From Pearl Harbor until her sinking in May 1942, Neosho
operated directly with the US carriers as they fought to stem the Japanese
advances at the start of WWII. On 6-May-1942,
at the beginning of the Battle of The Coral Sea, Neosho refueled the carrier Yorktown and the heavy cruiser
Astoria before leaving the carriers with a
single escort, the destroyer Sims (DD-409), to proceed to the next refueling
location. On 7-May, a Japanese search
plane found the Neosho and Sims and mistakenly reported them as a carrier and a
cruiser. The Japanese quickly launched
three attacks involving a total of 61 aircraft.
Sims was hit by three 500 lb bombs and quickly sank. Neosho was hit by seven bombs and a kamikaze
crash and left a blazing wreck.
 |
| Neosho Refueling Yorktown |
Neosho remained afloat until 11-May when the USS Henley
(DD-391) arrived, took off survivors, and sank the Neosho with gunfire.
From Wiki,
One
of her crewmen, Oscar V.
Peterson, was posthumously
awarded the Medal of
Honor for his efforts to
save the ship in spite of his severe injuries suffered in the attack.
So, what lessons can we learn from this episode?
Forward Operations
– There is immense risk in having valuable auxiliaries operate too far forward. Neosho was retiring from the immediate battle
and yet was still found and destroyed.
We need to carefully balance the benefits of forward auxiliary support
versus the risk of loss of a vital ship.
The risk and the impact of loss is exacerbated by the limited numbers we
have of the valuable support vessels. This
illustrates the kind of operational and doctrinal exploration and evaluation
that the Navy should be engaging in on a daily basis. How do we intend to support our fleets in
combat? Do we have enough auxiliary
ships to support our fleets? How many
can we risk in exposed, forward areas?
Can we absorb the inevitable attrition from forward operating
auxiliaries?
Escorts – The
Neosho, an immensely valuable support ship was given only a single escort in a
forward combat zone. To be fair, the US
Navy lacked sufficient numbers of escorts at that time and a single escort was
all that could be spared. We need to
determine the number and type of escorts we need to support not only our combat
fleets but our auxiliary fleet.
Distributed Lethality
– The Neosho incident is an object lesson in the dangers of distributed
lethality. Placing irreplaceable support
and amphibious ships in forward combat zones just to be able to launch a few
anti-ship missiles is an unwise risk.
These types of ships have very little defensive capabilities and, like
Neosho, if found will certainly be sunk.
Air Power –
Neosho was operating under a no-man’s sky.
In fact, at the time of the attack, the Japanese controlled the sky at
that location. We’ve talked about the
transient nature of air control when fighting a peer. Neosho and Sims were caught in a moment when
the Japanese controlled the air and Neosho and Sims paid the price for
operating without air support. We need
to recognize the transient nature of air control against a peer and what the
implications of that are for escort numbers, distributed lethality, and forward
operations.
Nuclear Versus Conventional
Power – This incident illustrates one of the operational advantages of
nuclear power for carriers. Nuclear
power reduces the need for conventional oilers and refueling though it does not
eliminate it since the escorts are all conventionally fueled. As opposed to cost arguments, this is an
operational factor and should, therefore, carry more weight. We need to carefully weigh the impact of
fueling requirements as we – for the thousandth time! – debate whether nuclear
power or conventional power is preferred.
Attrition –
Neosho’s loss illustrates that war is all about attrition and, despite our best
efforts, losses will occur. We need to
factor that reality into our fleet size goals and, more importantly, into our
ship designs. It’s one thing to lose a
basic, cheap ship that can be relatively quickly replaced but it’s another to
lose a ship that is so complex and expensive that replacement is not possible
in any useful time frame. Currently, our
ships are far too complex to allow for timely attrition replacement. Thus, we’ve artificially limited ourselves to
the ships we’ll have on hand at the outbreak of a war because there will be
very few replacements available in any useful time frame. This also calls into question our decision to
forego maintenance of a reserve fleet.
The navy that does not plan for attrition is a navy destined for defeat.
History is, almost literally, screaming lessons at us but
our naval leadership refuses to listen.
When you run the Navy’s decisions of the last few decades through the
filter of WWII’s lessons, you find very few of the decisions are combat wise. The Navy needs to institutionally study its
history and learn the lessons offered so as to better prepare for the next
war. That doesn’t mean preparing to
refight the last war but the refusal to learn lessons and apply them to the
next war is the basis for defeat.
Auxiliary ships like a oiler should be very cheap. Expendable in a way. It is not top of the line tech in order to resupply with fuel another ship.
ReplyDeleteSo in a way a incident like one involving Neosho today could be seen a little victory.
A vast portion of the enemy airforce would be fixated on a unimportant ship. And every missile alocated by the enemy for that mission will be one missile less alocated for our ships that are important.
"So in a way a incident like one involving Neosho today could be seen a little victory.
Delete... every missile alocated by the enemy for that mission will be one missile less alocated for our ships that are important."
This isn't even the tiniest bit true. Given how few logistics, support, and replenishment ships we have, every one lost is a major hit on our ability to operate and sustain forward fleets. A major loss.
The half dozen or so missiles that might be expended today on such a ship would have no meaningful impact on an enemy's total missile inventory. No other ship will be spared because the enemy came up half a dozen missiles short or wiping us out.
“Auxiliary ships like a oiler should be very cheap. Expendable in a way…”
DeleteCheap yes, expendable no – trading relatively expensive, slow to build ships for relatively cheap missiles, bombs, and torpedoes is a gift to the enemy.
“Logistics” is vital, and sadly ignored by the Navy. Nothing like running out of fuel, ammunition, and replacement parts in combat.
Commercial oil and product tankers are universally slow (< 18 knots) ships that are completely vulnerable to submarine attack. Worse, they slow the task forces they refuel making them vulnerable to attack.
Designing a large oil tanker with fine hull lines for high sustained speed and endurance is not rocket science, and due to the unique, uneconomic characteristics of such a ship, the USN is responsible and should have developed a stable hull design dating from the 1960s. The reality that the USN largely relied upon WW2 oilers and improvised designs is telling.
GAB
I know that the nuclear dismantlement costs put out there are insanely high, and admittedly i dont understand why they are that high. To me, once the reactors and all radioactive/classified material is removed, its just another hull to scrap... So why the Navy cant auction it off for scrap, or pay $.01 for someone to take it like they did with previous carriers...i dont know... Id sure like to!!!
DeleteRather think the nuclear v conventional powered carriers argument is rather more nuanced, think you mentioned previously that carrier task forces carried out mission and returned to port, did not spend months at sea?, if not why not add say 5-10,000 t displacement to carrier for additional tankage at minimal cost.
ReplyDeleteA minimal amount of the $Bs saved by the conventional propulsion carriers compared to nuclear to be used to upgrade the GT gas guzzling Burkes to Hybrid Electrical Drive, Navy cancelled program March 2018. An 'unnamed' Navy source stated the intense electrical load that running the drive system on the ship’s two running generators (of three) was putting on the ship at risk “At that point you are a light switch flipping on away from winking out the whole ship” . Conveniently forgetting to mention that Navy had funded a UPS for the Burke from DRS to obviate that very problem.
Would suggest that the above option of conventional carrier and upgraded Burkes would require fewer oilers.
So you're proposing INCREASING the size (displacement) of the 100,000t, $15B Ford by 5%-10%??!!! The Ford is already unaffordable and far too costly to risk in combat and you want to make it even more expensive and less likely to be used in combat?
Delete"nuclear v conventional powered carriers argument is rather more nuanced"
Of course it is. The conclusion one reaches is a function of the factors one includes in the consideration and the weight given to each factor. For example, nuclear carriers mean fewer oilers are needed (saving money), fewer oiler crews are needed (saving money), less oil is used (saving money), fewer escorts are needed to guard the oilers (freeing up escorts or requiring fewer escorts to be built - saving construction, operating, and manning costs), less command, control, and logistics required to direct and operate the oilers (saving money), fewer shipyard spaces required (good for production, potentially bad for industrial capacity maintenance), and so on - and that's just one aspect of the overall discussion. Of course it's nuanced!
Unfortunately, almost everyone comes into the discussion with a preconceived notion and then just cherry picks the facts that support their conclusion. What should happen is that we look at all the facts and follow them to whatever conclusion they lead to - but no one does.
Personally, I've looked at the arguments and I'm ambivalent. None of the data and factors lead me to any solid conclusion. Both sides of the issue are pretty equally weighted. I keep looking for that one factor that will tip the scales one way or the other and I don't see it.
Not saying carrier should be 100,000+t, but the larger trans-pacific commercial container ships run to 150,000 to 200,000t capable of 20-23 knots, so doable, could be an argument that carrier of that size nearly unsinkable :)
DeleteHow you weight the factors, those you have outlined, CVN high speed when operational,associated costs for the necessary specialized on-shore nuclear facilities/shipyards, nuclear training and avoid bias, hard numbers for the nuclear carriers are not disclosed, cost of the reactors, actual nuclear cost of the re-fuelling element included for mid-life RCOH, GAO report did reveal cost of the dismantlement and disposal of CVN65 Enterprise as $2.5B, is the ~CVN 3,000 ship crew number high due to nuclear? A figure quoted averages 3.3 operational available CVNs per year, ~40% , 60% pier side?, of that how much shipyard maintenance, would conventional carriers give higher availability?
As the numbers for nuclear carriers are hidden makes me suspicious, need competition to give transparency, Navy should ask GD NASSCO for quote for conventional powered carrier, will never happen.
@Nick- I think that Ive previously shown that the nuclear component of CVNs is suprisingly cheap. There are NO $Bs to be saved by going to conventional propulsion. In fact everything upstream of the secondary loop costs under $500M, and the nuclear component of an RCOH is around half that amount, for under a billion in ships lifetime "nuclear" costs. Understand, Im not a proponent of nuclear power, per se. But given the operational flexibility it gives, I dont see conventional power as an option. Saving a few hundred million dollars, and then having to rely on an inadequate and potentially vulnerable logistics system for our frontline units seems a poor choice...
Delete"Navy should ask GD NASSCO for quote for conventional powered carrier"
DeleteThe implicit assumption in your suggestion is that they could make a carrier for far, far less because they can build commercial ships that are bigger for less.
Are you taking into account the gargantuan differences between a commercial ship and a carrier (or any WARship, for that matter)? Consider simply the manning element. A commercial ship has a crew of, what, two dozen or so? That needs very, very, very, very little galley space, berthing, food refrigeration, fresh water generation and storage, showers, heads, mess tables, laundry facilities, etc. Now, multiply that by the 4000 crew on a carrier and suddenly, just for that one element, manning, the costs jump enormously.
Now, do the same thing for networks, electronics, compartmentation, damage control, firefighting, computers, sensors, redundant everything, and on and on. There is almost zero relationship between the cost of a giant commercial ship and the cost of a carrier.
If I've misconstrued your point, forgive me and correct me.
"will never happen. "
Because they've never built a warship, as far as I know. Building a warship is a totally different animal. Ask GD/Austal who tried to build a simple LCS based on their commercial ferry design and failed miserably - and I'm not talking about the specs - those were set by the Navy. I'm talking about routing engineering access through the "clean requirement" galley spaces, omitting bridge wings, omitting galvanic corrosion control (that might have been a purely Navy decision, to be fair), insufficient flight deck structural support for heavier helos or more than two helos, almost inoperable RHIB/UxV launch recovery mechanism, and on and on.
It's not their fault, per se. They didn't have the warship expertise. The Navy should never have given them a contract or, if they wanted to promote a new warship builder (which I'm all for!) then they should have been given a contract for just one ship so that they could learn rather than trying to learn on the fly while building 55 (well, half that).
"How you weight the factors,"
DeleteThis is an important aspect that I haven't yet really addressed. Not all factors should be equally weighted. Let's say, for sake of discussion, that a nuclear ship costs 2x a conventional one when all economic factors are considered. The problem is that the Navy is not in the business of running a business. If that were the case, then the simple business case wins out. However, the Navy is in the business of combat. If a nuclear ship is 2x expensive but has a combat advantage, the combat factor should weight much more heavily. It's pointless to have a cheaper ship that fails in combat. Every decision the Navy makes, about anything, should be run through the filter of combat. Will "this - whatever this is" help in combat? If yes, it should be strongly considered. If not, it should be dropped.
So, all the economic assessments in the world, no matter how favorable for conventional power, weigh far less heavily than combat enhancement. If nuclear power enhances combat then it tips the scale almost by itself.
Now, the problem is that nuclear power enhancement of combat is not at all clear cut. It enhances aspects of combat (greater endurance, unlimited range, infinite high speed, great power for weapons, sensors, etc.) but hurts other aspects (damage control when radiation is a factor, damage repair will be nearly impossible, catastrophic effects of sunk, damaged nuclear ship, a potential one-hit kill on the reactor rendering the entire ship unusable due to radiation). So, unfortunately, as I've stated, even combat doesn't tip the scales for me. Nothing does. I'm ambivalent.
CNO "Are you taking into account the gargantuan differences between a commercial ship and a carrier (or any WARship, for that matter)?
DeleteEastern Shipbuilding won the contract for the new design USCG OPC, up to that point they have only built commercial ships, BIW objected, GAO overruled objection, and to date OPC on program with no slippage, USCG have a reputation for tight contracts and insist guarantees/warranties which is more than the Navy do.
GD NASSCO would have the expertise of GD BIW to call on so would expect yes it would be probability they could build a conventional carrier.
@Jjabatie Unfortunately nuclear has a long history of being expensive, GAO reported Enterprise cost of removing the nuclear fuel from the ship’s reactors and taking off equipment and other materials in preparation for dismantlement of the ship alone cost $863M. The new Vogtle, Georgia nuclear power station may never be completed after looking at $2.7B overspend on its $25B budget, one of the reasons Westinghouse went bankrupt.
DeleteWould be interested if you could supply any hard figures on the nuclear element of the CVNs.
" hard figures on the nuclear element of the CVNs."
DeleteHard figures are hard to come by. :)
The problem with any quoted figure is that it's likely to include significant extraneous costs. For example, a carrier mid-life refueling and overhaul involves drydocking. Depending on what point you want to make, you can charge the cost of drydocking to the nuclear side or the overhaul side. Enterprise had to be defueled. If (and I'm just making this up; I have no idea) the process involved cutting through decks to provide access, is that really the cost of nuclear defueling or, since the ship was going to be scrapped and cut up anyway, is that just a scrapping cost? If some HVAC runs had to be removed to get at some nuclear aspect is that really a nuclear cost or, since they had to be removed anyway as a normal part of scrapping, is it a scrapping cost? And so, many times over.
Thus, without an itemized listing of charged tasks, we have no way of knowing what charges were appropriate and what charges were not and what charges could have gone either way. Ultimately, the breakdown of the costs is important only to people like us to who want to debate nuclear vs conventional.
Consider your own sentence,
"cost of removing the nuclear fuel from the ship’s reactors and taking off equipment and other materials in preparation for dismantlement of the ship"
The part following "and taking off … in preparation for dismantlement" suggests that much of the $863M was just normal scrapping costs. How much? Who knows? I would assume A LOT.
Nick-I had looked into this in previous CVN-centric posts,and going through press releases, DOD and GAO reports, along with some scientific foundation reports, this is what I found.
DeleteNew construction costs of nuclear reactors hovered at $200M each.
Nuclear component of Vinson RCOH was $510M, although some "specifically unallocated" dollars in the reports could worst-case make that number almost $620M. Admittedly it seems expensive to spend $5-600M refueling $400M worth of reactors, but obviously doing work in the depths of a hull complicate it vs. building somthing in a factory setting initially...
So $400M new reactor cost plus $500M refueling, even with "fudge-factors" puts nuclear-component costs at $.9B, or up to $1.2B.
I dont find that prohibitively expensive at all, if you consider the costs to fuel a conventional carrier over its lifespan, plus the cost of the replenishment ships, their repairs and operational expenses, etc...
According to US Navy fact file we only have 15 as of 2015. Yikes. Therefore, to answer your question we do not have enough replenishment ships to fight a peer war. Period. Our decision makers have decided that we will either never be in a war or if one starts our fleet will have to stay home... After the war starts we would have to convert commercial vessels to fill the role. So much for my enthusiastic assumption we can hold the SCS.
ReplyDeleteMeanwhile the Chinese keep building toward their 400 ship/100 sub fleet. Can anyone come up with something more cheerful to post?
I note the new Lewis class, the replacement goes three knots slower... Forward!
ReplyDelete"There is immense risk in having valuable auxiliaries operate too far forward. Neosho was retiring from the immediate battle and yet was still found and destroyed."
ReplyDeleteIf Yorktown and Astoria were low on fuel and couldn't sail further away from the battle, then there was no other choice but to send Neosho forward. You're right to note the risks of operating auxiliaries too far forward, but the tactical situation may require doing just that.
I'm not surprised they were found as the Japanese were trying to find our carriers. If she had better speed or sailed in a different direction, she might have escaped detection. But, Neosho and Sims were misidentified as a carrier and an escort, which is why so many aircraft were sent. It would be hard for a battleship to fight off that many attackers.
ComNavOps
ReplyDeleteFor the love of God, please don't mention anything that might make Navy leadership think that might need less escorts or fewer oilers. We all understood you on the nuke/ nonnuke issue. But admirals aren't always so smart. They'll read your comment and think we need a 300 ship Navy made of Ford's.
As for escorts for critical ships, the UK Royal Navy in WW2 tended not to escort troopships as they tended to be converted liners and were deemed to fast for a U-boat to sink.
ReplyDeleteRMS Lancastria was an oddity because it was sunk by aircraft whilst leaving a French port but the idea is right.
Others - Laconia (1942), the Laconia Incident is quite interesting.
The Eurofighter engines use about 5,000kg of fuel per hour, the Superhornet is significantly heavier.
ReplyDeleteNuclear power of the Carrier does reduce the fuel drain, but 80 aircraft, 2 engines per aircraft, 3 hours flight time per day, 2.5milion litres.
Not sure how much propulsion/catapult boilers consume each day/mile on a very big ship.
It's not true to say their are "plenty of" is regards to oilers, the trend has been towards fewer, bigger, tankers.
There simply aren't masses of spare tankers available for hire.
The trend to massive has also increased spevialisation as well, few tankers have ship to ship capabilities, many are reliant on shore support to load or unload.
Its lucky the Neosho was found and destroyed. The japanese sent the airgroup thinking it was a carrier. After they sent the airgroup the true location of the cv was found. It was just to late to change the attack. Meanwhile the us airgroups were far north sinking the Shoho.
ReplyDeleteJust think if the neosho had not been spotted then the yorktown could of been sunk and both the history of the battle of coral sea and midway may have changed.
*Waiting for the Navy to try to turn the oilers and other log-ships into Arleigh-Burke lights with aegis and 1000 VLS batteries.*
ReplyDeleteThis blog post with topics of "oil", "Neosho", and "aircraft carrier" has special symbolic meaning to me. One of my grandfathers was badly injured while building the emergency war pipeline during WW2. He recovered and went on spending a few decades working on oil drilling rigs in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. He's turning 96 next week, and only in the past few months has his health gone downhill. My other grandfather was in the Army during the war, in the south Pacific, driving fuel trucks. After the war he started a large family near the Neosho River (WW2 oilers were named after rivers). If he were still alive he'd be 100, but he died 31 years ago. My Grandma is 97 and she might make it to 100. My dad and his brothers had many boyhood adventures along the Neosho River. Two of those brothers (my uncles) and I were in the Navy: an avionics technician, a radioman, and I was a nuclear machinist mate. Ironically after being a nuke on a carrier, I've come to the opinion that nuclear power should be only for submarines, not surface ships. Sorry to go off topic with family history, but it just all tied together for me.
ReplyDeleteThat's a wonderful story and thank you for sharing!
DeleteUpdate: The grandfather that helped build the emergency war pipeline, passed on last night. He was a very strong, tough man who bounced back from a number of bad work related injuries, but finally time caught up with him. He was doing fine up until about five months ago. He was 96. (1923-2019)
DeleteMy condolences to you and your family. Take comfort in the faith that you'll see him again, in due time. Again, thanks for sharing.
DeleteExcellent point that it is local, short term air.superiority not total air supremacy. In truth, we have rarely had that until the closing of a conflict and then only once we have destroyed their means of production. We won't be doing that easily against a nation that does much of OUR production for us (steel, rare earths, electronic s etc.)
ReplyDeleteI think we could produce two weapons that would help in quicker manner than expected: long range air to air and anti radar missiles. An SM-3 minus the vertical launch booster would be within a Super hornet 's carry capacity. Replacing the seeker with one from the aim-120 (like the sm-6 did) would give you a modern Phoenix missile.
The standard missile has been tested as an an ARM, an an updated version with better electronics and warhead could help suppress ship AAW or even used air to air against fighters with their long range radar on.