Combat Fleet Count - Update

We know the fleet size is trending upward because the Navy and the current administration assure of this.  Further, the various 30 year shipbuilding plans all describe a fleet solidly in the low to mid 300+ range.  A couple of years ago, the fleet size was around 280 so by now it must be in the 290-300 range, right?  Go ahead, take a guess – what is the current fleet size? 

Answer:  It’s 290.  Hmm …  I thought it would be a bit higher but, hey, we have been under pretty tight budget constraints, so I guess that number isn’t bad.

I wonder, though, what the combat fleet size is?  Setting aside the JHSV, MCM, PC, hospital ships, LCS (we’ll count them if and when they ever get any combat capability), tugs, salvage ships, and ships whose designation starts with “T” or “A”, what do you think the combat fleet size is?  Hint:  it was 225 in 2010.  By now it must be up to around 235 or so, wouldn’t you think? 

Answer:  It’s 205.  Wait a minute!  It was 225 four years ago and now it’s 205.  That’s a drop of 20 ships in a four year period.  But, isn’t the fleet growing on its way to 300+?  How can the fleet be growing and the combat fleet be dropping sharply?

This is an update to our previous discussion about fleet size (see, “Combat Fleet Count”).  Here’s the updated Combat Fleet Count numbers.  The count includes carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, and amphibious ships. 

1980  392

1985  421

1990  405

1995  283

2000  243

2005  220

2010  225

2012  210

2014  205

You can check the fleet size for yourself at www.nvr.navy.mil .

So, what do we make of this?  The combat fleet size is steadily decreasing.  Deceptively, even the overall fleet size isn’t actually increasing.  We’re just counting previously uncounted ships like hospital ships, PCs, tugs, salvage ships, and whatnot.  The overall fleet count is being politically manipulated to seem like the current administration and Navy leadership aren’t gutting the fleet.  Check out SECNAVINST 4030.8B at www.nvr.navy.mil/5030.8B.pdf for the new counting rules.  We’re going to be counting rowboats, soon.  Fortunately, you and ComNavOps know better.  We’ve dug a bit deeper and see the facts. 

Sadly, it’s worse even than this.  You recall that the Navy is planning to “idle” 11 Aegis cruisers?  You and I both know that those are never coming back despite what the Navy claims.  Once laid up, the Navy will never find the funding to reactivate them.  As now, all available funding will go to new construction.  So, instead of 205 combat ships, we actually have only 194.  The Navy is already talking about early retiring a carrier and more amphibious ships as well as looking at the possibility of “idling” additional ships.  We are headed for a combat fleet count of 150 or so in the not too distant future.

I’ll close this post with the same statement I closed the previous Combat Fleet Count post:

Compare the Navy’s trend to China’s and ponder the implications for yourself.

I’ll continue to update this from time to time.

Return of the Viking

The Navy seems to have a clear need for an organic tanker, a long range fixed wing ASW aircraft, and a long range ECM/ESM aircraft.  Unfortunately, the R&D costs to develop a new multi-role support aircraft would be prohibitive in today’s budget climate.  If only there were an already fully developed and flight proven aircraft just sitting waiting to be put into production.  But, alas, we don’t have …  Hey, wait a minute!  Didn’t the S-3 Viking do all that stuff?  Couldn’t we just put it back into production?  Well, yeah, we could but it’s out of date.  We need a modern aircraft.  Yeah, I guess that won’t work because an old design like that just won’t …  well, it wouldn’t be able to, um …  Actually, what’s wrong with the old design?  None of those roles call for stealth.  None of those roles call for supercruise, Mach+ speed.  None of those roles call for 360 degree sensor fused, integrated, networked, anti-gravity, vertical takeoff, invisibility, and whatever other features the Navy would try to wedge into a new design.  Those roles just call for a flying truck.  This is exactly what CNO Greenert has been preaching. 

For those of you who have forgotten, the S-3 Viking functioned as a tanker, ASW, and ESM (remember the ES-3A Shadow?).  Additional roles are also possible.  A commenter once suggested the need for a long range UAV controller aircraft and the Naval Postgraduate School published a thesis in 1994 that examined the use of an S-3 Viking as a carrier based gunship. 

Not only could we quickly put the Viking back into production but my understanding is that the S-3 fleet has been preserved and could be restored to service with relatively little effort.  In fact, S. Korea is supposedly looking into buying several Vikings for ASW work.  Restored Vikings, if they won’t entirely meet the needed numbers, could be used almost immediately while a Viking production line is being reconstituted.

Check the Viking’s range and speed.  They’re more than adequate for the roles.

Range:  2765 nm

Speed:  max 430 kts, cruise 350 kts

Heck, the tanking role, alone, pretty much justifies this.  Right now, we’re using combat aircraft, Hornets, to act as tankers.  Every Hornet that gets used as a tanker is one less combat aircraft from an already shrunken pool of combat aircraft.  It’s not like there’s no room on the carrier.  The airwings have shrunk to the point that they barely occupy half the capacity of the carrier.

This is exactly the type of procurement that the Navy refuses to consider.  Here’s an aircraft that meets a variety of needs, is a proven design with all the bugs worked out, needs little engineering work, and would cost a fraction of a new design but the Navy won’t consider it because it isn’t a shiny, new toy with all the latest and greatest bells and whistles.  The fact that it can perform all the required missions means nothing to the Navy.  They only want leap-ahead technology. 

C’mon, Greenert.  Stop preaching and start practicing.

JHSV - A Bit Short But Not Bad

ComNavOps has previously expressed doubt about the intended role of the JHSV (see, “JHSV”) and nothing has happened to change that.  That aside, the JHSV appears to be largely meeting its designed capabilities with a few notable exceptions.  Frankly, it’s a welcome relief to see a Navy shipbuilding program largely succeed even if the intended role is questionable.

The FY2013 DOT&E report (1) highlights a few shortcomings with a couple related to range being noteworthy.

“USNS Spearhead cannot make the required 23 knot, 4,700 nautical mile light ship self-deployment transit; current analysis shows a 682 nautical mile deficit assuming a 90 percent starting fuel load with an ending fuel load of 10,000 gallons.”

“It appears that USNS Spearhead cannot make the required 35 knot, 1,200 nautical mile, fully loaded (600 short tons) transit.”

“USNS Spearhead is roughly 12.5 short tons over the predicted outfitted weight.”

“The JHSV’s organic container load trailer is not effective for loading 20-foot long metal storage containers. During the IOT&E, the test team took five hours to connect the container load trailer with a storage container and failed to load it aboard the ship.”

On the plus side, the main functions of transporting cargo and personnel and supporting the personnel appear to have been fully achieved.  In short, the vessel appears to have generally met its design goals.  Kind of refreshing, actually, even though I remain doubtful about its usefulness!

(1) Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2013 Annual Report

Prowlers and Growlers

The EA-6B Prowler, based on the A-6 Intruder, is/was the Navy’s electronic warfare plane, providing ECM and jamming in support of attack aircraft.  The Prowler is being retired in favor of the electronic warfare version of the Hornet, the EA-18G Growler.

According to Wiki, 170 Prowlers were built.  Wiki also cites 114 Growlers as built or on order although reports suggest that the Navy is looking at additional orders.

Here are some comparative specs on the two aircraft.



EA-6B Prowler



Prowler

Max speed:  566 kts

Cruise speed:  418 kts

Range:  2100 mi

Electronic Warfare Hardpoints:  5

Crew:  4

EA-18G Growler

Growler

Max speed:  ?

Cruise speed:  ?

Range:  1275 nm (clean); 390 nm combat radius

Electronic Warfare Hardpoints:  5

Crew:  2

Specs are hard to come by for the Growler.  The only available data appears to be simply copied over from Hornet data sheets.  For example, the max speed that is commonly cited is not valid since the Growler will always operate with its hardpoints loaded with large, heavy pods.  Similarly, the range is undoubtedly invalid for the same reason.  To be fair, I have similar doubts about the Prowler’s cited specifications although a loaded Prowler and a loaded Intruder would probably have reasonably similar performance.

Unfortunately, electronic warfare performance assessments of the two aircraft do not exist in the public domain.  I remain highly doubtful that the four operators of the Prowler can be effectively replaced by two.

Two things stand out in a cursory look at the aircraft.  First, is that the Growler’s mission range appears to be much less than the Prowler.  Even granting the Growler the higher range figure due to a clean configuration only puts it at just more than half the Prowler.  Second, is that the Growler has been obtained in much smaller quantities than the Prowler.  We’ve repeatedly stressed that “quantity has a quality all its own”.  Further, modern combat is placing an ever-increasing emphasis on electronic warfare while, at the same time, the Navy has decreased its electronic warfare aviation fleet by 33%. 

Lacking any performance comparison, I have no particular problem with the Growler other than the range and quantity issues.  However, the Growler seems to be an example of the all too common trend of new platforms and systems that provide only limited benefits over their legacy predecessors despite large expenditures of time and money.  For example, the Growler uses the same legacy ALQ-99 jamming pods as the Prowler which would suggest no performance improvement in that respect.

One of the original justifications for the Growler over the Prowler was the increased speed – the concept being that the Growler could keep up with the strike aircraft.  That always seemed a bit suspect to me.  The Prowler had sufficient speed to keep up with strike aircraft at cruising speed.  Only at max speed would the Prowler drop off.  Given that the strike aircraft would cruise at a moderate speed to and from the target and the Prowler stands off during the actual attack run, the Prowler’s speed never seemed to me to be an issue.  Nevertheless, the Growler’s higher max speed was a justification. 

Setting aside the validity of that initial justification, we’ve now, in a relatively few short years, moved from a conventional strike package concept to very long range, manned/unmanned, stealth strikes.  The Growler, as a completely non-stealthy aircraft with limited range now seems like a poor fit as a supplement to the future strike package.  I’m not suggesting that we get rid of the Growler – they have many years of productive service ahead of them – but, rather, that we think very carefully before committing to any additional Growlers, as the Navy seems to be leaning towards.  It may be time to look at a stealthy, long range electronic warfare aircraft, possibly even unmanned if the technology and software are sufficiently advanced (I’m doubtful but it’s worth consideration).

Islands Don't Sink

From time to time ComNavOps examines truisms to see whether they actually do contain truth.  Today’s is the common argument that islands don’t sink.  This argument is put forth to justify the F-35 program (and by extension, the Marine’s acquisition of the F-35B) or to demonstrate how we will dominate a Chinese conflict using remote, austere bases.  Let’s look a bit closer at these ideas.

The F-35 program is often justified by the idea that F-35s (presumably “B” models) will be dispersed to numerous small airstrips carved out of jungle islands.  The idea traces its roots back to the Pacific campaign of WWII in which island airstrips were constructed to provide forward operating bases in support of the march across the Pacific.  The modern version of this espouses small airstrips hosting a “few” (half a dozen, perhaps?) F-35s that would presumably wreak havoc across thousands of miles of ocean, secure in the knowledge that their base would either be undiscoverable or, if discovered, be “unsinkable”.

So, let’s look at the logistics of such a base.  Aside from the obvious need for fuel (modern jets, and the F-35B in particular, are voracious gas guzzlers – a couple of 55 gal drums of fuel aren’t going to suffice as they did for WWII Wildcats) and munitions, even a meager airstrip would need food, water, housing, large supplies of highly sophisticated spare parts and diagnostic equipment (the days of a mechanic with a wrench, duct tape, and wire are long gone).  Getting all those supplies to the dispersed bases will be a challenge, to say the least.  It was a challenge in WWII when we had thousands of warships and cargo ships and many thousands of delivery aircraft.  Today, we have very little in the way of logistical supply ships or aircraft and what little we have will be totally consumed supplying our major bases let alone small airstrips housing a few planes.



WWII Pacific Airstrip



What would such a base look like?  We’ve all seen the WWII jungle strips made up of steel matting and huts for the personnel.  Well, today’s aircraft are very delicate, FOD intolerant machines that require scrupulously clean runways.  We need hangars to shelter the aircraft from the elements and to house the sophisticated diagnostic and repair equipment required to maintain modern stealth aircraft.  We need powerful, long range radars for base defense and situational awareness.  We need sophisticated anti-missile batteries and ballistic missile defense systems.  And so on…  Not exactly the definition of an austere base.



In addition, F-35Bs operating in vertical mode (we’re talking short runways, right?) have already been proven to damage existing carrier decks.  What will these austere runways be made out of?  Common steel?  Doesn’t sound like it will hold up.  Asphalt?  A melted puddle.  Concrete?  No idea.  Again, these are not WWII Corsairs.  These are aircraft that are difficult to operate and maintain.

Let’s look closer at the “unsinkable” aspect.  Proponents of these bases call the islands unsinkable.  I take that to mean that they can’t be permanently destroyed.  Strictly speaking, that’s true.  The bases do, however, offer fixed targets that can’t move and are perfect for long range ballistic or cruise missile attack.  Because these will be austere bases, according to the proponents, they won’t have the sophisticated equipment or technical expertise to repair runways or facilities damaged in attacks.  Who’s going to repair destroyed computers, radar arrays, or even paved runways?  Of course, we could maintain large stockpiles of extra computers, radars, diagnostic equipment, and specialized aircraft maintenance tools but then the austere base is well on its way to becoming a major base. 

Well, the F-35s will provide their own base defense, won’t they?  Ignoring the fact that F-35s don’t have an anti-ballistic missile capability and would probably be hard pressed to demonstrate an effective anti-cruise missile defense, if we only have a half dozen (or dozen) aircraft and they’re tied up on base defense, who’s conducting the offensive missions which are, presumably, their reason for existence?  Of course, we could mount Patriot batteries and other, similar, high tech, powerful anti-missile defenses and radar systems but, again, there goes the concept of an austere base and the powerful radar broadcasts the base’s location.  One quickly reaches a point where the base exists merely to defend itself.

Now, let’s look at the reason the base would exist – it’s offensive capability.  We’ve got half a dozen or so high tech, stealthy F-35Bs.  These are relatively short range aircraft with limited payload when operating in stealth mode.  Presumably, these small, austere bases are going to utilize the F-35B’s vertical or short takeoff capability – if not, we’ve again got a major size base.  In vertical or short takeoff mode, the plane sacrifices range and payload.  Given the very high tech nature of these aircraft and the intensive maintenance demands – yes, read the initial reports;  the maintenance demands are staggering, at the moment, and are unlikely to improve all that much – we’ll be lucky to field three or so aircraft at any given moment.  So what will these few aircraft, assuming they aren’t consumed in base defense, do offensively?  Well, they can patrol and strike out to a couple hundred miles.  Yes, I know they can fly around the world if we want to set up a staggeringly complex tanker and support system.  Are we going to have flights of tankers dedicated to small, austere bases housing a half dozen or so aircraft?  Not likely!  Are we going to dedicate electronic support aircraft (Growlers) to assist these aircraft?  Again, no.  So, we’ll have a few F-35Bs with limited range and payload attacking targets of opportunity in their immediate area.  Does this justify the base construction, defense, and logistics necessary to support them?  It doesn’t look like it.  The island may be unsinkable but the austere basing concept is not.   

Frigate Interview

ComNavOps just scored an exclusive interview with the head of the frigate design committee.  Here’s the transcript of the interview.

ComNavOps:  Welcome, Mr. Burrow.  I know everyone is eager for news about the new frigate.  Thanks for giving my readers and myself the exclusive inside information.  As a Marine ground equipment person for the last 10 years, have there been any surprises in the design process, so far?

Burrow:  Well, I couldn’t help but notice right off that the ship is missing wheels.

ComNavOps:  Ahh …  It’s a ship, sir.  It’s meant to float.

Burrow:  Exactly!  And, like any amphibious vehicle it needs wheels once it gets to shore.  I would have thought you’d know that!

ComNavOps:  I do.  I mean, I don’t.  But it’s …  OK …  Moving on …  Any other new design changes we can look for?

Burrow:  We’ll be welding a large number of rings and hooks onto the hull of the ship for the crew to hang their packs and helmets from.

ComNavOps:  Based on your previous comment I guess I should have seen that coming.  You’re aware that the crew has storage space in the berthing compartments?

Burrow:  Hey, hey, hey!  I know we have mixed gender crews but no one is giving birth aboard ship.

ComNavOps:  ?! …

ComNavOps:  Again, moving on …  Many people feel that a frigate needs VLS to be effective.

Burrow:  I agree completely.  The ship will definitely have a Vertical Lunch System to dispense MRE’s.  That’s one Navy system I like – it’s a much more efficient way to feed the crew.

ComNavOps:  Ahh, you may have misunderstood the acronym, there.

Burrow:  I’m not an idiot.  I know what MRE stands for.

ComNavOps:  That’s not the acronym I was …  Never mind.

ComNavOps:  I’m probably going to regret this but one of the potential weaknesses of a frigate is the single propeller and shaft versus dual shaft arrangements in larger ships.  Any thoughts?

Burrow:  Yes.  We’ll be installing oar ports – about 35 per side.  Backup systems are important, you know.

ComNavOps:  Yes they are and that’s probably a good point to stop.  Thanks for taking the time to update us.

Burrow:  Happy to help!  As you Navy guys say, Anchors Away!

ComNavOps:  That’s not …  Oh, what the heck – close enough.

I could do this all day.  Seriously, this stuff just writes itself!

Frigate Committee Meeting Transcript

ComNavOps has obtained a recording of the Navy’s new frigate evaluation committee’s first meeting.  Here’s the transcript.

Civilian Chairman Burrow :  OK, settle down.  You all know why we’re here …

Chorus of Voices :  New LCS!

Burrow :  Exactly!

Lone Voice From The Back of the Room :  I thought we were going to look at combat capable frigate designs?

Chorus :  - near hysterical laughter -

Burrow :  “Combat capable”?!?  Oh, geez, you Navy guys crack me up.  That’s a good one!

Burrow :  You do have a point, though.  We’re supposed to look at alternatives so …

Chorus :  New LCS!

Burrow :  That’s what I’m talking about!  We’re making great progress.  You know, though, we can’t just recommend the same LCS so we …

Chorus :  Big New LCS!

Burrow :  I love you guys!

Burrow :  All right, we’ve got this thing pretty well locked down so let’s call it a day and head down to the Lockheed hospitality suite for happy hour massages.