One of the common refrains from military observers is that we should be establishing forward bases in the Pacific as a way of dealing with China. There are, however, a few problems with forward bases that must be addressed and overcome in order for them to be viable options.
We’re going to take a two-part look at the issue of forward bases beginning with a general examination of the concept in this, the first part, and followed by a specific example in the second part.
Definition
One of the problems in a discussion of forward bases is that no two people can agree on what constitutes a forward base. What is the definition of a forward base? Just as with phrases like ‘sea control’ or ‘littoral’, everyone has their own idea of what a forward base is. A base one mile ahead of a main base is technically a forward base but that’s obviously not what we’re talking about. For our discussion purposes, a forward base is defined as a permanent facility of moderate or large size located in enemy controlled – or at least highly contested – waters that serves the purpose of providing support and staging for further operations.
It is the location in enemy controlled/contested waters that makes it ‘forward’.
The permanence of the base is what separates a forward base from, say, the Marine’s fantasy of secret platoon size units that temporarily occupy a location and then move on to sow destruction and confusion among the enemy.
Challenges
As noted, forward bases face a variety of challenges that must be overcome to make them viable.
History - The first obstacle to overcome is history. History strongly suggests that forward bases almost invariably wind up being lost to the enemy. The one glaring exception in history is the string of forward bases established by the US during the WWII Pacific campaign as the US island hopped its way to Japan. It is noteworthy, however, that the pre-WWII forward bases established by the US as a means of deterrence and forward defense were all lost to Japan during the early months of the war.
Now, consider the history of Japan’s forward bases in the Pacific. At their peak, Japan had an extensive network of powerful bases throughout the Pacific. It didn’t matter how strong the individual bases were, they all fell. Consider the example of Truk, the Japanese Gibraltar of the Pacific. It was considered nearly impregnable and unapproachable.
At the height of the atoll’s life as a Japanese base area, as many as 1,000 ships were on occasion to be found in the lagoon.[1]
The Japanese garrison peaked at 27,856 naval personnel …and 16,737 army personnel … [1]
Other defensive efforts included:
- coast-defense artillery
- remote controlled mines
- 40 anti-aircraft guns
Base facilities included,
… roads, trenches, bunkers and caves. The whole defensive complex included five airfields, seaplane bases, a torpedo boat station, submarine repair facilities, a communications centre and a radar station.[1]
Despite this collection of base force and firepower, Truk was easily attacked, destroyed, and then bypassed by US forces.
Isolation – The pre-war US forward bases and Japan’s forward bases all fell because they were isolated and, generally, separated from each other by great distances. The bases were unable to mutually support each other and were subject to local massing of numerically superior enemy forces with greater firepower at a time of the enemy’s choosing.
In fact, one could logically argue that Japan’s scattered, forward bases were actually detriments to Japan’s overall military objectives because each base represented a ‘penny packet’ of force that had no hope of accomplishing anything, was doomed to defeat in detail, and drained forces from the overall military effort and geopolitical objectives.
The lesson is that if you can’t successfully defend a base (and history suggests that’s a very difficult thing to do) then you’re just throwing away resources.
Sea Control – As noted, isolation is a major challenge and the only way to overcome it is to maintain control of the connecting seas. Reinforcement and resupply can only occur by sea. When control of the sea is lost, so too, is the forward base. During the pre-war and early months of war, Japan was able to exercise control of the sea and its forward bases were viable. Once control of the sea was lost, Japan’s bases were doomed even if it took the US a few years to systematically destroy them.
Similarly, when the US lost control of the seas, its forward bases (Wake, Philippines, etc.) were doomed. Once the US re-established control of the seas in the later years of the war, it was able to establish a string of forward bases that were viable.
Location and Purpose - It is vitally important to understand what a forward base really is. To begin with, it’s not forward! It may begin life at the forward edge of battle but by the time it becomes operational and useful, the forward edge of battle has moved on and the base is rendered a rear area support and staging facility.
As the American example of WWII demonstrated, forward bases work only when they are part of a coordinated, overall effort and then only when they are not actually at the forward edge of battle. For example, each island base the US seized began as the forward edge of battle but became an operational base only when we moved on, rendering the base a rear area support facility. Indeed, that is what a ‘forward’ base is: a rear area support facility from which to stage and launch future actions.
Forward bases that are actually forward – meaning at the leading edge of battle or actually in enemy territory – are generally either ineffective (Guadalcanal while the island was being contested) or lost.
Conclusion
The fantasy of a forward base, existing and operating inside an enemy’s sphere of influence and control, is just that … a fantasy. The reality is that an operationally useful forward base is, in reality, and by necessity, a rear area support and staging facility. We need to recognize and accept that. Every dollar and every hour spent attempting to implement forward base fantasies is another dollar and hour lost to efforts that are actually productive and effective.
We also have got to come to grips with the imperative to establish and maintain control of the sea Without control of the sea, Guam (or any other base) is just a useless, doomed facility waiting to die. Unfortunately, we are currently in the process of knowingly and willingly ceding control of the seas to China. The relative naval and air production rates of the US and China guarantee eventual Chinese control of the sea.
___________________________________
[1]https://cmchant.com/japans-pacific-base-truk-atoll/
Besides, where would such bases be established?
ReplyDeleteI have yet to hear of a proposal that's both realistic and useful.
Should a country like Russia or China destroy one or more of our bases nearest to them, what on earth could we do?
ReplyDeleteStrike Russia itself? Or China, knowing that both countries can and will immediately destroy one or more of our cities.
Our bases are hostages to humiliation.
Where are nearest bases to Russia? In Lithuania and other Baltic nations that are also NATO members. Russia knows destroying them will start a war it cannot win, so as long as no one does something stupidly provocative- e.g., Lithuania cutting off Russian access to the latter's enclave of Kaliningrad- then the question is only hypothetical.
DeleteWhere are the nearest bases to China? In South Korea and Japan. China won't be stupid enough to destroy bases in those nations, which will automatically inflame public moods in those nations and make them join a war as US allies. It's another matter if those nations exercise their sovereignty, declaring neutrality, and forbidding the US from launching attacks from those bases; but surely we have other bases we can use, e.g., Guam?
If China attacks Guam, all bets are off. But surely they know such an attack will invite a retaliatory one- likely a NUCLEAR attack- against a Chinese base in the South China Sea?
US bases aren't necessarily hostages to humiliation. It would depend on where those bases are; against whom they're meant to be used; how smart our government and military leaders are.
I dont see the US, or Russia/China going nuclear. I just dont believe the idea that nukes will fly at the drop of a hat...
DeleteI hear that assertion that a conventional war will surely go nuclear often, and I don't believe thats true. Look at the difference in the warhead count. Why would China up the stakes to nuclear conflict with around 300, knowing theyre facing an enemy that could send 1000 or more in return, and still have plenty left in reserve for Russia?? Sure, 300 takes out all the major military bases, and 200+ of the largest cities, and the US is no more, but whats left of China after receiving half or more of the US arsenal, if not all of it???
DeleteI dont believe either side is foolish enough to think that theres such thing as a "limited exchange", either. The inability to absolutely predict the enemys reaction to even a single nuclear weapon, even a small tactical one, and the inability to control an eacalating tit for tat, in my mind, precludes their use at all...
"I dont see the US, or Russia/China going nuclear. I just dont believe the idea that nukes will fly at the drop of a hat..."
DeleteOne of my pet peeves is unsupported statements, whether I agree with them or not. What evidence or logic leads you to your conclusion?
"What evidence or logic leads you to your conclusion?"
DeleteIt's nothing but wishful thinking. If China or Russia perceives an existential threat, they will do whatever it takes to eliminate this threat, just as the US will.
"If China or Russia perceives an existential threat, they will do whatever it takes to eliminate this threat"
DeleteDoes history support that contention? The Soviet Union faced an existential threat during the Cold War and collapsed without resorting to nuclear weapons to eliminate the US/NATO.
Israel faces an existential threat on a daily basis and has not resorted to nuclear weapons.
NKorea believes they face an existential threat from SKorea/US and have not resorted to nuclear weapons.
I'm not necessarily disagreeing with your contention. I'm just nudging you to support your belief with history, logic, and data.
For example, logically, one might argue that self-preservation is the highest human instinct and that proves that a country will resort to nuclear weapons if faced with an existential threat. On the other hand, triggering a nuclear war is an almost certain guarantee of death and would violate the instinct for self-preservation so, therefore, human instinct precludes the use of nuclear weapons in a mutual destruction scenario.
Its interesting the effort that China is going through to modernize their nuclear capability. ~300 new missile silos spread over two regions. New SSBNs and new nuclear capable aircraft.
DeleteThinking that China only has 300 nuclear weapons is kind of 2000s thinking. They say no first use, and I pretty much believe them, but if push comes to shove, who knows.
"I pretty much believe them"
DeleteWhy would you believe anything China says? Is it because of their stellar record for obeying treaties they've signed? Is it because of their promises not to militarize the artificial islands that they then promptly militarized? Is it because of their wholesale flouting of international patent law? I can do this all night but you get the idea. What could possibly lead you to believe anything China says?
First use by anyone has huge repercussions. Its simply not worth it. Arguably that's a major reason why the Russians haven't used even battlefield nukes in Ukraine.
DeleteSo its not really hard to believe the Chinese are not going to be first use. And year by year, the necessity to fall back on first use of nuclear weapons is becoming less pressing as China's military capability grows.
George
"[T]hat's a major reason why the Russians haven't used even battlefield nukes in Ukraine."
DeleteI have to ask which way the wind blows there, i.e., if Russia used nukes against Ukraine, would the winds blow the radioactive fallout towards Russia? That may be a more likely reason.
"The Soviet Union faced an existential threat during the Cold War and collapsed without resorting to nuclear weapons to eliminate the US/NATO."
DeleteThe Soviet Union collapsed because of its ECONOMIC problems; a nuclear attack against the US and NATO will do NOTHING to fix those problems.
"The Soviet Union collapsed because of its ECONOMIC problems"
DeleteAn economic collapse IS an existential threat. The SU ceased to exist. Existential threats come in many forms.
"a nuclear attack against the US and NATO will do NOTHING to fix those problems."
Incorrect. Had the US/NATO been nuclear bombed out of existence or to the point of irrelevancy, the Soviet Union would have gained life-saving economic space. They would not have had to spend so much on defense (though that was not why they collapsed).
The point is that the premise that Russia would resort to nuclear weapons when faced with an existential threat is, historically, disproven.
"I have to ask which way the wind blows there,"
DeleteDepends on the weather patterns on the day, and immediately after. A look at what happened after Chernobyl is revealing.
https://youtu.be/4eRkBuepWyw
Its french with english subtitles. The graphics of the plume over a couple of weeks are the important bits.
Essentially, the plume went everywhere, but that was a huge amount of radioactive material that escaped. How that would compare with a battlefield nuke would depend on how it was delivered e.g. airburst vs groundburst for example.
"Thinking that China only has 300 nuclear weapons is kind of 2000s thinking."
DeleteThats not my number... Not sure how its "2000s thinking". Most online sources say 300 or 350 although DOD estimates from last year say "low 200s".
China is building somewhere between 229 and 300 new silos. If they are going to hold something like a DF-41, then you could expect to have up to ten MIRVs on each.
DeleteIn addition, you have to look at the SSBN build program, plus whatever airborne delivery systems are being developed.
Federation of American Scientists is talking around 845 warheads when this is finished. Even assume they are off by 50%, that is still a big change from 300.
Its interesting that the build-up is happening so quickly, and on such a large scale.
And the change in direction on nuclear policy happened very fast under Xi.
"China is building somewhere between 229 and 300 new silos."
DeleteOne very strong possibility is that the majority of the silos are, at any given moment, empty and act as decoys. No one knows.
Absolutely. Without treaties that mandate inspections, there is no way to accurately figure out what is going on. It has been suggested these constructs may be windmill foundations!
DeleteAt least satellite data is becoming very useful as more and more civilian data comes into the mix available to the NRO.
You can probably bet that initially there are likely to be very few filled silos, although that may change in the future.
However, I suggest the build program for SSBNs confirms that there is definitely a push on to enhance nuclear capability. They are churning out Type 094 variants as fast as they can build them, and are now moving on to Type 096s.
We've been hearing about 300 warheads for quite a while. That may very well no longer be true, and the rate of change may be very high. That was my point about "2000s thinking", and it certainly wasn't intended as a dig at anyone here. Sometimes the conventional wisdom is not really wise.
It would be nice if we didn't have to use "may" quite so often when talking about Chinese capabilities!
" I suggest the build program for SSBNs confirms that there is definitely a push on to enhance nuclear capability."
DeleteThe SSBN push is to enhance survivability of their nuclear arsenal in the event of a US first strike. Of course, the US will never conduct a nuclear first strike but the Chinese are unbelievably paranoid.
I totally agree. A base needs to be part of a network with sufficient capability to dominate line of communications. In that way the base adds value as it allows operations closer/deeper into enemy territories.
ReplyDeleteAn isolated base is a liability.
The German and Russians bases at Tsing Tao and Port Arthur are great examples of this concept. Isolated and with too weak line of communications to be defensible.
Meanwhile both the British Royal Navy in its heydey and modern USN's bases served as strategic force multipliers because they generally had/have dominance of lines of communications.
In Asia-Pacific US is still in a dominant position in the Pacific and North Asia due to its allies and associated basing in Japan and South Korea and unwritten defence agreement with Taiwan.
In SE Asia USA is far weaker because save Singapore it lacks both bases and suitable partners. However US can still close Chinese access to Indian and Pacific Oceans thanks to its unsinkable Australian base.
If US maintains current force levels, China will still be hemmed in South and East China Sea even if China rapidly grows its blue water capability. Bigger issue is if US naval power continues to decline.
" sufficient capability to dominate line of communications."
DeleteI'm not sure what, exactly, you mean by that. You've correctly identified the networked nature of forward bases but the critical link is resupply - the ability to resupply and reinforce. The inability to resupply and reinforce is why both the US and Japanese lost their forward bases in WWII. The ability to resupply and reinforce is what allowed the British to [barely] hold on to the Falklands.
To be fair, I suspect you were lumping resupply and reinforcements in the term 'communications' as you noted that an isolated base is a liability.
"US is still in a dominant position in the Pacific and North Asia due to its allies and associated basing in Japan and South Korea"
That's a suspect proposition as it is nowhere near certain that either SKorea or Japan would actively support the US in a war with China. I suspect that if SKorea is not direcly attacked, they'd opt for neutrality. Japan is a toss-up regarding active involvement and would depend on the circumstances of the war. China will, undoubtedly, conduct an international public relations 'war' to isolate Japan and force them to choose neutrality.
If either of those countries remain neutral, the US strategic picture becomes much more difficult and the number of useful bases is drastically reduced to near zero.