ComNavOps has stated that the Marine’s primary mission
should be port seizure. The
Ukraine-Russia war has provided an illustrative example of exactly that mission
so let’s take a look and see what we can learn from it.
Incident
Russia had seized the port of Berdyansk and was using it as
a logistics and resupply point. However,
on 24-Mar-2022, Ukraine struck a Russian Alligator class amphibious landing
ship (reportedly, the Orsk) while it was docked in Berdyansk along with two
other amphibious ships.[1] Satellite
photos confirm the ship has sunk.
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| Sunken Ship and Damaged Facilities |
After the attack, the other two Ropucha-II class landing
ships were observed quickly leaving the port.
Some reports suggest that one or both also suffered damage from the
attack. In addition, facilities on the
dock were damaged, as confirmed by satellite photos.
It is unknown whether the Orsk was loaded and, if so, what
the cargo/troops was. The Orsk can carry
1000+ tons of cargo or around 400 troops and vehicles. Presumably, since it was docked, it was in
the process of unloading though, if so, to what degree it had completed its
unloading is unknown.
The weapon used was speculated to be an OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21
Scarab) which, depending on the version, has a range of 43-70 miles, an
accuracy (CEP) of 229-490 ft, and a thousand pound HE or fragmentation warhead. The Tochka missile is unguided and uses
inertial navigation.
It is hard to believe that an inertial guided missile with a
CEP of hundreds of feet could hit a single ship which is only 370 ft long and
50 ft wide. Of course, that ship may or
may not have been the intended target. Regardless
of the delivery method, the Orsk suffered some type of major explosive attack.
Berdyansk
Berdyansk is a port city of about 100,000 people and is
located along the northwestern shore of the Sea of Azov. The port is some fifty miles or so directly
across from Russia territory and ports on the eastern side of the Sea of Azov. Berdyansk fell to the Russians sometime
around 27-Feb-2022, shortly after the start of the invasion.
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| Berdyansk Location |
Implications
This incident demonstrates both the vital importance of
having a secure port to provide logistical support for ground forces and the
extreme difficulty in securing said port and operating it under combat
conditions. One of the consistent
reports from Ukraine concerns the apparent lack of logistical support for
Russian ground troops with reports of shortages of food, ammo, fuel, and
parts. Thus, a port such as this is
mandatory for successful sustained ground operations.
It shouldn’t need to be said but let me say it clearly and
forcefully, anyway: it is not
possible to logistically support a significant ground war by air. A secure and functional port is an absolute
necessity.
Russian
state media reports that the Russian Navy is using the captured port of
Berdyansk - located on Ukraine's Sea of Azov coastline - in order to funnel
more arms, armor and ammunition to the front lines of the invasion of Ukraine.
Berdyansk
is just 50 road miles west of the city of Mariupol, which has been encircled
and besieged by the 8th Combined Arms Army and the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
From the start, the operation has been characterized by heavy artillery
bombardment, which requires extensive logistics support for sustainment. With
relatively limited in-house trucking capacity, Russian maneuver units need to
stay within about 90 miles of a supply stockpile or risk running out of
ammunition, according to U.S. Army analyst Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin. The early
seizure of Berdyansk has helped the invading force to meet this distance requirement
for operations between Crimea and Mariupol.
According
to Russian state-controlled outlet Zvezda, 10 ships are assigned to resupply
runs from nearby Russian-controlled ports to Berdyansk.[2]
Clearly, the port is vital to Russian logistical support efforts. Russia managed to seize the port but has, thus
far, been unable to secure it, as demonstrated by this attack. On the other hand, no matter how secure the
port, a docked ship is at risk unless the port is out of range of enemy
weapons. Of course, if it is out of
range of enemy weapons it is also probably quite far from the very ground
forces that it is supposed to support.
This incident suggests that we need to come to grips with
the reality of combat losses when trying to operate a port while under fire.
The incident also points out the need to have specialized
rapid port repair capability for when the inevitable port damage occurs.
In addition, there is a need to be able to clear sunken
ships so that port operations can continue.
Port Seizure
We’ve discussed port seizure in previous posts (see, “Amphibious Assault – Port Seizure”).
As a reminder, here are some of the requirements to seize
and secure a port facility:
Elimination of enemy forces from the immediate area
Establishment of C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar) protection
Establishment of cruise and ballistic missile defenses
Establishment of long range attacks against enemy rocket, artillery, mortar, cruise, and ballistic weapons (best defense is a good offense)
Establishment of secure transportation routes out of the port to enable distribution of supplies to the ground forces
Since most (all?) ports are intimately associated with
surrounding, built up, urban areas, eliminating enemy forces from the area will
be difficult and will require a degree of urban fighting with all its attendant
challenges. This will require a very
highly trained and specialized force, thoroughly familiar with the unique
tactics of urban warfare. This will also
require a great deal of specialized equipment such as breeching equipment for
anything from doors to smashing through reinforced walls. Another example might be barricade erection
machinery to provide a secure barrier for cleared areas.
Hand in hand with specialized tactics and equipment is the
requirement for specialized rules of engagement. Urban warfare simply cannot be fought with
any regard for civilian casualties or collateral damage to structures. To do so is to guarantee unnecessary friendly
casualties. In urban warfare, lots of
people are going to die. There’s no way
around it. The goal is to make sure that
as few of the deaths are US soldiers as possible. The only good thing about a war is ending it as
quickly as possible and the way to do that, with as few deaths as possible, is
to conduct the war with overwhelming force and violence. If there’s a sniper in a building, you don’t
do a floor by floor, room by room search which winds up with a dead sniper and
a dozen of your own soldiers killed; you
demolish the entire building, with no friendly casualties, and move on.
Verticality is another consideration in port seizure and
defense. In most built up areas, tall
buildings are a reality and they impose their own unique impact on both offense
and defense. For example, tall buildings
may block lower arcing artillery, rockets, and missiles while allowing higher
arcing mortars. Buildings will block the
field of fire of defensive weapons. A
C-RAM, for example, has to be placed where it has a clear field of fire and
that will be a challenge to accomplish.
It may be that we would need an entirely new type of defensive weapon,
one that is much more vertically oriented.
Conclusion
Port seizure is a highly specialized military action and
requires dedicated, specially trained units to accomplish the mission. Despite the difficulty, ports are a mandatory
requirement to logistically support ground forces. Currently, we have no forces trained or
equipped to accomplish this mission. The
logical organization to take the mission is the Marines. Unfortunately, they seem to have zero
interest in the mission. To be fair, no
one in the entire US military seems to have any interest in the mission and I’m
unaware of anyone having even spoken about it.
The US military seems to assume that free and easy access to ports is
our birthright, just as we assume that we’ll have uncontested and unhindered
use of air bases. Unfortunately, when
China comes knocking, we’ll find ourselves having to fight for ports and bases,
if we want them. We’re going to have to
learn how to fight for ports and how to defend and operate them while under
fire – something we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.
‘Conquest is easy, control is not’ and this adage certainly
applies to port seizure. Merely seizing
a port is not enough. The port has to be
secured sufficiently to enable shipping operations with a reasonable degree of
safety and the ability to deal with the damage from successful attacks, should
they occur.
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[1]Naval News website, “Ukraine Strikes Russia’s Alligator
Class LST With Ballistic Missile”, Tayfun Ozberk, 24-Mar-2022,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/03/ukraine-strikes-alligator-class-lst-with-ballistic-missile/
[2]The Maritime Executive website, “Russia Uses Captured
Port of Berdyansk to Resupply Southern Front”, 21-Mar-2022,
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-uses-captured-port-of-berdyansk-to-resupply-southern-front
