Monday, August 22, 2022

Forward Base - Tinian

This is part 2 of our look at forward bases in the Pacific.  In the first part (see, “Forward Bases in the Pacific”), we looked at general considerations and issues.  In this post, we’ll take a closer look at the challenges involved in establishing a forward base by looking at the specific example of Tinian.

 

The Pacific island of Tinian has been cited as an example of a location where the US could establish a forward base for operations against China.  In fact, the island has a commercial airfield that is being expanded for military use.  In addition, the island has been proposed for extensive use as a military training site. 

 

As a reminder, Tinian is a U.S. territory that is part of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).  It is located 1700 miles from Taiwan, 2000 miles or so from the South China Sea, and just 123 miles north of Guam.


 

Tinian - Circled in Red


Tinian serves as an excellent example of both the potential benefits and the enormous challenges to establishing bases in the Pacific theater as counters to Chinese expansion.  Let’s look at some of the issues related to establishing bases in the Pacific.

 

 

Benefits

 

Nobody seems to have the slightest doubt that Guam will be a major day-one target for the Chinese and will almost certainly be put out of action, if not totally destroyed.  Having an alternate base(s) is plainly beneficial and will allow us to stay in the fight even if we lose a major base like Guam.  In addition, the more bases we have, the more the Chinese will have to divide their attention and weapons which enhances the chances of survival for each base.

 

Multiple bases provide flexibility and reduce predictability.  For example, if a naval force can put into any of several bases for replenishment and refueling, it reduces the predictability of the event as opposed to having only one base which the Chinese can then easily ‘stake out’ and wait for the naval force to come to them.

 

Pacific bases also provide the opportunity to train in the relevant Pacific environment and with a degree of privacy.  The isolated nature of island bases also allows for the possibility of live fire training.

 

Pacific bases provide strategic and operational benefits by allowing staging from various, widely dispersed locations and expanded air operations and sensor coverage of the surrounding areas.

 

In short, the benefits of multiple Pacific bases are potentially significant and fairly self-evident.

 

 

Challenges

 

Now as an example of the challenges in establishing Pacific bases, let’s consider the specifics of the current efforts to establish and enhance Tinian as a base.

 

Airfield Expansion - Tinian’s commercial airfield is being expanded to accommodate a larger military presence.

 

Satellite imagery shows major construction at Tinian International Airport that we can say with near certainty is linked directly to plans to expand the facility's ability to act as a divert airfield for the U.S. military in a crisis. More than a decade in the making, the project is intended to provide a vital alternative operating location to the U.S. Air Force's massive Andersen Air Force Base on the island of Guam, just to the southwest of Tinian, should that base be put out of action for any reason.[2]

 

A ground-breaking ceremony was held on the island in February of this year to mark the formal start of this work, which will cost approximately $161.8 million and is excepted to be completed by October 2025.[2]

 

Of course, this is still a minor expansion compared to, say, Guam, and thus cannot serve as a true replacement if Guam were destroyed.

 

Even after the divert airfield project is complete, Tinian's airfield facilities will pale in comparison to those on Guam. Still, they will give the Air Force, as well as other branches of the U.S. military, a more viable and immediate alternative to Andersen, especially when it comes to supporting larger aircraft, like aerial refueling tankers and cargo planes, should flight operations come to a halt on Guam as a result of enemy action or for any other reason.[2]

 

 

Fuel Storage - Hand-in-hand with the airfield expansion is the establishment of a major fuel storage and handling facility.  After all, airfields are of no use without fuel !

 

The complete divert airfield effort is also set to include the construction of new fuel storage facilities at Tinian's main port on the southern end of the island and a pipeline linking them to the airport … [2]

 

The fuel pipeline from the port to the airfield will be around 4 miles long which, unfortunately, represents a significant vulnerability in that it is a very long stretch of critical structure that is vulnerable to easy destruction anywhere along the line.  At one end of the spectrum of threats, a single missile hit anywhere along the four mile pipe will put the airfield out of action within a short period.  At the other end of the spectrum a single saboteur could also destroy the pipe with ease.  The lack of base defenses makes any attack a near certain success.

 

 

Training – The US envisioned a major expansion of training facilities and opportunities on Tinian.  However, various issues arose which drastically curtailed those plans.

 

The U.S. military is dramatically scaling back its proposed training plans from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the territory’s governor announced this week.[1]

 

“The new notional proposal contemplates similar training activities that are already currently conducted on the island of Tinian but with an eye towards training for the future that is significantly less impactful and harmful to the environment and the way of life for the people of Tinian than the 2015 proposal,” the press release said.[1]

 

The new draft proposal also gets rid of the planned landing ramps on Unai Chulu in Tinian, which environmental officials warned would harm coral reefs, and a planned artillery range on Tinian that would have destroyed historic landmarks from World War II.[1]

 

 

Environmental Impact – As we have seen repeatedly with military basing and training efforts in the US, environmental concerns seem to outweigh combat readiness.

 

When the CNMI Joint Military Training plan was first proposed in 2015, it prompted widespread backlash, including more than 27,000 comments on the draft environmental impact statement, even though the commonwealth is home only to about 50,000 people.[1]

 

The Environmental Protection Agency warned the plans for Tinian could contaminate the island’s aquifer, and the environmental analysis for the CNMI Joint Military Training plan estimated 200 historic sites on Tinian would be affected.[1]

 

The proposal prompted a 2016 lawsuit from the Honolulu Earthjustice office in partnership with local organizations.[1]

 

 

Stupidity

 

And, of course, what would a post be without some official military stupidity?  Here’s today’s contribution:

 

"You want to confuse the enemy about where you actually are," Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall told Aviation Week's Brian Everstine in an interview in March. "So some decoys in other locations will be helpful to do that."[2]

 

No one is going to be fooled by some decoys – whatever those are.  The enemy will know where we are. 

 

We’ll be where the resupply ships are sailing to and docking. 

We’ll be where the radar emissions are coming from. 

We’ll be where the non-stop communications are originating. 

We’ll be where the massive numbers of operating aircraft are located. 

We’ll be where the hundreds of moving trucks and support vehicles are operating. 

We’ll be where the hundred/thousands of people running around are. 

We’ll be where the extensive anti-air defenses are.

 

To believe some decoys in other locations are going to fool the Chinese is delusional.  With satellite, cyber, and human observers, the Chinese will have extensive recordings, photos, and verification about where we’re constructing and emplacing decoys.

 

 

History

 

There are very few examples (none?) of an isolated, island base successfully defending itself from an attacker.  That being the case, one has to ask whether the advantages are worth the eventual loss of the defending forces.

 

 

Summary

 

While the benefits are self-evident, the challenges are substantial.

 

A major issue is that we need to settle the conflict between environmental concerns and combat readiness.  At the moment, environmental concerns reign supreme, however, this is an unwise balance.  Environmental concerns are important and should be accorded due weight in all non-combat civilian applications but the military represents our national survival and environmental concerns cannot trump national survival.  It does no good to have a clean environment and be conquered.  We need to come to grips with this and establish the legal primacy of combat readiness over environment concerns. 

 

This is not to say that we totally ignore environmental concerns and run roughshod over the areas we operate and train in but we cannot allow truly vital operations and training to be negated by snail darters (look it up if you don’t get the reference).  The Hawaii fuel leak fiasco is an excellent example.  The major Pacific fuel storage facility in Hawaii is going to be shut down without replacement due to fuel leaks.  This represents a major blow to our operational capability in the Pacific.  China is now scratching that target off their high priority target list without ever having fired a shot !  Of course, the blame for this lies entirely with the military for failing to act in good faith as stewards of the people’s money and trust.  Hopefully, this will serve as a lesson (it won’t;  nothing seems to get through to military leadership) to the US military that it cannot totally ignore environmental concerns.

 

Any Pacific base that is close enough to China and combat operational areas will, pretty much by definition, be within range of Chinese cruise/ballistic missile strikes.  This mandates robust base defenses which, unfortunately, is the flip side of forcing the Chinese to dilute their offensive efforts.  While the Chinese will be forced to spread their attentions and resources to deal with multiple bases, we, too, will have to spread our attentions and resources to protect those multiple bases.  Are the benefits worth the dilution of resources required to establish and vigorously defend multiple bases?  The answer to that depends on our overall military strategy … which we lack.

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Honolulu Civil Beat website, “Northern Mariana Islands Says US Military Agreed To Scale Back Training”, Anita Hofschneider, 1-Apr-2022,

https://www.civilbeat.org/2022/04/northern-mariana-islands-says-us-military-agreed-to-scale-back-training/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force%20had%20proposed%20a%20new%20airfield,testing%20and%20bombing%20practice%20on%20Farallon%20de%20Medinilla.

 

[2]The Drive website, “Construction Of Airbase On Tinian Island In Case Guam Gets Knocked Out Has Begun”, Joseph Trevithick, 15-Jun-2022,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/construction-of-airbase-on-tinian-island-in-case-guam-gets-knocked-out-has-begun


35 comments:

  1. While we're gallantly defending those bases from multiple Chinese hypersonic strikes, are we permitted to strike back?

    Given that we value San Diego above Taipei, what actual targets in what actual country do we strike when we strike back?

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    1. That is a good question.

      During WWII, that wasn't a real issue since CONUS was not in range of Axis nations, with some very sporadic exceptions, so America could bomb whatever she wanted without fear of payback.

      Now, American and Chinese mainlands are within range of each other.
      What happens then?
      Does an unwritten (or even written) rule saying that the mainland is off-limits comes up, or will it be a free-for-all?

      I'm sure the US military would prefer the former, but what would China say?

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    2. "Does an unwritten (or even written) rule saying that the mainland is off-limits comes up"

      Keep in mind that both Guam and Tinian are sovereign US territory and their residents are US citizens. While essentially all the major Chinese bases are in mainland China. Do we really want to allow the Chinese to blast away at sovereign US territory and kill US citizens with no response to their bases in China?

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    3. The American military thinking is still stuck in the Korea and Vietnam era. Chinese missiles can hit our bases in Hawaii and San Diego. If a shooting war breaks out at sea between ships and aircraft, Admirals and Generals will want to hit targets ashore in China. If they do, expect thousands of Chinese missiles to be launched at our bases in the Pacific. As our Navy rushes to deploy carriers, missiles slamming into the North Island base in San Diego would be problematic, especially when many civilian and contract employees refuse to work in the area. One missile could hit a carrier!

      https://www.militarytimes.com/resizer/JwAxau-E2LcCm3d86PrzMoNMzjQ=/1024x0/filters:format(jpg):quality(70)/cloudfront-us-east-1.images.arcpublishing.com/archetype/P4I4BGH6HNCMDIKCA5JLT5URNM.jpg

      Delete
    4. "While we're gallantly defending those bases from multiple Chinese hypersonic strikes, are we permitted to strike back?

      Given that we value San Diego above Taipei, "

      You're conflating two different scenarios. By definition, if we're defending our bases then China has attacked us, presumably first, and likely against bases that are sovereign US territory. That alone should answer your question and, indeed, preclude even needing to ask the question.

      The alternate scenario, which you've conflated with being pre-emptively attacked by China, is that of coming to the defense of Taiwan. That would, again, by definition, establish a constrained area of conflict unless one side, or both, opt to expand the scope. Given the US tendency to [unwisely] always try to limit the scope of war, that would, again, suggest that any expansion would be initiated by China. The modern analogy, here, is the constrained combat area in the Falklands war.

      As a general thought, one would hope that the US has learned the folly of trying to fight limited, constrained wars by now. If you're fighting a constrained war, you probably shouldn't be fighting at all because that would suggest that the war is not worth fighting. In it to win it or don't get in it.

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    5. " expect thousands of Chinese missiles to be launched at our bases in the Pacific."

      As someone who has advocated for Pacific bases, what does that suggest about the viability of such bases?

      You're referring to ballistic missiles, of course. If they are the threat that you seem to be suggesting, what does that suggest about our offensive weaponry given that we have almost no conventional ballistic missiles? Do we need to establish a robust ballistic missile capability? Is our dependence on cruise missiles a sufficient counter to China's ballistic missiles? Or not?

      Delete
  2. Still not convinced we'll actually defend Taiwan any more than Ukraine.

    Will the US actually trade blows with a nuclear power?

    Forget all the investment in bases. Rather, clandestinely send enough road mobile AShM & SAM systems until we risk sinking the island.

    Also not convinced the PRC build up is anything more than trying to keep it's neighbors in check. ROC is probably more useful as a trading partner & distraction for the PRC leadership to use on the masses.

    -LP

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    1. "Will the US actually trade blows with a nuclear power?"

      Why didn't you ask, 'will China actually trade blows with a nuclear power?'

      Delete
    2. "clandestinely"

      Do you really think, in this day and age, that it's possible to clandestinely ship large quantities of heavy equipment?

      Why clandestinely? Why would we want to hide a perfectly legal action? It's not like China can get any madder at us!

      Delete
    3. I should have put quotes around "clandestinely". As in, try not to make it public. Give the PRC plausible deniability. I don't see a benefit of making a stink about it.

      As for the nuke matter. I'm just looking at it through the Ukraine lens. We can argue the finer points of the Budapest Memorandum but, from my pov our lack of any use of force is an indication of future behavior.

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    4. @Anon: "I should have put quotes around "clandestinely"."
      'Clandestine and 'Covert' are overused, misused, and often confused. Military dispositions and operations should generally not be disclosed (OPSEC): there is no 'clandestine' about that. Sorry about the rant - I will get off my horse...
      GAB

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    5. "Will the US actually trade blows with a nuclear power?"
      Great question. Recall that China and India recently fought a vicious border war in the Galwan Valley largely with clubs to prevent a wider war. WW2 was generally fought without chemical and biological weapons even thought every combatant had them.

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    6. WW2 was largely fought without chemical weapons because they were not tactically effective enough in most battlefield scenarios (especially against any army that has a clue about them) to make them worthwhile in the face of their many limitations and drawbacks. Had they worked as well as nukes, or even filled a niche like flamethrowers and incendiary bombs, they absolutely would have been used by both sides.

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    7. At some point, the only way that the US will be able to assist Taiwan is by striking Chinese ports and airfields. We'll definitely be sinking ships, and they ours. So, you also have to hit where they originate from.
      Problem is that Guam can be struck conventionally. Its a piece of land that we own but its not CONUS. Us striking a Chinese port on the Chinese mainland is very, very different.
      How far will we want to go to 'protect' Taiwan?

      Delete
    8. "but its not CONUS"

      Are you sure you're not just trying to create a contrived scenario? If the Chinese struck, say, Hawaii, that would not be CONUS but I don't think we'd view it differently because it's not part of mainland US, do you? Similarly, I don't think we'd accept strikes on any US territory, mainland or not, and feel constrained in what our response could be.

      To turn the situation around, are you suggesting that we could strike, say, Hainan with impunity because it's not connected to mainland China?

      Your logic seems a bit inconsistent.

      "you also have to hit where they originate from."

      Sadly, I have to remind you of the many wars we've fought where we've tied our own hands and refused to attack the source of military forces and supplies against us. For example, in Vietnam, for most of the war, we refused to hit Hanoi and ports in the north that were the source of military supplies. We allowed sanctuary in Laos. In Afghanistan, we allowed safe haven in Pakistan. And so on. So, no we don't necessarily have to hit originating ports and bases. In fact, regrettably, it would be typical of the American way of war to try to fight with constrained, half-measures.

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    9. I guess what I was trying to say is how the average American would view these attacks. Doesn't matter whether or not its an island per se. Just saying that, for example, if Oahu were to get hit then, Americans would be up in arms. Tinian gets hit...or even Guam...and the average Joe will just say..."Where's that?"
      All a matter of perspective I guess.

      Delete
  3. I agree that the whole question depends on strategy.

    For example, if our strategy is based on fighting/defending/winning along the second island chain along with such allies as Japan (maybe more?), Tinian might play an important role. That would require fortifying Guam, Tinian, Kadena, and likely other locations, and training appropriately. As Japan is effectively 'forward deployed' they may need a commitment to fight geographically next to them - they won't want to fight China alone while we... sortie out of Hawaii?

    If we choose to minimize our forward presence, countries in the area could read into that decision that we are 'abandoning' the Western Pacific to China. I'm not saying that is right, but it could be viewed that way, and we'd need to factor that into a strategy.

    It's a choice. We seem not to want to make choices beyond decommissioning ships, avoiding training/maintenance, and buying high-tech garbage. And if we keep doing that, I'm not sure it will matter which strategy we choose.

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    1. "I'm not sure it will matter which strategy we choose."

      There's a truism:

      No decision IS a decision.

      We can dither and put off adopting any strategy but the reality is, that IS a strategy ... a strategy of appeasement and inaction.

      Delete
    2. "For example, if our strategy is based on fighting/defending/winning along the second island chain"

      You're conceding the first island chain?

      Delete
    3. Good catch, I should have said first island chain. Otherwise we concede both Taiwan and Okinawa. But I think that's your point: Either we 1) develop a realistic strategy to hold them and then implement it, 2) reduce our presence there to token levels, or 3) through our current inaction, lose them and the half-measure forces tied to them.

      Delete
  4. Even if the chinese can hit, Guam or Tinian, the US will still need foward deployed bases to support a war. Even if all bases are to be hit in a non nuclear first strike, not putting all your eggs in a basket means, that the enemy has to hit a much larger number of targets potentially reducing the number of missiles/strikes/special forces operations that can be dedicated to a single base that is to be targeted. The usage of nuclear weapons nullyfies this point, but I'm always hoping, that the nuclear option doesn't comes to pass.

    To render such a foward deployed base more survivable there should be in the caso Tinian:
    - A hardened undergroud fuel storage, if possible with secondary and tertiary sites. The fuel tanks in Hawaii have been built a long time ago an the leaks have been mostly caused by failed surveillance and failed preventive mantainance. Building the fuel storage today with todays technology should give enough gaurantees about spill prevention, but it'll still need continuous surveillance an preventive mantaince so at least on paper the water sources should be safe. Fuel is still most important, as without fuel not only the planes can't fly, but the generators can't run an you have no energy to comunicate, exercise comand and control, mantain the planes, pump water and fuel, cook, mantain food, operate radars and much more.
    - Investments on the North Field runways to use them in case of damage to the civilian runway.
    - Road investments (widening and strenghtening) to move planes from the civilian runway to North Field in an emergency.
    - Probably all dispersals should have revetments to at least mitigate splinter damage (especially from airbusts).

    These bases should probably be upgraded to a level very similar to the RAAF bare bases. Many today don't consider airbase hardening important, but some thing still need to be hardened (fuel, ammunition, comand and control) not to withstand direct hits, but to survive near misses or splinter damage.

    Clearly the needed works represent a huge investment, these works should be completed in a short period of time, so the number of targets the chinese have to potentially hit gets larger in 2023-2025 not in 2030.

    At the same time the DOD need a real plan for the investment needed in bases in the Pacific Region. Only Tinian isn't enough, you need bases in PNG an other places (for example, Timor and the Philipines and the Solomons if they are not too far gone). Places like Midway and Wake Island have to strenthened anyway (even if they are exposed).
    A real concept of operations and long term supply of these bases in wartime is needed. If not,every cent spent on forward bases could be better used elswhere as these bases would simply be not viable nor survivable.
    Further you need the personel to operate this bases, from security, to firefighting an everything that falls in base ops.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "means, that the enemy has to hit a much larger number of targets"

      Do you grasp that it also means that we have to defend a much larger number of targets?

      " I'm always hoping, that the nuclear option doesn't comes to pass."

      Any sane person would hope that. However, don't you think the Chinese are hoping the same thing? Or, do you think they're insane? Assuming they're sane, then there is little real risk of a war 'going nuclear'. I frankly don't understand why so many people are so terrified of the possibility given that it's so unlikely. I also don't understand why so many people seem to worry us being attacked by nuclear weapons but give no thought to China being attacked. Again, so many people seem to think the onus is on us to prevent nuclear war and China bears no responsibility, whatsoever.

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    2. If Tinian is going to see use/expansion, hardening is needed, and isnt it a good place for AegisAshore, along with Guam??

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    3. Considering how mature and relatively simple Aegis Ashore installations are, my feeling is that they should be popping up on everything US-held in the Pacific like hotels on a Monopoly board...

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    4. I'd prefer THAAD. It might not be quite as capable as Aegis Ashore, but being based off the Patriot platform, THAAD uses mobile TELs and radars, as opposed to Aegis Ashore, which is a static, fixed installation that can be easily pre-targeted and suppressed (because it's not moving).

      On the other hand, every ballistic missile fired at a forward base is a ballistic missile not threatening the US...

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    5. "If Tinian is going to see use/expansion, hardening is needed, and isnt it a good place for AegisAshore, along with Guam??"

      There are issues associated with Aegis Ashore.

      1. Unlike an Aegis ship which has an unhindered, 360 deg view, Aegis Ashore, unless it's cited on a mountain top or has flat land for hundreds of miles around, will have radar blind spots - probably large and numerous - due to topography. Do we then need several installations to cover the 360 deg?

      2. Aegis, itself, is totally unproven. Before we commit the resources to Aegis Ashore, we need to set it up in the middle of a desert and start launching real missiles at it and see if it is even effective.

      3. It's a fixed target. The enemy only needs a single success - on missile - to get through and the installation is destroyed. Conversely, Aegis Ashore must be 100% successful or it will be destroyed. No system is 100% successful so it is a certainty that the installation will be destroyed if the enemy wishes to commit a sufficient number of missiles (see point 2., above).

      A better solution would be for a defensive system of multiple, distributed, widely separated, mobile radars and multiple, distributed, widely separated launch cells.

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    6. Agree on all those points, #2 especially!!! It just seems like a relatively simple build. The small/mobile system is likely better, at least more survivable, but with Tinian specifically being so small, it seems like any serious saturation attack would be tough to hide from, or defend against. I suppose whatever system we employ, itd better have not only deep magazines, but lots of replacements on the way on day one...

      Delete
    7. "Tinian specifically being so small"

      I'm thinking more generally for Europe, Japan, etc.

      Delete
  5. "...the military represents our national survival and environmental concerns cannot trump national survival..."

    We have been secure for so long that people don't really feel it in their gut that they could ever be in real danger.

    Because of this, they concern themselves with "the priorities of the well fed" and don't concern themselves with the ramifications of military defeat.

    Lutefisk

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  6. It's a little pointless to be building up a forward base if it poisons your freshwater supply. That just adds yet another thing that needs to be pushed forward and makes your sustainment harder.

    It's the same reasoning behind the original impetuos for the environmentally friendly green ammo the Army was buying - lead buildup from trillions of rounds fired at ranges on army bases stateside was seeping into groundwater and causing lead poisoning issues, so the Army went for a lead-free round (which was also designed to be a more lethal round, on the advice of Infantry and SF branch reps, who pointed out that since Big Army was going to make a new bullet anyway, we might as well make it more kill).

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    1. Conversely, It's a little pointless to protect your freshwater supply.and lose the base as a result.

      This is the dilemma that the post addresses.

      I would also point out that forward bases, such as those established by the US during the WWII Pacific push, are new and more or less temporary and are unlikely to cause any significant environmental problems due to their short life spans (duration of the war).

      Permanent bases, such as Guam, require environmental awareness and attention but the environmental concerns cannot trump military needs. On the other hand, as stated in the post, the military cannot simply ignore environmental concerns. Changing rounds is a good example of the balance between the two concerns: you don't shut down the range, you modify the rounds IF YOU CAN DO SO WITHOUT DECREASING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS OR INCREASING THEIR COST BEYOND REASON.

      Some examples of environmental concerns unwisely and incorrectly trumping military needs are the corrosion/painting of ships which has been banned at most ports and has resulted in corroding ships or the ban on sonar training in many places due to concerns about dolphins and whales being affected. We should do what we can to mitigate the effects of maintenance and training but, in the end, they cannot be banned. It's pointless to have clean ports and acoustically safe waters if it renders the navy ineffective, poorly maintained, and untrained.

      The military must be responsive to environmental concerns but, ultimately, military needs must have priority.

      Delete
    2. Well, M855A1 costs the taxpayer 36 cents per round vs M855's 10 cents, but I'd say it's worth it given that it's a significantly more lethal round that extends the effective range of the M4 platform.

      Permanent fixed forward bases, IMO, are the wrong way to go about things. I wish the Navy had put more thought into using the expeditionary base ships as mobile forward base ships, like the repair ships that formed the temp base at Ulithi Atoll.

      Delete
    3. "Permanent fixed forward bases, IMO, are the wrong way to go about things."

      One of the major functions of a forward base is to provide aviation. If you don't like forward bases, how would you envision providing forward aviation capabilities?

      I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing ... just exploring your thought.

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    4. "Permanent fixed forward bases, IMO, are the wrong way to go about things."

      I assume, then, that you favor a greatly expanded logistics support fleet? That being the case, how do you protect and defend the logistics fleet? Do you envision siphoning off, say, Burkes for logistics defense? If so, how does that impact combat operations?

      Again, just exploring the ramifications of your statement.

      Delete
  7. The US needs to decide where it wants to place its forward line of defended bases.

    That decision is like raising teenagers in that wherever you place the line is where the fight is going to take place.

    Lutefisk

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