The Modern Hedgehog

ComNavOps has called for the design and construction of a dedicated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ship instead of a frigate.  The reason for this is that our current ASW vessel is the Burke class destroyer which costs $2B each, conservatively, and is far too expensive to risk playing tag with submarines, especially small, silent, non-nuclear shallow water subs.  Further, the Burkes are primarily anti-air warfare (AAW) vessels and do not train for ASW enough to be effective at it.  That leads to the situation of a poorly trained and very expensive ship being asked to conduct ASW against an enemy that possesses most of the inherent advantages to begin with.  We need an ASW vessel that is dedicated to ASW so that the ship and crew will be thoroughly trained and cheap enough to be expendable when playing tag with submarines.

However, in order to be effective, an ASW ship must have effective weapons.  Currently, for close range encounters, the US Navy has only the standard Mk32 triple torpedo tube system (12.75”, 324mm) which launches lightweight Mk 46, Mk 50, and Mk 54 torpedoes.  Unfortunately, these torpedoes have problems with their shallow water performance.  The Mk 54, in fact, was developed in response to an urgent operational need resulting from shallow water performance problems demonstrated by the Mk 50.  The Mk 54 has had its share of problems with DOT&E assessing it as “not operationally effective” in its 2014 Annual Report and states in the 2016 Annual Report that the Mk 54 “will remain not effective even with the Mod 1 fixes”.

The US Navy also has the vertical launch ASROC system but it is not a close range system.  It has a maximum range of 15 miles.  The minimum range is unknown but given that the weapon is a homing torpedo, it figures to be substantial.

Thus, the Navy’s only shipboard, close range ASW weapons are torpedoes which have faulty shallow water performance, are subject to minimum engagement limits, and are assessed as “not effective”. 

As subs have grown quieter and more advanced around the world, and as US Navy ASW proficiency has atrophied, the likelihood that we will have more late detection, close range, unexpected encounters has increased.  Further, shallow water ASW with its attendant noisy (poor sonar) conditions almost guarantees much closer detections.  We need a quick reaction, anti-submarine weapon for those surprise, close range encounters.  The Navy has had such weapons in the past but abandoned them with the advent of the ASW helicopter which was supposed to keep the ship at arm’s length from the submarine.  In deep water, this is a reasonably valid concept but not in shallow water which is likely to be the more common ASW arena in the future.

Close range ASW weapons of the past include the iconic depth charge of WWII and the Hedgehog which was a mortar system that launched contact fused charges a few hundred feet in front of the ship.  These weapons were eventually abandoned in favor of helicopters and homing torpedoes.

WWII Era Hedgehog

Today’s version of the Hedgehog was developed by the Soviet Navy and is called the RBU.  The RBU is a short range rocket launcher which fires high explosive charges with either contact or depth fusing.  The charges can be fired singly or in salvo.  The launcher comes in various sizes which differ in the number of launching barrels, typically 6-12.  Maximum range is 1000 yds – 6500 yds, depending on the version.  The launcher is moveable in train and elevation and is rapidly and automatically reloadable from an integrated hatch at the base.  Magazine capacity is up to around 100 reloads, depending on version.  RBU’s were standard on all Soviet warships.

Russian RBU-1000

The RBU offers the capability of instantaneous attacks against very close contacts.  The charges are immune to countermeasures and, in contact fuse mode, offer positive feedback on hits.  The “dumb” nature of the free-sinking charges ensures that they offer no threat to the launching ship unlike homing torpedoes which can target the launching ship.  To prevent self-targeting, torpedoes have minimum safe distance arming limits.  Unfortunately, the minimum arming distance precludes engagement within that range.  Thus, the Navy’s short range torpedo is not really short range or, rather, short range is a relative term.  I’ve been unable to find a citation for the minimum safe arming distance for US torpedoes.  Thus, an RBU can fill the gap between the minimum arming range of the torpedo and the ship.

An upgraded version of the RBU, the RPK-8, uses the RBU launcher with a 90R homing head charge which offers increased chance of a hit.  The homing search radius is 130 m and the effective range is 600-4300 m and effective depth is 1000 m (1).  Again, this demonstrates the drawback to homing capabilities in the form of minimum safe distance limits from the launch ship.  Still, this may represent a balance of close range and enhanced kill probability via homing.  The system is quick reaction with a combat ready time of 15 sec (1).

RBU rocket charges are also much cheaper and smaller than torpedoes which allows many more to be carried and used.  In combat, when many questionable contacts will be prosecuted (no Captain will risk not prosecuting a questionable contact that could turn out to be real), the ability to use cheap, plentiful charges rather than scarce, expensive torpedoes could be a welcome option.

Russian Parchim Class Corvette Firing RBU-6000

Surface ships engaged in shallow water ASW or merely operating in shallow water will likely find themselves in surprise, close range encounters with non-nuclear submarines and a short range, quick reaction ASW weapon could provide the defense needed to survive the encounter.  The small size and weight of the launcher makes it suitable for any ship and allows it to be added almost anywhere that a small deck penetration for the reloads can be accommodated.

The US Navy should give serious consideration to developing or obtaining such a weapon system.  The combination of a small, dedicated, cheap ASW vessel and basic, reliable ASW weapons such as an RBU-Hedgehog along with lightweight torpedoes and various sonar sensors would provide the Navy with a viable, effective, and expendable ASW vessel well suited for shallow water operations.

On a side note, a time-fused version could possibly be adapted to torpedo defense by launching a salvo timed to drop in front of an incoming torpedo and explode – the anti-torpedo equivalent of CIWS.

Note:  Russia offers the RPK-8 as an export weapon system – no development needed and it would be satisfying to “take” something from the Russians for a change!

Note:  This is not a replacement for anti-submarine torpedoes.  It is a complement intended to provide effective attacks in close range, surprise encounters.

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(1)Russian Defense Export website, products/naval systems/shipborne weapons/RPK-8,

http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/naval-systems/shipborne-weapons/rpk-8/

Spencer For SecNav?

The Trump administration is, apparently, set to announce that they will nominate Richard Spencer for the position of Secretary of the Navy (SecNav).  Mr. Spencer is a former Marine Captain (1976 – 1981) and has since held various positions in the private financial sector mostly dealing with venture capital and investments along with serving on some military advisory boards.  Some reports indicate that he was a Marine aviator though I haven’t been able to confirm that and his short service time may indicate otherwise.  Helo pilot, maybe?

In any event, his nomination would be curious.  A Marine with limited service time and a private sector financial background seems like a weak resume, on the surface, for the position of Secretary of the Navy.  At this point, let me say that I know nothing about Mr. Spencer other than what I’ve just described.  He may be an outstanding candidate.  This post is not about his suitability for the job but, rather, the seeming oddity of choosing someone with such an apparently marginally relevant background given the tens of thousands of former Navy people out there.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m not advocating for a former Admiral because, if you’ve followed this blog for any length of time, you know that I think Admirals, serving or retired, are worthless.  Surely, though, there must be some mid-level former Navy personnel who served for an extended period, have a good understanding of naval matters, and have a private background in something a bit more relevant such as technology, defense, electronics, computers, business management, etc.

I’m also not against a non-Navy person who has a strong management background in a large organization.  After all, the Navy is a large bureaucratic organization and an experienced, outside person who could cut through the traditional Navy games would be an invaluable asset in the SecNav position.

The point is that there must be thousands of people with better qualifications for the SecNav position.  This choice seems odd.  I’ll be curious to learn more about Mr. Spencer.

Navy Accepts Incomplete and Damaged Ford

The Navy has accepted delivery of the aircraft carrier Ford.

“The Navy accepted delivery of the first-in-class aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) on May 31, following the completion of acceptance trials on May 26 …” (1)

This continues the Navy’s practice of accepting substantially incomplete ships which began with the first LCS’s, continued with the LPD-17 class, included the Zumwalt, and now counts the Ford in this should-be criminal practice. 

The Navy issued a contract for the construction and delivery of a COMPLETE aircraft carrier.  The Navy is accepting delivery of a substantially INCOMPLETE aircraft carrier.  In fact, parts of the ship are not only incomplete but are actually damaged, as we’ve documented in previous posts.

Here’s a list of known incomplete or damaged items that the Navy just accepted.  I’m not going to document these in this post since I’ve extensively documented them in previous posts.

EMALS – cannot safely launch Hornets and Growlers with wing mounted external fuel tanks;  system cannot be electrically isolated for repairs; induces unsafe oscillations of the F-35 during launch; reliability is poor with Mean Cycles Between Critical Failure (MCBCF) – a cycle is one launch – of 340 versus the target of 4,166 – every 340 launches, you’re tossin’ a plane in the drink!

Main Turbine Generator - Ford has suffered major main turbine generator (MTG) failures (an explosion of the No. 2 MTG and a similar event with the No 1 MTG) which have crippled half the the ship’s main generators.  The No. 2 MTG is non-functional and will be repaired sometime after the ship is commissioned.

Advanced Arresting Gear – The Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) is essentially non-functional, having had to undergo recent fundamental redesigns due to equipment failures.  Further, the most recent reliability data indicates the AAG is non-functional.  The MCBCF requirement for the arresting gear is one every 16,500.  The actual MCBCF is 20.  That’s a critical failure every 20 recoveries!

Weapon Elevators – cited in 2016 DOT&E Annual Report

Berthing – insufficient berthing for the CVN-78 Service Lilfe Allowance

Dual Band Radar - testing has uncovered tracking, clutter/false

track, track continuity, and engagement support problems, according to the 2016 DOT&E Annual Report

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) – system has been indefinitely deferred for budgetary reasons

This is just a selection of the problems that have come to light.  There are, undoubtedly, many others.

What is the point of sea trials and inspections if you’re going to accept the ship no matter what condition it’s in?  They may as well just cancel trials and inspections and save some money. 

Not only will the Navy accept delivery of a badly damaged ship but it will also commission a badly damaged ship.  A commissioned ship is supposed to be combat ready.

This is just stupidity beyond belief.  The only justification for accepting a damaged ship is a feeble and fraudulent attempt to generate positive public relations.

________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Carrier Ford Delivers To Navy After 15 Months of Delays”, Megan Eckstein, 1-Jun-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/06/01/25931

Missile Training Should Not Be A Noteworthy Event

This little tidbit caught my eye and emphasizes one of my pet peeves.  The French frigate Forbin (Horizon class) conducted a missile firing exercise, launching an Aster-30

“This is the third Aster 30 firing by Forbin since it entered active duty.” (1)

Forbin’s first deployment was in 2009 so the vessel has been in service for 8 years and has fired 3 Aster missiles in that time.  That’s one missile firing every 2.7 years.  Is that sufficient to keep the crew trained, thoroughly exercise and debug the system, and establish a baseline of performance and reliability?

I don’t know how the French Navy works but in the US Navy a ship’s Captain could come and go during that 2.7 year interval and never fire the ship’s main weapon.  Crews can come and go during that interval and never see a live firing.  Is that really the degree of training that a WARship should have?

Before anyone jumps on me, I know little about the French Navy’s practices so if this article misrepresents the state of training to some degree, bear with me.  Perhaps the crew fires a thousand live missiles per year at some other training facility.  They don’t but the point is that the specific details don’t matter.  This article illustrates my theme that the Navy (I’m now talking about the US Navy) needs to engage in much more realistic and frequent training.

Yes, missiles cost money and there’s a limit on how many we can go flinging around in the name of training ……….  or is there?

A Standard missile costs around two million dollars depending on the specific version.  If every Burke were to launch a single Standard each month in training, that would be 12 missiles per year per ship.  Hey, let’s call it 10 per year because ships invariably are unavailable at times for maintenance and whatnot.  There are around 70 Burkes in the fleet so that equates to 700 Standard missile firings per year which would cost $1.4B in missiles. 

Hmm, that’s a lot of money, you say?  Well, consider these benefits – because it’s all a cost-benefit balance, right?

• Hugely enhanced training quality with the crews operating actual systems with live missiles rather than simulations.  Crews become accustomed to the real thing. 

• We’ll get a much better idea of the baseline reliability of the missiles and sensor/launch systems.  Today, a live missile firing is a major event preceded by days of preparation, tweaking of systems, inspections, etc. all designed to produce a successful launch.  That won’t happen in war.  Combat launches will be a little or no notice, come as you are event.  More frequent training launches will allow us to get a better feel for how the system works without a major workup period leading to the actual firing.

• We’ll get a much better idea of the baseline performance of the missiles and systems.  What can we actually expect from the missile in terms of shoot-down effectiveness?  Of course, the Navy would probably still use simplistic, canned scenarios so the performance value would be vastly overstated but more launches would still give better performance data.

• We would have to produce many more missiles per year which would increase the production capability of the manufacturer.  This would be vital in the case of war where would need large quantities of replacement missiles on a continuous basis.  This kind of training would force us to be better prepared for wartime production capacity.

• Producing many more missiles per year would drive down the cost substantially, one would have to imagine.  That $2M figure becomes, perhaps, $1M per missile.  See, we’re saving money already!  So now this level of training only costs $700M per year.  That’s the cost of a single LCS and is almost insignificant compared to the overall Navy budget.

Is $700M per year still too much for you to consider?  Okay, how about cutting the launches in half and only doing 5 per year per ship?  Now we’re down to $350M per year.  That is insignificant.  That’s almost round off error in the Navy’s accounting ledgers.

The benefits of live fire training, especially if coupled with more realistic scenarios, are immense.  If even a single Burke is saved in wartime by being better trained and having missile systems whose reliability and performance are better understood, we’ll save the $2B cost of a lost ship and the $XB cost of its replacement.  That alone justifies the expense of the training.

Live fire training inevitably reveals the little things that aren’t accounted for in simulations.  Remember the Granada invasion when, despite all our military’s training, we discovered that none of the units could talk to each other?  Remember the Marines “return” to the sea and the first major amphibious exercise they attempted after decades of land combat?  They found hosts of “little” things that failed or that no one knew/remembered how to do.  You can simulate all the training in the world but until you do it live, you don’t realize that no one has the right size wrench to do the job.  And so on. 

Live fire training is absolutely vital and needs to become a commonplace event.  We need to find out how our systems perform without special tweaking prior to the event.  We need crews to be completely comfortable with the weapons and systems.  We don’t need to be able to make the system work with the most brilliant operator on the ship – we need to be able to make the system work with the worst operator on the ship.

It should not be noteworthy that a ship launches an AAW missile in training.  It should not generate an article read world wide.  It should not be the third time it’s happened in the eight year history of the ship.  Missile launches should be routine, commonplace events that evoke no particular notice.

The larger, overarching point is not the exact number of missile launches per ship per year but, rather, the incredible dearth of such events and lack of live fire exercise of all of our weapons and systems.  The Navy is supposed to be prepared to fight tonight, to use the latest buzz phrase, and the only way to ensure that level of preparedness is to conduct frequent, routine live fire exercises in as challenging scenarios as possible consistent with a reasonable degree of safety.

I’ve previously stated that the Navy should be largely non-deployed (I hesitate to use the word “homeported” because that has a different, inappropriate meaning) and should be spending its time training and this is exactly the type of training that the fleet should be routinely conducting.

__________________________________

(1)Navy Recognition website, 19-May-2017,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/may-2017-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/5221-french-navy-horizon-class-destroyer-forbin-succeeds-in-aster-30-test-firing.html

Freedom of Navigation - Trump Version

We’ve previously noted that the infrequent Freedom of Navigation (FON) actions by the US Navy in the South China Sea have done more harm than good, legally, by serving to reinforce China’s claims of sovereignty.  The actions were carried out as “innocent passage” which is a prescribed method (see the UNCLOS documents for the exact procedure) for warships to pass peacefully through the waters of another country.  By conducting the FON actions as innocent passages, they served to bolster China’s claims since innocent passage can only be applied to another country’s territorial waters.  Thus, the US was implicitly recognizing China’s claims.  Alternatively, some FON actions were conducted at greater than 12 miles from any disputed islands or lands which, again, bolsters China’s claims of sovereignty. 

Had the US wanted to dispute China’s sovereignty claims, the FON actions should have studiously avoided following innocent passage procedures or observing the 12 mile territorial limit. 

Interestingly, the Navy has just recently executed a FON action near Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands that explicitly ignores the innocent passage procedures.

“A U.S. destroyer sailed within six nautical miles of a Chinese artificial island on Wednesday in the strongest challenge of hotly debated Chinese claims in the South China Sea, USNI News has learned.

Around 7 P.M. EST on Wednesday (7 A.M. Thursday local time), USS Dewey (DDG-105) passed within six nautical miles of the Chinese installation on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Island chain, several U.S. officials confirmed to USNI News

The guided-missile destroyer operated normally and did not conduct the transit under the rules of an innocent passage – the restrictions that allow a warship to pass through another country’s territorial waters with no notice.

The ship was within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef for about 90 minutes zig-zagging in the water near the installation. At one point during the operation, the ship’s crew conducted a man overboard drill, a U.S. official told USNI News.” [emphasis added] (1)

This is good news in a minimalist sense.  At least this FON did no further legal damage.  Presumably, this change in policy is due to the new Trump administration.

On the other hand, this kind of FON serves no concrete purpose if the other side, the Chinese in this case, choose to ignore it.  It does not hinder development of artificial islands or bases.  It does not blockade any Chinese actions.  It does not lodge an official protest with the UN.  It does not establish a “counter-island” developed and controlled by the US.  In short, it does nothing but offer a silent, unspoken, token, symbolic protest in the mildest manner possible.

Previous FON actions have clearly done nothing to dissuade China from their expansionist policies and actions in the South and East China Seas.  FON actions, even this type, accomplish nothing but ratcheting up tensions.  We need to either back out of the area and concede the South and East China Seas as Chinese territories or begin taking concrete, productive actions along the lines we’ve discussed in previous posts and comments.

As a reminder,

“Unlike other Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea, the Mischief Reef installation isn’t subject to overlapping territorial claims from any other country and is built on a low-tide elevation, as determined by the 2016 Hague tribunal ruling on Chinese claims in the South China Sea.

Under the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention [UNCLOS], a low-tide elevation cannot be claimed as the territory of any country and does not command a territorial sea.”

China, you’ll recall, is a signatory to UNCLOS and, therefore, bound by it’s rules and regulations.  Despite this, China is actively violating several aspects and provisions of the agreement.

Setting aside the myriad political and economic actions that we could and should take, the following actions, which cover a range of intensity, should also be considered.

• Close, high speed passes to attempt to cause wake damage to island facilities
• Blockade of islands and bases
• Physical hindering of resupply ships
• Physical disruption of, and interference with, reclamation vessels
• Covert disruption of island facilities (SEAL missions)
• Electronic jamming of island communications

China is clearly on a militaristic expansionist path.  It is only a matter of time before China and US come to blows.  One can make a pretty compelling argument that it is better to do it now while China has not yet gained complete parity/superiority than to wait and do it under even less favorable circumstances.

If we’re not going to contest the South and East China Seas then we need to cede the area and retire from the region, diffuse tensions, and save the wear and tear on our ships and aircraft.  Of course, if we’re going to do all that, one can also reasonably ask why we need ships and aircraft.  We can cede entire regions without the use of our military!

Our policy of token resistance is having no positive effect whatsoever.  We need a new geopolitical and military strategy for the region.

_____________________________

(1)USNI News website, “U.S. Warship Came Within 6 Miles of Chinese Artificial Island in Toughest Challenge Yet to Beijing South China Sea Claims

”, Sam LaGrone, 25-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/25/u-s-warship-came-beijing-south-china-sea-claims

LRASM Drops Out of OTH Competition

Well, the Navy’s over the horizon (OTH) anti-ship missile (ASM) selection process just gets more baffling by the day!  As you recall, the Navy is looking for an OTH ASM to arm its LCS ships and, possibly, Burkes and other ships.  The OTH ASM is intended both to give the toothless LCS a bit of bite and to make the LCS and every other ship in the Navy components in the much-hyped distributed lethality concept that the Navy seems committed to.  You’ll further recall that distributed lethality is one of the outgrowths of the Third Offset Strategy which is predicated on networks and UAVs.  The Third Offset and Distributed Lethality envision a vast regional (world wide?!) network of all-seeing sensors completely interconnected with every platform and weapon.  Every ship in the Navy thus becomes an offensive threat – or so the fairy tale goes.  The key to all of this is, of course, networking.  Remember that - we’ll come back to it in a moment.

You’ll also recall that Boeing just recently dropped out of the OTH competition, stating that its missile, the Harpoon, was overqualified (see, "Harpoon Drops Out of OTH Competition").

Now, in a fairly surprising bit of news, Lockheed has announced that it, too, is dropping the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) out of the competition.

“After long and careful consideration, Lockheed Martin has decided to withdraw from the U.S. Navy Over-the-Horizon Weapon System (OTH-WS) competition. As the current OTH-WS request for proposal process refined over time, it became clear that our offering would not be fully valued,” read a statement from the company provided to USNI News.” (1)

“Lockheed Martin, frustrated by changing requirements the company feels are skewed to a particular competitor [Kongsberg’s NSM], is dropping out of the U.S. Navy’s over-the-horizon missile program … “ (2)

Their offering would not be fully valued????  What does that mean?  Apparently, it means that certain features of the missile would not be considered as benefits in the eyes of the Navy selectors.

“Both companies expressed concern that the Navy was giving little consideration to the networked capability of the weapons, USNI News understands.” (1)

“…Boeing and Lockheed felt that key attributes of their systems, particularly networking capabilities and in-flight targeting updates, were being discounted, robbing Lockheed’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, and Boeing’s extended-range Harpoon Block II Plus of key competitive advantages.

“There was no value for being able to go after radiating or emitting targets,” an industry source said, discounting an LRASM capability that can detect emitting and moving targets.  “Through responses it became clear there would be no credit for attacking emitting targets, and no requirement to be on a network.” 

The absence of a networking requirement was “surprising,” the industry source said, “given the needs of the distributed lethality concept,” which envisions netting together weapons, sensors and command facilities on a variety of platforms.   

Additionally, the industry source said, there was “no plan to do a cost-per-kill analysis. They made that clear. So no extra credit for improved survivability.” (2)

So, if you believe Lockheed and Boeing, the OTH ASM selection competition is a sham and the Navy has a pre-determined winner, the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) already selected.  Now, do I believe Lockheed and Boeing?  Do they have any credibility?  Emphatically, no!  However, they have both dropped out of a potentially lucrative competition so that means that there is something seriously wrong.  With that in mind, yes, I am inclined to believe that the Navy has already, unofficially selected the NSM for the OTH ASM.

The only alternative explanation is that the Navy is conducting a fair and open competition but that the real requirements are for a vastly dumbed down missile with no networking capability and that just doesn’t seem believable.  The entire foundation of the Third Offset Strategy and the Navy’s distributed lethality concept is networking – the very feature that they don’t want in the OTH ASM?  Does that seem believable?

The Navy, and the military in general, loves to trumpet tests wherein a Boy Scout in Montana controls a Standard missile fired by a cruiser in the Pacific until the missile is re-targeted, mid flight, by a Marine private marching out of his boot camp graduation ceremony while he relays the new targeting data via a handheld quadcopter.  Given the Navy’s love of this kind of nonsensical networking capability, the dependence of distributed lethality on networking, the Navy’s pursuit of NIFC-CA (Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air) and CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability), again I ask, does not requiring networking in the OTH ASM sound believable?

Now, understand, I have no sympathy for Lockheed or Boeing and I have no problem with the Navy tailoring their industry requests (RFP) to give them exactly the product they want.  Their requests should be specific and tailored.  Why pay for capabilities you don’t want or need? 

However, if the stories and claims are to be believed, what the Navy appears to want doesn’t match their desired warfighting concepts, as questionable as those may be in my mind.  This is inconsistent.  I’m missing something here.

What is it about the NSM that makes the Navy want it so bad?  You’ll recall that we recently looked at the NSM (see, "Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile") and concluded that it was a nice weapon with some advantages and disadvantages.  Curiously, we also noted that it was claimed to be capable of in-flight re-targeting which suggests at least a degree of networking which is at odds with Lockheed and Boeing’s claims.  Be that as it may, nothing about the NSM jumped out as a world-beater capability that would make it the automatic choice of the Navy for an OTH ASM.  The NSM’s completely passive nature was an unusual feature but that did not strike me as an overwhelming advantage.

Kongsberg NSM - Where's the Magic?

I can’t answer my own question.  I don’t know what makes the NSM so desirable to the Navy that they would write RFPs that “force” the Harpoon and LRASM out of the competition. 

Further, forcing the LRASM out is doubly puzzling because the LRASM is being developed as the air-launched ASM of the Navy and most observers, myself included, assumed the ship-launched version would quickly follow and that the LRASM would become the standard Navy OTH ASM.  Now, it’s possible that the NSM could become the LCS OTH missile and the LRASM could be selected, separately, for Burkes but I would have thought the Navy would have been driven to standardize on a single OTH ASM.

Finally, forcing Lockheed and Boeing out leaves only a single competitor.  Is that single competitor, knowing that the Navy has no other option, likely to offer their cheapest bid?  Of course not!  The single source competitor is going to greatly increase their bid to the highest point that they think they can get without triggering a reopening of the competition.  Instead of getting everyone's cheapest bids the Navy will get a single source's highest bid!  That's one of the reasons why monopolies are bad.  I would have thought the Navy would leave the requirements loose enough to at least have a few companies offer a bid so that all the bids are cheaper.  In the end, the Navy can always select the one they want, anyway, so there's no harm in having multiple bidders even if the Navy already knows which one they want. There's no harm, and a lot of good, in having multiple bidders.  The Navy seems to have no business sense about how to play competitors against each other.

In summary, I have no idea what’s going on here. 

_______________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Lockheed Martin Drops LRASM Out of Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate Missile Competition”, Sam LaGrone, 24-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/24/lockheed-martin-drops-lrasm-frigate-missile-competition

(2)Defense News website, “Lockheed Martin Drops Out of US Navy Missile Competition”, Christopher Cavas, 24-May-2017,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/lockheed-drops-out-of-us-navy-missile-competition

Combatant Commanders and OpTempo

The Navy constantly complains that it is underfunded and cannot meet the combatant commander’s requests.  As a result, Navy operations tempo (OpTemp) is far too high and critical ship maintenance is being deferred, training is being neglected, and readiness is degrading.  It seems obvious, doesn’t it, that if the combatant commander’s requests can’t be met then the Navy needs more funding?  Well, before we ship additional barges of money to the Navy, let’s think about this system a bit more.

Who or what are the combatant commanders (CC)?  You can readily find all the information you want on them on the Internet so I’m not going to bother providing any more than the bare bones highlights. 

The US Department of Defense has organized its command and control of the armed forces via regional or functional commands with a high ranking General or Admiral in charge of each command.  Here are the commands.

• United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
• United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)
• United States European Command (USEUCOM)
• United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
• United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)
• United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
• United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
• United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
• United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

Simplistically, the commanders assess the military needs of their area of responsibility and request the forces they feel are needed to meet those needs.  Pretty straightforward, right?  In order to continue this discussion, let’s recognize that none of us has any access to the combatant commander’s requests or the process of prioritizing and filling those needs.  Thus, any further discussion is pure speculation.  So, with that said, let’s speculate, apply some logic, and see what we come up with!

Let’s start by seeing what data and logic we have to work with, given that we just stated that we have no insight into the actual requests or process.

• Here’s a truism:  You need more military assets to fight a war than you do to simply “patrol” a region.

• Here’s a data point:  The only region in the world that is actively engaged in combat is the Middle East (USCENTCOM) and even that is limited and sporadic. 

• Here’s a fact:  The Navy’s primary objective is to maintain or expand their budget share.

• Here’s a fact:  The Navy’s resources and assets are fixed and finite.

Well, that’s not a lot to work with but let’s see what we can come up with.

Requests.  A reasonable person would assume that the CC’s only request those assets that are absolutely vital to meeting their responsibilities and our national security interests.  A reasonable person would be wrong.  The CC’s have no incentive to reign in their requests.  For example, we can request a policeman on every corner but we cannot afford to pay the taxes to make that happen.  Therefore, we don’t make the request.  The CC’s, however, simply make requests and do not have to directly deal with budget or resource issues.  If a CC wants a ship to patrol his area, he does not have to pay to build it and operate it.  Therefore, from the CC’s perspective, why not request a policeman on every corner? 

In fact, there is a perverse, reverse incentive to ask for more than you need.  The more you request, the more likely you are to get at least something.  If you really only need one ship, why not request ten?  Who knows, you might get two which is one more than you really need!

What’s the penalty for requesting, and receiving, more assets than you need?  There is none.  Again, there’s a perverse, reverse incentive.  The more assets you get, the more stability your region should have and the more “presence” you can demonstrate (presence accomplishes nothing but it is the Navy’s coin of the realm, currently).  The more stable the region, the better the CC looks.  So, it is in the best interest of the CC to request as many assets as he possibly can.

We noted that only a single region has any combat occurring and that is only a limited, sporadic combat.  So, why are the CC’s even requesting any assets?  Presumably, they want them for presence which we have repeatedly shown is a worthless mission and deterrence which is a questionable mission, at best.

As I noted, I have no access to the annual lists of CC requests so I can’t analyze their worth.  However, here is a list of “major” deployments as cited in a 2017 Bipartisan Policy Center report (1).

• The war in Afghanistan
• The continuing U.S. presence in Iraq
• The fight against ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups
• Various movements and operations in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Niger, Poland, Senegal, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Uganda
• The Ebola epidemic
• Various disaster-relief missions
• New force presence in Australia

Note that of the listed deployments, only two involve any degree of actual combat (Afghanistan and ISIS).  Two are 100% non-combat related (Ebola epidemic and disaster relief).  The remainder are presence missions which we’ve already established are worthless.  So, of the 7 listed deployments, 2 are completely non-combat and should not even be military missions.  Thus, right off the top, around 30% of the deployments shouldn’t be done!  This is an example of how many CC requests may be militarily worthless and accomplish nothing militarily other than to artificially and needlessly increase OpTempo and decrease maintenance and readiness.

Budget.  The Navy tells us that they just don’t have the assets to fulfill all the CC requests.  A reasonable person would assume, then, that the Navy must prioritize the CC requests and balance them against the maintenance, training, and readiness needs of the Navy when determining which CC requests to fill and which to ignore.  A reasonable person would be wrong.

The Navy views the CC requests as a godsend because every request is viewed as justification for more budget, more ships, and more aircraft.  It doesn’t matter to the Navy whether the requests are worthwhile or trivial.  All requests are equal when it comes to justifying budget.

In fact, the perverse, reverse incentive rears its ugly head, yet again, when it comes to requests.  The more requests the Navy fills, the faster the ships and aircraft wear out which means more budget, sooner, for new construction.  Thus, the Navy would rather fill CC requests, no matter how worthless, by extending deployments and deferring maintenance in order to be able to retire ships earlier due to lack of maintenance, thereby strengthening their case to Congress for increased funding.

The entire Combatant Commander setup is geared towards inflated requests, reverse incentives, and leads to premature wear and tear on the military.  There is nothing wrong with having a CC as a regional subject matter expert but having them divorced from the budgetary, maintenance, and readiness ramifications of their asset requests is a flawed system.

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(1)Bipartisan Policy Center, “The Building Blocks of a Ready Military: People, Funding, Tempo”, Jan 2017,

https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/BPC-Defense-Military-Readiness.pdf