China Training Hard

ComNavOps follows Chinese military matters fairly closely.  Know your enemy, right?  My impression is that the Chinese are training hard … harder than we are.  

Admittedly, I may be seeing carefully staged, propaganda type photos and descriptions that don't really reflect the state of Chinese training.  To mitigate that, I 'validate' the sources I use to the extent I can.  If a source has a history of posting verifiably accurate information about other matters then I assume that the training-specific posts are also accurate.  Still, one can never be entirely sure.

With that in mind, my impression is that the Chinese are training hard and more realistically than we are and by a wide margin.  Here's what I mean …

Photos of US training exercises show little use of smoke, obstacles, 'enemy' forces, or general confusion.  They also show no evidence of stress or realism.  For example, personnel are typically seen standing bolt upright rather than under cover and standing exposed in hatches of vehicles rather than buttoned up.  Amphibious assaults show personnel on beaches directing nice, neat, orderly lines of AAVs - is that really how an assault will occur?  Disembarking/dismounting personnel are shown walking off rather than crouched and sprinting as if their lives were at stake.  Examine these photos of US training exercises and ask yourself how realistic they seem and how representative you think they are of actual combat?

In contrast, take a look at these photos of Chinese training exercises (1).  Note the much greater degree of realism.  Note the smoke everywhere.  Note the night training.  Note the postures of the personnel.  Note the degree of live or semi-live firing.  Note the opportunity for confusion and noise.

I also admit that I'm cherry picking the photos, to an extent, to support the premise.  Certainly, there are US exercise photos that show smoke being used and personnel running but the point is that I had no trouble finding the types of photos I selected for the US and more realistic ones are much harder to find - that's telling.  I also had no trouble finding the Chinese photos - in fact, it was hard to find any that weren't realistic.

Relax a little.  I'm not proving or disproving anything in this post with just a handful of photos.  I'm merely stating that my general impression is that the Chinese are training harder and more realistically than we are.  If my impression is correct, this should concern us greatly.

It's also troubling that I can find any photos of Us personnel in mid-exercise without smoke, confusion, explosions, crouching/covering, etc.  If I can, then that exercise time was unrealistic and wasted.

By the way, my conversations with serving personnel confirm and, indeed, help form my impressions.

Consider this post is food for thought rather than a proof of anything.

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(1)All photos from China Defense Blog, http://china-defense.blogspot.com/

Multi-National ASW Exercise

Here’s the headline:

“Maritime forces from Japan, UK, US practice submarine hunting in Philippine Sea” (1)

Very nice.  I can envision it.  Ships crisscrossing the ocean, searching for submarines.  Aircraft dropping sensors.  An ASW commander coordinating and directing the overall effort, vectoring multiple ships and aircraft to suspected submarine locations.  The submarines working to evade and attack.  This is what an ASW exercise should be!

Unfortunately, it appears that this is not what the exercise was.  From the Pacific Fleet website article, the participating forces consisted of

• 1x Japanese helo destroyer
• 1x Royal Navy Type 23 frigate
• 1x US submarine
• 1x P-8 Poseidon

That’s it.

That’s not an exercise, that’s a photo op.

The US Pacific Fleet has a hundred or so ships and several hundred aircraft.  Of those, we assigned one sub and one aircraft to the exercise.  Were the rest too busy to participate?

If someone went to the trouble of organizing this, why not make a significant event?  Even better, why not make it an unannounced, no-notice, come-as-you-are, scramble exercise for multiple squadrons of ships and aircraft and let’s see what our first day of war capabilities look like?

Here’s some phrases from the article:

• “for the first time”
• “trilateral exercise”
• “unprecedented opportunity”
• “support of a free and open Indo-Pacific"
• “Working together”
• “cooperate more effectively at sea.”
• “exciting opportunity”
• “improve upon our combined capabilities"
• “first trilateral exercise of its kind”
• “shared commitment to enhance maritime cooperation”

Sounds like a ground-breaking, mammoth, multi-national exercise, doesn’t it?  …  Since when did creative writing become a Navy mission? 

What’s that old saying?  - Don’t talk about, be about it. 

Well, it appears that the Navy is substituting talking for doing.  What was the rest of the Pacific Fleet doing that was more important than ASW combat training?  Seriously, one sub and one aircraft?  Pathetic.  Even worse was bragging about it.  Very disappointing.

_____________________________

(1)Commander, US Pacific Fleet, Ensign Jacob Dirr, 21-Dec-2018,

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130406

2018 Developments and Favorites

It’s that time of year, the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, when everyone likes to release lists.  Well, ComNavOps will offer two lists.

First up is a list of the top significant developments for the US Navy in 2018.  In no particular order, here they are:

No LCS Deployments in 2018 – Despite having 13 ships in commission, there were no LCS deployments in 2018.  Through its inaction, even the Navy is grudgingly acknowledging that there is no use for these floating dog piles.

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/09/no-lcs-deployments.html

F-35 Concurrency Orphans – It has been acknowledged that concurrency is going to result in hundreds of F-35s that can’t be upgraded to combat status.  What a colossal waste!

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/01/f-35-concurrency-orphans.html

No Munition for Zumwalt Gun – The Navy officially announced that they’ve given up on the idea of developing some kind of munition for the Zumwalt’s gun.  This one is criminal, or should be.

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/01/ags-zumwalt-colossal-failure.html

MQ-25 Contract Awarded – The Navy has officially moved into the UAV era – for better or worse.

Navy Greatly Reduces McCain/Fitzgerald CO Punishments – After announcing plans to prosecute the Cos for negligent homicide, among other charges, the Navy inexplicably reduced the punishments to mere slaps on the wrist.  The Navy’s accountability and integrity just went from near-zero to below zero.

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/05/navy-fails-mccain-collision.html

Norwegian Frigate Sinks – While not a US Navy incident, the opportunity for lessons learned is unprecedented.  Further, the design is one of the US Navy’s frigate contenders.  Ominous.

Frigate Conceptual Design Contracts Awarded - Huntington Ingalls, Lockheed Martin, Austal, GD Bath Iron Works, and Fincantieri will move forward with conceptual frigate designs.  The Lockheed Martin Freedom class LCS 'frigate' will be selected for production in 2018, thus condemning the Navy to a frigate on par with the LCS.

The second list is ComNavOps favorite posts from 2018.  The challenge here is that all the posts are so good that it’s hard to choose favorites.  This is your chance for a well-worth-it re-read of some outstanding posts.  In no particular order, here they are:

Deployments Or Missions?

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/05/deployments-or-missions.html

PT Boat

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/03/pt-boat.html

Carrier Vulnerability and Operational Reality

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/05/carrier-vulnerability-and-operational.html

Battle Damage – Savo Island

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/06/battle-damage-savo-island.html’

Why Not Battleships?

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-not-battleships.html

War Deployments

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/07/war-deployments.html

China War – Setting The Stage

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/10/china-war-setting-stage.html

Carrier Strike

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/11/carrier-strike.html

Europe – Why?

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/12/europe-why_5.html

Precision Guidance

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/12/precision-guidance.html

US Navy Cooperation With India

One of the potential allies in confronting and containing China is India.  For reasons I am at a complete loss to explain, the US has not pursued cooperation with India in any significant way, that I’m aware of.  I’m also unaware of any serious obstacles to enhanced cooperation either.  In other words, we ought to be seeking greater cooperation with India and yet we seem to have little interest in doing so, despite the obvious strategic and geopolitical benefits.  The US and India conduct occasional exercises together but the interactions appear limited and I’m unaware of significant diplomatic interactions, either.  To be fair, I do not follow the political aspects too closely and it is possible that more is occurring than I’m aware of.  If so, however, it is not making any of the news sources that I frequent.

An example of the limited interaction is an Oct 2018 exercise between the US and India involving a single US P-8 Poseidon which conducted anti-submarine exercises with India. (2)  Given that India has bought a few P-8s, this may have been more of a sales PR effort than an actual military exercise.

Recently, however, the Navy has engaged in some limited interactions with India beyond the handful of formal, staged events such as RIMPAC.

USS Anchorage (LPD-23), with elements of 13th MEU embarked, conducted a port visit to Visakhapatnam, India, followed by some at sea cross training.  The visit and training consisted of the typical assortment of professional exchanges with Indian naval counterparts, humanitarian assistance operations, and cross deck helo operations.
  

USS Anchorage

China is aggressively courting countries around the world in a bid to strengthen their global position.  The US, on the other hand, is almost ignoring potential allies in the Chinese region as well as around the world.  We need to recognize and admit that we are at war with China and start fighting back or we’ll find ourselves losers without ever contesting the issue – as happened when we sat back and watched China annex the South/East China Seas.

Our reluctance to strengthen relations with India is perplexing.  We need to correct that.

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(1)Commander, US Pacific Fleet website, MC3 Ryan M. Breeden, 27-Dec-2018,

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130410

(2)The Times of India website, “US Navy, Indian Navy undertake anti-submarine exercises in Arabian Sea”, Newton Sequeira, 24-Oct-2018,

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-navy-indian-navy-undertake-anti-submarine-exercises-in-arabian-sea/articleshow/66351003.cms

Littoral Combat Group????

This one somehow snuck by me but I see it now.  The Navy has formed something called a Littoral Combat Group.

Sailors and Marines from Littoral Combat Group One (LCG-1) returned home to Naval Base San Diego and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam after participating in the International Maritime and Naval Exhibition for South America, known as EXPONAVAL. (1)

The group apparently consisted of USS Somerset (LPD 25) and USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) plus an embarked Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF-Peru) as well as a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment.

The group (are two ships really a group?) apparently conducted humanitarian and disaster response exercises, fisheries enforcement activities, and community projects.

I’ve been unable to find out any additional information about the group or its intended purpose.

I don’t know if this was a one-time, ad-hoc group that was given a catchy name and will never be repeated or if this is some kind of new and idiotic concept the Navy is implementing.

Taking the name at face value, there is no way that a single LPD and a Burke can form a useful, effective combat group for high end combat.  This leads us into the next observation.

This kind of non-combat exercise is absolutely worthless and is all the worse when our ships are chronically under-maintained and undertrained.  Why aren’t we spending the time teaching our officers and crews how to conduct basic navigation and seamanship in a safe manner without colliding with giant, hulking commercial ships?  Why aren’t we spending our time developing and practicing peer war doctrine and tactics?  And so on.  There are so many better things our combat ships should be doing.

Now, I’m not against interacting with South American countries.  Quite the opposite, in fact.  South America is a major exporter of problems for the US and we ought to take an active interest in the region.  However, there are much better means of interacting than putting wear and tear on top of the line warships that are desperately in need of maintenance and training.

I’ll be keeping an eye out for an recurrence of this Littoral Combat Group idiocy.

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(1)Commander, US Pacific Fleet website, “Littoral Combat Group-1 Returns From South America”, 26-Dec-2018,

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/110635

Fleet Problem Exercises

The US Navy famously conducted extensive, full scale fleet problem exercises in the pre-WWII years and those exercises served to validate battle doctrine, explore scenarios, develop carrier operations and tactics, and even predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor (Fleet Problem V conducted a carrier attack on Hawaii).

The Fleet Problems were conducted from 1923-1940 (I – XXI) and were then abandoned after WWII.  Recently, the Pacific Fleet has revived a much scaled down version of Fleet Problem exercises beginning with Fleet Problem XXIII and continuing through XXVIII.

The resumption of Fleet Problems, even if scaled down and limited to the Pacific Fleet rather than the entire Navy, is welcome news.  The exercises were, apparently, reinstituted by Adm. Scott Swift.  He describes a bit of the impetus for the resumption,

Adding to my concern was the clear message from my intelligence team that our potential adversaries were investing in training that was ever more complex and challenging. We needed to raise our training bar. As fleet commander, I needed to know what we could do, exploring the art of the possible and testing our assumptions about fleet capabilities in a fight against a high-end adversary. (1)

It’s encouraging that Adm. Swift seemed to have recognized that many of our operational concepts (ConOps) were more fantasy than reality.

In other cases, as we considered how our ConOps would play out in reality, it became apparent there were warfighting tasks that were critical to success that we could not execute with confidence. This gap was not because deployers did not practice these tasks individually—the efficiency of the OFRP ensured they could—but because we as a force never practiced them together, in combination with multiple tasks, against a free-playing, informed, and representative Red. (1)

In one case, during an exercise planning session, we discussed a critical operational tactic that is used routinely in exercises and assumed to be executable by the fleet. In the course of the brief, a lone voice said, “Sir, you know we can’t actually do that.” (1)

One of ComNavOps’ criticisms of Navy training is that it is broken down into simplistic, scripted exercises and then the assumption is made that the limited result is applicable to an entire war.  For example, if a single ship can launch a single missile and hit a single, unrealistic drone surrogate target, then the assumption is made that our entire air defense concept is valid and has been ‘proven’.  Adm. Swift appears to have grasped the fallacy in this type of training.  For example,

For example, it is critical that we be able to operate carrier strike groups (CSGs) in areas of significant submarine threat. Our traditional approach to this challenge would be to create an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercise, tasking submarines to act as targets within a set geographic area. In a Fleet Problem, we instead would task the CSG to conduct a combat mission (“NLT 01100Z, conduct strikes on…”), giving it maximum flexibility in timing and mechanism. We then would create an environment rich in submarine threats. The CSG’s mission would not be ASW, but rather conducting a core combat mission (strike) in support of the joint fight in a robust submarine threat environment.

Managing the submarine threat is the means to the end —strike. (1) (emphasis added)

Brilliant!  This is how training should be.

Swift’s use of Fleet Problems also embraces failure.  He seems to recognize that failure is not only the best teacher but also a requirement for learning.  This is outstanding especially in today’s risk averse, zero-tolerance command environment.  I only hope that he is successful in implementing this philosophy of embraced failure.

One of the strengths of the new Fleet Problem series is that it does not involve future weapons and capabilities.  Participants use only the existing capabilities of their assets.  Thus, for example, there is no hand waving to magically sense enemy assets due to the anticipated, future all-seeing sensor.  The participants must fight with what they actually have – you know, kind of like how you have to fight an actual war.

An Opposing Force (OpFor) has, apparently, been created, the Pacific Naval Aggressor Team (PNAT).  Unfortunately, the article does not go into detail about the structure and assets of the OpFor or the degree of dedication and training they have.  The strength of the Navy’s famous Top Gun program was the core of people dedicated to nothing but studying the enemy’s tactics and capabilities and then using that knowledge to develop and teach tactics.  It is unknown to what degree this model is being followed.  Without a competent OpFor, the training loses much of its value.

Adm. Swift sums up the value of realistic Fleet Problems nicely,

Fleet Problems allow us to learn those lessons with bruised egos instead of combat losses. (1)

Unfortunately, there are some notable shortcomings with the Fleet Problem as currently practiced:

Limited Assets – The Pacific Fleet, though large, is still just a subset of the Navy and has a limited number of ships and aircraft assigned to it.  For example, it typically has only a single carrier or, occasionaly, two.  This means that any exercise will not be representative of how we’ll actually fight.  We’ll conduct carrier operations with groups of four and it just isn’t possible to simulate multi-carrier groups with only a single ship.  Further, it’s impossible to provide multiple carriers to both the OpFor and the Blue (US) groups.  Thus, we run the risk of developing bad habits.  We may develop tactics suited for a single carrier that are entirely unsuited for multiple carriers.  We certainly aren’t learning how to effectively command and utilize twenty or thirty escorts, for example.  By way of comparison, Fleet Problem XX in 1939 involved 134 ships, 600 planes, and over 52,000 personnel, according to Wiki. (2)

Limited Geography – Pacific Fleet can only operate in the Pacific Fleet area although given that China is the ultimate enemy this is not as bad a limitation as it might be.  It does, however, limit the ability to exercise in an area or against land targets that are better simulated elsewhere around the globe.

Limited OpFor – there just aren’t enough assets to properly equip a realistic OpFor.  Again, the Pacific Fleet normally has only one carrier assigned or, temporarily, perhaps two.  It just isn’t possible to provide multiple carriers to both the OpFor and the Blue (US) groups.  The same applies to submarines and aircraft.  Thus, the exercises are inherently limited in scope.

Limited Applicability – The ‘doctrine’ developed from the Pacific Fleet exercises is limited to just the current Pacific Fleet personnel.  It is not, to the best of my knowledge, adopted or applied Navy-wide.  Thus, the local commanders may benefit but the Navy, overall, does not.  The next logical step would be for the Navy to reinstitute Navy-wide Fleet Problems.

ComNavOps loves to report good news but there are so few opportunities.  Well, this is one such opportunity.  The resumption of Fleet Problems, even on a limited basis, is a great development.  The Navy needs to reinstitute this practice on a Navy-wide basis and provide the larger numbers of assets that a truly useful Fleet Problem requires.  Well done, Adm. Swift. 

Now, Admiral, get the Navy to expand this to a true Fleet Problem and let’s find out what 4-carrier battle groups can do.  Let’s put that distributed lethality concept to a large scale test.  Let’s see if we can sustain our logistical support for the fleet during combat.  Let’s explore what the Chinese will attempt to do.  Let’s see if we can retake Taiwan.  Let’s figure out how to penetrate the Chinese A2/AD zone.

Peacetime is our golden opportunity to prepare for the next war and we’re squandering it.  Let’s get back to the business of preparing for high end, peer war.

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(1)USNI Proceedings, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities”, Mar 2018, Adm. Scott Swift,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/fleet-problems-offer-opportunities

(2)Wikipedia, “Fleet Problem”, retrieved 28-Dec-2018,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_problem

Doctrine - Battle of Vella Gulf

We’ve often discussed tactics and strategy and have occasionally touched on doctrine.  In simplified form, doctrine is a set of standardized actions in response to a given situation. 

For example, the Navy/Marines have devised a doctrine for executing an amphibious assault.  That the doctrine is an unworkable fantasy doesn’t change the fact that it’s the accepted doctrine.

As another example, a naval surface group would have an anti-air doctrine – how to position the various ships, how to allocate defensive measures, whether to emphasize passive or active defenses, and so on.  Of course, there is a great deal of overlap between doctrine and tactics.

The advantage of having doctrine is that the individual soldiers, sailors, ships, and planes don’t need detailed orders since they understand the guiding doctrine and can act accordingly with the knowledge that everyone else understands the same situation and will act in a unified manner – at least, that’s the theory.

The classic example of the successful use of naval doctrine was British Admiral Nelson’s engagement at Trafalgar.  Nelson devised a new doctrine that provided general guidance about his intent to his Captains but left room for the specifics to change.  His plan entailed cutting off, isolating, and overwhelming the last third of the enemy fleet.  With this guidance in place, Nelson and his Captains were freed from any concerns about the order of their ships or the exact placement or maneuvering as long as the individual Captains acted under the overall guidance.  This greatly reduced the need for in-battle communications and helped reduce the inevitable confusion of battle.  Every Captain had all the information they needed prior to the battle, in the form of Nelson’s doctrine.  From Wiki,

Nothing is sure in a sea battle, so he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short, circumstances would dictate the execution, subject to the guiding rule that the enemy's rear was to be cut off and superior force concentrated on that part of the enemy's line. (1)

One can debate whether Nelson’s new tactics were truly doctrinal since, by definition, doctrine is a standardized set of actions and his tactics were not, at that time, standardized across the entire British Navy. They were, however, standardized across his fleet. This devolves into a semantics discussion and is irrelevant to the point of the post.

The point is that a set of standard, generalized guidance (which is what doctrine is) allowed the British ships to operate with minimal orders, each secure in the knowledge that every other ship and Captain in the fleet would operate in the same way.  There was no need to issue orders in the midst of the battle and no need to ask for orders.

Let’s move, now, to WWII and the early naval battles around Guadalcanal.  US Navy pre-war and early war doctrine had the destroyers tied tightly to the battle line (cruisers, since the battleships had been sunk at Pearl Harbor and not yet replaced).  The initial night battles revealed the folly of this doctrine as the US Navy suffered multiple defeats and the US destroyers were ineffective and poorly used.

As the Navy gained operating experience, doctrine changed, culminating in a decisive night battle in which the destroyers were allowed to operate independently.  The battle resulted in an overwhelming victory for the US at the Battle of Vella Gulf.

Rather than being tied to cruisers, six US destroyers, operating under Comdr. Frederick Moosbrugger, sailed independently to intercept a Japanese resupply force of four destroyers.  The independence doctrine was further enhanced by a flexible plan of attack that was simple and allowed for the inevitable unexpected actions by the enemy.  

Moosbrugger’s destroyers were split into two groups of three ships each and each group thoroughly understood what to do and what the other group would do regardless of how the enemy behaved.  The Destroyer History Foundation has an excellent and detailed description of the battle for those who would like more information. (2)

Salient points of the doctrine included:

• Attack instantly upon initial sighting, no waiting, no orders needed
• Torpedoes first, hold gunfire until the torpedoes reached their targets
• Operate in two offset groups, each able to take advantage of the enemy regardless of which way the enemy turned (cross fire)
• The two groups would provide mutual support

Again, one can argue at what point the doctrine descends into tactics but that’s irrelevant.  The main doctrinal point was that, for the first time, the destroyers were free to operate independently and this totally changed how the destroyers behaved and what tactics they could use.

USS Craven - Vella Gulf Participant

This is all very interesting but what can we learn from it?

For starters, the US Navy has no battle doctrine of any kind that I’m aware of.  The Navy has technology instead of doctrine.  In other words, our battle leaders are taught to embrace technology and, when war comes, they’ll be expected to figure out how to use it.  That means that no one but the single commander who formulates the plan will know what the plan is and that, in turn, requires extensive communications during the battle – communications that history has taught us will not be clear and successful in the fog of battle.  We need doctrine instead of technology so that every commander understands how we intend to fight.

Doctrine needs to be validated.  The Navy’s pre-WWII doctrine of tying the destroyers to the battle line proved unworkable because circumstances changed and the Navy failed to anticipate the new circumstances.  The doctrine must be exercised under every imaginable set of circumstances so as to anticipate and prepare for the unexpected, as best as possible.  To the best of my knowledge, the pre-war Navy never exercised night battles in the crowded confines of nearby islands even though that set of circumstances should have been foreseeable in a Pacific campaign.  

To be fair, the Navy never anticipated the complete loss of the battleship fleet on the first day of the war and so they never exercised cruisers and destroyers as the main battle line.  However, that is exactly the kind of alternative exercise that should be practiced.  What if we are forced to attempt naval operations without carrier air cover?  We should exercise that and see what happens and what new doctrine that might call for.

We don’t even practice our main, anticipated doctrine – we don’t have any so I don’t know what it would be but, presumably, it would involve carriers.  We’ve discussed the requirement to operate carriers in groups of four and yet we never exercise that way.  To the extent that that is our battle doctrine, none of our battle leaders know it or have ever practiced it.

Peacetime is a precious commodity for a combat organization.  It is the time to exercise, develop doctrine and tactics, and prepare for combat.  Peacetime is a gift of immeasurable value to a warfighting organization and yet we are squandering it with every conceivable activity except combat preparation.  We need to get our minds right, assume a combat mentality and start preparing by developing and testing battle doctrine

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(1)Wikipedia, “Battle of Trafalgar”, retrieved 11-Dec-2018,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Trafalgar#Nelson's_plan

(2)Destroyer History Foundation website, “Battle of Vella Gulf”,

http://destroyerhistory.org/actions/index.asp?r=4340&pid=4345