution.
The grandad's axe of missiles.
I don't get how the Burkes have "prevented the Navy from developing new classes of more effective ships". We've tried to build new, presumably more effective, ships (DDX, CG(X), LCS). They've just been failures. That's not the Burke's fault. We even stopped building Burkes for a while under the mistaken expectation that these new ships would fill the void, only to have to restart the line.
ReplyDeleteFar from an anchor, the Burkes are our only life preserver. They're single-handedly keeping the surface Navy afloat.
They may not align with everyone's fantasy fleet design, but they're the only proven, successful surface combatant we can build right now.
Read the linked post.
DeleteI did. My earlier comment still stands.
DeleteI can lead you to water ......
Delete"Let's cancel the Burke program today, instead of building two per year. They're obsolete and we are wasting $4+B per year on them, right?"
DeleteThis is the kind of useless comment that subtracts from your many worthwhile comments. No one except you said to instantly stop building Burkes. Any semi-intelligent person would understand the concept of phasing out Burkes and phasing in new designs.
I deleted your comment because it failed to move the conversation forward and offered no worthwhile information.
If you stick to substantive comments, you're thoughts are productive and worthwhile. When you stray ...
That's ok. All of my comments on your site are throwaway. I've learned not to put effort into them.
Delete" I've learned not to put effort into them."
DeleteI can see that !
Id say the biggest OOPS the Navy has committed is, like mentioned above, the change from evolutionary to revolutionary. But Im going to retitle it, and call the Navys big mistake a "lack of rearward thinking"!!! In that vein, they've also fallen into the trap of not having follow-on designs ready to produce at the end of a previous class production run. The USN actually has a fantastic history of intelligent ship design and incremental improvement that runs from the 19-teens deep into the 1950s(and you could argue even longer than that, but Im very comfortable with saying into the 50s). You can look at every ship type and clearly see the evolution and advances made. There was no generation-skipping. Every improvement was tested and vetted, and hard-won before moving on.
ReplyDeleteThe fact that the USN deviated from the past so far, that Ford, LCS, etc exist, shows a tragic lack of historical perspective, understanding, and rearward thinking...!!!
If Congress or an administration would back it, they should press block buys and cancel the next block if it hasn't been developed in time. Of course, this will never happen as it will punish the shipyard workers more than anyone else. The other option is automatically tossing out the brass when their plans aren't refined and readdy. Of course that menas the administration needs to be on board and Congress fund it in time.
Delete"block buys"
DeleteThere's nothing wrong with block buys but, by law, they can only be used in very strict, defined circumstances. Be sure you understand what those circumstances are before you call for more block buys. The Navy has illegally abused the block buy procedure.
" The Navy has illegally abused the block buy procedure." by ComNavOps
DeleteThen another fatal mistake: not obeying and abusing the law!!!!
Of course, in my opinion, a big one is closing Naval(U.S. government)-controlled aircraft and other war-making infrastructures and leaving it to outsiders (i.e. private companies not under their control) and thus allowing the F-35 to cost so much, I mean look at the opening for the Naval Aircraft Factory, one of the original purpose was:
" The Navy Department concluded that it was necessary to build a Navy-owned aircraft factory in order to assure a part of its aircraft supply; to obtain cost data for the department’s guidance in its dealings with private manufacturers; and to have under its own control a factory capable of producing experimental designs."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Aircraft_Factory
"closing Naval(U.S. government)-controlled aircraft"
DeleteYou may have a misunderstanding of what the naval aircraft factory facility was and what it's purpose was. It was NOT to build front line combat aircraft. It was to act as a knowledge center for aircraft design and production so as to provide the Navy with a solid knowledge base when dealing with civilian aircraft manufacturers. In the course of that effort, the facility built non-combat patrol planes and the like.
Read the quote you offered. It says, 'factory capable of producing experimental designs'. It does not say anything about producing front line combat aircraft. It also became quickly apparent that the facility could NOT match civilian companies when it came to cutting edge technology; hence, the focus on less advanced patrol type aircraft.
The F-35 cost is not related the lack of an in-house aircraft manufacturing center. The F-35 cost is the result of inappropriate requirements and specifications, the desire to fuse three distinct designs into one, the misguided desire to replace every existing combat aircraft with a single aircraft, the political desire to make the F-35 a glorified jobs program, etc. None of those problems would have been alleviated by having an in-house facility.
So what if the Naval Aircraft Factory produces 9870th Rate waay back of the line aircrafts? Having NAF with the in-house expertise would have provided, say, a faster fix for the F-35C's catapult problem as from the early day like below:
Deletehttps://news.usni.org/2017/02/16/f-35c-catapult-problem-next-week
Thus, some cost saving, after all it was one of the Naval Aircraft Factory's job to test out, and at one point actually make, catapult and other aircraft carrier systems as below
https://www.patriotspoint.org/news-and-events/hydraulic-catapults-enter-navy-service-1934-2/
Besides, if the Navy followed the law there has got to be some whistleblower systems (I'm guessing, as how would they make those aircraft parts cost analysis otherwise) from aircraft experts to NAF thus preventing the F-35 from happening in the first place.
Same Anonymous as above: I'll include the quote from the "Patriots Point" link I've posted above in case readers do not want to go to the link or it gets taken down:
Delete"The Type H, Mark I catapult was manufactured by the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and was the first to be enclosed under the surface of the carrier flight deck."
"NAF with the in-house expertise"
DeletePlease don't misunderstand. I'm not opposed to an in-house facility. There's much good that could come of it but not in the way you seem to think.
A WWII aircraft was, essentially, an exercise in automobile engines (meaning pistons) and wrench-plumbing. It was low level technology, mechanically, even if some of the aerodynamics were cutting edge and poorly understood, for the time. In contrast, today's jets require Ph.D design engineers with decades of experience, precise computer aided chip and board design, an exquisite level of knowledge about physics, advanced computer modeling and simulation capability, stealth, metallurgy, aerodynamics, computers, etc., robotics manufacturing to achieve mind-boggling tolerances, and massive, cutting edge software coding capability. This is far beyond the ability of the Navy to accomplish even for career naval engineer types.
What an in-house facility would allow is a sufficient level of understanding to discern a good design from a bad one, a fair price from gouging, and an understanding of what should be tested and how to go about it (in conjunction with DOT&E's statistically designed test protocols). Currently, we lack that degree of in-house expertise but would benefit greatly from it. Just don't labor under the misconception that such a facility could design or produce a modern combat aircraft.
" the change from evolutionary to revolutionary."
DeleteYep, that's a major problem!
"The Navy has illegally abused the block buy procedure."
DeleteYet, these block buys were supported by the Department of Defense, approved by Congress, and signed into law by the President.
"Yet ... "
DeleteThat doesn't make it legal. See 10 U.S.C. 2306b for the text of the statute governing multi-year buys.
MYP/BBC requires Congressional approval. Approval does not, however, assure legality. Congressional actions are often overturned by courts.
BBC is likely illegal in that it directly contradicts and bypasses the provisions of the MYP statute. It was an end-around by Navy/Congress to bypass the Virginia class MYP ineligibility. BBC has no statutory standing or authority and, again, is likely illegal as it directly violates 10 U.S.C. 2306b.
See the Oct 19, 2021 "Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress" CRS report for a good description of the MYP/BBC procedure.
Per the Summary section of that same report, "BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC." Also, "There is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC."
DeleteAs you know, all defense procurement programs go through multiple legal reviews. There is no illegality with the Navy using block buy contracting.
As you know from your careful reading of the MYP statute, the MYP can ONLY be used for stable and mature designs. The Burke Flt III, for example, was a significantly different design from the preceding FLT IIa, just as the Super Hornet had little in common with the Hornet, other than name. Thus, the Flt III was ineligible for MYP and yet the navy went ahead with it anyway. From the Navy's website,
Delete"The acquisition strategy included the procurement of 10 DDG-51 class ships from FY 2018-2022 using MYP authority to competitively award ships ...
The destroyers are being procured in a Flight III configuration, relying on a stable and mature design while delivering critical integrated air and missile defense capability with the AN/SPY6(V)(1) Air and Missile Defense Radar."
A Flt III had never been built before so, by definition, it was not a stable and mature design which made the MYP illegal. In other procurement actions, BBC was concocted as a means of getting around the legal prohibition for MYP in the Ford class since it was clearly not a stable and mature design. BBC does exactly what a MYP does and is, therefore, illegal. The fact that Congress authorized it (authorization is different from passing a statutory law) does not make it legal. Congressional actions are frequently taken to court and declared unconstitutional. Of course, until someone challenges it in court, it will stand. If/when challenged, it will be struck down. However, given Congress, the Navy, and industry's common goal of spending, it is unlikely that anyone will challenge the illegal BBC procedure. That does not make it legal, only unchallenged.
This is analogous to Congress authorizing a murder despite a law against murder. Authorizing does not make something legal.
This is an example of the Navy manipulating Congress and the law, and acting illegally to obtain what they want.
It is also important to understand that the MYP statutory restrictions were put in place specifically to prevent various abuses, all of which the navy is currently engaging in. MYP restrictions exist for very good reasons and the mere fact that Congress has authorized an illegal action does not negate the very good reasons why the MYP restrictions exist.
"A Flt III had never been built before so, by definition, it was not a stable and mature design which made the MYP illegal."
DeleteAre you familiar with the concept of qualification by similarity? The Flt III Burke's have a new radar, new electronics, new power distribution equipment, and a few other changes. All of which, beings along some techical risks. The new radar probably being the most significant.
Overall, what percentage of commonality is there between the Flt IIA and Flt III? Seventy-five? Eighty-five percent? The new equipment has gone through it's own certification process.
In this instance, it seems the Navy made the case that the design of Flt III Burke is mature enough for multi-year procurement. A decision that was supported by the DOD and approved by Congress.
The problem is that the Navy hasn't built a general porpose surface combattant since the Perry class. A GP unit is not a multifunctional unit as planned for the LCS. A GP ship is a jack of al trades that can function in many roles but isn't really optimised too much for a specific role, while the LCS in the end is only an empty container that could have been a multifunctional class, with single role ships, if the planned capability modules would've cole to fruition. As the whole LCS concept has failed (aside from the asisine decision regardings the hulls and systems), the navy now doesn't have GP units in service and has to find roles for the LCS and has to use the Burkes for missions for which they are notreally suited. A GP ship shouldn't have too much gold plating, no overoptimisation if avoidable and limited capabilities as specified by the user.
ReplyDeleteThe Burkes killed the GP role in the fleet with an overoptimisation in the AAW role and the capability to launch land attack cruise missiles, today most of the class lack anti ship missiles (while there are SAMs with secondary capabilieties in the role they will never be really on par with a specific weapon).
The downward trend began with the conversion of the Spurance class to cruise missile launchers and their subsequent early retirement. The Perry class was downgraded to a large OPV removing it's missile armament and it' turbines. They've been mostly been replaced by Burkes, while the LCS hasn't really replaced anything.
Even in Europe, where real GP classes have been built for decades, new large bloated frigates have become the new trend, with destroyer like AAW suites, lack of serious missile armament for a ship of this size. These ships become not affordable very quickly and only handfulls are built, and are very similar in in role to the Burkes.
The coreans instead continue to produce GP escorts with the Deagu und Incheon classes.
Reduced manning in the Zumwalt program came from its cost overrun thus Navy came a "genius" idea to reduce manning to save money.
ReplyDeleteThey were originally shooting for a crew of 95.
DeleteI'm going to suggest something that's going to piss off our host, ComNavOps, and say that a "fatal mistake" was the US Navy not going all the way into the Arsenal Ship concept. Not because it was a good idea (it's not) or because of any practical reason that would have benefited the Navy, but purely because the Navy would have purchased (hopefully) huge additional numbers of Standard & Harpoon missiles. My grandfather was a contract manager for Aerojet Tactical Systems, and part of his yearly bonus was tied to sales numbers for both of those systems, and he personally would have benefited immensely if the Navy had committed to large purchases of those missiles. My grandfather certainly would have appreciated the Navy making such a "fatal mistake".
ReplyDeleteGray
One of the things I think that went awry, is lack of legitimate competition between various shipyards. If you have ever read any of the Late Senator McCains papers on the navy, it is one of the things that he always brought up. We need many more shipyards that are ready and capable of repairing the various ships.
ReplyDeleteWhat is the most troubling, is how do we build up our capability to build ships and repair them ? One doesn't snap ones fingers and you have a shipyard and supporting machinery and people to work on the ships and use machinery. I went through a 4-year apprentice ship to become a boilermaker. Also, there are many aspects of designing and building a naval vessel, that arent easily learned outside of the Navy.
I remember two decades ago when a close friend expressed concerns about the Navy's new minimal ship manning plan. Much of the preventive maintenance would be done by civilians while in port rather than the crew. That's a good idea if everything works perfectly. But if a ship is deployed longer than six months, or can't make port calls overseas, or while in port the civilians are unavailable to due manning shortages or too many ships in port or backlogs, the maintenance (like painting) does not get done. I suspect lots of preventive maintenance is often skipped leading to costly and time consuming corrective maintenance and even the need to retire ships early. With larger crews, needed preventive maintenance was done when needed under the command of a ship's captain and chiefs who ensure it and it got done correctly and on time!
ReplyDelete"Much of the preventive maintenance would be done by civilians while in port rather than the crew. That's a good idea if everything works perfectly."
DeleteNot sure I can agree with that. I dont see where civilians are ever cost-effective at maintenance. Navy rates still have lengthy A Schools, as well as lots of OJT. With the Navy complaining about the cost of sailors, why aren't they being utilized to the fullest??? In my time, the ETs maintained and repaired the electronics, the GMs maintained the weapons, the BTs, MMs and ENs handled the propulsion, BMs worked on the hull and superstructure, as well as ships boats and the UNREP rigs, etc... Every piece of that ship had rated sailors assigned to its care and feeding. The yard periods, and the civilian contractors, only did things that were out of the crews scope (although with materials furnished, they still couldve done those jobs) such as adding a UNREP fuel rig, adding a Halon system to the mainspace, etc. Full boiler rebuilds were done, but likely our crew could've managed. While in the yards, each rate was working hard to give their assigned gear a full rebuild.Obviously we needed a hull cleaning and painting, but we couldve even done that once in a drydock. So what changed? So on major alteration or construction/upgrades etc, fine, thats yardbird territory. But otherwise, Im not seeing how hired out maintenance is wise, or an intelligent use of our sailors and their training, or the maintenance budget...
All these failure are derived from one factor - fading of military R&D capabilities. Not just Navy, almost all major weapons developed in past two decades ended up in failure.
ReplyDeleteI not going to deny the US had had some white elephants. But we also have a more open system and information availability care to name a nation that is batting 100% on high tech leading edge or all the time on budget and super effective?
Delete"fading of military R&D capabilities."
DeleteThere have been many program failures. However, be careful that you correctly distinguish the cause of those failures. R&D is, strictly, the science portion of a program. Most failures have been due to mismanagement, inappropriate or overly ambitious requirements, concurrency, cost overruns, etc. which have nothing to do with the actual science.
Women on ships.
ReplyDeleteNot plowing any new ground here, but...
ReplyDelete1) Trying to skip a generation of technology.
2) Forgetting what war really is.
Lutefisk
Excellent choices!
DeleteTwo good candidates, one obvious, one might be controversial:
ReplyDelete1. Ford: This is a far bigger disaster currently than Zumwalt or LCS. Zumwalt and LCS poured billions of dollars down the toilet, but they weren't being depended on for a capability we can't get anywhere else. The Ford program has dedicated our entire carrier production capacity to ships that show no sign of becoming mission capable anytime soon. These are the most important asset the navy has in a conventional war.
F/A-18: Maybe in line with COMNAVOPS on Burke, this is an effective platform for what it was designed for in the 80's. But think of the mix of capabilities in a 1980s CVW. Long range air superiority / fleet defence (F-14), long range strike (A-6), ground attack / medium range attack (A-7) etc. We now have all our eggs in the F/A-18 basket in the same way that all of our surface warfare "eggs" are in the Burke basket.
Can't argue with either of those !
Delete1- concurrency
ReplyDelete2- MIC dominance
As an aside, I think there's plenty of evidence the usn has no chance of catching up to China, as far as overall numbers go.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/?fbclid=IwAR3MifEH2oEXZWWQtKB_lBhY-CgKkyP5vRS-Zm1be2MIsNX2Yna0i9UG57g
Andrew