Monday, June 26, 2023

Yokosuka Pearl Harbor

The US Navy has, for several decades, maintained a permanently forward deployed carrier at Yokosuka, Japan.  Here’s the sequence of carriers that have been based at Yokosuka:
 
1973  Midway
1991  Independence
1998  Kitty Hawk
2008  Washington
2015  Reagan
2024  Washington
 
 
To have maintained a carrier at Yokosuka for so many decades, the Navy must perceive some value in it.  What is that value?  I ask because I’m not seeing it.  Let’s examine some possible benefits and risks.
 
 
Deterrence
 
The obvious potential benefit – and the one that I’m sure the Navy believes - is deterrence of the Chinese.  In general terms, we’ve discredited forward presence as a deterrent.  Let’s look at the history of China’s actions over the last several decades and see whether deterrence has worked.  Note, this is attempting to prove a negative which is not possible so we’ll try to discern a pattern to see whether we’re succeeding at deterring China.  Consider the following Chinese actions:
 
  • China has annexed every unclaimed or disputed island/reef in the East and South China Seas.
  • China has built and militarized several artificial islands, illegally and in violation of the UNCLOS treaty of which they are a signatory.
  • China forced down and seized a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft in international airspace.  They then held the aircraft and crew, stripped the aircraft of equipment, and dismantled the aircraft before eventually releasing the crew.
  • China seized a US underwater drone vehicle.
  • China has routinely violated Philippine and Vietnam territorial waters.
  • Chinese fishing fleets have routinely encroached on the territorial waters of various countries.
  • China has routinely threatened Taiwan and violated its territory and air defense zones.
  • China has interfered with US military operations in international waters (McCain towed array incident near Subic Bay, Philippines, for example).
 
Does this sound like we’ve deterred China?  Does this sound like a pattern of deterrence?  Not in the least!  It sounds like a pattern of unrestrained, non-kinetic conquest!
 
Some of you are going to attempt to claim the fact that China hasn’t initiated a war demonstrates that deterrence must be working.  Of course, there is absolutely no indication that China had any intention of going to war with the US, prior to now.  You can’t deter someone from doing something they weren’t going to do anyway. 
 
Even now, why would China want to go to war with the US?  They’re getting everything they want without needing a war!  They’ve annexed and fortified the entire East and South China Seas.  For all practical purposes, they’ve kicked us out of the E/S China Seas.  They’re expanding into the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Cuba.  They’re in the process of annexing the Philippines through a combination of emigration, intimidation, and foreign assistance.  They’re isolating Taiwan and working to encircle Japan.  They’re attempting to intimidate Australia and gain control of various strategic resources via financial and business manipulations.  And the list goes on and on.
 
They don’t need or want a war when they can get everything they want thanks to our policy of appeasement.
 
Is a single carrier in Japan deterring China from anything?  No.
 
USS Reagan at Yokosuka

 

Combat
 
Another potential benefit is combat.  Can a single carrier conduct initial, forward, combat operations to disrupt Chinese operations and buy time for a more forceful US response?
 
Unfortunately, as we’ve repeatedly proven, a single carrier is not an effective combat force.  It’s a ship waiting to be sunk.  A single carrier is incapable of effective self-defense let alone able to simultaneously mount any kind of useful offense.  A single carrier serves no purpose other than to provide China with a live fire, carrier SINKEX.  So, if a single carrier is not survivable in combat and serves no useful combat purpose … why are we maintaining one there?
 
 
 
Risk
 
Okay, so a Japan-based carrier offers no benefits but what’s the harm?  Why do we care whether there’s a carrier in Japan?  The answer is that we care because of the concomitant risk of losing that carrier.
 
There are only a couple of possibilities for a Japan-based carrier at the start of a war with China:
 
  • The carrier is sunk in the first hour of the war.  China is not going to pass up a free sinking of a carrier.
  • Japan opts to remain neutral and the carrier is interned for the duration.
 
Neither of those options provides any useful combat capability and both result in the loss of the carrier.  The inescapable conclusion is that a Japan-based carrier is a certain loss in a war with China.  Is the loss of a hideously expensive carrier and air wing for no positive return really what we want?  I would hope not!
 
A carrier in Japan is a ‘Pearl Harbor’ waiting to happen.  You might be tempted to say that we’ll simply pull the carrier back to the US if war seems likely.  That’s possible but history suggests that’s unlikely.  We had ample warning about the actual Pearl Harbor and opted to do nothing.  China is all but telling us they’re just about ready to initiate the invasion of Taiwan and we haven’t pulled our carrier out of danger.  History – and our current inactions – strongly indicate that our carrier will still be sitting, docked in Japan, when war starts.
 
 
Summary
 
So, if a single Japan-based carrier isn’t providing any discernible deterrent effect, isn’t survivable in combat, can’t contribute any useful offense, and is certain to be ‘Pearl Harbored’ in the first hour of a war    why do we have a carrier there?  There are two answers:
 
  1. Inertia – we’ve always had one there so we’ll continue to do so.
  2. Stupidity – our so-called professional warriors are too stupid to understand the situation and change it.  As we’ve repeatedly documented on this blog, the extent of stupidity by Navy leadership is staggering and this is yet another example.
 
The conclusion is obvious – we need to end the Japan-based, forward deployment of a carrier and bring the carrier back home.

72 comments:

  1. Hi,

    Is the carrier a bait for China to attack. This would involve attacking Japanese territory. Thus pushing Japan to go to war with China.

    Ofcourse Japan may simply take it on the chin and say it's ok. But that would be a very very bitter pill to swallow and political suicide for the incumbent leaders.

    What they may ofcourse do is intern the carrier or ask it to leave before hostilities.

    -BM

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    Replies
    1. "Japan has almost no real military capability"

      I've deleted this comment as it is factually incorrect and discusses politics. This is not a political blog. If you'd care to re-post either without the politics or by directly linking the politics to naval matters, that would be fine.

      Delete
    2. Agree with BM. Only real use is a trip wire for US and Japan to force a decision to go to war. USA losing a carrier and a POTUS not doing anything would be political suicide, same for Japan, how could a Japanese politician walk away from an direct attack on Japanese soil and not do anything?

      Not saying I agree with the strategy but its really its only use.

      Delete
    3. Saves money. Japan pays for some of it. Cheaper because when it actually deploys its on scene. Most importantly its a visible security commitment essentially at the Japanese capitol. Our fleet operates with their fleet and we avoid some of the confusion with comms, proccesses etc should war come. Allies can be a burden. It takes wrk to make them an asset. Easier done with Japan in the Pacific against China than NATO against Russia.

      Delete
    4. "Saves money. Japan pays for some of it."

      Maybe 5% when it costs 50% more to keep ships there. Most of their contributions are bogus, like counting the "costs" of not charging import duties on exchange and commissary goods, or income taxes on sailors. Most goes to pay rent on Okinawa and other bases.

      We can keep some destroyers and support ships there, but a carrier group is stupid.

      Delete
  2. Agree will pulling the forward based ships back 100%. I have to believe that if/when hostilities start, the timing will be absolutely centered around the forward carrier. Whether the Chinese strike it in port or at sea, that will be determined by the political ramifications and the effect it will have on world opinion. With the exception of weather, I don't think theres a more important chip in the game for the Chinese as far as timing a move against Taiwan, or any other neighbor. Since a single CVBG isnt a serious threat to anything the Chinese do, I think that any attack on it will be shaped by what political fallout it will cause, and what the response of other nations will be.
    I wonder if political maneuvering pre-war could create a scenario that causes Japan to stay neutral, and if its likely. Internment of our CVN and the 10+ other combatants would take a lot of our pieces off the table on day one. Would we have the political will to send the ships to sea anyway?? (Regardless, I doubt our crews could take the ships to sea sans tugs and pilots without running aground or into each other, but I digress)
    Id suggest that an attack on the CVBG would be while its at sea, and in spite of the temptation of such a juicy target, the attack would be measured to just mission kill it and send it home. In spite of our fractured political and cultural status at home, I have to believe that a sinking would create a Pearl Harbor-esque reaction. If they simply damaged it enough to send it home, the Chinese could claim they benevolently spared the crew and sent the "agressor" packing, and use that for propaganda and political purposes...
    Regardless of how any of it unfolds, pulling all the forward ships back is a no-brainer.

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  3. If a tripwire is needed, I vote for it to be an LCS.

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    Replies
    1. That might trip over its own shoelaces without any help from the PLAN

      Delete
  4. "...pulling all the forward ships back is a no-brainer."

    I understand what you're saying here, but I disagree.

    If we are going to lead an encircling alliance around an expansionary China, we need to be there. Physically.

    The problem with our deterrence of China is not the presence, or absence, of a single carrier forward deployed in Japan. The problem is our appeasement attitude.

    But to move beyond this, to a posture of strength, I think we need real military power in the region (not a single carrier stationed at the end of the line).

    I know that I'm swimming against the current here, so I'll explain in more detail how I would distribute my forces to hopefully prompt some good discussion.

    Lutefisk

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    1. Naval and Airbase assets:

      All of this assumes that the diplomatic hurdles for these facilities could be cleared (I know, this would be no small achievement but humor me).

      Besides the permanent bases in Yokosuka, Guam, and Okinawa, I would add permanent facilities (PCS location with facilities for dependents) at Perth, a major naval base and NAS at Mindanao (Davao area), a NAS at Palau, and a NAS (either US or Japan) at Iwo Jima.

      I would also have a naval base and NAS at Subic Bay and Cam Rahn Bay. These would just be for refuel/ rearm/ resupply of ships and planes. The manning would be light and would be TDY rotation from either Okinawa or Davao Naval Base.

      I would also continue with the proposed facilities on Palawan and Luzon, which I think are a good idea (if I understand their purposes correctly).

      Lutefisk

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    2. I forgot to mention a joint Air Force and Army base at Mindanao which I'm calling Joint Base MacArthur.

      Lutefisk

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    3. Imaginary Equipment:
      (These are weapons that I feel we should have, could have, but don't have.)

      Navalised F22
      Navalised A10
      Skyraider
      S3 Viking ASW
      S3 Viking air refueling tanker

      Des Moines class-esque cruiser
      Gehring class-esque surface combatant
      Perry class-esque ASW frigate (2 helos)
      Sumner class-esque ASW destroyer (no helos)
      Drone carrier built on Atlanta class-esque hull
      Cruise missile shooter built on Cleveland-esque class hull
      Light carrier (CNO's Midway class-esque carrier)

      Lutefisk

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    4. Having basing in significant amounts in the Phillipines would be a huge help. Even without basing, just having access and being able to operate/rearm/resupply in their waters would be huge. The Philippine leadership has been fostering competition, playing the US and China against each other, etc for a while. Sadly, if we're serious about staying in WestPac and supporting Taiwan, I think we need to politically and financially do whatever it takes to "win" the Phillipines and make them a solid and reliable ally that we can utilize.

      Delete
    5. I've described in other posts what those ships would be so I don't want to bore, but if anyone has a question what I'm talking about I'll be glad to describe what I'm talking about.

      Lutefisk

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    6. General task force constructions:

      Super Carrier (10 total; 3 in Japan, 1 in Hawaii, 2 on West Coast, 3 on East Coast, one being overhauled)

      - Carrier escort, 4 Burkes, 3 ASW teams (1 Perry and two Sumner each)


      Light carrier (4 total: 1 at Guam, 1 at Hawaii, 1 West Coast, 1 East Coast)

      Delete
    7. Ugh, published accidentally

      Light carrier escort: 3 Burkes, 3 ASW teams

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    8. " I think we need real military power in the region"

      You understand that the entire 7th Fleet is in the region along with all the Air Force assets of Guam plus submarines from Pearl and troops all over the region, including South Korea? I'm not sure how much more 'real military power' we can fit in the region. If all I just described is insufficient, how will any more ships or planes help anything?

      You nailed it earlier in your comment with this statement:

      "The problem is our appeasement attitude."

      Our entire military could be based in Japan and it wouldn't do an ounce of good because we'd just back down from every confrontation. Until we ditch the appeasement policy, military force is useless.

      "I know that I'm swimming against the current here, so I'll explain in more detail how I would distribute my forces to hopefully prompt some good discussion."

      You see, I hope, that NO amount of forces and NO distribution of forces can accomplish anything until we stop appeasing?

      Delete
    9. "These are weapons that I feel we should have, could have, but don't have."

      As far as peacetime deterrence, we've proven we haven't got the will to use any of them so why do you want them? For war they'd be nice but for peacetime they're useless. That's the crux of the deterrence problem.

      Delete
    10. This is so true!!! I think deterring actual war can only be done by gathering unquestionably overwhelming force. But we do also need to stop being polite in our peacetime interactions. I understand we've always played the "nice guy" role and adhered to self imposed rules, but we definitely need to change that, and push back, HARD, against all that the Chinese do...

      Delete
    11. "...As far as peacetime deterrence, we've proven we haven't got the will to use any of them..."

      Our attitude is very frustrating.

      Why do we appease?

      Are we waiting for the Chinese demographic collapse so we don't want to provoke them?

      Are our elites so concerned about losing their lucrative arrangements with the Chinese that they're paralyzed to act?

      I wish I knew the answer(s).

      Lutefisk

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    12. "Why do we appease?"

      The wise answer is always, 'follow the money'. The money leads right to China. Business interests - meaning lawmakers influenced by lobbyist's donations - want continued access to/from China. Hence, no confrontations with China.

      A second, possibly equally valid, reason is the feminization of our society. No one is allowed to confront anyone for fear of hurting their feelings. This societal attitude has now carried over to politics and the military. Thus, confrontation is seen as bad.

      Men have allowed themselves to be feminized. The traditional values of standing up for oneself, actually fighting when necessary, and holding others accountable have been lost. Men need to become men again and stop kowtowing to women.

      How's that for an opinion? Want to fight about it?

      Delete
    13. Ill fight... But theres no reason to, because I share your opinion...

      Delete
    14. "But theres no reason to, because I share your opinion.."

      Going for appeasement, huh? :)

      Delete
    15. I would have loved to see, during the near collision in the Taiwan Straight recently, the Chinese come close to one of my Gehrings.

      Three twin 5" gun turrets tracking them as they get close...

      Maybe in a parallel universe.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
  5. @Lutefisk Looking fwd to it. Im going to go out on a limb here and theorize that if we wanted to actually create some deterrence to a WestPac conflict- pulling the fwd deployed ships back to Pearl, and moving two 2nd/6th fleet carrier groups to the West Coast would show a much more prudent, serious, and tactically sound intent than handing the Chinese one or more easy targets in the proverbial platter...

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    1. The term "Pivot West" has been thrown around a lot... But nothing says we're actually doing it like a sizeable reallocation of forces to the theatre. I suggest we talk to NATO and hand over the majority of Mediterranean and Middle East responsibilities to them. They will manage just fine. Sixth Fleet gets cannabalized, and most all forces move back to the 2nd. Then in turn, 2nd gets drawn down and CVBGs and the lions share of our SSNs and all the SSGNs move to the Pacific. ( if our allies whine loudly about it, send the LCSs to make visits in Sigonella or Haifa or Souda Bay or wherever to hold hands and make them feel better.) Id do the same with Air Force assets. Then, we could start exercising our 4+ carrier CVBG, and training it up. The money saved from all the needless deployments and fwd basing wouldnt be insignificant, and could be utilized more wisely elsewhere. We know that deterrence (in a non-nuclear context) isnt necessasarilly working, and our token fwd deployment has no effect. I think the only way its viable is to gather overwhelming force, at a safe distance, that tells your adversary "we're ready, and you wont succeed". If theres any question about whether they can succeed or not, then youve failed to deter them and the effort is wasted.

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  6. I'm making hash out of this, my apologies.

    Super Carriers (10 total: 3 in Japan, 1 in Hawaii, 2 on West Coast, 2 on East Coast)

    -Super Carrier escorts: 4 Burkes, 3 ASW teams (one Perry and two Sumners each)
    - 3 carriers would be a total of 42 combat ships

    Light Carries (4 total; 1 in Guam, 1 in Hawaii, 1 on West Coast, 1 on East Coast)

    - Light carrier escort: 3 Burkes, 3 ASW teams

    Des Moines class cruisers (8 total; 2 at Perth, 2 at Davao, 2 on West Coast, 2 on East Coast)

    - Des Moines escorts: 1 Gehring, 2 Burkes, 1 ASW team
    - 2 Des Moines would be a task force of 14 ships

    Gehring team: 3 Gehring surface combatants

    Drone carriers: (6 total: 2 in Perth, 1 in Mindanao, 1 in Hawaii, 1 West Coast, 1 East Coast)

    Cruise Missile cruisers: (4 total: 1 in Perth, 1 Hawaii, 1 West Coast, 1 East Coast)

    Lutefisk

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    1. "Super Carriers (10 total: 3 in Japan..."
      Brought this to mind...

      The Naval leadership had decided that a show of force would deter further Chinese aggression. So in a bold move, three carriers were forward deployed to Japan.
      Mere months later, the Chinese assault on Taiwan began, but the opening moves were against the USN. A few staged and aggressive territorial incursions by PLAN ships in Taiwanese waters had trigerred the USN to sail a carrier through the Taiwan Strait, and it was halfway back to Yokosuka on a predictable course when hostilities began. A barrage of land based missiles overwhelmed the Ford's escorts, and all three ships sustained multiple hits. The cruiser survived, but with half her propulsion plant destroyed and all sensors and weapons except her 5in gun out of action. The DDG was lost in minutes, after the third hit she took detonated the aft VLS cell. The Ford sustained minor actual damage, but the shock from the detonations rendered the EMALS, the AAG, two elevators, and all but one of the weapons elevators unusable. The Washington and Reagan were in port. A massive salvo of missiles struck both carriers, as well as a few escorts, but did no or minimal damage to shore installations, Japanese property, or JSDF ships.  The Washington suffered some damage, but she remained mission capable, although a large amount of her air wing was destroyed by the fires that engulfed the hanger and flight deck. The Reagan though, suffered catastrophic damage. Multiple missiles struck in succession, in almost the same place. They penetrated deep into the ship, breaching the reactor spaces. Coolant lines were breached, and the engineering spaces became lethally radioactive. Mistakes made by damage control teams vented radioactive air and water out of the ship, and a  significant part of the port became dangerously irradiated.
        A month later:  Reeling from their losses, and with no ability to intervene, the USN was unable to affect the outcome, and Taiwan was overrun. American SSNs and SSGNs attacked PLAN units, and the invasion fleet, and sank or damaged quite a few Chinese assets. But after initial ships magazines were emptied, and the Chinese rapidly gained ground in Taiwan, US forces were quietly told to cease fire, and all forward deployed ships returned to Pearl without further action due to a backchannel govt agreement with the Chinese.
        After undergoing some repairs in Pearl Harbor, the Ford and Washington arrived in San Diego. The Washington would see a month of repairs before being fully operational again. The Ford wouldn't go back to sea for well over a year, as much of the power storage system would need replaced, and all the elevators would need to be almost completely rebuilt.  The Reagan fared the worst.  The Japanese govt, pushed by an instant groundswell of anti-nuclear sentiment from the population, not only declined to join the fight, but ordered the Reagans immediate removal from Japanese waters.  With only small measures being taken so far, mostly to contain the radiation, and all other damage control efforts abandoned the night of the attack, she was about 40% burned out. She was towed from port, and the leadership, consultants, and repair industry professionals discussed and debated the ability to repair her. But, along with two unrepairable DDGs, she was eventually scuttled in deep water....

      Delete
    2. "A month later...", the United States Navy had successfully interdicted all Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean.

      India remained officially neutral, but were happy to see their rival brought to their knees. The delivery of confiscated Chinese oil tankers to Indian refineries helped ensure their cooperation.

      Chinese industry was not able to function when half of its oil imports were interdicted by the USN blockade. China suffered even further difficulties when their pipelines from Siberia were mysteriously sabotaged.

      China's Communist Party was unable to come to peace terms with an infuriated America and its alliance of countries and collapsed under internal rebellion.

      That is what would happen.

      Lutefisk

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    3. If you don't like the sabotage scenario, how about a B-21 strike knocks out the pipelines in 17 different places.

      Lutefisk

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    4. Sounds good...but the last report i read suggests that a blockade of oil wouldn't really hurt them for quite a while. With Russian pipelines, plus the ability to ration overnight, coupled with huge reserves...a blockade might not have any effects for a year or more...

      Delete
    5. "oil imports were interdicted by the USN blockade."

      I would remind you of the WWII situations for Germany and Japan. Both were essentially isolated from oil imports and yet managed to keep their militaries supplied with oil and fighting for several years. China has much more internal oil capacity, reserves, and external over-land sources. Do you really think an oil blockade would have a significant effect in any useful time frame?

      By all means, we should establish a blockade but it's not going to win the war or even significantly influence it.

      Delete
    6. The oil blockade would have an impact.

      China currently is using about 16 million barrels per day and produces domestically about 4 million of that.

      Much of the difference comes via tanker from the middle east across the Indian Ocean or from a major pipeline from Western Siberia.

      As of last year the Chinese were estimated to have 950 million barrels in their strategic reserve.

      What I don't know is how many millions of barrels per day they would use during wartime.

      The military would use substantially more to fight the war, but the economy could be shut down or reduced to save oil.

      If they had to consume 10 million barrels a day from reserves they would use it up in three months.
      At 5 million barrels a day it would be 6 months.

      I don't know how much they can shut down their economy, a blockade would probably do it for them.
      But it would be very damaging to them.
      Is forcibly occupying Taiwan worth it to them?

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    7. I dont know or recall all the figures... But i do recall a couple that are relevant- With all seaborne oul imports cut off it was mentioned that in a vigorous active war, the Chinese wouldnt likely exceed .5M bpd for the military uses, and that a 50% rationing of oil domestically (which could be enacted within days) would see their reserves and the Russian pipeline keeping them going for nearly two years...

      Delete
    8. Im trying to find the link to the paper im citing...

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    9. The graphic I found shows the ESPO pipeline into mainland China from Siberia is about 0.8 million barrels per day.

      Lutefisk

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    10. "The oil blockade would have an impact."

      You're overlooking a few important factors:

      1. Much of China's oil use goes to consumer comforts which would be severely curtailed during war so that represents instant 'savings'.

      2. For the first 5 months of this year, China was EXPORTING 1.4 million bpd of refined oil products. Thus, much of the imported oil was being turned into refined products and going straight back out of the country. Thus, the imports are for the purpose of generating income rather than for internal consumption. Again, this would be instant 'savings' in war.

      3. China has been putting around 1.8 million bpd into storage on a sustained basis. We, on the other hand, are draining our reserves for political reasons every time gas prices spike.

      4. China is constantly expanding its oil and gas pipeline capacities via Russia.

      5. In a war with the US, China will be fighting in its own backyard which drastically reduces military oil consumption as opposed to the US which will be fighting at the end of a ten thousand mile or so pipeline and consuming large quantities of oil just to get to the end of the pipeline!

      The conclusion is clear. While a blockade is worthwhile, China is not going to be blockaded into submission.

      Delete
    11. Here's the link for the graphic, FWIW.

      https://cdn.ihsmarkit.com/www/images/0322/espo-pipeline-blog-image-2.jpg

      Lutefisk

      Lutefisk

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    12. The paper im citing was lengthy...idk...30-40 pages?? Im at work, still trying to hunt it down lol

      Delete
    13. And the link for the conversion calculator from tons to barrels:

      https://www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/calc_refined.html

      Lutefisk

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    14. "The graphic I found shows the ESPO pipeline into mainland China from Siberia is about 0.8 million barrels per day."

      Crude oil is not the only form of import. The Power of Siberia pipeline supplies natural gas to China as noted in this Wiki passage:

      "In 2019, the export to China was expected to start with 5 billion m3 (180 billion cu ft) per annum in 2020, and to increase gradually to 38 billion m3 (1.3 trillion cu ft) per annum by 2025."

      There are also other oil pipelines. New pipelines are being built between Russia and China and existing capacities are being increased.

      Delete
  7. Ground forces:

    Marine divisions would be the traditional hard-nosed Marine infantry with each split between light infantry and Stryker.

    - One division on the East Coast, one division on the West Coast, and the third with a regiment in Okinawa, a regiment in Mindanao, and the third in Guam

    The army would restore the 2nd ID in Korea to a true Mech Inf division, and add the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regt and preposition a mech inf division's equipment in Japan.

    The army would separate the 187th and station it as a Air Assault Brigade at Joint Base Macarthur, training with the Philippine Army.

    The 25th ID in Hawaii would be deactivated in favor of armor divisions and the 173rd ABN Brigade would be moved from Italy to Schofield Barracks in Hawaii to serve as the immediate reaction force for the Pacific.

    Lutefisk

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  8. How the forces would be used:

    The carrier groups in Japan would train for combat in the East China, South China and Philippine Seas and be ready to move into the Philippine Sea if the Chinese made a move on Taiwan.

    The light carriers would be, in my navy, primarily CAS vessels carrying a Marine Air Wing of 36 A10's and 12 Skyraiders.
    But with cat and traps they could carry anything to support the missions.

    The two Des Moines would be used to secure the Philippine archipelago and contest aggressively the South China Sea from Mindanao.
    Also from Mindanao would be 4 Gehring teams (3 ships each) that would work in the Philippines and out of Subic and Cam Rahn.

    The two Des Moines out of Perth would be to interdict shipping in the Indian Ocean and generally make mischief.
    They would have a cruise missile cruiser to add some long additional long range punch beyond the Des Moines' cruise missiles and also have two drone carriers to give them eyes and situational awareness.

    Lutefisk

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    1. Thanks to CNO for deleting my accidental postings of partial posts.

      Lutefisk

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    2. Oops, thought they had disappeared.

      Lutefisk

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  9. I feel like Bill Murray in 'Groundhog Day' after his long description of the weather forecast with the owner of the B&B...

    Him - "Did you really want to talk about the weather or were you just making chit chat?"

    Her - "Chit chat"

    Lutefisk

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  10. Keeping amphibs at Sasebo is even more idiotic, as I wrote a few years back. https://www.g2mil.com/sasebo.htm

    And what happens to the families during wartime? How much of crews will mutiny and not abandon their children during a war to sail away? Why keep a carrier forward deployed when the war plan is for it to sail east of Guam ASAP to await the arrival of other carriers four months later?

    Keeping ships in Japan is also far more expensive with all the expensive PCS moves and running the schools, commissaries and exchanges there, plus ultra-high housing costs. We have plenty of airbase access in West Pac, so the Japan carrier usually deploys to the Persian Gulf!

    One can debate if China can hit a carrier on the open ocean with ballistic missiles, it can certainly hit one pierside at Yokosuka. Fire 20 missiles and several are sure to hit. They also know the exact GPS route in and out of the harbor. Time it right and sink her in the harbor entrance!

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    1. "And what happens to the families during wartime? How much of crews will mutiny and not abandon their children during a war to sail away?"

      The odds of that happening is less than 1/10 of 1%.

      Lutefisk

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    2. Chinese Gordon

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    3. "They also know the exact GPS route in and out of the harbor. Time it right and sink her in the harbor" G2mIl said.

      Load a some DF-21s with 5 mirv mines each, fire them into the channel, keep everyone busy for a couple days clearing
      them with the awesome LCS MCM module.

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    4. I wonder how good the Japanese are at clearing mines?

      Lutefisk

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  11. I’m wondering what sort of message that would send to our Japanese allies about our continued willingness to defend them.
    At the moment the 7th Fleet represents a very powerful visible and tangible demonstration of the commitment of the United States to the security of the entire region, and we’d lose a heck of a lot of credibility if we pulled those ships back to somewhere safer.
    Side issue: would you also pull the escorts out? It becomes problematic from a legal perspective to use Japanese shipyards for repairs and maintenance if the ships are no longer homeported at those bases, and shipyard resourcing is something we’re struggling with right now.
    I’m not necessarily disagreeing with you - just pointing out that your recommendation would come with a very heavy cost to US credibility and once lost that’s a hard thing to recover.

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    1. "wondering what sort of message that would send to our Japanese allies"

      Perhaps it would send the message that we aren't tactical idiots? Perhaps it would send the message that we're serious about pulling our ships back for intensive training and maintenance so that they'll be as ready as possible when war comes? Perhaps it would send the message that we're more focused on combat considerations than political gestures?

      "7th Fleet represents a very powerful visible and tangible demonstration of the commitment of the United States to the security of the entire region"

      No it doesn't! It's highly debatable that we would intervene on behalf of Taiwan since we won't even recognize them as a nation. We've failed badly to provide useful assistance to Philippines which has caused them to lean towards China. We've stood by and watched while China has annexed the entire East and South China Seas. We're doing nothing while China encroaches on Vietnamese, Malaysian, and Philippine EEZs and territorial waters. And the list goes on ... We're not visibly committed to the security of the region and the presence or absence of a carrier in Japan doesn't change that. Can you name a single thing that carrier has ever done that actually demonstrated our resolve?

      "US credibility"

      That ship sailed long ago!

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  12. I’m not sure if you’re recommending just pulling the carrier back to Pearl Harbor or no longer having any home ported naval presence in Japan at all.
    It seems to me that without the 7th Fleet the whole of Indo-Pacific Command becomes an empty shell, and ceases to be relevant or to serve any useful purpose at all.
    Should we then pull out the 30,000 troops we’ve got based in South Korea, since they’re also very close to China?
    Any value in the Quad or Aukus?
    Interested in your opinions on all of this.

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    1. "It seems to me that without the 7th Fleet"

      Who, other than you, suggested eliminating 7th Fleet?

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    2. "'Who, other than you, suggested eliminating 7th Fleet'.
      You did, by implication"

      Nope. This is purely your imagination.

      Delete
  13. It's a pity you never served, CNO. If only you were inside the navy, shaking it up and cleaning house!

    It's our misfortune that that path was never open to you.

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  14. It is more to control Japan from seeking her own interests than follow US. This part, so far, is successful.

    Japan has been forced to give up self development weapons but to buy US ones several times. It is not just for money. Force Japan to use US weapons is a mean of control its defense force.

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    1. "Japan has been forced to give up self development weapons but to buy US ones"

      Let me understand this ... you believe that a carrier docked in Yokosuka forces Japan to buy US weapon systems???? How, exactly, does that force Japan?

      If a Japanese ship docked in the US would we be forced to buy Japanese weapon systems?

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  15. Missiles vs aircraft carrier

    Apparently, missiles are cheap, especially made in China. On defense side, if you shot down 98 missiles out of 100, 2 penetrated could make you lose fighting capability --- if steam shaft damaged, then, a carrier cannot launch aircrafts.

    So carrier need to attack and uproot enemy's missiles. However, this is increasingly difficult as today, missiles can be fired from mobile vehicles, submarines, underground bunkers, ....

    Not to mention, there is a vulnerability of nuclear powered carriers ---- if reactor is hit and radiation leaks out, despite the carrier is still operable, personnel health issue .... evacuate immediately or else?

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  16. maybe it's just me, nah, there are others that feel this way, but I think we are going to lose alot of ships in the next war, aircraft and sailors, unless we don't have the stomach to deal with a China. The base in Japan is more than direct presence only for China, it was there for years to deter the Soviets as the Chinese were a joke navy, and it was there to get jets over North Korea. If the time to pull back a permanent presence for a Carrier there rather than all ships at the base, then do it, but keep the base open. Of course, the base could be used for opposite reason as well, the spearhead to do the Un-American but potentially needed thing, Pearl Harbor the Chinese. Never, always better to be a victim would say the state dept. (how does one get a job where the bar is there is no failure and every worthless agreement and chat is marked as success?)! Nah, I'd rather go with the Benny Hill, the genius comic of Britain's motto- "Tis better to do unto others before they do it to you...". If we knew China was preparing for an attack, you hit them. That base could be a spearhead. But they need real protection as well, that means having the fortitude to buy many batteries of Patriots/Thaads/Aegis. In Korea, we aren't protecting them from the North, laughable, but it's a good base to hold armor for use against China. wait, we'll never have a land war in Asia chimes in the experts, yes, and tell Ali or Tyson you are not using your left in a boxing match. The threat of invasion in a long protacted war, with a nuke threat against China should China dare to raise the threat of nuke use against Army troops, that needs to be in their heads, and multiple corps of armor across the Gobi coming into N. China is an implied threat. So, to be short, we have to have a plan to fix ships fast that are hit, plan on losing 40-50% in a shooting war which will last more than a year, actually pulling stuff out of reserve, like Tarawa class, maybe not defueling LA class subs till they are really ready to be scrapped (what's the backlog now in WA, we in the teens of sub tubes sitting there?), and quit running the Navy like it's a corporate boardroom stuff with a bunch of who toed the line types that are worried about $ and costs solely rather than primary objective, defend and defeat. And we need not appease the clowns in Red China, there are a million ways to oh make an Su-27 buzzing a jet pay a price (AMARG old KC-135 lacking many parts makes a final flight and blows up right when its buzzed (drone software no humans on board), someone grabs our UUV and we in turn grab a full coast guard vessel, a head for an eye..)

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  17. You answered your own question, ComNavOps.

    "China is not going to pass up a free sinking of a carrier."
    Most likely. So, by attacking US forces in Japan, China will find herself at war with both, and US politicians will have the perfect "Pearl Harbour" casus belli to go to war against the cruel aggressor, just like in the forties.

    Essentially, it's bait.

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    1. 5,000 crew and $15B is some mighty expensive bait. Even as screwed up as the Navy/military is, I don't believe anyone would do that.

      China is rapidly reaching the point where they won't care (and may welcome) about going to war with the US. If that happens, it won't matter whether we have a carrier in Japan - we'll already be at war with China only we'll be down one irreplaceable carrier.

      Conspiracy theories aside, a carrier as bait to get America into a war is nonsense.

      The most likely scenario for a war is that China declares an internal civil emergency and invades Taiwan to quell an internal disturbance. The US would almost certainly refrain from intervening militarily other than by sending aid packages, as we're doing in Ukraine. In this case, having a carrier in Japan is pointless since we won't use it.

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    2. That's the bait dilemma: if it's too small (say, one LSC) it gets ignored, and if it's too much (a whole carrier group) losing it can be crippling: one carrier is the perfect amount of bait, as it turns out.

      Note that I'm not necessarily suggesting that the USA is doing this on purpose, yet that is the actual effect of the forward carrier right now.

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    3. "one carrier is the perfect amount of bait"

      Come on, think this through. If China decides to attack Taiwan without engaging the US, they won't 'take the bait' and a carrier in Japan is useless as far as pushing the US into war. On the other hand, if China attacks Taiwan and decides that taking on the US is part of that effort, they'll wipe out Guam and everything there (along with the Japan carrier) which would be more than enough to push the US into war and one carrier more or less would be irrelevant as far as priming the war pump.

      As I said, the idea of using a carrier as 'war bait' is nonsense.

      Finally, the idea that a carrier is being maintained in Japan in order to push the American people into war presupposes that the US government WANTS to go to war with China and just needs a reason to galvanize the people. Do you really think Biden, who appears to have (or had) financial relationships with China is trying to drag us into a war with China? As his actions have demonstrated, war with China is the last thing Biden wants.

      Note: We're not going down the politics rabbit hole so don't bother.

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  18. One reason is far superior maintenance. Having been there, we used to stagger out of a US Shipyard overhaul, creep our way to Sasebo/Yokosuka, and get well in short order. The workforce is far superior, doesn't play stupid union games and takes pride in their work.

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    1. If true, that suggests that we should be rotating carriers in and out of there every six months to get their maintenance.

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    2. sad but when we see ships that are often on display, such as at Roda, I'd have to think that is very true. I used to think it was a flaw with some classes, like the Burke, since they often looked like crap after a deployment, or it was pure length, but very often our allies using Burke like classes have great looking ships. Case in point- look at Japan's Phantoms after being in service for 40 years and just retired (1-300 website on Youbtube). Those birds still look great. Alot of this has to be on us as a shipyard and depot for that.

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    3. We ought to be rotating ships (not just carriers) in there for maintenance regularly. Not sure why we don't.

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  19. What evidence do you have that the purpose of 7th Fleet (or, more specifically, the carrier based there) has, or ever had, the primary goal of deterring China, as you've described? That's news to me.

    I was stationed on a ship in Yokosuka in the early 1990s and worked in operations. I can tell you flat out that our primary concern with not China, but North Korea. War on the Korean peninsula, or North Korea doing anything belligerent, was considered the most likely event we'd need to prepare for.

    Deterring Chinese aggression or expansion was simply not among our goals. Watching China? Yes. Making sure they knew we cared about what happened in the S China Sea? Definitely. But the only shooting war in the region we thought we might actually get into would involve Korea.

    I don't think anyone thought we'd make out well against the Chinese if it came to conflict - and this was well before they were a "near-peer" competitor. Not that anyone thought much about it, because, again, stopping China from doing anything wasn't ever 7th Fleet goal. I don't think anyone in the Navy would tell you that a carrier in Japan is stopping China from invading Taiwan today, either. That isn't it's purpose, and near as I can tell, never was.

    Why keep the ships in Yokosuka then? First - it does give us some options if things get hot, with any country. Even if the group wouldn't survive, it could buy us time, force the belligerent to expend (perhaps limited) resources, etc.

    Separately and more importantly, these ships are stationed a lot closer to lots of places in the world. I did a short notice deployment to the Arabian Gulf with the Independence group - took half the time to get there compared to West Coast. It lets us get closer, faster to countries through SE Asia, the Indian Ocean, even places like the Sakhalins. That sort of proximity, and the ability to be in more places, faster, can and will likely continue to be useful.

    It's not all about China.

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    1. I made no suggestion that deterring China was the main purpose back in the '90s, however, it almost certainly is today. Aside from the general proof that the Navy believes - and has stated publicly many times - that deployments and forward presence has a deterrent effect, the Navy's actions over recent years are clearly focused on China. China is referred to as the 'pacing threat'. We've developed concepts of war specifically aimed at China such as the Air-Sea Battle. We initiated the Pacific Pivot. We've added assets to 7th Fleet. We've added assets to Guam. We're increasing Guam defenses. And so on. All aimed at deterring China. It would be illogical to believe that the carrier in Japan was not part of the Chinese deterrence effort despite every other asset in the Pacific being focused on that.

      I would also point out that a Japan-based carrier may have made some sense, as a matter of convenience, in earlier times when no enemy could reach the carrier in Yokosuka. Today, however, Yokosuka is within easy reach of Chinese missiles and the risk of losing the carrier outweighs any convenience of location.

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  20. The CVN at Yokosuka should be moved to a more survivable location like Sydney.

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