Someone's Been Reading The Blog

Apparently, someone in the Navy has been reading this blog.  ComNavOps has long pointed out and lamented the fact that the Navy has become a largely defensive force, existing only to protect itself.  Now, the Navy has finally come to that same realization.

“We’ve spent a lot of time over the past years playing defense,” Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall, director of surface warfare, said at the West 2019 conference here. “Waiting for them to come to you, waiting for the missile to come, for the airplane to come. The best defense is a good offense, and the idea that we will go after the threat — at range — is something that we have to be able to do.”

Welcome to the blog, Adm. Boxall.  Of course, you could and should have had this epiphany long ago – all you had to do was be a regular reader of this blog (see, "Offensive Aegis").  Still, better late than never.

The Navy may have also latched onto one of our pet concepts and that is heavy weight torpedoes on surface ships (see, "Surface Ship Torpedoes").  It’s unclear from the statement below whether Adm. Davidson is referencing surface ship torpedo armament or just subs.  Either way, torpedo development is a very worthwhile effort.

Indo-Pacific Command chief Adm. Phillip Davidson …  added that he is most interested in innovations in heavy-weight torpedo technology which can “provide force-multiplying effects that currently do not exist, including long-range in-port or at-sea attack and shallow water covert mine laying.”

We’ve also harped on the need for more frequent, extensive, and realistic training (see, "Train To Fail") and the Navy may be starting to come around.

The Navy has already instituted new training methods for its submarine commanders to ensure they’re more combat ready, and “we have shifted underway periods to be high-end combat operations. Instead of doing a lot of peacetime, shallow water [maneuvers] and ISR stuff, it’s all about combat.”

Unfortunately, the submarine commanders don’t actually know anything about combat because they’re the ones that have spent their careers “doing a lot of peacetime” stuff because the Navy forgot its reason for being.  Still, it’s a step in the right direction.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “No More ‘Playing Defense’ For US Navy; Offensive Weapons Are The Play”, Paul McLeary, 14-Feb-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/no-more-playing-defense-for-us-navy-offensive-weapons-are-the-play/

Top Gun For Basic Shiphandling

The Navy has loudly and proudly announced the formation of a Top Gun of sorts for surface warfare operations and tactics.  That’s great but it’s like teaching calculus to a student who doesn’t know their multiplication tables.  It’s jumping the gun.

Where’s the sense in teaching an officer about tactics when he can’t navigate from point A to point B without colliding or running aground?

There are some serious deficiencies in the way the Navy is operating that are contributing to the incompetent shiphandling by its officers.

Time At Sea – As a budget saving measure, ships are being kept docked for excessive periods.  The USS Guardian, as we saw in the recent post, had only been to sea 59 days the entire previous year.  You can’t gain much experience that way.  The Navy’s incompetent handling of maintenance has also resulted in ships being sidelined for extended periods waiting for maintenance.  We have submarines that have been idled for months or years.  Sailors need to sail.

Zero Defects – We can’t learn if our officers are so scared of making a mistake that they won’t explore the envelope of the ship’s performance.  We have to change the culture to allow shiphandling mistakes.  We also need to provide a training environment where mistakes not only can happen but are encouraged.  More on this below.

Time In Position – The Navy rotates officers far too fast.  They’re unable to master their position before they’re moved to the next one.  There are Captains that take command and leave without ever putting to sea!

How can we correct this situation?  How about we form a Top Gun school for basic shiphandling?  Let’s cycle officers through a school that has several vessels of different sizes that the students can actually learn hands on.  Let’s teach them how to navigate, maneuver, anchor, dock, etc. and not just to a barely acceptable standard – let’s make it a master course with each student receiving many hours of actual experience.  Yes, there will be lots of dents in the hulls and we should encourage that!  Let’s make it an intensive academic course, as well, so that the students thoroughly learn the rules of the road at sea and all the other bits of knowledge that a master mariner would have to know.  In fact, let’s culminate the course with the equivalent – if not the actual – licensing exam for the Coast Guard’s Master Mariner license.  And – and this is key – let’s set a very high standard and hold it.  Let’s weed out the unfit.  Not everyone is capable of being a Master Mariner.

I feel the need, the need for basic navigation!

Since a student can’t sail a ship by himself, this would also be a great opportunity to cycle sailors through the various crew positions for intensive training.  We could produce accomplished shiphandlers and well trained crews.

Our current hodge-podge of training methods with its reliance on computer based learning and learning aboard ship, on the job, is clearly not working.  It’s past time to try something else.

You WILL Comply

Navy aircraft readiness has been abysmal for some time now.  Here’s some data as presented in a USNI News article. (1)

Mission Capable Rate
	EA-18G	F-18E	F-18F
2012	64%	56%	55%
2013	59%	53%	48%
2014	54%	53%	43%
2015	55%	54%	46%
2016	58%	53%	45%
2017	54%	51%	47%
2018	51%	49%	46%

What we see is a slow, steady drop in readiness rates for the Growler and single seat Hornet and a steady rate for two seat Hornet.  In all cases, the readiness rates are very low. 

Well, not to worry.  In September of last year, just under 6 months ago, then Secretary of Defense Mattis issued a memo instructing the Navy to achieve an 80% readiness rate by the end of 2019. (2) 

Now, less than 6 months later, Rear Adm. Scott Conn, the Navy’s director of air warfare, just informed the House Armed Services tactical air and land forces subcommittee that Super Hornet readiness is 63%-76%. (1)  

Wow!!!!!!!!!!!  That’s stunning.

The Navy struggled with readiness for the last several years and was unable to effect any improvement (in fact, readiness was trending down, if anything) but a single memo from SecDef Mattis caused readiness to jump from less than 50% to as high as 76% in less than 6 months when several years of effort were unable to move the needle.  Wow, again!!!! 

If all it took was a memo, why didn’t anyone think to write one several years ago?  That is one powerful, near magical memo, isn’t it?

Years of maintenance manpower shortages, higher than expected corrosion and problems, chronic spare parts shortages, depot backlogs, funding shortages, etc., all cured in less than 6 months by a single memo.  In fact, allowing some time for the memo to be disseminated, digested, understood, and responses formulated, the actual improvement time was more like 5 months or less.  All of those problems solved in 5 months!

Before you all order your celebratory cake, let me pose one question:  do you think there’s even the slightest chance that nothing has changed except how readiness is reported?  Do you think readiness is unchanged and we’re just pencil-whipping and gun-decking the readiness reports?  Before you answer, consider all the Navy fraudulent statements and practices (lapsed certifications, acceptance trial waivers, fraudulent shock trial success claims, and hundreds of other examples) that we’ve exposed on this blog alone.  Now, let me repeat the question … Do you really think readiness surged that much in 5 months or less or is it unchanged and the Navy is just pencil-whipping the readiness reports?

Still unsure?  Well, consider who the Navy turned to for help:  the commercial airlines.

The Navy received help from logistics specialists from airlines, including Southwest, Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer said at an event last year. (1)

The airlines.  The people who, in order to claim on-time departures, routinely disengage a loaded plane from the boarding ramp and then let it sit for extended periods until it can actually take off.  It’s a fraudulent, disingenuous practice that covers up routine failure. (3)

The airlines.  The people who chronically falsify maintenance reports. (4)

What do you think these airline consultants taught the Navy?  Do you think it’s more likely that they taught the Navy how to improve maintenance or how to improve reporting practices?

I guess when the Secretary of Defense orders you to achieve miraculous improvements in readiness rates in very little time, you’re probably going to start bending and twisting the reporting in order to comply and save your job.

Well done, Navy.

Now, how many of those supposedly ready aircraft are actually ready?  I’m guessing it’s the same 50% or less that it was just 5 short months ago.

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Fighter Readiness Nearing 80 Percent Mission Capable Target”, Ben Werner, 5-Apr-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/04/05/42436

(2)USNI News website, “SECDEF Mattis Wants 80 Percent of Super Hornets Mission Capable by Next Year”, Sam LaGrone, 9-Oct-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/10/09/secdef-mattis-wants-80-percent-super-hornet-mission-capable-next-year

(3)Smarter Travel website, “The Truth About Deceptive Airline Practices”, Tim Winship, 26-Jun-2008,

https://www.smartertravel.com/the-truth-about-deceptive-airline-practices/

(4)Orlando Sentinel website, “FAA INSPECTOR: WORKERS SAID FALSIFYING RECORDS IS COMMON”, Roger Roy, 10-Jun-1997,

https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1997-06-10-9706090542-story.html

Neosho Lessons

ComNavOps is ever the student of history.  The lessons history offers us are of immeasurable value and free for the learning, if only we’ll listen.  One such lesson comes to us from the example of the sinking of the USS Neosho (AO-23), a Cimarron class fleet oiler during WWII.

From Pearl Harbor until her sinking in May 1942, Neosho operated directly with the US carriers as they fought to stem the Japanese advances at the start of WWII.  On 6-May-1942, at the beginning of the Battle of The Coral Sea, Neosho refueled the carrier Yorktown and the heavy cruiser Astoria before leaving the carriers with a single escort, the destroyer Sims (DD-409), to proceed to the next refueling location.  On 7-May, a Japanese search plane found the Neosho and Sims and mistakenly reported them as a carrier and a cruiser.  The Japanese quickly launched three attacks involving a total of 61 aircraft.  Sims was hit by three 500 lb bombs and quickly sank.  Neosho was hit by seven bombs and a kamikaze crash and left a blazing wreck.

Neosho Refueling Yorktown

Neosho remained afloat until 11-May when the USS Henley (DD-391) arrived, took off survivors, and sank the Neosho with gunfire.

From Wiki,

One of her crewmen, Oscar V. Peterson, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his efforts to save the ship in spite of his severe injuries suffered in the attack.

So, what lessons can we learn from this episode?

Forward Operations – There is immense risk in having valuable auxiliaries operate too far forward.  Neosho was retiring from the immediate battle and yet was still found and destroyed.  We need to carefully balance the benefits of forward auxiliary support versus the risk of loss of a vital ship.  The risk and the impact of loss is exacerbated by the limited numbers we have of the valuable support vessels.  This illustrates the kind of operational and doctrinal exploration and evaluation that the Navy should be engaging in on a daily basis.  How do we intend to support our fleets in combat?  Do we have enough auxiliary ships to support our fleets?  How many can we risk in exposed, forward areas?  Can we absorb the inevitable attrition from forward operating auxiliaries?

Escorts – The Neosho, an immensely valuable support ship was given only a single escort in a forward combat zone.  To be fair, the US Navy lacked sufficient numbers of escorts at that time and a single escort was all that could be spared.  We need to determine the number and type of escorts we need to support not only our combat fleets but our auxiliary fleet.

Distributed Lethality – The Neosho incident is an object lesson in the dangers of distributed lethality.  Placing irreplaceable support and amphibious ships in forward combat zones just to be able to launch a few anti-ship missiles is an unwise risk.  These types of ships have very little defensive capabilities and, like Neosho, if found will certainly be sunk.

Air Power – Neosho was operating under a no-man’s sky.  In fact, at the time of the attack, the Japanese controlled the sky at that location.  We’ve talked about the transient nature of air control when fighting a peer.  Neosho and Sims were caught in a moment when the Japanese controlled the air and Neosho and Sims paid the price for operating without air support.  We need to recognize the transient nature of air control against a peer and what the implications of that are for escort numbers, distributed lethality, and forward operations.

Nuclear Versus Conventional Power – This incident illustrates one of the operational advantages of nuclear power for carriers.  Nuclear power reduces the need for conventional oilers and refueling though it does not eliminate it since the escorts are all conventionally fueled.  As opposed to cost arguments, this is an operational factor and should, therefore, carry more weight.  We need to carefully weigh the impact of fueling requirements as we – for the thousandth time! – debate whether nuclear power or conventional power is preferred.

Attrition – Neosho’s loss illustrates that war is all about attrition and, despite our best efforts, losses will occur.  We need to factor that reality into our fleet size goals and, more importantly, into our ship designs.  It’s one thing to lose a basic, cheap ship that can be relatively quickly replaced but it’s another to lose a ship that is so complex and expensive that replacement is not possible in any useful time frame.  Currently, our ships are far too complex to allow for timely attrition replacement.  Thus, we’ve artificially limited ourselves to the ships we’ll have on hand at the outbreak of a war because there will be very few replacements available in any useful time frame.  This also calls into question our decision to forego maintenance of a reserve fleet.  The navy that does not plan for attrition is a navy destined for defeat.

History is, almost literally, screaming lessons at us but our naval leadership refuses to listen.  When you run the Navy’s decisions of the last few decades through the filter of WWII’s lessons, you find very few of the decisions are combat wise.  The Navy needs to institutionally study its history and learn the lessons offered so as to better prepare for the next war.  That doesn’t mean preparing to refight the last war but the refusal to learn lessons and apply them to the next war is the basis for defeat.

F-35 vs. F-18 Stealth Comparison

Proponents and critics of the F-35 and F-18 bandy stealth claims back and forth despite the fact that there is almost no actual data on the subject.  Well, ComNavOps has no data to offer.  What, you thought I’d have some official, classified data to share?  What I do have is an interesting observation about the front aspect stealth of the two aircraft.  Examine the drawing below of the side-by-side, split frontal view of the F-18 and F-35.

Drawing credit listed below (1)

What jumps out?  It’s that the two are virtually identical !  Be honest now … without labels, how many of you can tell the two apart?

What does this tell us about their relative stealth?  Well, it suggests that the frontal stealth of the two airframes may not be all that much different.  Of course, there is more to stealth than just the shape although the F-35 claims to not use much in the way of exotic coatings to enhance stealth which suggests that shape is the F-35’s main source of stealth.  There may be materials of construction or internal shaping that also contributes to stealth but, if so, I’ve never seen a detailed listing or description of what degree of stealth they contribute.  No one who knows what the differences are is talking but this suggests they are far less than F-35 proponents claim, at least from the front which is the most important aspect since it’s the head-on, approaching profile that enemy radars will be seeing most of the time.

The biggest frontal aspect difference between the two aircraft is the external, pylon-hung weapons and fuel tanks on the Hornet.  Again, no one knows impact those have on the overall stealth.  Do they increase the Hornet’s radar cross section by 10%?  50%?  700%?  Again, anyone who knows, isn’t saying.

My takeaway from this visual comparison is that the two airframes are likely pretty close in frontal aspect stealth with the Hornet losing stealth as pylons/weapons are added.

Don’t get too wound up about this.  It’s not meant to be much more than an interesting observation.

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(1)Drawing prepared and presented by username=payload, 02 Aug 2015, 21:53,

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=15013&start=240

You're Fired !

As you know, the USS Ford has had numerous problems with EMALS, the Advanced Arresting Gear, and, perhaps worst of all, the Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE).  We documented this in a post (see, “USS Ford – Ups and Downs”).

The Ford was delivered and commissioned without functioning weapon elevators.  How do you accept delivery and commission a carrier that can’t move weapons from its magazines to the flight deck?  But, I digress …

Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer took responsibility for getting the elevators working, telling President Trump he could fire him if they weren’t ready by the end of summer when Ford is scheduled to complete its post-shakedown availability (PSA).

Spencer said this morning at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security that he spoke to Trump at length last month at the Army-Navy football game in Philadelphia.

“I asked him to stick his hand out; he stuck his hand out. I said, let’s do this like corporate America. I shook his hand and said, the elevators will be ready to go when she pulls out or you can fire me,” Spencer said, adding that someone had to take accountability over the ongoing elevator challenges.  “We’re going to get it done. I know I’m going to get it done. I haven’t been fired yet by anyone; being fired by the president really isn’t on the top of my list.” (1)

Well, it now appears that SecNav Spencer is in line to be fired.  The Navy has announced that Ford’s PSA completion date will be delayed an additional three months, pushing it into October.  That’s beyond the original summer PSA deadline.  Time to send your resume out, Mr. Spencer.  You failed.  You’re fired.  If you have any integrity, you’ll submit your resignation and save the President the trouble of firing you.

SecNav Spencer

As of this writing, only two of the ship’s 11 elevators have been delivered.  Ford commissioned in July 2017 and now, 20 months later, the ship has only two functional elevators.  Wow!  Still, I remain confident that most of the elevators will be working by the time Ford retires in 2067.

It’s also interesting to note that the Ford’s PSA has been delayed more than once.

In July 2018, when Ford entered PSA, the Navy said the maintenance availability had been extended from a planned eight months to a full year, to accommodate both the typical work that arises in PSA but also deferred work such as the construction and installation of weapons elevators and an upgrade to the AAG, whose technical challenges greatly contributed to the delayed delivery and commissioning of the ship. (1)

So, the original 8 month PSA was extended to 12 months and now is being extended to 15 months.

Ford - Delayed Again

Elevators are not the only problem the Ford is experiencing.  In addition to the well known EMALS and AAG issues, Ford has severe problems with the propulsion system.

Problems with the propulsion system are less understood publicly. The problem isn’t resident in the two nuclear reactors aboard but rather the ship’s main turbines generators that are driven by the steam the reactors produce.

Sources familiar with the extent of the repairs have told USNI News two of the main turbine generators needed unanticipated and extensive overhauls. As Geurts told Congress, the ship’s company discovered the problem during sea trials. (2)

So, brand new turbine generators need ‘extensive overhauls’?  What kind of quality control is the Navy practicing?  None, apparently?  Nice job, inspecting and accepting the Ford, NAVSEA.  NAVSEA is a joke.  They’re absolutely worthless and need to be abolished. 

SecNav Spencer, I know you didn’t design the flawed elevators and you aren’t, personally, attempting the repairs but you accepted responsibility and you freely offered your conditional resignation last fall.  Well, you failed to deliver.  Accountability is what’s been missing from the Navy for quite some time.  Show us you have a sense of integrity.  Show the Navy you have a sense of accountability.  Set an example for the Navy.  Resign and take CNO Richardson with you.  

Failing that, you’re fired.

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(1)USNI News website, “SECNAV to Trump: Ford Carrier Weapons Elevators Will be Fixed by Summer, or ‘Fire Me’”, Megan Eckstein, 8-Jan-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/01/08/secnav-to-trump-aircraft-carrier-weapons-elevators-to-be-fixed-by-summer-or-fire-me

(2)USNI News website, “USS Gerald Ford Delivery Delayed Due to Extensive Nuclear Propulsion, Weapons Elevator Repairs; Carrier Won’t be Ready Until October”, Sam LaGrone, 26-Mar-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/03/26/uss-gerald-ford-delivery-delayed-due-extensive-nuclear-propulsion-weapons-elevator-repairs-carrier-wont-ready-October

Crewman Catapulted Overboard From Ford

As if the USS Ford needs any more problems … 

In an accident described by Navy officials as “a freak combination of factors”, a Navy deck crewman was inadvertently catapulted off the bow of the USS Ford during pierside maintenance activities. 

The ship’s problematic weapon elevators were being tested for the first time after having all been installed but not yet certified.  Unexpectedly, the operation of a single elevator triggered the operation of every elevator.  According to Navy spokesman, Lt. Jack Wang,

Obviously, we did not anticipate this but when the number 4 weapon elevator was triggered with all the other elevators electrically on line, all the elevators simultaneously activated in the same direction.  Just like the EMALS catapults have been found to have to be all up or all down, as a group, the elevators, which use the exact same sequential electric motor concept as EMALS, apparently are linked the same way, through a common weapons elevator capacitor.  If one moves, they all move.  This appears to be a common design flaw with both EMALS and the elevators.  We’re still investigating but it’s clear what happened. (1)

While this elevator flaw was bad enough, the unanticipated massive electromagnetic surge of all 11 elevators activating simultaneously caused an inductive relay activation of the firing circuits of the four EMALS catapults to engage and fired the cats.  Three of the four cats harmlessly fired but on one of the bow cats a deck crewman was sitting on the launch bar attachment trolley and when the cat fired the crewman was carried along and flung off the bow.

We were fortunate that the EMALS capacitor was at a low energy state and the cat shot was not a full speed launch.  It was just fast enough that the crewman couldn’t react in time to roll off but not fast enough to harm him. (1)

The crewman landed in the water about 50 ft in front of the carrier.  He was uninjured and able to swim to the stern where an arresting gear cable that was waiting to be installed was used to pull him back up to the flight deck.

When asked what it felt like to be catapulted, the crewman observed,

There was a surprising amount of vertical oscillation during the launch.  I had seen that on F-35 launches but they told us that problem was fixed.  I’m lucky I didn’t have one of those heavy helmets on that the pilots wear. (1)

Always looking to put a positive spin on things, the Navy spokesman noted,

While the incident was unfortunate, it did demonstrate that Ford’s elevators are all now working. (1)

The spokesman went on to address the aftermath of the incident,

CNO Richardson has already formed a committee, chaired by Admiral Merrill Stubing, to investigate, report, and make recommendations to prevent this from happening again. (1)

Off the record, the spokesman wryly noted,

Unofficially, the crewman is now the only person in the Navy who is credited with a cat and trap without an aircraft. (1)

The incident will have no impact on the Ford’s maintenance availability which is scheduled to be completed in early 2029.

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(1)Broken Defense website, “Ford Catapults Crewman”, Brandi Forall, 1-Apr-2019