Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the
Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1] The whereabouts of the third is unknown. Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps
ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz? Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they
were designed for? As you recall, the
original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s
name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that
larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
So, why aren’t they there?
Well, we all know the answer. The
originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never
materialized. But, what if the original
modules had become available as fully functioning equipment? Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East
today?
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original
modules.
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield
and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
ASuW - This
was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept. The NLOS (not to be confused with the current
Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would
address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles. By removing all visible threats, it would
allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out
an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy
submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW
equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW
and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats. Such a group in the strait, today, would
eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping
across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland. UAVs would provide continuous surveillance
with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.
Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged
from hiding. The MCM-LCS would search
for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
Highly effective, indeed!
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why
it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s
removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for. The concept was okay but it was dependent on
non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need
still exists, what do we have that could do the job? Well, there’s always air power that could,
for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick
response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats. We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that
could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide
targeting. We could land Army/Marines in
various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using
G/ATOR or similar systems.
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do
counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the
software to do so. Why hasn’t the Navy
ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability? Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls
in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was
legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and
wishful thinking. We didn’t need the
LCS. The need could have been met with
existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding
much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land
forces. The cost would have been minimal
– free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets
simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment. The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as
opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization
trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for
mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
Where are the LCSes?
The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to
take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
_______________________________
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-minesweepers-stationed-in-middle-east-are-now-in-singapore
I remember writing about the need for ship counterbattery radar two decades ago! Experts says the Aegis radar can do the job, it just needs a software package for that.
ReplyDeleteThe Zummies were the NGFS, one would think
Deletecounter battery would be an included function.
Maybe pull a Mark 1 fire control computer from
an Iowa ?
"one would think counter battery would be an included function."
DeleteAs far as I know, that was never an intended function of the Zumwalt. Remember, the Zumwalt was intended to provide very long range fires. I'm not even sure it could have provided very close fire support. It's guns were not capable of anti-ship (moving target) fire and it was not capable of area bombardment.
The Zumwalt never had a well thought out CONOPS. Even if everything about it had worked perfectly, it was a very limited platform.
Maybe it's an oversimplification but most radars allready could be used in a counterbattery role. It's just that the data adds to much information on the screens and as missiles and aircraft have been considered as the only real threats for decades so the data is probably filtered out. While a dedicated software package would be nice having the radar tracks of more than one source available (as it's most likely the case) and overlaying it on map should be enough to get a viable firing solution. It's been done in the past without radar and ground based artillery as far as I know still practises tracing/gun laying without radar support. So it should be possibile to compute a firing solution without a multimillion and possibly untested software package.
Delete"It's just that the data adds to much information on the screens"
DeleteYou may not understand how radar, fire control, and computers work. Counterbattery is simply a software modification to enable the radar data to be manipulated in such a way as to result in a target for the guns/missiles. Information on a screen has nothing to do with it.
"radar tracks of more than one source"
Radar doesn't require multiple sources unless you're using a special bi/multi-static system. There is no triangulation, if that's what you are describing. Modern radars provide precise locations (range, bearing, elevation).
"should be possibile to compute a firing solution without a multimillion and possibly untested software package."
It's certainly possible IF YOU HAPPEN TO HAVE AN OBSERVER IN THE EXACT SPOT THE ENEMY IS. This is old hat. Automated counterbattery eliminates the need for the observer and, thus, covers the entire area out to the range of the associated weapons.
I get the impression you need to study up on modern naval and radar technology and tactics. Feel free to make extensive use of the archives!
I would think Phalanx might provide some coverage for this given C-RAM does exactly this. Too bad the LPDs don't have any.
DeleteOne would think CIWS could provide some C-RAM type protection but I've never looked into it.
DeleteC-RAM (and CIWS) is very short range as opposed to the counterbattery fires we're discussing which are, on a relative basis, much longer range.
Counterbattery calculations are much, much complicated today by cheap (relatively) course correcting fuzes that enable even 'dumb' tube artillery rounds to adjust their trajectory. Simple ballistic calculations are not guaranteed as valid firing solutions. Further, the reality that most long range fires are now assigned to long range missiles (again, there are very few rockets that do not have inertial, or GPS guidance). It is not the 1980s anymore; an observer of some sort is almost required for counter battery work.
DeleteGAB
A carrier battle group can't get within a thousand kilometres of Iran. Even with counterbattery capabilities what's a piece of junk LCS going to do?
ReplyDeleteI understand you're venting frustration and that's fine but hopefully you recognize that carriers stand off from battle zones because they have aircraft. They don't need to approach danger closely. It's not that they can't. It's just tactically wiser not to. Recall the battle of Midway.
DeleteCounterbattery, if it was available, is key to controlling and mitigating threats. Counterbattery means the enemy only gets one shot and then they're dead. That's an equitable trade in combat!
a) carrier groups probably could approach much closer than they are. They must do so while taking appropriate countermeasures for each level of the "survivability onion." Namely, signature management to avoid long-range detection, maneuvers and decoys to avoid being accurately target, a variety of electronic and kinetic means to destroy incoming projectiles that will hit, and active damage control when hit anyway. Just spitballing, consider this enumeration to be non-exhaustive.
Delete2) a smaller, more attritable LCS is much less likely to be found, targeted, hit, and destroyed. With enough operational support, a forward LCS might draw Iranian fire and expose their batteries to other sensors and fires. A few repetitions and Iran learns that LCS isn't worth it.
3) warships are lost in war. The objective is not to preserve warships at any cost, because the perfect solution to that objective is to keep the warships at home; or better yet, buried in the ground in the form of iron ore, unbuilt. The objective is to exchange warships, blood, treasure, any asset you possess, for enemy assets, at a rate that achieves your objectives at an acceptable cost without allowing the enemy to do the same. We, the people of the United States, have suffered a misalignment in our understanding of exchange rates and acceptable costs. We have become accustomed to wars that cost nothing, comparatively, and forget that they achieve even less. War is costly. Maintaining dominance as a global super power is difficult. We must occasionally pay the piper.
Mistakenly posted this as a general reply at first.
"LCS is much less likely to be found, targeted, hit, and destroyed. With enough operational support, a forward LCS might draw Iranian fire and expose their batteries"
DeleteOf course, if the LCS was much less likely to be found and targeted then they'd be much less likely to draw fire! Almost a Catch-22 there!
"people of the United States, have suffered a misalignment in our understanding of exchange rates and acceptable costs"
This is one of the major lessons of the strikes on Iran. Imagine if "we the people", in WWII, had taken the same zero-tolerance approach to casualties and timelines greater than 1 week.
It's interesting- if the LCS and Zumwalts had panned out as originally intended, they'd actually be in their element off the coast of Iran today. Of course, if we had built 30+ Zumwalts and not restarted the Burkes, then what would we have left to do the AAW and CVBG escort duties? Flt I ships that are poorly maintained and falling apart? Would the Navy have already early-retired Burkes so that modernized versions didn't threaten their shiny new Zumwalt Flt IIs, IIIs etc, like the Spruances? With the Zums price tag, surely the Navy would've wanted to ditch the "legacy" platforms, and all the cruisers and some early Burkes would likely have already joined the Brownsville fraternity (sorority?). The neverending production of Burkes without a modern replacement is getting absurd, but in retrospect, it seems like there are actually alternate versions of shipbuilding history that could be worse!!
ReplyDelete(Note: I'm NOT supporting LCS, Zumwalt, OR 40 yrs of Burkes- just noting a 'what-if' where a programs success mightve been worse than its failure.)
"if we had built 30+ Zumwalts and not restarted the Burkes, then what would we have left to do the AAW and CVBG escort duties?"
DeleteYou offer a thought provoking scenario. Of course, had the Zumwalt and LCS become fully functional, as intended, we wouldn't have needed as many Burkes for AAW and CV escort. We need large numbers of Burkes, today, because we lack other ships, not because Burkes are the best choice. Burkes are actually ill-suited as general purpose escorts and are less than optimized for AAW. They also have almost no ground fire support capability, cannot conduct MCM, and are far too expensive to risk in ASW - all tasks that the Zumwalt and LCS would excel at (assuming your alternate scenario where they were built fully functional, as intended)!
So, one could make the argument that your alternate history might have been better. Consider further: had the Zumwalt and LCS been successful, perhaps the Navy wouldn't have become so gun shy and clung to the "safety" of the Burke design. Maybe we'd have produced the other members of the family of ships that were supposed to accompany the DDG(X) such as the CG(X). You might want to read the Wiki "SC-21" topic and check out the family of ships that were supposed to have been part of the overall program. It makes fascinating reading about the family of ships!
The initial concept for the Zumwalt was "just" a stealth Spruance, with the main idea being to repeat a sucessful general purpose ASW destroyer with technological advancements and stealth for greater survivability. Unfortunate that the focus was loat, eapecially with the naval gunfire debacle.
Delete"The initial concept for the Zumwalt was "just" a stealth Spruance"
DeleteI'm sorry but that's not even remotely correct. The Zumwalt derived from the DD-21/SC-21 which was an attempt to placate Congress and the Marines regarding their anger over the Navy's abandonment of the naval fire support role. The DD-21/SC-21 and, subsequently, the Zumwalt was intended as a land attack ship. The DD-21 is often referred to as the "land attack destroyer".
While the Zumwalt has a theoretical ASW capability in that it has a sonar, the ship is in no realistic way ASW capable. The sonar is intended for mine detection and shallow water submarine detection. The ship lacks ASW torpedoes and may or may not carry VL-ASROC which is, itself, a nearly useless ASW weapon being far too short range. Finally, no sane commander would risk the $8B vessel playing tag with a submarine.
Regarding AAW, the slashed the original 32-ship requirement to zero, citing the Zumwalt's inability to counter aerial threats. The ship has NO close in AAW weapons and serious shortcomings in its AAW missile guidance. I've posted on this. The CG(X) was intended as the AAW vessel.
Zumwalt was always intended to be a land attack vessel though even that role seems not to have been well thought out (unable to perform area bombardment, for example).
While I wouldn't necessarily call the Spruance class destroyers cheap per se, Spruance cost 83 million in 1972 dollars, which works out as 675 million dollars in 2025. Which is still a fair bit more affordable than the almost 2 billion dollar Burkes we have in service. And it's not that much more expensive, relatively speaking, than ASW LCS. I am willing to spend twice the money for a significantly more capable ship!
Delete"Which is still a fair bit more affordable than the almost 2 billion dollar Burkes"
DeleteArithmetically, you're correct. However, you need to recognize WHY equivalent ships today are more expensive to build. Here's a few reasons:
-Change orders during construction have become a standard today whereas there were few with the Spruance.
-Quantities have drastically decreased today which increases costs.
-Overhead (OSHA, labor laws, gender requirements, benefits, legal, etc.) have exploded, increasing cost.
And so on. The implication of your statement (to be fair, you did not explicitly say this) is that we should be able to build a modern Spruance for $675M but, as you see, would not even be remotely possible. If you attempted to build an exact duplicate of the old Spruance today, it would cost $2B+, just as a Burke does.
Surely we can save some amount of cost by going to lower tier radars - SPY-6 costs 300 million for a full set, and that's not counting the extra costs of steel for the superstructure and man hours to fabricate. A general purpose destroyer should not need to be using an AAW-grade radar. The TRS-4D radar that LCS and various European frigates use costs only 20 million apiece, and it's a significantly lighter and easier fit than the gigantic Aegis panels.
Delete"Surely we can save some amount of cost by going to lower tier radars"
DeleteOf course we can. We can also eliminate hangars and flight decks, use small guns instead of 5"/6"/8", minimize non-radar sensors, reduce redundancy and separation, eliminate acoustic isolation, and so on but then it's no longer a modern Spruance. Remember, Spruance was top of the line for its time. It was the ASW-emphasized Burke of its time. If you want the equivalent, you pay for it.
You're taking things a little too far to the extreme - like you've said in the past, we need to spec our ships appropriately instead of just cramming in features that don't get used. Burkes have a flight deck, ASW helicopters, hull sonar and towed array sonar, but how much of that ASW gear is actually being used?
DeleteLikewise, for an ASW destroyer, its primary purpose is ASW, with ASuW and land attack via cruise missile being useful secondary roles. Does it really need an expensive AAW-grade radar? I'm not sure it does. I think it just needs a radar good enough to look to the horizon and cue interceptor missiles and point defense missiles. For that role, Sea Giraffe and TRS-4D are adequete and affordable options.
That said, I don't think you're going to get a modern Spruance counterpart at a price under a billion dollars. I'd argue that a modern Spruance should hew closer to the Hayler DDH concept. I'd want a larger helo hangar to carry 3-4 LAMPS III helos or drones, and a VLS battery of at least 64 cells. Drones, I'd use them for dropping sonobouys, helo with the dipping sonar to follow up, and we'd prosecute targets with VL ASROC-ER (an extended range ASROC is a weapon we'd need to develop, but since we're developing a 21st century Spruance anyway...)
Call it a billion, maybe 1.5 billion for a modern day clean sheet ASW destroyer. At which point, the cost comparison is no longer LCS, but Constellation, which was 1.5 billion at last report. Funnily enough, the Kidd-class destroyers, the ultimate evolution of the Spruances, would cost 1.5 billion in today's money..
With all that said...
"Of course we can. We can also eliminate hangars and flight decks, use small guns instead of 5"/6"/8", minimize non-radar sensors, reduce redundancy and separation, eliminate acoustic isolation, and so on but then it's no longer a modern Spruance."
I know you're being a little sarcastic for effect, but honestly, this is really sounding like a modern take on the Flower-class ASW corvettes, and I think there's value in having cheap oceangoing ASW escorts that can sweep for subs in the littorals and augment the carrier's screen in the open sea.
A tertiary effect is that it would give more officers opportunity for command at sea experience at a lower level. In WW2, we had Lieutenant Commanders and even Lieutenants commanding DDs and DEs. Now a DDG is commanded by a Commander at least. For many captains, their first command is a capital ship. Our fleet mix is a little imbalanced. (I'm reminded of our pre WW1 fleet, where the USN was also capital-heavy and light on the lighter escorts.)
It's unlikely you could get a modern Spruance equivalent below 1.5 billion. Sure, you can save 300 million by going to a SHORAD radar like TRS-4D or Sea Giraffe (which are adequete options on the global market, being rotating single face radars), but you're going to gain back those savings in your sonars and acoustic quieting. You'll also need to spend on RCS reduction shaping for the superstructure, because stealth it just the cost of doing business these days.
DeleteIt might be worthwhile, perhaps, to open a blogpost on what a 21st century Spruance should look like, and the approach we want to use to get there, and what we want that ship to look like - Spruance, or Hayler.
"I know you're being a little sarcastic for effect"
DeleteA little bit, yes, but not all that much. If the goal is a 4-helo ASW ship then there is no need for guns, gun magazines, land attack cruise missiles, sophisticated sensors, etc. One could also debate the value of sonar, VDS, towed arrays, acoustic isolation, etc. since, presumably, the goal of such a ship is to stand well off from the submarine threat and allow other ships or helos to do the detection and combat. This goes back to CONOPS. Is the ship's role to get up close and slug it out with submarines despite the risk? If so, you need all those things. If, on the other hand, the role is to stand off then those things are not needed.
"perhaps, to open a blogpost on what a 21st century Spruance ... or Hayler."
DeleteI'm going to give some very serious thought to doing that. Good idea!
As it is, Burkes already have hull sonars and towed arrays, and they have had some acoustic quieting. If you just deleted the AAW radar faces, I'd think you could get a smaller lighter superstructure, and then you've got a workable general purpose DD.
DeleteNot really. Two of the characteristics of a destroyer are affordability and large numbers. Even with the radar arrays removed, you're still looking at a $2B+ vessel and that's not affordable which means inadequate numbers. Aa a general purpose destroyer, it would not be an area air defense ship you would want to eliminate not only the Aegis radars but at least 32 and quite possibly 64 of the VLS. That, alone, would significantly reduce the length of the ship which is a strong step toward affordable. The smaller ship length might also allow a reduction in propulsion power, further lightening the ship and freeing up more internal volume. An engineer would have to determine that. Helos on a general purpose (not a dedicated ASW destroyer) destroyer are another debatable item which would hugely reduce cost, size, and weight.
DeleteSo, a Burke is NOT the starting point for a general purpose destroyer.
It's unlikely that any notional DD would go below the 64 VLS cells of the Spruance (though this really is somethibg for discussing in a future Spruance blogpost). Whether we like it or not, the reality is that all our warships are carryibg Tomahawk and are expected to contribute missile cells to land attack missiles. We saw it happen in the 90s - all VLS ships, Spruance, Burke, Tico, were documented performing cruise missile strikes.
DeleteAs early as 2018, CSBA was already calling for the future Tomahawk replacement to be a combined role ASCM, a cruise missile capable of land attack and antiship attack, in order to consolidate missile loads on ships.
As VLS-capable antiship missiles propagate to the fleet, there will be more of a need to fit them in. We cannot rely on the air wing to generate a massive salvo of missiles anynoree, not when the air wing is shrinking hard. A cold war Nimitz air wing had some 70 tactical aircraft capable of attacking shios, today we're down to 40-odd fighters.
"the reality is that all our warships are carryibg Tomahawk and are expected to contribute missile cells to land attack missiles."
DeleteYes and no. Yes, it seems that way because all our surface ships are Burkes which does have the land attack mission. No, that's not what a true destroyer should be doing. The reality is that the Burke is a cruiser, despite our tortured terminology, and land attack is a legitimate mission for a cruiser. If we were to build a true destroyer, land attack would not be a primary mission.
Also, we have something on the order of 2000-5000 Tomahawk missiles in inventory (need to subtract the thousand or so missiles we've just used against Iran). That's an estimate on my part but it's from examining purchasing records for the last several decades. In contrast, we have some 90 VLS ships and 40 or so VLS submarines which gives us an inventory of somewhere around 9000 VLS-Tomahawk capable cells. You can see that if war came, and assuming we filled 1/3-1/2 the cells (3000-4500) with Tomahawks, that would pretty well empty our inventory and there would be no replacements. Thus, building even more VLS-Tomahawk ships is pointless. A destroyer with AAW(ESSM)-VLS is legitimate but that only requires around 16 cells (64 quad packed ESSM). If we develop a long range VL-ASROC we can include another 8-16 cells for that. So, 64 cells is vast overspecification. Everyone thinks of VLS cells as being a weapon but they're not. They're just a launcher. Without inventory to put in them, they're just wasted space/weight.
If we ever get a VL-anti-ship missile into useful production, we can re-examine the issue but the Navy has been talking about such a missile for many years and has done nothing so I'm not holding my breath.
"Nimitz air wing had some 70 tactical aircraft capable of attacking shios, today we're down to 40-odd fighters"
Yet another Navy failing for which a long string of CNOs should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed for dereliction of duty. As with Tomahawk missiles, there are no replacements when war comes. It's worse even than just declining air with size. Most people don't realize that we don't even have enough air wings load all our carriers. We nominally have 11 carriers and only 9 air wings which means we can only put a maximum of 9 carriers into a war.
It should be noted that despite being ASW destroyers, the VLS Spruances still carried Tomahawks and performed land attack missions with these missiles.
DeleteMy completely arbitrary vibes based definition classes frigates, destroyers and cruisers based on their VLS throw weight:
- Frigate: around 32 cells.
- Destroyer: around 64 cells.
- Cruiser: around 96 cells.
For a pure ASW frigate, I'd say 32 cells is right on the money. The Japanese Akizuki-class destroyers (really, J-Eurofrigates) had 32 VLS cells, alongside 8 canisters for Type-90 SSMs (J-Harpoon). It's widely believed that the typical load was 16 cells for VLA and 16 cells for ESSM. 16 rounds of VLA seems a little overkill, perhaps, or it might well be how many rounds it takes to put down a submarine. The early Spruances with the matchbox ASROC launcher had a magazine of some two dozen missiles, afterall.
For the Burkes, 96 cells starts filling up really quick once we start loading with missiles. Consider this hypothetical loadout:
- 30 cells for land-attack Tomahawk
- 16 cells for quadpacked ESSM
- 4 cells for VL ASROC
- 16 cells for SM-3 (BMD & ASAT)
- 30 cells for SM-6 (Long range AAW & terminal BMD)
I've been told that most Burkes typically only have 8 cells wired to receive ESSM, and that the ESSM fitting needs to fill full banks of 8 cells. This strikes me as a problem that the Navy needs to fix, because this isn't the cold war, where we'd be expecting to engage Backfires at medium altitude. We really ought to expect more incoming seaskimming cruise missiles.
At the same time, we can't neglect BMD either, because the Chinese have been putting a lot of effort into their antiship ballistic missiles. We can expect that they'll be using ASBMs to attack stationary ships docked pierside, and as part of multi-axis attacks in conjuction with surface launched and air launched cruise missiles, in order to complicate the defensive picture. We'll need to have enough missiles to be able to engage both threats simultaneously.
"It should be noted that despite being ASW destroyers, the VLS Spruances still carried Tomahawks"
DeleteIt should be noted that the Spruance was the size of a WWII cruiser at 563 ft compared to, for example, an Atlanta class cruiser at 541 ft or the Cleveland class cruiser at 608 ft.
It should also be noted that the Spruance existed at a time of greatly reduced submarine threat compared to today by virtue of the much louder acoustic signatures of enemy subs and much greater availability of US ASW assets. Thus, giving a cruiser size ship a formidable ASW capability in addition to land attack was a reasonable risk. Today, making a destroyer bigger and more expensive than it needs to be when the threat and risk is much greater is foolish.
"I've been told that most Burkes typically only have 8 cells wired to receive ESSM"
I've never heard that. Where did you get that information? I need a reference.
"We really ought to expect more incoming seaskimming cruise missiles."
Quite right. I've pointed this out many times and posted on it. Instead, the Navy builds the Zumwalt with NO close in weapons! Our carriers, out most important surface ship, are woefully lacking in AAW capability.
Something to also bear in mind is that ESSM was not as pervalent in the Spruance era, and you needed a large VLS array to carry a reasonable number of interceptor missiles.
DeleteToday, quadpacked ESSM gets you 32 missiles in 8 cells, which is a reasonable number of self defense missiles, freeing up the rest of the cells for other weapons.
"If we ever get a VL-anti-ship missile into useful production, we can re-examine the issue but the Navy has been talking about such a missile for many years and has done nothing so I'm not holding my breath."
And it's not even if such missiles don't exist. Industry has already developed LRASM and JSM as VLS-held antiship missiles, but the Navy isn't committing to consistent buys of missiles to keep production lines open and build economies of sale.
Side note, all 6 FRCs appeared in Singapore today too. My unbacked hope is we see all these ships getting some added gear to fight right now. LCS surface warfare module weapons should have always been standard with the MCM module being interchangeable with VBSS boats and team for surface warfare. Among other things.
ReplyDeleteI wrote several articles long ago that the US Navy needed a least a dozen Ambassador MK III missile boats. These fast corvettes were being produced in Mississippi for export with the last one costing just $240 million in 2009 with a crew of 36 and no big explosive missiles inside. This compared to the current Burke destroyers costing $3 billion with a crew of 300. Navy officers dismissed this idea saying they were too small and could not deploy with carrier groups. The big reason is they were less profitable for the military industry. These would be perfect to send into the Strait right now to shoot up Iranian boats and slug it out with shore batteries.
ReplyDeleteType Missile boat
Displacement 600 tons [3]
Length 63 m (206 ft 8 in) [4]
Beam 10 m (32 ft 10 in)
Draft 2 m (6 ft 7 in)
Installed power 4× MTU diesels,[5] 30,000 hp (22 MW)
Propulsion 4 shafts[6]
Speed 41 knots (76 km/h)[7]
Range 2,000 nmi (3,700 km; 2,300 mi) at 15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph)
Endurance 8 days at sea
Complement 36 (8 officers, 10 chief petty officers, and 18 ratings), 38[8]
Sensors &
processing systems
Thales MRR-3D NG G band multi-role radar
Thales Scout (I/J band) Maritime Surveillance Radar
Thales STING-EO Mk2 fire control Radar
Link ASN 150, LinkYE, Link 14 and Link 11 data links
IFF
TACTICOS Combat Management System with Model 033-2T/066-2T Tracking Pedestals.
Electronic warfare
& decoys
4 × chaff/IR Decoy launchers
ESM/ECM
Armament
8 × RGM-84 Boeing Harpoon SSM Block 1G in 2 quad canister launchers
1 × OTO Melara Mk 75 76 mm/62 Super Rapid DP gun
1 × Mk 31 Mod 3 RIM-116 RAM (21 missiles)
1 × Raytheon Mk 15 Mod 21 Phalanx (Block 1B) 20 mm Phalanx CIWS
2 × deck-mounted 7.62 mm M60 machine guns[1]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lEiknOU90s
Here is the actual ABS data for Ambassador III: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/14D_NvLK7TMUUCzYANqjd1bC-Wo3atMsmD2c5QFaBW-o/edit?gid=0#gid=0
DeleteI think we've simply invested in the wrong surface navy.
ReplyDeleteWe've built a good striking force with the carriers (although the lack of a 5th gen fighter is ridiculous) and the high end Tico/Burke escorts.
But we've neglected everything else.
It's not just the lack of minesweepers.
We should have 'corvettes' designed using the WW2 destroyer escorts as a starting point.
Two versions:
1) A surface action ship designed for work close to shores and islands intended to destroy patrol boats, speed boats, barges, navalized fishing trawlers and anything else in the lines of communications in littoral waters.
2) An ASW version designed to hunt subs in shallow waters.
We should also have destroyers designed on the basis of the WW2 Gearing class, again with two versions.
1) A surface action ship armed with 5" guns, NSM, and Mk48 torpedoes, working in teams in an EMCON environment.
2) An ASW version designed to be a first class sub hunter with quieted mechanicals but w/out helicopters.
Naval artillery ships:
Thoroughly updated Iowas with 16" guns, 8" secondary, and
SRBM.
New construction heavy cruisers based on the Des Moines class with 8" rapid fire artillery and 80 or so VLS cells built in to carry Tomahawks (freeing up the Burkes to carry more Standards).
That surface fleet is what we need to dominate the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz right now, not endless R&D on unmanned fantasy.
Lutefisk
I've had this fight before, but I still have yet to find a satisfying answer—I'm not certain of my own position, either, but I'm less certain of the dissenting opinion.
DeleteBut—why do you propose making room on the big-gun battleship for SRBMs? Two weapons with totally different use cases and range profiles, so why should they be on the same boat? I can see the value of each weapon, individually, but combining them seems to take a lot of the design sacrifices you would have to make for either type of ship and make them irrelevant.
To get more specific: a big-gun BB is going to have to approach very close to the enemy, even if you use base-bleed and/or subcaliber projectiles to increase range. That means a lot of armor, stealth, ECM, escorts, operational planning, whatever to keep it safe on approach and during retreat. A lot of effort, but the payoff is that you get to flatten whatever your target was under a torrent of shells.
SRBMs are very long ranged. Do not approach--or if you do, hit a very deep target, but that gets into the target designation problem. So if you hold at long range and fire the missiles at targets found by other, front line warships, you don't need all the design considerations of a close-range bruiser, and the guns are sitting useless. If you approach to fistfighting range to use the guns, then either you blind fire the missiles at deep targets, or you waste them on near targets.
Alternative use: gun BBs approach while SRBMs wait at extreme range. Once the jig is up, the BBs are detected, and the enemy begins taking countermeasures, fire the SRBMs to open the gates for the BBs—hit sensors, weapons, whatever that the BBs can designate from up close. The BBs sail in and do their thing. Since you don't have to make room for SRBMs, the BBs can be smaller (easier to armor, less costly), or pack more guns, or more ammunition, or more air defense. The SRBM boats don't have to waste a bunch of space on guns they never use, and get to stick with 1-2 5" guns or whatever they have for contingency use.
The dissent I'll offer against myself is that sometimes you just need flexibility, and SRBMs aren't huge monsters like Dark Eagle. Maybe they could fit into VLS and therefore take up space that was already baked into the design for air defense, when battlefield conditions don't require so much air defense. And maybe you only want one class of warship designed to get up close, and you need SRBMs to hit targets in depth, requiring a close and dangers firing point. But still, isn't that more suitable for subs, if you're already so far away that you'll have to use offboard target designation?
"We should also have destroyers designed on the basis of the WW2 Gearing class"
DeleteYou keep coming back to this and I'm not sure how literal you mean this. If you just mean the general concept of the Gearing but thoroughly modernized (meaning an entirely new hull, not a Gearing hull) then fine. If you mean it a bit more literally, such as use the same hull, then you have a severe problem. The Gearing hull/superstructure is not suitable for modern combat.
Tell me just how literal you mean for this.
"why do you propose making room on the big-gun battleship for SRBMs?"
DeleteI can't speak for Lutefisk but one good argument for mounting SRBMs on a battleship is simply that it would have the room. No other ship would have the room unless you build a dedicated SRBM ship.
Another argument for SRBMs on a BB is that the bulk of a BB's time would be spent nowhere near an enemy (witness WWII BB experience) so it would be useful to still have a thousand+ mile weapon available to maximize the usefulness of the BB.
Another argument for is the survivability of the BB. Assuming the BB is properly designed, with the SRBM's enclosed in armor, it would be the most survivable option for mounting SRBMs at sea.
Arguments against include the impact on armor/survivability by creating penetrations if a suitable armor scheme can't be designed (I have my doubts) and the fact that SRBMs are fairly large and would consume a potentially disproportionate amount of space.
The ultimate answer would depend on what other ship types one is willing to build and what long range strike concept of operations the overall military has (AF and land based versus ship based).
"Another argument for SRBMs on a BB is that the bulk of a BB's time would be spent nowhere near an enemy (witness WWII BB experience) so it would be useful to still have a thousand+ mile weapon available to maximize the usefulness of the BB."
DeleteI think this is the key argument I've been missing. If a battleship's time and effort could be perfectly optimized, such that it never spent any "downtime" where 100% of the crew wasn't already busy with either repair/recovery or gun combat, then sure. SRBMs are a waste of space.
But that won't be the case. It will spend quite a lot of time sailing. It will have a large crew for the damage control contingency + simple fact that combat requires more manpower than sailing, so they'll be doing nothing while repositioning. It will also have downtime where it is fully combat capable, waiting on other ships, or the opportunity for a near strike hasn't presented itself.
So realistically, being ready and able to provide long-range missile support would be helpful. Perhaps a better vision of the Navy's "distributed lethality" idea. If it doesn't hurt the core mission, it would be nice to have more options for missile shooters when a sensor finds a target.
"I can't speak for Lutefisk but one good argument for mounting SRBMs on a battleship is simply that it would have the room. No other ship would have the room unless you build a dedicated SRBM ship. "
DeleteI should also add, PrSM is smaller than TLAM, and is considered an SRBM. I don't know if the exhaust is too much for Mk41 to handle, but size wise, it fits. So, you could probably put a few on any VLS-capable warship, for the sake of contingency, so long as it doesn't negatively impact their primary mission.
All of this supposes there is a value in ballistic missiles over various types (LO, hypersonic) of cruise missiles. I am inclined to believe so, if only to increase the breadth of threats an enemy will face.
"they'll be doing nothing while repositioning"
DeleteOne assumes that, as in WWII, the large crews will be well occupied conducting daily combat drills, practicing damage control, maintaining weapons and sensors, and, if total boredom sets in, removing rust and doing corrosion control!
In war, ships will be running with partially (or fully?) manned battle stations at all times because when a missile unexpectedly appears at the horizon, you don't have time to go to GQ. If you're not already there, you're going to die. This is a key difference from WWII where speeds were so much slower that you had time to prepare when "surprised" by the enemy. So, I don't think there will be any downtime or "doing nothing" by the crew.
Sure, I can accept that rebuke. I meant, doing nothing in the sense that they can quickly reorient towards a new, higher priority task—you can't volley PrSM while trying to maintain discretion 120 miles off Hainan, not without likely sacrificing discretion; but you could drop a damage control drill if a target of opportunity is found by the drone net.
Delete"Sure, I can accept that rebuke."
DeleteNot meant as a rebuke, at all. Just pointing out that we need to readjust some of our paradigms. We've become used to peacetime manning and, worse, peacetime crew activities which include everything EXCEPT a total focus on combat and maintenance.
We've gotten used to crew sizing that is woefully undersized. That undersizing is achieved by foregoing combat and maintenance. When war comes, we'll relearn proper crew sizing and activities.
It is up to us as naval observers and analysts to make sure we recognize our flawed, modern paradigms and look to actual combat (like WWII) for the relevant lessons.
"You keep coming back to this and I'm not sure how literal you mean this."
DeleteWhat I mean by starting with the Gearing is that is the template, the beginning point.
The Gearing was a solid, seaworthy design.
I like it's length at 390' and its beam at 41', its draft at 14', and its tonnage at 2600 standard tons and full weight at 3500.
Then start making modernizing adaptations.
Replace the boilers, turbines, and reduction gearing with LM2500 gensets and electric drive motors. It's really hard to find total weights for everything but it looks like it's a 1000 ton tradeoff while doubling the amount of MW/HP. It just needs to be made to fit.
Then the hull structure. This is where the hull can be shaped for stealthy advantage (assuming no significant loss of seakeeping or hydrodynamic efficiency).
Their is no reason that the WW2 superstructure would need to be used, utilize a stealthy shaping.
As for armaments, remove the 5"/38 guns, 40mm guns and mounts, 20mm guns and mounts, 10 torpedoes plus launchers and deckhouse, two racks of depth charges and k-guns, weight savings of about 250 tons by my best estimate.
Add back 5"/62 unmanned turrets, 2 x SeaRAM, 4 x Phalanx, 2 x Goalkeepers, 1 x MK29 launcher w/eight ESSM, 8 x naval strike missiles in canister launchers, 6 x MK48 torpedoes with launchers, also about 250 tons.
Replace the WW2 radars, sonar, and fire directors with modern emphasizing EO/IR sensors, TRS 3D rotating flat panels, SLQ-32 ECM, and AN/SQS-53c sonar.
Increase hull thickness, possibly using closed cell steel foam at 1/3 the weight of steel and kevlar at 1/5 the weight of steel in a layered system.
The added weight of the hull/bulkheads and transverse bulkheads and the possible extra weight of fire control systems might require adding a couple of feet of beam to maintain reserve buoyancy, but I don't know how to calculate that.
The increased SHP to the screws (60k to 80k) should mitigate performance loss from any additional beam.
So why use the Gearing with all these changes?
It is a good design and starting with stated dimensions requires decisions to be made as to what changes would be allowed.
Without that discipline it is easy to end up with a 10,000 ton Burke that costs $3 billion each.
Using a Gearing as the starting point and keeping the changes reasonable keeps the ship small, the mission limited, the crew size manageable, and the cost affordable.
Anyway, that is my thinking on the matter...for what it's worth as a non-navy layman here.
Lutefisk
I didn't mention the ASW version in the above post.
DeleteThe ASW Gearing would replace the 'B' and 'C' turrets with ASROC box launchers.
The fantail would get a variable depth sonar.
Both the ASuW and ASW could probably benefit from a towed array.
I don't know the $ cost or weight cost of rafting and quieting equipment, but the ASW version would certainly get that and possible the ASuW version as well.
Lutefisk
"that is my thinking on the matter"
DeleteFair enough and quite reasonable. In WWII, the Navy went from the single 5" to the dual mounts. I wonder if a dual 5"/62 would be appropriate in your design?
"ASROC box launchers."
DeleteWe desperately need a significantly longer ranged ASROC in order to get the most out of the weapon.
"The fantail would get a variable depth sonar."
VDS equipment is fairly large. I don't know whether we could fit it in the very limited stern space.
You might consider pod propulsion to eliminate gearboxes (seemingly a chronic failure point for the Navy), shafts, points of flooding (seals and bulkhead penetrations), etc.
"...why do you propose making room on the big-gun battleship for SRBMs?"
DeleteWhat my thinking here is that it's a weapon system that the Navy should probably have and the battleships would be a good place to put them without needing to build another ship/platform for it.
Keep in mind that the ATACMS (500lb warhead - 186 mile range) and Precision Strike Missile (200lb warhead - 310 mile range) are fired out of a HIMARS or M270 launch system.
HIMARS are mounted on a truck and M270 is simply a double HIMARS.
You could fit a number of them between the funnels of the Iowas and not interfere with the workings of the ships' primary functions.
My original thought was to use Tomahawks in VLS cells, but that would necessitate penetrating the armored citadel to accommodate the 25' depth of the system. CNO and an anon poster had cautioned becoming the HMS Hood, which was a healthy criticism.
The SRBM can be mounted above the bomb deck in its own armored enclosure with blow out panels, etc...
The purpose is to make the Iowa class a more independent weapon system.
The value of the big ships is to perform missions to free up the aircraft carriers to do other jobs.
The SRBM might not be all that useful against China in the SCS.
But against Iran, or Venezuela, or the Houthis it would be nice to have that range.
The ability to reach out and touch at 300 miles might obviate the need to have an aircraft carrier battle group sitting around off those coasts when an Iowa could do the job instead.
Lutefisk
Do we really need an armored battleship to be an SRBM carrier tho?
DeleteAs ComNavOps pointed out several years ago, a surface ship firing ballistic missiles will be firing them from some 1000 miles away. That is far outside the range of immediate counterbattery by any enemy. Even if detected and backtraced, by the time retaliatory fires are on the way, the ship has already departed from its firing position. It doesn't seem that necessary for missile carrier ships to be heavily armored.
Incidentally, for a time the Indian Navy deployed their nuclear deterrant on surface ships, while waiting for their ballistic missile submarines to enter service,
"As ComNavOps pointed out several years ago, a surface ship firing ballistic missiles will be firing them from some 1000 miles away. That is far outside the range of immediate counterbattery by any enemy. Even if detected and backtraced, by the time retaliatory fires are on the way, the ship has already departed from its firing position. It doesn't seem that necessary for missile carrier ships to be heavily armored."
DeleteShort-Range Ballistic Missile, SRBM. As Lutefisk just laid out above, we're talking 300 mile range for PrSM or 180 for ATACMS, which is much more likely to be fired on. Furthermore, they could also be useful picking at targets in enemy depth--rather than fired from maximum range to hit the periphery of the enemy, they could conduct counterbattery during a gun engagement. While the guns engage a submarine base about twenty miles away, for instance, the missiles are fired at an air field 200 miles further inland. Illustrative example only.
Longer ranged missiles, like the DF-21, I would strongly advocate against deployment on heavily armored gun-centric warships. They take up too much space, you can't share any other sort of mission. You won't need them at all for most gun missions. And heavy armor would help less with protection at extreme range; at close range, armor could absorb gun hits, some antiship missiles, and CIWS interceptions that came a little too late; but at extreme range, the only missiles that have a chance of hitting you are the ballistic missiles with ridiculously heavy warheads and high kinetic energy, and the better countermeasure is to just focus on not getting hit.
Always some armor, of course, for the sake of contingency.
"DF-21, I would strongly advocate against deployment on heavily armored gun-centric warships. They take up too much space,"
DeleteInteresting. I assume you, like everyone else, is in favor of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles on pretty much every ship including the "heavily armored gun-centric warships" you mention. That being the case, how is it different carrying ballistic missiles instead of, or in addition to, cruise missiles? Is it just a question of size? Consider ... if it takes, say, ten cruise missiles to ensure one hit against a competent peer enemy but a ballistic missile "with ridiculously heavy warheads and high kinetic energy" is a nearly assured hit, perhaps the ballistic missile actually takes up LESS space per hit than cruise missiles!
The alternative to ship based ballistic missiles is land based and the obvious problem there is that they are more or less a "fixed" location and subject to attack. Guam, for instance, might be a place to site ballistic missiles but the storage locations, launchers, etc. would be likely and easy targets.
I'm not suggesting that ballistic missiles only be mounted on ships. As with most things military, dispersal and alternatives are the preferred approach. Land and ships. The point is that I see no good reason to exclude ballistic missiles from ships. Of course, one can certainly debate which ship type should carry them. A BB? A dedicated ballistic missile arsenal ship? Something else?
"You could fit a number of them between the funnels of the Iowas and not interfere with the workings of the ships' primary functions."
DeleteCaution, here. As you noted, there is currently no ship launcher for the ballistic missiles you're talking about. One would have to be developed as literally mounting a HIMARS/M270 on a ship is not viable. You also neglect the issue of reloads. A BB that can only fire one or two dozen missiles is not very effective. It would need to be able to launch hundreds which means a magazine and reload mechanism both of which require deck penetration which impacts the integrity of the armor scheme. An armored "turret" mechanism similar to the 16" gun mounts could be developed but now you're talking major weight, stability, and cost concerns.
So many people just casually talk about plopping weapons on ships without considering the real world factors. Does this alter your thinking any or do you have a solution?
"I wonder if a dual 5"/62 would be appropriate in your design?"
DeleteIt's an interesting question.
The Navy's 5" guns have a ready rack of 20 rounds that can be fired in a minute...a round every 3 seconds.
A single mount would save some weight in place of a dual mount.
But I would still lean towards the dual mount.
The ASuW version would be intended to engage enemy warships with its 5" guns.
Of course, it is artillery. There is a certain randomness as to where the rounds will impact within the beaten zone.
The dual mounts, assuming all three turrets were unmasked, should be able to land 20 rounds every 10 seconds.
That seems to give a high probability of a hit at the beginning of an engagement.
When providing NGFS, the same advantage would apply. The ship could rain 5" shells on a target, shock and awe at its finest.
As long as space and weight limits were not exceeded, I would prefer the dual mounts.
Lutefisk
"You might consider pod propulsion..."
DeleteThat is a really interesting idea.
The use of electric motors, as I understand it, would eliminate the gearboxes.
But getting rid of the shafts and associated hull penetrations would be really beneficial.
IIRC, the HMS Prince of Wales was struck in the screws by an aerial torpedo. The no longer gyroscopic spinning of the shaft breached the hull and tore open the watertight compartments along its length, letting in the sea for the length of the damage.
I don't know much about the pods, but as an electrically powered ship they would only need the cabling from inside the hull.
I wonder how much they can be quieted for ASW applications?
Lutefisk
"VDS equipment is fairly large. I don't know whether we could fit it in the very limited stern space."
DeleteI didn't consider that it would be so large. It's kind of like when I discovered AN/SQS-53c sonar weighed 30 tons.
I suppose a solution could be to eliminate the rear ASROC launcher.
I would be concerned that doing that would put more pressure on the fore/aft balance of the ship. The Sumner/Gearings were already considered a bit bow heavy when they went with the dual 5" guns on a Fletcher bow designed for single mounts forward.
This would likely be compounded by the need, as you had also stated, for a longer range ASROC.
That would almost surely require a larger/longer rocket, which would add weight to the forward ASROC launcher.
Another possibility would be to reduce the 'A' turret to a single mount, or even a 76mm OTO Melara for the ASW Gearing.
The frustrations of weapons designs....
I'll need to get Smedley working on the weight balances.
Lutefisk
"put more pressure on the fore/aft balance of the ship. The Sumner/Gearings were already considered a bit bow heavy"
DeleteThis gets back to my caution/question about the degree of "literality" you intend. Weights and space can be adequately addressed IN A NEW DESIGN HULL. If you want to use an exact (or close facsimile) of the Gearing hull, you're constrained by the limitations of that hull.
By the way, have you ever looked at the vertical dimension of a Fletcher/Gearing destroyer at the stern? It is not much! Trying to fit equipment for towed arrays, VDS, unmanned assets, turret mounts, or whatever else is a daunting exercise in packaging! The inevitable clash of concept/desires with reality is often ugly!
"Interesting. I assume you, like everyone else, is in favor of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles on pretty much every ship including the "heavily armored gun-centric warships" you mention. That being the case, how is it different carrying ballistic missiles instead of, or in addition to, cruise missiles?"
DeleteA good argument, but a mistaken assumption. I do not favor Tomahawk on a gun-centered warship. A gun-armed warship makes a lot of sacrifices to be able to get very close to the enemy and use its guns. Long-range weapons systems would not make use of that capability. But, as I conceded in this comment chain, I could see the value of a small number of long-range effectors for the sake of contingency, so long as it does not inflict a loss of mission.
Long-ranged weapons like Tomahawk, DF-21, or LRHW, I have no problem with mounting on warships, bases, or aircraft if possible. Dispersal, like you say. I just don't think they should be mounted on the same boat that carries the born-again Mark 7 16" guns; if they are, for the sake of contingency, then the battery should be small and only take up room that wasn't being used anyways.
A battery of shorter ranged missiles that complement the range of the guns could be valuable. PrSM with a dedicated, shortened launcher to reduce volume. Anti-ship missiles, of course. A subsonic cruise missile like TLAM, that is either smaller or carries a heavier warhead in exchange for a shorter range. These weapons fit in the needed range bracket—counterbattery or preparatory fire to support a gun bombardment mission. If you need 1,000 mile strikes to support the gun bombardment mission, bring a spare boat designed for that purpose.
"By the way, have you ever looked at the vertical dimension of a Fletcher/Gearing destroyer at the stern? It is not much!"
DeleteIt is very small. I've always assumed that it is to accommodate the screws and hydrodynamic flow.
Of course, the physical limitations help keep the design under control...but sometimes it's probably just not worth it. It depends on what is trying to be accomplished I suppose.
Lutefisk
As an amendment to the above comments, the idea you proposed of the pod propulsion might actually create additional fantail space on the Gearing hull.
DeleteLutefisk
" pod propulsion might actually create additional fantail space on the Gearing hull."
DeleteIf you look at a side profile of the Gearing (or any ship) you see that the shaft penetrations are not directly under the stern where you might think they would be, but much further forward. What IS directly under the stern is the rudder(s) and, therefore, the rudder machinery (steering) is in the stern. How much room the leaves for any other gear such as arrays, VDS, etc. is unknown. You'd have to see a schematic of the vessel. I'll just say that there is no extra space in a ship so any new equipment you want to put in the stern will require something to be moved or removed.
As I often say, people casually discuss placing all manner of equipment on ships but never consider the real world space considerations. Just something to keep in mind.
As I've had time to think about all the things that we've discussed here, the basic difficulty with this entire ship design problem is the way the navy conducts its day to day business.
DeleteI think that the CNO change from months long deployments to simulated combat missions is a profundity that would alter much of what the Navy does.
There seem to be very few completely new designs, everything is based on something previous.
So why not a Gearing based design?
They are proven designs, combat tested under the most extreme conditions.
Well, one of the reasons is that it's 'old'. People want something that is 'new and improved', something that solves all the problems with the old designs, not considering that there will be a whole host of new problems, of course.
But the biggest hurdle, the real issue, is that the Gearings would be seen as small, cramped, and uncomfortable for a volunteer navy crew.
Well, they would be if they were going to be on months long deployments.
But not if the ships were used for simulated combat missions with defined purposes and end dates.
With a complement of 350, the WW2 Gearings were pretty cramped. But without the massive crews needed to man and feed the 40mm and 20mm mounts. Without the large gun crews on the 5" mounts. Without the labor intensive boilers...how many crew would you really need?
The need would be to have enough crew to have full manning of crew stations at all times.
I don't know what that number would be, but I suspect it would be an amount that would allow for reasonable berthing accommodations for limited term missions.
But as long as the Navy is doing these long deployments, ships will need to be larger than they would be if they were simply designed for combat.
Lutefisk
"how many crew would you really need?"
DeleteIt depends on whether you think the ship is worth conducting damage control to try to save when it gets hit. If you're going to abandon it at the first serious hit, as is the official Navy position regarding the LCS, then you don't need many at all. If you're going to neglect corrosion control and on board maintenance and routine repair and defer all casualty reports and associated maintenance as is the official Navy policy, then you don't need many at all.
On the other hand, if you want to conduct damage control, save the ship, keep the ship reasonably corrosion free, well-maintained, and have the capability to on board ship repairs then you need a sizable crew.
After I wrote that I realized that I had deleted the damage control portion of crew manning as I was editing it and forgot to add it back in.
DeleteI decided not to add yet another post to amend. I realize I should have.
Lutefisk
To explain what I mean by 'based on the WW2 Gearing' for example....
ReplyDeleteI would have a naval architecture CAD program and an AI assistant that would facilitate my use of it.
The AI assistant would be British and name Smedley.
It would have somehow gotten the idea that I am of British nobility.
Our interactions would sound something like this:
Me: Smedley?
Smedley: Yes, your grace?
Me: Pull up the plans for the American Gearing class destroyer, if you would please.
Smedley: Jolly good show, sir. What will we be doing with it today?
Me: We will be designing a modern destroyer, using it as a basis.
Smedley: What a smashingly good idea! How would you like to start?
Me: Let's being by removing the boilers replacing the propulsion with LM2500 turbo-electric gensets and electric motors to drive the screws.
Etc., etc....
Lutefisk
One thread running through all of this is the need for a far more diversified surface force.
ReplyDeleteOne could conclude that’s but they also need a plan of action.
DeleteAlso needed is groups of ships in production that aren’t changed mid design or production. Say produce 4 of x equipment and configuration and move on to the next iteration
"groups of ships in production that aren’t changed"
DeleteYes! This is exactly how the WWII Fletchers were built and how changes were incorporated.
In a recent podcast, CAVASSHIPS Podcast [Mar 13, ’26] Ep: 234 Deep Dive on Navy's Mine Countermeasure Capabilities, Rear Admiral (retired) Ted LeClair and Captain (retired) Elliott Donald, basically pinky swore that all three LCSs in the ME had the Mine Warfare module installed and they worked superbly. Cough, cough.
ReplyDeleteI guess I'll be skipping that fantasy podcast!
DeleteAdjectival inflation is common these days.
DeleteIconic, Legendary and Awesome don't mean as much.
So "Superb" = marginally effective in old money.