The US military is highly dependent on GPS positioning
signals. Weapons, vehicles, ships,
aircraft, and individual troops all depend on GPS to the point where most are
helpless without a GPS signal. Many
failures and accidents have been documented as being attributable to the loss
of GPS.
It has long been recognized that the loss of GPS can render
many weapons useless. One response by
the military has been to attempt to develop and deploy more resistant GPS
satellites and systems.
As with so many (all?) military systems today, software
development has proven to be a (the?) major stumbling block (ask the F-35
program how software development has gone!).
Regarding ground control station software development,
Concerns
Satellite Destruction - Twenty seven GPS M-code satellites is
not a lot and may represent a vulnerability to physical destruction given that China
has demonstrated an anti-satellite capability.
Spoofing – False signal injection is an insidious attack as
it may not even be recognized as such for extended periods since we’ve become
so accustomed to accepting GPS readings as gospel and have lost the ability or
desire to conduct alternate/manual location checks (does any sailor, today,
know how to use a sextant?).
Jamming – The GPS frequencies are not exactly secret. Jamming will likely be successful albeit localized
in effect.
Legacy/Inertia – Even if the ‘hardened’ GPS system works
perfectly (it won’t !), there remains an enormous inventory of legacy GPS
equipment in the military that are susceptible to the various forms of
disruption. It will take decades to
completely switch over to any new system and, of course, by then the ‘new’
system will have, in turn, been rendered obsolete.
Conclusion
While any effort to ‘harden’ our GPS system is worthwhile,
the fundamental problem is that the GPS system has too many nodes of attack and
relies on a signal. Any system that
relies on an external signal is highly vulnerable to disruption (hence, my
distrust of networks). As we develop
future weapons, systems, and equipment we need to make every effort to
eliminate the use of external signals.
In the case of GPS, this can be accomplished by returning to
local/manual methods of location determination (maps/compass, sextant, dead
reckoning, etc.), using alternate navigation methods such as inertial
navigation, and developing new methods that don’t require external signals
(quantum positioning, for example).
The US military has become addicted to GPS and must wean
itself off.
_______________________________
The Department of Defense (DOD) has worked for more than 2 decades to modernize GPS with a more jam-resistant, military-specific signal known as M-code. Space Force, part of the Department of the Air Force, is responsible for GPS modernization.[1]
M-code is a stronger, encrypted, military-specific GPS signal designed to meet military PNT [Positioning, Navigation, Timing] information needs. M-code will help military users overcome attempts to block the GPS signal, known as jamming, by using a more powerful signal with a broader radio frequency range. It will also protect against false GPS signals, known as spoofing, by encrypting the signal.[1]The military appears to have a requirement for 27 GPS satellites.
Space Force met its approved requirement for 24 M-code-capable satellites on orbit, but determined that it needs at least three more to meet certain user requirements for accuracy. Building and maintaining this larger constellation presents a challenge. GAO’s analysis indicates it is not likely that 27 satellites will be available on a consistent basis over the next decade. Unless the Air Force assesses its operational need for satellites to establish a firm requirement for a 27-satellite constellation, other DOD efforts could take priority, leaving the warfighter with GPS user equipment performing below the required capability levels.[1]
The first satellite able to transmit the M-code signal entered orbit in 2005 and 25 of the 31 satellites in the GPS constellation are M-code capable.[1]One of the [many] challenges is procuring and equipping the military with untold thousands of M-code capable receivers.
Eventually, the total number of GPS receivers purchased by the DOD could number up to 1 million.[1]One of the challenges with ‘hardening’ the GPS system is that it has multiple nodes/links that can be disrupted: ground control (cyber attacks), software (cyber attacks), satellites (disruption/destruction), ground receivers (cyber attack, spoofing, jamming, physical destruction), and the signal itself (jamming, spoofing). Each node is vulnerable to disruption by a variety of means.
The contractor, Raytheon, faced unanticipated challenges during the software qualification testing of OCX [ed. operational control system] in 2022. … Raytheon discovered more deficiencies than anticipated during subsequent software qualification testing. These deficiencies included errors uploading navigation data to satellites in a simulated environment. The ability to upload this data is an essential function of the ground control system. As of September 2022, approximately 50 percent of software passed testing, lower than the program’s goal of 80 percent.[1]
China is progressing with the development of missiles and electronic weapons that could target satellites in low and high orbits, the Pentagon says in a new report released Sept. 1 [ed. 2020].
China already has operational ground-based missiles that can hit satellites in low-Earth orbit and “probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” says the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities.[2]Cyber Attacks – China (and other actors) are demonstrating an ability to penetrate military networks on a near daily basis. There is no reason to believe that when war comes, cyber attacks won’t continue and, likely, increase in frequency and intensity. Presumably, China has identified vulnerabilities in our networks and software that it is keeping ‘in reserve’ for wartime use.
https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/
"Eventually, the total number of GPS receivers purchased by the DOD could number up to 1 million."
ReplyDeleteAm I the only one who thought, that's a very juicy contract if you get it?
Remember reading a comment by an Air Force Colonel that the new gen GPS sats will have approx 8 times stronger signal, but to stop jamming they would need signal nearer 8,000 times more powerful which is not going to happen as sat solar arrays unable to generate that amount of power.
ReplyDeleteUsually during the annual Air Force Red Flag two week exercise they jam all GPS signals as did the Army at their Project Convergence 2021.
What has surprised me is the reported the lack of jamming of GPS in Ukraine, presuming the Russians relying on GPS (pic surfaced of a GPS attached to a Russian aircraft cockpit) as much as the Ukrainians.
Various options to GPS being researched including the quantum compass, how feasible unknown and expect many years away.
Jamming has the same physics where the area impacted is small unless you have a massive jammer. And a massive jammer makes an easy target.
DeleteThen the latest receivers can discern direction and filter out bad signals which further limits the jamming radius.
Finally, most of our weapons have inertial navigation paired with GPS. So if GPS gets jammed for the last few seconds of flight they will still hit within a few meters.
Jamming is more a nuisance compared to some of the other risks.
As CNO says all systems can be hacked, and repurposed.
DeleteSo Galileo , Beidou and Glonass are our backup sat nav systems. If you have a Garmin watch it probably uses all the above systems to increase accuracy.
I agree the legacy GPS system carries unacceptable risk. Luckily there are many solutions.
ReplyDeleteOne option is to use other satellites that already exist. SpaceX's Starlink constellation can be used for navigation with a few tweaks. Starlink satellites (3000+ in number) make up over half the satellites in orbit only a few short years after the first launch. SpaceX has a railroad to orbit in Falcon 9, with launches averaging roughly every three days so far this year. Starlink also uses phased array antennas making it much less susceptible to jamming and spoofing. They also have laser links between the satellites limiting reliance on ground stations. SpaceX has a defense product is Starshield that uses the Starlink bus, so you could put GPS transmitters on those and launch hundreds per month at a fraction of the cost of a traditional GPS satellite. Space technology is changing at an extremely rapid pace, led by US companies.
https://www.pcmag.com/news/researchers-find-way-to-use-starlink-signals-as-alternative-to-gps
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/satellites-spacex-problem-space-pollution
I also agree we need methods outside of satellites. Terrain mapping and celestial navigation using the infrared spectrum paired with inertial navigation are the obvious solutions. Terrain mapping on missiles has been available since the 1980s, it only gets cheaper with time. Platforms like B-2 have celestial navigation. Both of these systems are vulnerable to cloud cover but provide good alternative options.
https://www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2018-12/laine.pdf
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a36078957/celestial-navigation/
Most probably already realize this but I'll point out that we often only care about relative position. We're spoiled from GPS so we will often use absolute locations for targeting even if we only care about relative because its available. That obviously requires much higher accuracy than general navigation where 100 or even 1000 meters of error might be acceptable. Radar, laser range finders, etc. can excel at relative position when targeting. This works especially well for artillery.
DeleteTom Clancy interviews a young HR McMaster about fighting in Desert Storm in the book "Armored Cav." They had just gotten the GPS units as they deployed, so their training was completely based on traditional navigation techniques. He talks about how depressing it was having to go back to those methods when there was no satellite coverage and how much harder it was to organize their units. We should be willing to spend tons of money on passive systems that act like a GPS receiver even if they don't use satellites.
DeleteIn Desert Storm, Marine LAV units were able to navigate the desert with nothing more than map, compass, and timer, much to the disbelief of the Iraqis.
DeleteNo doubt you can do it and we should never end the tradition of new 2nd LTs getting their platoon lost in training. The point McMaster made in the book was that it was much easier for the units on the hook to keep their spacing and prevent the scout elements from getting too far ahead of the main body. Error compounds over time and distance and the hook units had a lot further to go than the Marines. If we can spend $1000-$10,000 per unit for a tool that images the sky or the surroundings to get a non-GPS fix then its probably worth it as a way to increase combat effectiveness without relying on satellites. INS keeps getting better which makes those methods more effective.
Deletehttps://sobchak.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/ds.png
" it was much easier"
DeleteWhat we cannot lose sight of is that we failed to properly utilize GPS. It should have been a SUPPLEMENT to traditional methods but, instead, we became dependent on it and LOST our ability to function without it. GPS became our ONLY method of localization. We were literally lost without it.
At one point, most of our weapons were rendered useless due to GPS vulnerability. Now, belatedly, we're attempting to harden GPS and provide our weapons with alternate navigation methods. That's good but should never have been necessary.
Agreed.
DeleteThere is also a lot of work under way to add more traditional inertial nav systems that are accurate eenough to sub in for GPS.
ReplyDeleteNote that it's actually much worse than we realize. Our entire commercial economy, including merchant shipping and commercial aviation but not only those, is heavily dependent on GPS. And they don't even have m-code. Without those, we can't fight for more than a short time.
ReplyDeleteThis is another of those areas, like mine warfare, NGFS, and ASW, that has pretty much been totally ignored by the USN. The solution is twofold, as stated by ComNavOps--harden GPS and provide and train on alternate navigation methods. I think step one might be to stipulate that for all naval exercises for the next year, GPS is not available except to observers for grading purposes. That would at least start the navy toward figuring how to cope. But as Bob Nagele notes, our commercial sector is so heavily dependent on GPS that hardening becomes a critical imperative, and the sooner the better.
ReplyDeleteI had just gotten off active duty and was sitting in my favorite bar in Houston nursing a cold beer, when the proprietor came over and said there's somebody here you should meet. The guy asked me if I could do celestial and I said yes I could. He had a sailboat that was in the annual Galveston to Vera Cruz race, and he had a full crew for the race but he needed a navigator for the trip back. He said it was pretty simple, you basically relied on Loran, which was good in the area, but he wanted somebody who knew celestial as a backup in case Loran went down. So I got a pretty good trip to Vera Cruz, partied for a few days, shot a few sun lines on the way back home, and made a few bucks to boot. I'm not sure today's sailors could answer that call.
"The US military has become addicted to GPS and must wean itself off."
ReplyDeleteThis is already known and the change, at least in the Army, is already under way. Current paradigm is "GPS+", that is "GPS plus something else"... inertia, celestial, another GNSS, Iridium, etc., because of the issues brought up.
The real issue is that the US Military got addicted to precision, and the relatively smaller stocks needed compared to "dumb" munitions.
China has similar problem as US can also attack their Beidou System.
ReplyDeleteQuite right. We generally examine our own vulnerabilities on this blog while too often forgetting that our enemies have the same vulnerabilities.
DeleteIt seems the Navy is acquiring new INS fort it's ships https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/06/northrop-grumman-to-produce-new-ins-for-u-s-navy/
ReplyDeleteNew sextants wouldn't hurt, either!
DeleteYou can get a sextant emulator app on the Iphone.
DeleteGreat for fog.
{humor}
Speaking of sextants- on our trips across the Pacific, we Rd’s and QM’s always looked foreword to the day our captain would call the junior officers to the bridge for the find our position contest. Sextants and math only. Usually, at least one officer would get us in the right part of the ocean and the best results usually came from a ROTC grad.
ReplyDelete