The Navy has publicly stated that they view a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a war with China within the next several years as highly likely. If so, what kind of shape will the Navy be in if a war starts, say, five years from now?
Here’s an overview of the Navy’s projected condition in 2027 based on the Navy’s most recent 30 year plan which includes the detailed 2022-2027 five year period[1]:
- Burkes will have begun retiring; DDG-51 is scheduled to retire in 2027
- 1-2 Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) will be in service
- Down to 48 attack subs (SSN) with several unavailable for service due to multi-year waiting periods for maintenance
- Down to 9 active carriers (9+1 in RCOH)
- 1-3 Constellation class frigates (FFG) in service
- Another air wing will almost certainly be disestablished, dropping the number of air wings to 8, as the carrier level drops to 10
- Early retirement of a carrier is likely
- F-18s will be woefully obsolete but will constitute the bulk of carrier air wings
- No great amount of F-35s; at most, one squadron of 10 aircraft in each air wing
- 20-50 unmanned, lightly armed vessels
- Ticonderoga class will all be gone
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Projected 2027 Combat Fleet |
|
|
Carrier |
10 |
|
Burke |
86 |
|
LCS+FFG |
23 |
|
SSN |
48 |
|
SSGN |
1 |
|
Total Combat Ships |
168 |
A total combat fleet of 168 ships is not a lot and 20 or so of that total will be the remaining LCS which have no combat capability due to their lack of meaningful armament and very short endurance/range for the Pacific theater. The real combat fleet will be about 148 ships!
It is also quite possible that the Ford class carriers will not be combat-capable due to the ongoing, and seemingly unsolvable, EMALS, elevator, and AAG reliability issues.
The fleet is also projected to have 25 amphibious ships of various types, mostly the LPD-17 class.
It is absolutely baffling that the Navy believes war is imminent and yet they’re shedding ships as fast as they can. If a Chinese agent had infiltrated the Navy and become CNO, he couldn’t do a better job of declawing the Navy than what we’re doing to ourselves.
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A Burke and an Unmanned Vessel This is Your Future Navy |
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[1]Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, Apr 2022
Considering the Navy's recruitment and retention problems, it's likely unable to man the larger fleet it needs; hence the nonsense with unmanned ships. Of course, the smart thing to do would be to fix the recruitment and retention problems; increased automation so the Navy could "do more with less," is, at best, a stopgap until the former problems are fixed.
ReplyDeleteSadly, the Navy confused the stopgap for the solution, i.e., the EXACT SAME MISTAKE Robert McNamara made.
If the USN sails near the coast of China it will be sunk. If it lingers in mid-ocean it will be useless.
ReplyDeleteIt's easy to prove me wrong: just point to a rational, coherent account of what the navy is for and how it plans to realise that purpose.
If an army marches into enemy territory without armor, artillery, or air support it will be destroyed. If it stays in garrison it will be useless.
Delete" just point to a rational, coherent account of what the navy is for and how it plans to realise that purpose."
This blog is packed with examples of how a navy should operate and what kind of missions it should execute. Of course, whether the US Navy is as intelligent as this blog is an open question, sadly.
The point is that a properly used navy is a potent weapon.
"If the USN sails near the coast of China it will be sunk. If it lingers in mid-ocean it will be useless."
ReplyDeleteIsn't that the norm?
Since when have navies been able to sail up to hostile coasts and operate with impunity?
Lutefisk
Well, I did do a post on exactly this topic. See, "A Ship's a Fool to Fight a Fort"
DeleteAlso, the entire Pacific war and many examples in the European theater illustrate that navies can operate near enemy coasts, GIVEN THE PROPER PREPARATIONS.
Just read it.
DeleteLutefisk
Back in 1990s USN could actually sail into Chinese coastal waters and survive as the Chinese military was technologically and tactically stuck in late 1950s.
DeleteI'd argue you could sail close to a lot of Russian waters these days - the Russian navy and related air power is too small to actually cover most of their coast line (much like their army is too small to conquer Ukraine).
March 1996 changed forever the Chinese military. When Clinton ordered a second aircraft carrier into the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese felt impudent to do anything about the incursion into their "sovereign territory". If you look back you will see that that event was the starting point for the entire Chinese military, navy and missile corps, build up. What they have accomplished in the following 26 years is mind blowing. While the US went from 111 combatant ships in Sept 1996, to 71 in 2016.
DeleteThe Navy has lost its way. Is there anyone at the helm?
"When Clinton ordered a second aircraft carrier into the Taiwan Straits."
DeleteJust as a point of historical accuracy, it appears that neither US carrier entered the strait. See, for example, this account. The Independence group took up position east of Taiwan and the Nimitz took position in the Philippine Sea, in a supporting position. There are conflicting reports but they appear to be inaccurate.
It is also unlikely that the US carriers triggered the subsequent Chinese military build up. In fact, the build up had already begun and the initiating event of the strait crisis was, in fact, Chinese military tests of missiles and the swarming of Chinese 'fishing' craft into Taiwan waters.
The real trick is we keep putting new money down on new ships with old gear that will waste money relative to new gear for the entire life of the ship. Burkes with only gas turbines, no electric motors, no diesels, trailing a shaft. I'll give them credit on the Connie's for probably picking a good design for manning and logistics. I'd still prefer a Burke with less max speed, more range, and more growth margin.
ReplyDeleteYou have to understand that the Navy is petrified about yet another ship class failure and/or Congressional oversight and mandated testing.
DeleteThe new Flt III Burkes were presented to Congress, by the Navy, as a minor improvement over the Flt IIa. This was fraudulent, of course, but it allowed the Navy to immediately request block buys with no additional testing.which was an illegal abuse of the block buy laws. Had the Navy been honest about the extent of the changes from the IIa to the III, it would have triggered a great deal of extra testing and would have precluded block buys. Changing the entire powerplant architecture would have made it more likely that Congress would have balked at approving the Flt III's and demanded additional testing.
In addition, being terrified of another failure, the Navy is firmly committed to keeping the Burke's powerplant. Consider the colossal failure the Freedom class has been as regards the powerplant with mixed engines and the fatally flawed combining gear. The Navy simply didn't want to risk that in the Flt III.
From the Navy's perspective, ship performance and efficiency is unimportant. What's important is manipulating Congress.
I think Truxtun still runs with the hybrid motor from DRS. It wouldn't be hard to say, keep that, leave the gears, but don't install the extra 1 LM2500 per shaft. Look to drop in more gensets. You coulld have 20MW if they actually need it.
DeleteIf the current warship building rates continue, then by 2027 the Chinese PLAN Navy is likely to have something like:
ReplyDeleteCarriers:
Type 001 : 1
Type 002 : 1
Type 003 : 1
Type 004 : 1 (?)
Destroyers:
Type 055 : 16
Type 052d : 38
Type 052c : 6
Frigates:
Type 054A : 50
Corvettes:
Type 56 : 20
Type 56A : 50
That would mean that at least in terms of surface combatants the US and China are slowly approaching parity by 2027.
Considering that in the last few years the US has been building some 1.5 major surface combatants on average, while China has been building some 4.5 such warships, it would require a major acceleration of the ship building effort on the side of the US to reverse this trend.
It will be interesting to see if they decide to maintain and modernize or just keep building new. I'm betting on the latter.
DeleteAccording to Wiki, China also has 82 Type 022 missile boats each armed with 8 antiship missiles.
Delete"The Navy has publicly stated that they view a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a war with China within the next several years as highly likely. "
ReplyDeleteI don't think they actually believe that, it's just something they say to get more budget money.
Can we get serious now
ReplyDeleteits not about whether China has hostile relationship with Taiwan
its not about whether Western Europe has some disagreements with Russia
its not about whether Iran vs Israel in middle East
ITS ABOUT USA and whether it WANTS to maintain its status quo as world's Economic, Military and Political Superpower.
Considering the current situation the stability of above 3 are Military > Economical > Political
Current US Military Long term Goals are set by everyone ( military contractors, policy makers, politicians and some random people with REAL powers) except US Military
Coming to US Navy
During WW2 US Admiral Marc Mitscher said "The ideal composition of a fast-carrier task force is four carriers, six to eight support vessels
and not less than 18 destroyers, preferably 24. More than four carriers in a task group cannot be advantageously used due to the amount of air room required.
Less than four carriers requires an uneconomical use of support ships and screening vessels."
US navy considers Carrier Strike Group as its most important assets in conventional war.
However, US Navy doesn't have the Resources, Dry Docks or Industrial Capacity to amass such Task Force let alone to deploy it near Chinese waters.
According to Naval historian Gary E. Weir, “In all, U.S. submarines destroyed 1,314 enemy warships in the Pacific, representing 55% of all Axis power warships lost
and a total of 5.3 million tons of shipping.”
The American success came at a cost, though. In World War II, 52 US submarines were lost, with a total of 3,506 officers and enlisted men killed.
The US Navy Submarine Service had the highest casualty percentage of any American forces in the War: about 20%
currently US Navy has around same number of attack submarines it loss during Pacific theater, My question to US Navy is
"Are you willing to lose all of your Attack submarines in next war in Pacific Theater ? "
Worst part is as time passes by Capability of US Navy is going to "shrink" and Chinese Navy capabilities are going to "increase".
"US Navy doesn't have the Resources, Dry Docks or Industrial Capacity to amass such Task Force"
DeleteAmassing a task force has nothing to do with dry docks, industrial capacity, or resources (whatever you mean by that). It's just about number and type of ships and the Navy has plenty to assemble multiple carrier task forces. We've got nine or ten carriers and eighty some high level Burke/Tico escorts. So, yes, we can easily assemble carrier groups.
"U.S. submarines destroyed 1,314 enemy warships in the Pacific"
I'm not familiar with that source but it appears either false or ill-defined. According to Wikipedia, the Japanese only operated around 600 warships over the entire course of the war. Wiki further cites total Japanese warship losses as 334. A figure of 1300 sounds like merchant ship losses or minor patrol boat losses.
"Are you willing to lose all of your Attack submarines in next war in Pacific Theater ? "
Japan had a Pacific-wide empire with a vast Navy. China, for the moderate future, is a home waters navy and has no empire. There is no reason to believe the US would lose fifty some submarines. The war circumstances are completely different as it relates to submarine warfare.
Further, WWII submarines were surface ships that could briefly submerge. This made them vulnerable. Modern subs can operate submerged indefinitely on a tactical basis and this makes them extremely difficult targets - far more difficult than their WWII predecessors.
Consider the amount of area a modern SSN can search and understand vs a WWII sub. Consider carrier task forces had no AEW in WWII. Its not a one to one comparison, although our numbers are obviously low.
Delete"Consider the amount of area a modern SSN can search and understand vs a WWII sub."
DeleteIt works both ways. Consider the extreme quieting (submarine shaping, acoustic tiles, machinery rafting, cavitation suppression, Prairie/Masker, deeper diving, etc.) of modern enemy subs and surface ships vs WWII subs and ships. It's much harder to detect modern enemy ships/subs.
"ITS ABOUT USA and whether it WANTS to maintain its status quo as world's Economic, Military and Political Superpower."
DeleteThis hits the nail on the head.
The Chinese aren't a military superpower and their navy is still largely a green water one. Even if they build more carriers they are still a green water one as the Chinese lack the global infrastructure (aka bases) to maintain long term control over key parts of the oceans and seas.
Note most of the ships the Chinese are building are also green water vessels ie Type 056 corvettes.
The US not only had bases but also critically sufficient hull numbers to maintain an overwhelming capability in most parts of the world.
A base without force projection or secure logistics and lines of communications is a liability, not an asset (eg Port Arthur in 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War or German base at Tsingtao in 1914).
However as the USN shrinks it's unable to exploit either these bases nor maintain overwhelming capability. The bases become liabilities. Thus the Chinese can invest very little to potentially gain control of key chokepoints etc.
Thus the limited Chinese bluewater capability becomes more of a threat simply since the US no longer outmathces them.
"Amassing a task force has nothing to do with dry docks, industrial capacity, or resources (whatever you mean by that). It's just about number and type of ships and the Navy has plenty to assemble multiple carrier task forces"
DeleteActually those dry docks etc are key to amassing a task force.
USA could have 50 aircraft carriers and 200 cruisers but if the maintenance infrastructure is incapable of maintaining such a fleet then those ships are dead weight. If the Chinese attack Pearl Harbour, it matters very little if there is 50 carriers but only 3 are operational.
This kind of thing has already started happening in the west. Eg at one recent stage none of the 6 U212s subs operated by the Germans was operational. RN counted 19 surface escorts but 2 of those were long term non-operational due to lack of crews. In some periods nearly all the 6 Type 45s have been out of commission due to both routine maintenance and irregular faults.
And even getting sufficient ships to amass these kinds of task force not only require maintenance capability but also the ability to build vessels in a timely manner.
Since 1991 the US has lost more warships than it's commissioned. The combat capable component fleet is increasingly getting older and older with most Ticos and a few Arleigh Burke's now over 30 years old!
"Amassing a task force has nothing to do with dry docks, industrial capacity, or resources (whatever you mean by that). It's just about number and type of ships and the Navy has plenty to assemble multiple carrier task forces"
DeleteActually those dry docks etc are key to amassing a task force.
USA could have 50 aircraft carriers and 200 cruisers but if the maintenance infrastructure is incapable of maintaining such a fleet then those ships are dead weight. If the Chinese attack Pearl Harbour, it matters very little if there is 50 carriers but only 3 are operational.
This kind of thing has already started happening in the west. Eg at one recent stage none of the 6 U212s subs operated by the Germans was operational. RN counted 19 surface escorts but 2 of those were long term non-operational due to lack of crews. In some periods nearly all the 6 Type 45s have been out of commission due to both routine maintenance and irregular faults.
And even getting sufficient ships to amass these kinds of task force not only require maintenance capability but also the ability to build vessels in a timely manner.
Since 1991 the US has lost more warships than it's commissioned. The combat capable component fleet is increasingly getting older and older with most Ticos and a few Arleigh Burke's now over 30 years old!
"dry docks etc are key to amassing a task force."
DeleteAmassing a task force is an instantaneous exercise and has nothing to do with dry docks or maintenance. You either have the ships you want for a task force or you do not, at that moment.
Dry docks and maintenance are long term exercises that impact the long term status of the fleet.
You're stating some extremely obvious and basic things. Do you have some deeper analysis you'd like to offer?
Remember that the US success rate against Japanese merchant ships in WW2 was ENTIRELY based on the merchants being REQUIRED by the IJN to report their location, course, and speed at least DAILY and the US being able to read these transmissions... No other warships in history had such an advantage... Even with modern SSNs it is harder to have to "find" targets to attack rather than having the targets "self-identify" to you and then guide you in to them,
ReplyDelete"ENTIRELY based on the merchants being REQUIRED by the IJN to report their location"
DeleteNot quite. The US obtained copies of JN-25 but Japan quickly changed to JN-40 which was not broken until the start of 1943. From the History Collection website,
"That changed in 1943. America’s code breakers, as they had with several other Japanese communication codes, cracked what submariners called the “maru code”."
Prior to that, US subs were assigned geographic areas to patrol.
US submarines achieved a great deal of success without the aid of code intercepts. US subs operating in Japanese home waters ensured that merchant shipping would be located and destroyed regardless of code assists although intercepts were quite welcome.
Japanese tactics were also poor. They didn't start organise convoys until 1943. Even then convoys were often too small to be useful and even a singly US sub could wreak havoc on one. ASW training was often poor with emphasis on fleet anti-surface action.
ReplyDeleteIJN fleet air arm was the same with no real dedicated ASW aircraft for most of war (most of their strike capability was again anti ship orientated).
There was very poor army - navy cooperation (army controlled the airforce) which hampered air operations.
Japanese also made poor decisions eg building gigantic battleships instead of more numerous and more capable destroyers and escorts. And most Japanese destroyers/escorts were weak and largely obsolete so offered little value to protecting merchant ships. Initially most destroyers didn't even carry depth charges.
Better equipment had started to be developed but given their industrial limitations, none of it arrived on time or in enough numbers to make a difference.
Congress, frightening as that is, has to be the voice of reason. They should put in an amendment that the Navy cannot downsize; at worst dramatically increase the size of the Naval Reserve if they can't afford to operate the sized navy they need and have something there for a surge need, like say a war with China. LA class subs that are not a danger to their crew and can still operate somewhere effectively should be retained, and if they can't operate in the pacific, but can in the Med, put them there and let the VA and Seawolf class handle the hotspots. The Nimitz should not be retired, hell, don't let them scrap the old Kennedy now that her sister ship has made its way to TX for the scrap heap. If they believe war is likely within 5 years, then China will probably, and that's a guess, be smart and hit them up at their weakest. Don't let it get there, nothing gets retired unless the ship becomes a true menace. Even the old Tico's should be made into mobile SAM stations surrounding important areas if they can't efficiently be used across the Pacific on cruises. The Navy can't operate like it's in a boardroom with powerpoints matching X to a budget; They need to state what they need in order to outright win a war, period.
ReplyDeleteI would have thought that the United States would put its own interests first and not commit its forces to defend Taiwan if the Chinese attacked. Obviously, don’t broadcast this to the world, but if push comes to shove common sense would tell you to avoid a war that you are unlikely to win and your own sovereignty is not at stake. The Chinese military will have more resources to commit to the fight, their proximity to the battle will be a massive advantage and their leadership will put everything into the fight to win.
ReplyDeleteThe Taiwanese don’t seem keen to voluntarily agree to reunification, particularly as their citizens have seen what has happened in Hong Kong. So, from the Chinese perspective they are likely to continue to put more pressure on Taiwan. Xi Jinping has told his military to prepare for war and the most likely option for reunification is some form of military pressure.
The democratic world should be clear about what they will do collectively if China does invade (i.e., the economic cost to China and the diplomatic isolation they will suffer). The United States should continue to sell modern weapons to Taiwan to increase the likely cost to China and the risk of failure. Where possible weapon delivery should be expedited. Additionally, while not easy, democratic nations where possible and practicable should put in place plans now to cope with Taiwan being invaded or blockaded (e.g., supply chain disruptions) and ultimately Taiwan being ruled by Beijing,
The United States and its allies do not need another unwinnable war.
Just a reminder ... this is not a political blog so we're not going any further down that discussion path.
Delete