Sunday, February 13, 2022

Washington Versus Kirishima Lessons

The night engagement between the Japanese battleship Kirishima and the US battleship Washington was one of only two battleship vs. battleship engagements in the WWII Pacific fighting.  The end result was the sinking of Kirishima by the Washington.  There are a host of lessons for us, today.  Let’s take a look.

 

There are many descriptions of the battle available in books, on the Internet, and in the public domain.  A comprehensive description of the entire battle is available on line [2] so I’ll not cover it in detail, here.

 

 

USS Washington



US Order of Battle

 

Battleship Force, Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr.

 

Washington (Capt.  Glen Davis), BB

South Dakota (Capt. Thomas Gatch), BB

 

Destroyer Screen, Cdr. Thomas Fraser

 

Walke, DD

Benham, DD

Preston, DD

Gwin, DD

 

 

Japanese Order of Battle

 

Japanese Forces Emergency Bombardment Force

Bombardment Unit, VAdm Kondo Nobutake

 

Atago, CA

Takao, CA

Kirishima, BB

Nagara, CL

Ikazuchi, DD

Samidare, DD

 

Direct Escort Unit RAdm Tamotsu Takama

 

Asagumo, DD

Shirayuki, DD

Hatsuyuki, DD

Teruzuki, DD

 

Sweeping Unit RAdm Shintaro Hashimoto

 

Sendai, CL

Ayanami, DD

Shikinami, DD

Uranami, DD

 

 

Following are some very brief battle highlights and notes.  The times listed are taken from Reference 2, however, it should be noted that I have other sources that list different times for the same events.  Other than placing the events in the proper sequence, the exact times are irrelevant so this is not an issue. 

  • The US destroyers were arranged in a line ahead formation, 5000 yds ahead of the two battleships which were, themselves, separated by 2000 yds.
  • South Dakota obtains first radar contact at 0008 hrs, 18,300 yds distant.
  • Washington obtains first radar contact at 0000 hrs, 19,600 yds distant.
  • Washington opens fire at 0016 hr
  • South Dakota opens fire at 0017 hr
  • Walke, at 0018 hr, leading the destroyer line, veers out of line, unordered and without communicating, and engages various targets before being quickly sunk
  • Benham, second in line, nearly ran over Walke, was torpedoed and knocked out of action; survived
  • Preston, third in line, engaged various targets but was hit several times and abandoned ship at 0033 hr
  • Gwin, fourth and last in line, engages various targets and is ordered to withdraw at 0045 hr by Lee
  • Washington passes burning Preston at 0035 hr keeping on dark side
  • South Dakota passes on the light side of the burning destroyers and is illuminated and taken under fire at 0049 hr
  • South Dakota loses track of Washington around 0056 hr
  • Washington begins engagement with Kirishima at 0100 hr
  • South Dakota loses radio aerials around 0102 hr;  unable to co-ordinate with Washington and loses track of Washington
  • Washington loses track of South Dakota around 0117 hr and passes up many possible targets due to fear of friendly fire

 

 Hits - The best analysis shows the Kirishima having suffered 20x 16” hits and 17x 5” hits.[1]

 

 

 

Lessons

 

Target Identification and IFF.  The common theme in the battle (and war in general !) is uncertainty.  Many shots were passed up due to uncertainty about target identification.  There are multiple ways to deal with identification during battle but all depend on experience, procedures, and doctrine which can only come from repeated, realistic exercises where confusion [intentionally] reigns.

 

Doctrine can be a major aid to identification.  If everyone knows what everyone else will do and where everyone else will be, identification (or non-identification) becomes easier.  For example, if doctrine had dictated that the escorting destroyers, upon contact, should fire torpedoes and then immediately head away from the enemy on a perpendicular course, thus clearing the way for the battleships to fire without worry about friendly fire or misidentification, the battle would have been simpler and, likely, more successful.

 

 

Engagement Time. 

 

Demonstrating the brevity of engagement time, here is Washington’s elapsed time (min:sec) sequence of fire versus Kirishima.

 

2:39 ; 39x 16” (equivalent of 4-1/3 complete salvoes)

1:30  check fire

2:45 ; 36x 16” (equivalent of 4 complete salvoes)

 

Total engagement time = 5:24 ; 75x 16”, 107x 5”

 

Washington’s main battery fire was rapid for the initial two minutes thirty nine seconds, firing thirty nine 16-inch projectiles.  Main battery fire was checked for one minute thirty seconds based on an erroneous report that the target had been sunk.  Fire was resumed for two minutes forty five seconds, firing thirty six 16-inch projectiles. 

 

The total engagement time was a mere 5:24 during which Washington fired seventy five main caliber rounds and 107 5-inch AA common rounds between 0100 hr and 0107 hr.

 

As we demonstrated in the missile attack analysis post (see, “Missile Attack Analysis”), engagements, regardless of weapon or platform speed, tend to be very short.  The Washington’s engagement with Kirishima lasted a grand total of 5:24 (only 6:54 even with the check fire period).  We need to recognize this fact of naval combat and rethink our combat methodology.  We need to ensure that we can ‘cram’ the maximum offensive firepower into the shortest possible time.  As I have so often pointed out, having ten thousand VLS cells does no good for an 87 second engagement.  We also need to be prepared to exert maximum effective defensive firepower in the shortest possible time.  In other words, we need systems that can operate effectively in an utterly chaotic, extremely brief period.  Our current obsessive desire to obtain complete information and absolute target surety is antithetical to the reality of combat.

 

Naval weapons are so powerful and so concentrated in usage that either an attack will be quickly defeated or it will quickly succeed and the target will be destroyed.  The days of long, drawn out engagements with continuous attacks are likely over if for no other reason than the lack of offensive weapon inventories of any significant size.  A US ship has, at best, around 8 anti-ship missiles without counting Standard missiles that aren’t really anti-ship weapons.  Thus, US ships cannot sustain an attack even if they wanted to.

 

The brevity of engagement was also demonstrated by the fate of the American destroyers.  The US destroyers were all sunk or put out of action in a matter minutes.

 

In ten minutes of furious action, Task Force 64’s destroyers were out of the fight.[3]

 

 

Doctrine/Tactics/Training.  None of the US ships had ever worked or trained together and they had no doctrine to fall back on.

 

The admiral was concerned about his destroyers.  They had been chosen almost randomly from TF 16’s screen because they had the most fuel remaining in their bunkers;  no two were of the same class, no two of the same division, and they had never operated together before. … The same could be said of the battleships.  Although both were administratively part of BatDiv 6, until this operation they had never worked together, a fact that was to have its consequences.[3]

 

All reports mention losing targets as they passed into the visual shadow of surrounding islands.  This illustrates the need to exercise under every conceivable condition so as to learn how to deal with atypical situations and conditions.  In contrast, the Navy’s current exercises are all identical, set-piece, scripted works that are conducted under perfect conditions (for safety).  We must accept the risk of exercises under poor and uncontrolled conditions because those are the conditions under which we’ll fight real battles.

 

Pre-WWII live fire night battle exercises would have revealed that the blindingly bright, flashing powder used by the US offered perfect aim points for the Japanese.  In contrast, the Japanese used flashless powder which provided very little illumination and aim points.  There’s just no getting around it – you absolutely must train for every conceivable – and inconceivable – situation.

 

South Dakota, in a display of pure ignorance of combat conditions, passed the burning US destroyers on the lit side, thereby silhouetting itself against the flames and providing the Japanese with perfect aiming.  This was utter lack of tactical training.

 

South Dakota’s Number 3 main turret set the ship’s Kingfisher scout planes on fire, offering the Japanese yet another aim point.  Again, live fire exercises would, presumably, have revealed this vulnerability.

 

Poor training and tactics caused South Dakota to receive 42 hits of various calibers, 38 dead, an 60 wounded.

 

 

Gunnery.  RAdm. Lee’s passion for gunnery excellence was renowned aboard the Washington.  He established a ‘gun club’ of officers who lived and breathed gunnery.[3, p.81]  They understood that there was no point to Washington’s existence if the ship and crew could not hit what they were aiming at.  Live fire drills of some type occurred daily.

 

In contrast, most ships in the Navy today average less than one live fire exercise per year.  Many crew come and go without ever experiencing a live fire event.

 

 

Commander’s Intent.  The Washington officers were thoroughly briefed.

 

After dinner in the wardroom, all officers not on watch were asked to remain, and there followed a detailed briefing by Ching Lee and Glenn Davis on the probably events of the morrow.  … Everything was addressed, from battle formations to pyrotechnics, damage control, gunnery, navigation, and feeding the men at general quarters.[3]

 

For the Washington’s crew, everything was understood.  The same could not be said for the rest of the ships in the task force.

 

 

Communications.  Washington received reconnaissance reports from PT boats which had spotted the Japanese force, however, the reports were coded using a newer code that Washington did not have.  Thus, RAdm. Lee was unable to decipher or take advantage of the PT boat reports.

 

South Dakota lost all her radio aerials and was out of communication with Washington and RAdm. Lee.  This graphically demonstrates that the wise commander will make every effort to eliminate the need for communications during a battle.  Communications, even when successful, are often (usually?) subject to confusion and misinterpretation (for example, “The world wonders”, from Leyte Gulf ).  The best communication is no communication but that requires extensive drills and doctrine.

 

 

Inevitable Confusion.  As the American task force entered Ironbottom Sound, each ship’s magnetic compasses began spinning wildly, the result of the many wrecks littering the ocean floor.[3, p.116]  The Task Force was able to maintain dead reckoning until the effect faded away.

 

Early in the engagement, Washington believed that enemy land based gun emplacements had opened fire on them and the task force replied with 5” gunfire directed at the shoreline.  However, there were no land based guns.  The fire was from Japanese destroyers.


Confusion in battle is not to be feared.  It is to be accepted and embraced.  Just as the US Army once owned the night, we need to own the confusion of battle and master it by training with confusion as an intentional, integral part of every exercise we do.  We need to become comfortable with confusion.

 

 

Technology Dependency and Failures.  The Task Force had a theoretical radar advantage over the Japanese, however, it was negated by the surroundings and fear of friendly fire.

 

The closely confined waters of Ironbottom Sound had partially negated TF 64’s radar advantage … It was difficult to separate the radar echoes between ships and the land mass … [3]

 

The South Dakota chief engineer had tied the ship’s circuit breakers down which, in effect, put the entire electrical system in series.  As South Dakota absorbed otherwise harmless 5” hits, the concussion overloaded the system and the ship lost all electrical power.


Technology will always fail.  The only question is to what extent.  The wise naval force will train to accept those failures and fight on.  In addition to training, this requires backup systems of a completely different nature from the primary.  If our current radar fire control fails, what is our backup fire control system?  We don’t have any.

 


 

 

Conclusion

 

We cannot keep ignoring the lessons of history.  Washington’s engagement offers numerous lessons that are completely relevant today and yet the Navy has no interest in studying and applying the lessons.  When we compare today’s naval force structure, strategy (none), doctrine (none), tactics (none), and training (nothing useful) to the lessons from Washington’s engagement, the disconnect between the fleet and reality becomes painfully evident.

 

The Navy must begin studying their own history.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

 

[2]http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Battleship_Action_Guadalcanal.pdf

 

[3]Musicant, Ivan, “Battleship at War”, Avon Books, 1986, ISBN 0-380-70487-0


Wednesday, February 9, 2022

Ford Deployment Farce

We’re all well familiar with the saga of the Ford’s problems.  Now, the Navy appears determined to add further embarrassment to the Ford’s saga with an upcoming ‘deployment’.  Ford has missed numerous schedule deadlines, the most recent being a scheduled 2018 deployment, itself long delayed for a ship that was launched in 2013, years behind schedule and commissioned in 2017, again, years behind schedule.  Having missed the 2018 scheduled deployment, it is now 2022, nine years after launching and five years after commissioning and the ship is still not deployable.  What’s a Navy to do?  Well, in typical Navy fashion, they’re going to send the Ford on a fake public relations ‘deployment’, as they did for the first LCS.  This year, Ford,

 

… will conduct a “service-retained early employment” period where the Navy keeps full control over the ship’s activities and schedule, Rear Adm. John Meier said.[1]

 

Huh?  A ‘service-retained early employment’?  What’s that?  An ‘employment’ rather than a deployment?  What will this deployment employment do?  According to the Navy,

 

The carrier and its strike group will operate on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean alongside a long list of foreign navies, he [RAdm. Meier] said.

 

2nd Fleet’s sent out a ton of invitations, done a huge amount of work of inviting partners and allies to come and interact with Ford … [1]

 

So, this ‘employment’ will be a glorified air show cruise put on to entertain foreign navies?

 

But wait, it gets better.  Faced with a continuing multitude of problems, the Ford will ‘employ’ with only a partial air wing.

 

The air wing will be a robust, fully capable air wing, but smaller than an operational carrier air wing, … But that air wing is going to be more potent than any other air wing on any other ship in the world as it is,” Meier said.[1]

 

So, a partial air wing on a carrier with unreliable – bordering on non-functional - catapults, arresting gear, elevators, dual band radar, self-defense system, etc. is going to be ‘more potent than any other air wing on any other ship in the world’ ?  That’s some first class delusion or lying. 

 

Do you have to be a born liar to be an Admiral or can you learn on the job?

 

But wait, it gets better (you kind of knew this was coming, didn’t you?).  Because the arresting gear has a current failure rate of once every 36 traps (see, “Ford Reliability”), the carrier can’t operate its aircraft out of sight of land because the aircraft have to be able to frequently divert to land bases.  So, the ‘employment’ will have to be conducted near land or risk losing aircraft ditching in the sea because they can’t trap back aboard.

 

The Navy’s newest carrier can’t operate out of sight of land?  Well, that’s embarrassing!

 

“Honey, I’m going on deployment but I’ll be back in time for dinner!”

 

 

Well, with all that in mind, I’m looking forward to the Ford’s first deployment … uh, I mean ‘employment’ … uh, no, I mean ‘service-retained early … ‘  …  …  uh, I don’t know what I mean … but neither does the Navy.

 

 

Related note:  The Navy is hoping for the first real deployment in 2024 but that has almost zero chance of happening given the nearly non-functional state of the various major systems.  Even if, by some miracle, the problems are all solved and Ford deploys in 2024, that would still be an embarrassment, coming seven years after commissioning.  Right now, it’s a toss up which will happen first:  Ford’s mid-life refueling and overhaul or Ford’s first deployment!

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Defense News website, “US Navy carrier Ford to go on unusual deployment this year”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Feb-2022,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/02/03/us-navy-carrier-ford-to-go-on-unusual-deployment-this-year/


Monday, February 7, 2022

2022 Ship Retirements

China is outbuilding the US in terms of warships.  That means their fleet is growing faster than ours.  However, we’re making a bad situation worse by retiring ships at a far greater rate than we’re building new ones.  Here’s the Navy’s FY22 Retirement List[1,2] with each ship’s service life shown.

 

USS San Jacinto (CG 56), 34 yrs

USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), 34 yrs

USS Monterey (CG 61), 32 yrs

USS Hue City (CG 66), 31 yrs

USS Anzio (CG 68), 30 yrs

USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), 29 yrs

USS Port Royal (CG 73), 28 yrs

 

USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), 10 yrs

USS Coronado (LCS 4), 8 yrs

USS Detroit (LCS 7), 6 yrs

USS Little Rock (LCS 9), 5 yrs

 

USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), 37 yrs

 

USS Providence (SSN 719), 37 yrs

USS Oklahoma City (SSN 723), 34 yrs

 

USNS Apache (T-ATF 172), 41 yrs

 

 

We’re retiring 15 ships[3] that are all capable and most have service life remaining.  These retirements are unnecessary.  Their replacements – the few that will be – are going to be small, unmanned craft, generally speaking, with an occasional obsolete Burke or Constellation thrown in.  We are, quite literally, cutting our own naval throats.

 

As we predicted, the Navy is looking to quietly retire the LCS class.  By the end of 2022, six LCS will have been retired or designated for retirement, all with ten or fewer years of service. 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Defense Brief website, 18-Jun-2021,

https://defbrief.com/2021/06/18/here-are-all-the-ships-the-us-navy-plans-to-retire-and-buy-in-fy2022/

 

[2]https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jun/17/2002744915/-1/-1/0/PB22%20SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20JUNE%202021_FINAL.PDF/PB22%20SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20JUNE%202021_FINAL.PDF

 

[3]The two Los Angeles class submarine retirements had been previously announced or reclassified in 2021 and have been designated for scrapping/recycling in 2022.


Friday, February 4, 2022

Missile Attack Analysis

We’ve discussed the mechanics and timing of an anti-ship missile attack in various posts and comments.  It’s clear, however, that a lot of people don’t quite have a grasp of how short the window of time is for defensive efforts because I consistently see comments about the value of having a large number of VLS cells despite the fact that we’ve demonstrated, repeatedly, that a defending ship will be very fortunate to get off two salvoes (4 missiles total) per attack.  Well, it’s time to bring it home, graphically, with a second by second analysis of a theoretical attack and see what the implications are for our defenses.

 

 

Assumptions:

 

Anti-ship Missile

 

Type = Chinese C-80x family

Speed = Mach 0.9 = (761.2 mph * 0.9 = 685 mph = 11.4 miles/min = 0.19 miles/sec)

 

Defense

CIWS, effective range = ¾ mile

ESSM, effective range = radar horizon; launch rate = 1 missile every two seconds from two separate VLS clusters for an overall launch rate of 1 missile per second.  ESSM missile speed = Mach 4 = (761.2 mph * 4 = 3,045 mph = 50.7 miles/min = 0.85 miles/sec)

 

Radar Detection Point - For a radar 18 m high (Burke arrays) and a target 5 m above sea level (sea skimming anti-ship cruise missile), calculations[1] give,

 

Radar Horizon = 10.9 miles = 9.44 nm

Radar Target Visibility = 16.6 miles = 14.4 nm

 

Note: the radar target visibility distance is slightly greater than the nominal radar horizon due to ducting of the radar waves.

 

 

Scenario

 

For simplification, this scenario involves a single Burke and a single attacking anti-ship missile of the type described above.  Further, this scenario assumes that the crew and sensor/weapon systems are exquisitely trained and poised for instant action – eyes glued to screens, no hesitation, instant decision, fingers resting on launch buttons.

 

The general sequence of events is

 

  • Detect target
  • React
  • Launch defensive missiles
  • Observe results
  • Repeat until target is destroyed or ship is hit

 

It is necessary to understand the Navy’s typical engagement sequence which is shoot-shoot-look.  This means that two missiles are launched at a target and then the defending ship waits to see the results.  This waiting period allows the cluttered radar picture, which has been obscured by exploding missile debris, to clear as the debris from the intercept attempt falls clear and the actual target is reacquired, if it survived.

 

 

Event

 

Here, then, is the second by second analysis of an attack and defense.

 

 

Elapsed Time, sec

Missile Range, miles

 

Action

0

16.6

 

Missile crosses radar detection horizon

5

15.6

 

Operator verifies contact and reports detection

5-10

14.7

 

Command absorbs information

11-16

13.6

 

Engagement orders issued, targets assigned

16-19

13.0

 

Engagement enabled

20-21

12.6

 

2x ESSM missiles launched

22-24

12.0

 

Missiles tip over and acquire target

27

11.5

 

ESSM = 2.55 miles outbound from ship

30

10.9

 

ESSM = 5.1 miles outbound from ship

35

9.9

 

ESSM = 9.3 miles;  intercept explosions

36-40

9.0

 

Radar picture clearing

41

8.8

 

Re-engage

42-43

8.4

 

2x ESSM missiles launched

44-46

7.9

 

Missiles tip over and acquire target

50

7.1

 

ESSM = 2.55 miles outbound from ship

53

6.5

 

ESSM = 5.1 miles outbound from ship

54

6.3

 

ESSM = 5.95 miles;  intercept explosions

55-59

5.4

 

Radar picture clearing

60

5.2

 

Re-engage

61-62

4.8

 

2x ESSM missiles launched

63-65

4.2

 

Missiles tip over and acquire target

70

3.3

 

ESSM = 3.4 miles; intercept explosions

71-75

2.3

 

Radar picture clearing

76-86

 

 

CIWS/RAM engages for 11 seconds

87

0

 

Missile impacts ship

 

 

There it is, 87 seconds to defend against an attack.  That’s not much time and you can clearly see that there is only time for a theoretical maximum of three defensive engagement salvoes and the third is unlikely because it’s too close and would probably wind up within the missile’s non-engagement safety zone.  Also, the sequence is based on absurdly optimistic conditions of perfect, unhesitating response and speed of execution.  In addition, various time consuming steps were left out such as weapon system warm up time, external safety alarms and time to clear the decks of personnel, etc.  Perhaps the Aegis system, operating in full auto mode could approximate this kind of response time;  I have no idea.

 

Far more realistically, a ship would be lucky to get off a single salvo and two would be phenomenal. 

 

Thus, having ten thousand VLS cells and missiles would be utterly useless in any single engagement.  As we’ve demonstrated, a ship would be fortunate to get off 2-4 defensive missiles.  The remaining 9996 missiles are of no use.  This suggests that our ship design tendency toward ever larger VLS loads is pointless, at least from a defensive AAW perspective.  Using the cells for offensive cruise missile attacks is another story.

 

Now, consider the above scenario and timing from a more realistic perspective.  The radar/sensor operators are going to get momentary indications and will have to wait to try to firm up the possible detection.  The ‘command’ will hesitate, wanting confirmation, and will require some time to evaluate the situation.  Weapon operators will not have their fingers resting on launch buttons and will need some time to configure their systems, obtain weapon tracks, and prepare for launch.  Missiles, while not needing much time, still need a brief ‘warm up’ period.  And so on.  All of that adds time – time that is simply not available.  Hence, a ship would be lucky to get off a single defensive salvo.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Some of the conclusions from this scenario are:

 

  • Detection beyond the horizon is critical, though very difficult;  UAV ‘screen’ to provide early warning?
  • Auto mode is the preferred mode in combat
  • Training is critical to minimize hesitation time
  • The defensive action sequence needs to be shortened as much as possible and ‘command’ layers need to be eliminated, to the extent possible
  • Desperately need a better radar that can maintain target contact in a debris filled sky so that missiles can be launched continuously without needing to wait for the ‘look’ portion of shoot-shoot-look.  Ideally, we want shoot-shoot-shoot-shoot-shoot …

 

 

________________________________

 

Disclaimer:  I have not participated in an actual missile defense exercise so I may well be wrong about some of the events or timing – although it’s hard to imagine I’m overestimating any times!  These are just my semi-informed best guesses.  If anyone has actual experience and cares to share it, I’d appreciate it.

 

This post is NOT intended nor purported to be an actual combat simulation.  It is simply an exercise in the approximate timing of some of the events in a missile defense scenario so as to provide a feel for the time frames involved.

  

 

________________________________

 

[1]https://www.translatorscafe.com/unit-converter/en-US/calculator/radar-horizon/?hr=10&ht=15&u=m