Tuesday, August 16, 2022

Seriously, What’s Going On With The Navy?

The Navy just recently submitted its latest 30 year plan to Congress.[1]  In it, the Navy laid out ship retirements for the next five years (FYDP), as listed below, showing the year and the number of retirements:

 

 

Year

Retirements

2023

24

2024

13

2025

13

2026

14

2027

13

 

 

Okay.  We’ve already discussed how retiring dozens of ships (most of them early retirements) while building only half a dozen new ships each year is a bafflingly stupid plan but … there it is.

 

Now, however, it appears that the 30 year plan barely lasted a month … if it was ever a real plan to begin with.  The Navy has announced that instead of retiring 24 ships, as called for in the 30 year plan, they want to retire 39 ships.

 

That’s 13% of the entire fleet.  In one year.  With only half a dozen replacements. 

 

That’s insane.

 

Just as bad as the reckless retirement program is the utter aimlessness and randomness of Navy planning.  As we recently documented, the Navy has been tossing out random fleet size plans on a seemingly daily basis (see, “Floundering”).  Apparently, they couldn’t follow their most recent 30 year plan for more than a few weeks.  30 year plan?  Try 30 day plan.

 

I have to ask.  Is the Navy being run by Chinese agents?

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

[1]“Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023”, Table A4-1, p.21-22

 

[2]USNI News website, “Navy Wants to Decommission 39 Warships in 2023”, Heather Mongilio, 15-Aug-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/08/15/navy-wants-to-decommission-39-warships-in-2023


43 comments:

  1. "Is the Navy being run by Chinese agents?"

    No way! Chinese agents would be a lot more subtle.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Chinese agents are too busy launching a new ship every 7 weeks.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Navy made two fatal mistakes - LCS and DDG-1000. Originally, Zumwalt was designated to be its "next generation battle ship". Worse than tons of money wasted is its failure disrupted Navy's new ship procurement. With high hope on DDG-1000, Navy hasn't even started new destroyers until recently.

    Old Tico and Burke can no longer fight next generation battles. Upgrade them are not cost effective. For instance, Tico cannot generate enough electricity to power new radar. To increase generator, you need to upgrade its power system.

    Today and tomorrow, you cannot use 18 inch guns to fight with nations with many long range anti-ship missiles.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I would add the Fords as at least potentially a fatal mistake. I suppose they could still be fixed, but they are badly wrong and way, way too expensive. The opportunity cost with each one taking $14-15B out or the procurement budget is huge.

      I think the power system issue is one that needs to be thought through very carefully. The need for electric generation capacity probably drives a lot of propulsion decisions toward IEP or CODLAG. If you can generate enough electrical power to drive a ship through the water at 30+ knots, you can probably generate enough to drive the next generation of sensors and weapons.

      As far as 16-18 inch guns, up front they lose to missiles, as noted. But if you can keep them afloat until everybody runs out of missiles, those big guns suddenly become pretty potent weapons.

      Delete
    2. I also wonder if the Columbias are going to be worth the money.

      One thing that concerns me is that the USN does not seem to want to replace or grow the SSGN fleet. I think they are the number one strike weapon, for numerous reasons, andI think we need a bunch more, probably 20 or so. We sure as heck can't build that many on a Columbia chassis, but I wonder why we just don't build more Ohios and configure them as SSGNs.

      Delete
    3. "As far as 16-18 inch guns, up front they lose to missiles, as noted. But if you can keep them afloat until everybody runs out of missiles, those big guns suddenly become pretty potent weapons."

      It's difficult to build (or rebuild, in our case) and maintain the industrial capability and capacity to not only build large caliber guns, but the shells for them, as well as for ships large enough to absorb the guns' recoil- you certainly aren't going to fit a 16in gun on an Arleigh Burke class destroyer's hull. There are also great opportunity costs for building a ship capable of mounting such a gun- how many Arleigh Burke class destroyers can you buy for the cost of one battleship? And how long will the shipyard building that battleship, be unable to build destroyers because all its workers are too busy working on the battleship?

      "[B]ut I wonder why we just don't build more Ohios and configure them as SSGNs."

      Remember, the Ohio class ships were built between 1976-1997. Many of the companies that built their components, are likely out-of-business, and replacements must be found before more Ohio class ships can be built.

      Delete
    4. "I would add the Fords as at least potentially a fatal mistake."

      Amen.
      Monstrous costs aside, what happens when half the carriers in the fleet are Ford-class paperweights?

      Delete
    5. "There are also great opportunity costs for building a ship capable of mounting such a gun"

      There are opportunity costs associated with everything. The real question is whether there is an opportunity (cost) that offers more value than the original? Very few platforms offer the value that a true battleship does. The fact that we can build multiple destroyers for the cost of a battleship does not make the battleship a poor decision. If you have a sufficiently important operational need for a battleship then it's a good decision.

      Perhaps we should be asking what the opportunity cost of building multiple, purely defensive, Burkes is?

      Delete
    6. "how long will the shipyard building that battleship, be unable to build destroyers"

      You phrase that as a bad thing when, in reality, it would be a good thing! If we have enough shipbuilding demand and budget to justify battleships AND destroyers then we can justify additional shipyards. That would be a great thing!

      Delete
    7. "As far as 16-18 inch guns, up front they lose to missiles"

      Huh???? That's like saying a television loses to a toaster. The two are intended to do different tasks. In the modern world, a battleship gun is a close range, incredibly powerful, land attack and anti-surface weapon with an emphasis on area bombardment whereas missiles are long range, medium powerful weapons with no area bombardment capability due to cost. They have two different tasks. It's not valid to compare them.

      Delete
    8. "I wonder why we just don't build more Ohios and configure them as SSGNs."

      As you noted, it's because of new construction costs. An alternative is to convert retiring LA and Ohio class subs into SSGNs (smaller size/capacity, in the case of LA class). Given their age, they should be left pierside rather than deployed except for an occasional week of training at sea.

      A conversion would be expensive, yes, but not in comparison to new construction.

      Delete
    9. The Ohio, Michigan, Florida, and Georgia were in their early-twenties when they were converted to SSGNs. The Rhode Island, Maine, Wyoming, and Louisiana are in the mid-to-late twenties. Unless their reactor life was extended, they might only serve 10 to 12 years. At the same time, that means reducing our sea-based nuclear deterrent to 10 subs.

      Service life and a reduced strategic deterrent have to be factored any conversion versus new construction decision.

      Delete
    10. "...replace or grow the SSGN fleet."

      This is somthing Im wholeheartedly behind. I feel that the SSGNs are arguably the most potent, and certainly the most survivable platforms the Navy has ever had. With our likely inability to inject SSGN production during the Columbia run(as well as the Navys seeming disinterest in the idea), I think we should take a hard look at conversion of the Ohios. If refueling the nuclear plant is a big part of the expense, then why not consider creating a "very ready Reserve", where the boats don't do deployments, but are kept pierside, and crews rotate through them, only taking them to sea for training and to keep the certifications current. Basically, having the platforms all ready for battle, except for loading a crew and perishable food, but otherwise trying to keep the mileage down, so that they have "one good wars worth of use" left in them.
      While the upcoming VPM Virginias help, they're a case of too little, too late, too expensive. More Ohio SSGNs arent cheap, but the amount of bang they provide is unparallelled, the buck being not so important when you look at the Westpac crisis and the decomm spreadsheets CNO is sharing...

      Delete
    11. "Remember, the Ohio class ships were built between 1976-1997. Many of the companies that built their components, are likely out-of-business, and replacements must be found before more Ohio class ships can be built."

      While that may be true if we were talking about building a new run of Iowas, I disagree that that's the case for a couple reasons. First, we wouldnt build new Ohios with the originally installed equipment. We would use a modern equivalent, which is of course in production now, and has support and a parts chain. And second, we have companies right now that produce all the puzzle pieces that together make a submarine, whether SSN or SSBN. From hull plates to sonars to launch cells, to nuts, bolts, and rivets, somebody's supplying all that right now. So dusting off the Ohio blueprints and stuffing that hull with current equipment wouldnt be too hard.
      Of course the Navy would find a way to make it that way...

      Delete
    12. "VPM Virginias help"

      Before you say that, think it through operationally. With 40 missiles per VPM sub, it takes three subs to equal a single SSGN. Operationally, that means having to plan and coordinate the movements and deconfliction of three subs, potentially in the same area, versus one. It also gives the enemy three times the chance to find a sub. Operationally, the fewer subs that can perform a mission, the better.

      Delete
    13. "We would use a modern equivalent, which is of course in production now"

      Bingo! I don't know why so many people fail to grasp this but kudos to you for doing so.

      Delete
    14. "We would use a modern equivalent, which is of course in production now, and has support and a parts chain."

      The Ohio SSGN had two geared steam turbines, running a single shaft, capable of generating 60,000 hp. The available modern equivalent in production, used on the Virginia class, has two steam generators, running a single shaft, but only generates 40,000 hp. That's going to be a problem.

      Even using equipment in production requires some level of qualification for new applications. Aside from repair and replacement parts to maintain the Ohios, all of the submarine equipment in production today is designed to fit and operate on the Virginia class.

      Delete
    15. "The available modern equivalent in production, used on the Virginia class, has two steam generators, running a single shaft, but only generates 40,000 hp. That's going to be a problem."

      A problem that seems to have been solved with little effort in the Columbia class which is just as big as the Ohio class.

      " all of the submarine equipment in production today is designed to fit and operate on the Virginia class."

      Except for all the submarine equipment in production today which is designed to fit and operate on the Columbia class which is the Ohio replacement.

      Delete
    16. "That's going to be a problem."

      Honestly, I just don't understand the inability of so many people to grasp that just because something isn't in active production doesn't mean we can't produce it. Industry will make anything we're willing to pay for. There are no problems; only solutions waiting for sufficient justification to implement them.

      This same sophomoric argument is used to 'explain' why we can never again produce an F-22 (and yet we'll produce the NGAD), or battleship, or Ohio class sub (and yet we're producing the exact same size sub in the Columbia), or naval armor, or whatever.

      Delete
    17. "Honestly, I just don't understand the inability of so many people to grasp that just because something isn't in active production doesn't mean we can't produce it."
      My favorite example is the Saturn V's Rocketdyne F-1 engine, last modernized in the F-1B form. NASA screwed up and killed the Saturn Program and its derivatives in favor of the Space Shuttle, which proceeded to kill more astronauts, provide less capability, and ravage NASA budget for decades. Rumor is that NASA officials thought the space shuttle was "cooler" and would play with public imagination...

      GAB

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    18. NASA and the USAF needed each other, hence the eventual "compromise" Space Shuttle design. The payload bay size and wings (for one orbit mission cross range) were driven by the USAF & NRO.

      Delete
    19. The relationship is intertwined; while the 'payload bay' while drove the size of the shuttle, the decision to even build a shuttle was based on other factors.

      Delete
    20. "This same sophomoric argument is used to 'explain' why we can never again produce an F-22 (and yet we'll produce the NGAD), . . ."

      In 2017, Lockheed provided an estimate of what it would cost to produce a new batch of F-22s. Their estimate was approximately $50 billion to manufacture 194 F-22s. It broke down to roughly $10 billion for non-recurring costs and $40 billion in production costs. That worked out to just over $200 million a copy. Sounds like a great deal, right? And, given how the DOD manages their programs, Lord knows what the actual costs would be.

      I simply don't understand why so many naively believe we can easily put old and highly-complex weapon systems back into production. There are a lot of hard issues to deal with, such as, updating drawings, producing new tooling and fixtures, material and parts obsolescence, and recreating your supply chain, to name just a few.

      Delete
    21. Read "F-22 Production Line Restart Costs" and come up to speed before you comment further.

      Delete
    22. "Except for all the submarine equipment in production today which is designed to fit and operate on the Columbia class which is the Ohio replacement."
      So while there ARE some major parts and pieces like turbines, generators, etc that have changed, any determined effort can make the changes work. But, the vast majority of systems, while newer and/or different, cant be that difficult to swap into an older design. Sonar systems, comm gear, etc, while maybe internally 50-100% different, still come in "x" number of cabinets that are "x" in size(same footprint). They'll have the same number of in/out cabling and sensor connections.Theyll still have "x" power and cooling requirements, etc. Also, I doubt that todays Ohios have a very high percentage of originally installed equipment. The periodic and incremental upgrades and updates means that whats aboard them now is much closer to being current "new" gear than what is in those 1970s blueprints and specifications. So I think a "new" Ohio, or any other class for that matter, while not exactly plug n play, isnt the impossible concept its made out to be, especially from a "they dont make ______ anymore" standpoint.

      Delete
  4. "I wonder why we just don't build more Ohios and configure them as SSGNs."

    In the present tense, we don't because the manufacturing line for Ohios has been shut down for 25 years (nearly to the day btw).

    In the past tense, we didn't because the Navy didn't see the need for dedicated SSGNs at the time the Ohio production line was still open - we assumed that Russia would stay down and that neither China nor India would become a real opponent.

    What we could certainly do is refuel and convert *every* Ohio into an SSGN instead of retiring any of them; unfortunately, we won't have any replacement SSBNs ready until at least 2031 - 9 years from now, 4 years after the end of the much-ballyhooed period during which China is likely to kick off the war. And that's assuming no problems are found with Columbia.

    What we are doing instead is building Block 5 Virginias as half-assed SSGNs (26% of the VLS cells: 40 vs 154); the first of those won't be commissioned for another five years or so, assuming no problems are found with the VPM and attendant modifications. I guess there's an argument that it's better to have four times as many SSGNs with a quarter as many missiles each than a quarter the number of SSGNs with 4x as many missiles per boat, but the costs of doing so are something like 12x higher (we paid an amortized ~1.3bn FY2021 dollars per Ohio SSGN conversion, versus a likely ~4bn FY2021 dollars per Block 5 Virginia), the crew requirements are 4x higher, nobody honestly believes we're going to get >= 16 Virginias with VPM, each Block 5 Virginia is one or more Block 3 or 4 Virginias we don't get, etc.


    A final, sad note: from 1980 through 1989 we commissioned 33 Flight II and Flight II Los Angeles-class SSNs and 10 Ohio-class SSBNs, an average of 4.3 boats/year. From 2020 through 2030, we'll commission probably 19 Virginias and zero Columbias, so 1.9 boats/year. Looked at another way, the first Ohio took five years from laying the keel to commissioning, while the first Columbia is scheduled to take eleven years from the equivalent of keel laying to commissioning, assuming no problems in trials. We have the same two submarine shipyards, and the admirals keep bragging about how we're making hulls in more efficient ways now than we used to. I refuse to believe a lack of skilled welders is the biggest problem.

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    Replies
    1. "What we could certainly do is refuel and convert *every* Ohio into an SSGN instead of retiring any of them"

      Well, there is one concern that we would need to think about. Remember, they're submarines, which means that they operate at great depth, where water pressure is enormous. Also they frequently transit between different depths, which causes the external pressure to change greatly. Over time, this can cause hull fatigue which will eventually make the sub unsafe to operate. And the Ohio's are already well past their design life. If there's a way to definitely determine that the hull is actually safe for another 15 or 20 years (the length of the energy in the refueling), then it would be a good idea. Otherwise, maybe not.

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    2. "If there's a way to definitely determine that the hull is actually safe for another 15 or 20 years (the length of the energy in the refueling), then it would be a good idea."

      FYI they recently performed this sort of analysis for the Flight II Los Angeles SSNs still in service to extend their service lives to keep force levels up.

      I don't think there's public information as to how that particular sausage gets made, but it's mentioned in the Congressional Research Service's "Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
      Submarine Procurement: Background and
      Issues for Congress" document from 27 July 2022, which itself cites "Navy information paper on FY2022 Fiscal Planning Framework and SSN-688 class service live extension
      program questions, February 5, 2021, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to Congressional Budget Office
      (CBO) and CRS on February 5, 2021."

      Delete
    3. Certainly a good point- thats the kind of thing we couldve/shouldve looked at a while ago. Lots of navalists predicted the "Terrible 20s" long ago. We needed to have strategic thinking about budgets and ship building/maintenance long ago that found ways to maintain capabilities. As we look at the fact that we've run ships of all types into the ground, and have backed ourselves into a fleet size/capability corner, in retrospect, the endless deployments have really hurt us. But today is a good day to start husbanding and stretching the remaining lifespans of everything we have. For instance, what if the Ohios could start doing their deterrent patrols much closer to home to reduce the "mileage" put on them. (Admittedly im not well versed in the requirements for where they do those patrols, but I have to believe that at least a 10% reduction in "mileage" is possible, and that it could equate to a roughly comparable extension in lifespan). I understand that its not exactly that simple, but I also think that we HAVE to find ways to keep what we have of all types, as long as possible, and stop the 'divest to invest' trend, since most planned new ships have less capability and net firepower...

      Delete
  5. I just cringe as the build timelimes just keep getting longer and longer, as if its normal!!! Where are flags or civ leadership that will step up and say "This is absurd!!! Find a way to get it done in 30% of the time. I want plans and proposals to do it on my desk by the end of the day!!"
    The lack of any urgency, anywhere, is appaling... The fact that new ships can spend 20% of their proposed lifespan before actually becominging a useful part of the fleet is too...

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  6. The numbers that really count are SSNs and their production numbers are capped by the shipyard capacity we have. This is why I called for the acquisition of SSKs to help alleviate the pressure on SSNs, and also to provide some training opportunities for the surface force. Any USN operations against the PRC must focus on the five (5) great strategic choke points in the Indo-Pacific region - this is the type of war Admiral Karl Dönitz foresaw.
    GAB

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  7. Some of this is avoiding modernization traps to begin with. Don't invent service life based on unproved methods. Don't plan big modernizations late in life. Start a build new strategy. Our entire civilization has moved that way. Cheaper to get new shoes than hire the cobbler (most places)

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  8. At the end of the day, it's a numbers game.

    How big a fleet do you think the Navy needs by 2050? Just for grins and giggles, let's say 450. How big is it now? Say, 300. That means the fleet needs to grow by a net 5 ships per year. Looking at the 5 years we have,

    Year, Retirements
    2023, 24
    2024,13
    2025,13
    2026,14
    2027,13

    That's 77 retirements a year or 15.4 per year. That means 20+ new ships per year to hit the target. At CBO's estimated price of $2.8B/ship, that's $56B a year, compared to the current shipbuilding budget of around $22B/year. Ain't gonna happen. That current budget would build 8 ships a year, meaning an annual net decrease of 7 ships per year. By 2050, 90 ships, or basically no more USN.

    Now let's see what happens if we cut the cost/ship. Build:
    - Nimitzes at $9B and Kittys/Midways at $5-6B instead of Fords at $14-15B doubles the number of carriers
    - Build 30 or so SSKs at $750MM/ship to cover choke points and littorals, and free up the $3.5B SSNs for blue water ops
    - Build 20 or so SSGNs as the primary conventional strike platform, based on Ohios at about $6B each instead of Columbias at $10B
    - Build a cheaper amphib squadron, a smaller LHA/LHD like the Spanish Juan Carlos, an LPH like the French Mistral, an LPD/LSD like the RN Albion, a real LST with a beaching bow, and an LPA/LKA that could be a converted merchant for the same $4B as one USN LHA/LHD; convert the LPD-17s to ABM/BMD ships like HII has proposed for that hull, and put a ski jump on the LAs/LHDs and make them interim Lightning Carriers until the Kitty/Midway CVs come into the fleet
    - Build a bunch of ASW frigates (like in ComNavOps's proposed fleet) and also some GP ASW/ASuW escorts like what FREMMs are and Constellations should be
    - Build a littoral fleet of ASW corvettes, NGFS/ground attack patrol boats, mine countermeasures (MCM) sips, and those SSKs

    With those changes, average cost/ship could be reduced to $1.4-1.5B. With those costs you could build 15 ships/year for the current expenditure level of $21-22B, and reducing the deletions to 10/year would get you the net 5/year increase to hit 450 ships by 2050.

    Now, we need to find yards to build those ships and sailors to crew them. As far as yards, one reason I have included some foreign designs is the expectation to attract foreign builders (Naval Group, Damen, ThyssenKrupp, maybe Navantia) to reopen or build yards in the USA to construct what would be much longer production runs than they could get from the USN. The Naval Group project at Itaguai could be a model. As far as sailors, I think you could free up 33,000 or more sailors from admin/overhead slots to fill those combat and combat support slots and also you could keep a significant percentage of ships in reserve/backup status with reduced headcount.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "At the end of the day, it's a numbers game. ...
      ... Just for grins and giggles, let's say 450."

      Except that it's NOT a numbers game and the numbers being tossed around are meaningless because they're divorced from any strategic or operational reality.

      What matters is combat effectiveness. If that can be achieved by one ship, so be it. If that requires a thousand ships, so be it. Tossing out arbitrary numbers and then playing cost accounting games is a waste of time. Unfortunately, that's exactly what the Navy is doing but we observers and analysts can, and must, do better.

      Stop playing with numbers and costs and start focusing on operations and combat effectiveness. After you've identified the combat capabilities you need (from strategy and operations), then, and only then, do you look at costs and then only as a secondary factor.

      Delete
    2. Build cheaper but useful and effective ships and slow down retirements, particularly retirements before expiration of useful lives, and growing the fleet to 450, or 500, or even 600 is possible. But that requires a vastly different thought process from the current one.

      Delete
    3. "Except that it's NOT a numbers game and the numbers being tossed around are meaningless because they're divorced from any strategic or operational reality."

      But once you have determined strategic and operational needs, you need to figure out how to get there from here. I think because I have discussed numbers before, you get the idea that I'm letting the numbers drive my thinking. Nothing could be further from the truth. I start from strategy and combat effectiveness, but at some point you have to talk about numbers and what is possible.

      Delete
    4. One point. You have posted your proposed fleet structure, which I take to be based on your view of strategic and operational needs, and it has influenced my thinking significantly. I've also posted my thoughts, along with numbers of what and ow it might be possible. The two concepts are quite close to each other, and far closer to each other than to anything the USN has proposed. I would venture to say that is either of us set out to build our prosed fleet, and ended up with the other one's instead, we would be pretty happy that we had done a reasonably good job. Either we are both basing our proposals on strategic and operational needs, or we are using two different approaches that both lead to the same, or very similar, answers. I may pay more attention to cost and numbers than you do, but that is more because I am trying to take the abstract idea of what we need and bring it down to the reality of what we can do.

      The bottom line, on which I think we both agree, is that the approach being taken by the USN is imprudent and will fail.

      Delete
    5. " because I have discussed numbers before, you get the idea that I'm letting the numbers drive my thinking."

      It does drive your thinking! You came up with a fleet size and then worked back to a ?strategy? (containment?). That's backward.

      Instead of mentioning numbers, at all, why don't you describe, operationally, how a naval force would enact a successful containment strategy?

      Are you going to use subs? Where? Where will they operate from? What level of attrition/success do you expect?

      Will carriers play a role? What role? What will they do? Where will they operate from? How will they survive while operating?

      Do you need SSGNs? Why? What specific targets will you strike and why?

      Are you going to conduct amphibious assaults? Where? Why?

      Land strikes? With what? From where? Why?

      What constitutes victory?

      And so on. None of this involves numbers.

      Answer all that, in your mind or on the blog, and the numbers will make themselves apparent.

      " I start from strategy and combat effectiveness"

      You may think you do but none of it has come across in your writings except for a vague desire to 'contain' China and distribute forces in nice, neat, equal packages around the world.

      Delete
    6. "The two concepts are quite close to each other"

      You don't seem to grasp that there is no similarity between our fleet structures other than the final numbers. This is analogous to the difference between guessing the correct answer to a math problem versus understanding how to perform the mathematical manipulations that are guaranteed to produce the correct answer. One is luck and the other is correct thanks to an understanding of the underlying principles. My fleet structure has nothing in common with yours as regards usage, basis, guiding strategy and operations, wartime support, etc.

      Delete
  9. Peace dividend also has a big responsibility. Literally US brought less new ships after 1991 which in turn resulted in fleet getting older.

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  10. considering US Navy's current procurement plans,
    I think there is an assumption that if an armed conflict arises in Pacific Theater, then US will get full support of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia along with other nations in that region.
    The only reason I think about it because Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia are currently under US Occupation i.e. their Foreign Policy, Military and Internal Affairs (to some extent) will always an extension of US Long term Strategy.

    Just like Ukraine conflict, US will provide support to these nations while trying to stay out of conflict.
    Thus, creating a Win-Win situation for US.

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    1. "I think there is an assumption that if an armed conflict arises in Pacific Theater, then US will get full support of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia along with other nations in that region."

      This is a key aspect of US geopolitical strategy that deserves a deep analysis. I suspect there is a significant degree of truth to the statement and it has a significant impact on our plans and force structure. Unfortunately, the larger geopolitical aspects of this are beyond the scope of this blog.

      The rest of the comment is just nonsense.

      Delete
    2. "South Korea has already said, publicly"

      This comment was deleted for being disrespectful. If you'd care to repost in a civil tone, the bulk of the comment was fine. I would suggest, however, that you offer some sources since your statements were questionable.

      Delete

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