Forward Bases in the Pacific

One of the common refrains from military observers is that we should be establishing forward bases in the Pacific as a way of dealing with China.  There are, however, a few problems with forward bases that must be addressed and overcome in order for them to be viable options.

 

We’re going to take a two-part look at the issue of forward bases beginning with a general examination of the concept in this, the first part, and followed by a specific example in the second part.

 

 

Definition

 

One of the problems in a discussion of forward bases is that no two people can agree on what constitutes a forward base.  What is the definition of a forward base?  Just as with phrases like ‘sea control’ or ‘littoral’, everyone has their own idea of what a forward base is.  A base one mile ahead of a main base is technically a forward base but that’s obviously not what we’re talking about.  For our discussion purposes, a forward base is defined as a permanent facility of moderate or large size located in enemy controlled – or at least highly contested – waters that serves the purpose of providing support and staging for further operations. 

 

It is the location in enemy controlled/contested waters that makes it ‘forward’. 

 

The permanence of the base is what separates a forward base from, say, the Marine’s fantasy of secret platoon size units that temporarily occupy a location and then move on to sow destruction and confusion among the enemy.

 

 

Challenges

 

As noted, forward bases face a variety of challenges that must be overcome to make them viable.

 

History - The first obstacle to overcome is history.  History strongly suggests that forward bases almost invariably wind up being lost to the enemy.  The one glaring exception in history is the string of forward bases established by the US during the WWII Pacific campaign as the US island hopped its way to Japan.  It is noteworthy, however, that the pre-WWII forward bases established by the US as a means of deterrence and forward defense were all lost to Japan during the early months of the war.

 

Now, consider the history of Japan’s forward bases in the Pacific.  At their peak, Japan had an extensive network of powerful bases throughout the Pacific.  It didn’t matter how strong the individual bases were, they all fell.  Consider the example of Truk, the Japanese Gibraltar of the Pacific.  It was considered nearly impregnable and unapproachable.

 

At the height of the atoll’s life as a Japanese base area, as many as 1,000 ships were on occasion to be found in the lagoon.[1]

 

The Japanese garrison peaked at 27,856 naval personnel …and 16,737 army personnel … [1]

 

Other defensive efforts included:

 

• coast-defense artillery
• remote controlled mines
• 40 anti-aircraft guns

 

Base facilities included,

 

… roads, trenches, bunkers and caves. The whole defensive complex included five airfields, seaplane bases, a torpedo boat station, submarine repair facilities, a communications centre and a radar station.[1]

 

Despite this collection of base force and firepower, Truk was easily attacked, destroyed, and then bypassed by US forces.

 

Isolation – The pre-war US forward bases and Japan’s forward bases all fell because they were isolated and, generally, separated from each other by great distances.  The bases were unable to mutually support each other and were subject to local massing of numerically superior enemy forces with greater firepower at a time of the enemy’s choosing.

 

In fact, one could logically argue that Japan’s scattered, forward bases were actually detriments to Japan’s overall military objectives because each base represented a ‘penny packet’ of force that had no hope of accomplishing anything, was doomed to defeat in detail, and drained forces from the overall military effort and geopolitical objectives.

 

The lesson is that if you can’t successfully defend a base (and history suggests that’s a very difficult thing to do) then you’re just throwing away resources.

 

Sea Control – As noted, isolation is a major challenge and the only way to overcome it is to maintain control of the connecting seas.  Reinforcement and resupply can only occur by sea.  When control of the sea is lost, so too, is the forward base.  During the pre-war and early months of war, Japan was able to exercise control of the sea and its forward bases were viable.  Once control of the sea was lost, Japan’s bases were doomed even if it took the US a few years to systematically destroy them.

 

Similarly, when the US lost control of the seas, its forward bases (Wake, Philippines, etc.) were doomed.  Once the US re-established control of the seas in the later years of the war, it was able to establish a string of forward bases that were viable.

 

Location and Purpose - It is vitally important to understand what a forward base really is.  To begin with, it’s not forward!  It may begin life at the forward edge of battle but by the time it becomes operational and useful, the forward edge of battle has moved on and the base is rendered a rear area support and staging facility.

 

As the American example of WWII demonstrated, forward bases work only when they are part of a coordinated, overall effort and then only when they are not actually at the forward edge of battle.  For example, each island base the US seized began as the forward edge of battle but became an operational base only when we moved on, rendering the base a rear area support facility.  Indeed, that is what a ‘forward’ base is:  a rear area support facility from which to stage and launch future actions.

 

Forward bases that are actually forward – meaning at the leading edge of battle or actually in enemy territory – are generally either ineffective (Guadalcanal while the island was being contested) or lost.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

The fantasy of a forward base, existing and operating inside an enemy’s sphere of influence and control, is just that … a fantasy.  The reality is that an operationally useful forward base is, in reality, and by necessity, a rear area support and staging facility.  We need to recognize and accept that.  Every dollar and every hour spent attempting to implement forward base fantasies is another dollar and hour lost to efforts that are actually productive and effective.

 

We also have got to come to grips with the imperative to establish and maintain control of the sea   Without control of the sea, Guam (or any other base) is just a useless, doomed facility waiting to die.  Unfortunately, we are currently in the process of knowingly and willingly ceding control of the seas to China.  The relative naval and air production rates of the US and China guarantee eventual Chinese control of the sea.

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]https://cmchant.com/japans-pacific-base-truk-atoll/

War Five Years From Now

The Navy has publicly stated that they view a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a war with China within the next several years as highly likely.  If so, what kind of shape will the Navy be in if a war starts, say, five years from now?

 

Here’s an overview of the Navy’s projected condition in 2027 based on the Navy’s most recent 30 year plan which includes the detailed 2022-2027 five year period[1]:

 

• Burkes will have begun retiring;  DDG-51 is scheduled to retire in 2027
• 1-2 Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) will be in service
• Down to 48 attack subs (SSN) with several unavailable for service due to multi-year waiting periods for maintenance
• Down to 9 active carriers (9+1 in RCOH)
• 1-3 Constellation class frigates (FFG) in service
• Another air wing will almost certainly be disestablished, dropping the number of air wings to 8, as the carrier level drops to 10
• Early retirement of a carrier is likely
• F-18s will be woefully obsolete but will constitute the bulk of carrier air wings
• No great amount of F-35s;  at most, one squadron of 10 aircraft in each air wing
• 20-50 unmanned, lightly armed vessels
• Ticonderoga class will all be gone

 

 

Projected 2027 Combat Fleet
Carrier	10
Burke	86
LCS+FFG	23
SSN	48
SSGN	1
Total Combat Ships	168

 

 

A total combat fleet of 168 ships is not a lot and 20 or so of that total will be the remaining LCS which have no combat capability due to their lack of meaningful armament and very short endurance/range for the Pacific theater.  The real combat fleet will be about 148 ships!

 

It is also quite possible that the Ford class carriers will not be combat-capable due to the ongoing, and seemingly unsolvable, EMALS, elevator, and AAG reliability issues.

 

The fleet is also projected to have 25 amphibious ships of various types, mostly the LPD-17 class.

 

It is absolutely baffling that the Navy believes war is imminent and yet they’re shedding ships as fast as they can.  If a Chinese agent had infiltrated the Navy and become CNO, he couldn’t do a better job of declawing the Navy than what we’re doing to ourselves.

 

 

A Burke and an Unmanned Vessel

This is Your Future Navy

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, Apr 2022 

FY22 Weapon System Costs

For informational purposes, following are some Gross Weapon System costs taken from the Navy budget documents[1,2] for FY2022.

 

 

Ship Program[1]	Unit Cost
Columbia SSBN	$15.0B
Ford CVN	$12.8B
Virginia SSN	$3.5B
Burke DDG	$2.4B
Constellation FFG	$1.1B
John Lewis T-AO (Oiler)	$0.7B

 

 

Of course, the ship costs are only partial costs.  For example, the Ford cost is simply the Congressional cost cap number.  Billions of dollars more have been racked up on the Ford trying to complete elevators, fix EMALS and AAG, making warranty repairs on items that were delivered damaged (main turbine generators, for example), and completion of construction items that were deferred when the Ford hit its cap limit.  Those funds are coming from unknown sources and account lines.  The Ford’s true cost is somewhere in the $15B+ range.

 

 

Weapon Program[2]	Unit Cost	Qty
Tomahawk	$2.07M	60
AMRAAM a	$1.7M	122
Standard (type unspecified)	$4.8M	125
JASSM	$1.5M	25
LRASM	$3.4M	48
NSM	$1.7M	34
Mk48 Torpedo	$2.7M	58
Sidewinder	$485,000	178
Small Diameter Bomb II	$227,000	180
RAM	$930,000	100
Joint Air to Ground Missile	$303,000	164
Hellfire	$63,000	120

 

^a from 2021; none procured in 2022

 

 

One concerning aspect is the very small procurement quantities of many of the weapon system programs.  For example, when the war with China comes, we’ll need thousands of anti-ship missiles, right?  We’re procuring 34 of the small Naval Strike Missiles per year and 48 of the larger, mainstay LRASM missiles.  Can we increase our procurement from a few dozen per year to the thousands per year that we’ll need?  It seems unlikely.  We could, conceivably, double (triple???) production but that would still leave us thousands short of what we’d need.  If a factory is producing at a rate of dozens per year, they’re not going to have the capacity to suddenly increase production by a factor of 50x or so.  What are we going to do to achieve that kind of instantaneous production capacity increase?  What’s our plan?  We don’t have a plan, as far as I know.  I’ve never heard any discussion of industrial production plans for wartime.

 

Anyway … this summary is just intended to give us a quick, concise list of some costs to help inform our weapon system discussions.  Hope this helps!

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf

 

[2]Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates Volume 1 of 1, Weapons Procurment, Navy, May 2021,

https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/WPN_Book.pdf

Mobile Nuclear Reactor Stupidity Continues

We talked about the military’s idea of mobile nuclear reactors and ridiculed it as one of the dumbest ideas ever (see, “Mobile Nuclear Reactors – The Dumbest Idea Ever”) but now, it seems, the military is going ahead with it.

 

The Pentagon today announced that Idaho National Labs will build and initially operate a type of mobile “nuclear microreactor” … [1]

 

… designed to deliver one to five megawatts of electrical power for a minimum of three years … [1]

 

The reactor fuel will be high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fabricated into tristructural isotropic (TRISO) reactor fuel[2] … whatever that means.  I’m not a nuclear fuel expert.  See ref.[4] for a discussion of the vulnerabilities of the fuel.

 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has picked BWX Technologies’ (BWXT’s) microreactor design for its “Project Pele” full-scale transportable prototype.

 

Lynchburg, Virginia-based BWXT will now manufacture and deliver the prototype microreactor to Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for testing by 2024. “The prototype will be built under a cost-type contract valued at approximately $300 million … [2]

 

Three hundred million dollars?  For one?  You can buy a lot of conventional energy for that amount!

 

Why are we doing this?

 

“A safe, small, transportable nuclear reactor would address this growing [energy] demand with a resilient, carbon-free energy source that would not add to the DoD’s fuel needs … [1]

 

Let’s be thorough and note that this will add to DoD’s fuel needs.  The graphics shown in the photos below note that the transportation fuel requirements are substantial and then the operating site will require heavy earth moving and construction equipment to set up.  That heavy equipment will require its own transportation and operating fuel. 

 

The descriptions depict this as a zero-impact energy source.  What about the disposal impact?  What will happen when we have to dispose of dozens of these units?  Ominously, disposal does not appear to have been examined as part of the project.  Disposal planning is offered only as a possible future add-on study.  As we know, possible future add-ons almost never happen.

 

INL could also potentially conduct mobile microreactor and spent nuclear fuel post-irradiation examination and disposition.[2][emphasis added]

 

Radioactive material disposal is already an unsolvable and growing problem and we’re looking to add to the magnitude of the problem for a minor (1-5 megawatts) gain in convenience?  Is that really a positive in the overall picture?

 

Where will we use this reactor?

 

.. supporting mission-critical operations in remote and austere environments.[1]

 

Note the size of the transport vehicle in the photos above.  How are we going to get that vehicle to ‘remote and austere environments’ and, once there, how will that vehicle traverse areas that, because they are ‘remote and austere’, likely have no roads suitable for such a vehicle? 

 

Its transportable design “consists of multiple modules that contain the microreactor’s components in 20-foot long, ISO-compliant CONEX shipping containers.[2]

 

The reactor assembly is spec’ed to weigh up to 40 tons.[4]  That’s not light and not easily transported across ‘remote and austere’ terrain.

 

What about safety, both operational and combat damage related?  According to Jeff Waksman, program manager,

 

… an inherently safe by design mobile microreactor can be constructed … [1]

 

Inherently safe nuclear equipment?  Whew, that’s a load off my mind!  Unfortunately, Mr. Waksman then immediately contradicts himself,

 

It’s not that they’re no risk, but it is just a different era.[1]

 

Uh … so there is risk but the risk is in a different era?????  Huh?  Is risk in a different era somehow better?

 

We have the ability to build reactors that, even in worst case scenarios, have very minor radiological imprints.[1]

 

So, there is a radiation risk but it’s minor?  I’m guessing the exposed soldiers and surrounding civilian people and villages won’t consider it minor.

 

The Drive website notes,

 

There are concerns, of course, associated with deploying mobile nuclear reactors to bases or the battlefield. Meltdowns, waste products, and other malfunctions are always a concern with nuclear energy technologies, and if a reactor in a contested area is destroyed by adversary forces, for example, the risk of environmental contamination is high. That, in turn, could create a political disaster for the DOD and United States. Deploying any nuclear systems abroad also incurs the risk of proliferation if those technologies should fall into the wrong hands due to a forward-operating base or convoy being overrun by hostile forces.[3]

 

That seems like a lot of risk for a minor (1-5 megawatts) gain in energy.

 

We’ve seen that the nuclear power plant in Ukraine has come under fire from Russia.  What happens when these mobile reactors are shelled and blown up?

 

Just out of curiosity, what happens when enemies and terrorists capture these things?  We’ve had drones, ships, and aircraft captured by various enemy countries.  Why would we think a mobile nuclear reactor would not be seized?  Again, I’m not a nuclear expert but I suspect that a clever and resourceful enemy could come up with many ways to use these reactors to our detriment.  Do we really want to give an enemy or a terrorist the ability to cause major panic by threatening radioactive catastrophe?  Look at our over-the-top reaction to Monkeypox.  It doesn’t require a real threat to generate a real panic.

 

 

 

 

I previously called this one of the dumbest ideas ever and I’m not seeing anything to change my mind.

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “Idaho National Labs to build Pentagon’s mobile ‘nuclear microreactor’”, Jaspreet Gill, 13-Apr-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/idaho-national-labs-to-build-pentagons-mobile-nuclear-microreactor/?_ga=2.166586301.2026423008.1649640840-1009727458.1647467636

 

[2]https://www.powermag.com/dod-picks-bwxt-to-manufacture-project-pele-prototype-nuclear-microreactor/

 

[3]https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40914/the-militarys-mobile-nuclear-reactor-prototype-is-set-to-begin-taking-shape

 

[4]https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/mobile-nuclear-power-reactors-wont-solve-the-armys-energy-problems/

Late 1942 Distributed Lethality Meeting

Late 1942.

 

Japan’s navy has delivered one unpleasant surprise and defeat after another to the US Navy.  So many of our ships have been sunk that the waters around Guadalcanal have become known as Ironbottom Sound.  Japan has demonstrated remarkable capabilities such as advanced carriers and carrier aircraft, the Long Lance torpedo, superb night fighting optics and tactics, devastating cruiser and destroyer attacks, mammoth battleships, etc.

 

US naval leaders are meeting to discuss the future ship designs and construction plans for the US Pacific fleet.

 

The following transcript of a hitherto secret naval meeting has just been released along with other long-classified documents.  Admiral Nimitz is identified but the rest of the names are still redacted.

 

___________________________

 

Adm. Nimitz:  Let’s get started.  We’re here to discuss our future ship designs and construction plans.  You all know the Japanese naval and aviation capabilities have been a rude surprise and have cost us dearly.  We need to develop a fleet that can not only counter these capabilities but exceed them.  Ideas?

 

Person 1:       It seems obvious that we need more of everything along with vastly improved torpedoes, a new generation of aircraft, better armored ships, and more firepower.

 

Person 2:       I’d like to offer an alternative approach, if I could?

 

Adm. Nimitz:  Go ahead.  I asked for ideas.

 

Person 2:       Instead of the usual progression of bigger, stronger ships with more firepower, I’d like to suggest that we build smaller ships that can operate in a distributed fashion where they would sail individually, deep into Japanese waters.  The Japanese will be unable to find them and, if they do find them, will be confused by the number of targets.  Japanese uncertainty will be our strength.

 

*** Drawn out silence ***

 

Person 3:       Wait a minute, I think I get it.  You want us to build ships with mammoth amounts of armor so that they can penetrate deep into Japanese waters and survive to inflict damage, right?

 

Person 2:       No, the ships would be unarmored.

 

*** Drawn out silence ***

 

Person 4:       So, you’re saying instead of armor the ships would have massive gun batteries and torpedoes?

 

Person 2:       No, the ships would have just a few small guns.

 

*** More silence ***

 

Person 5:       You must be talking about large squadrons of ships, then, with massive air cover?

 

Person 2:       No, the ships would operate independently, with no support.

 

*** Long drawn out silence ***

 

Adm. Nimitz:  Do I understand you correctly, that you want us to build small, unarmored ships with just a few small weapons to operate individually deep inside Japanese waters with no support even though the Japanese have been sinking entire groups of our best armored, heaviest cruisers and best destroyers on a regular basis?  Won’t these ships you’re proposing, operating on their own in enemy waters with no protection and no firepower, just be simple target practice for the Japanese?

 

Person 2:       No sir, they would confuse and confound the enemy.

 

Adm. Nimitz:  Son, the only person who is confused and confounded is you.  I’ve never heard a more idiotic idea.  You’re either an imbecile or a Japanese agent.  Either way, get out of here before I have you shot !

 

_____________________________

 

 

 

Well, there you have it – distributed lethality presented in the context of WWII in the Pacific.  Sounds pretty stupid, doesn’t it?  And, I imagine that would have been exactly the reaction of our naval leaders at the time.  They understood only too well the harsh realities of naval combat and the kinds of ships and firepower that were needed to fight naval battles and win.  They would be aghast at today’s leaders buying into this idiocy hook, line, and sinker.

Counting Unmanned Vessels As Ships

Should unmanned surface vessels (USV) count as ships of the fleet?

 

Regardless of whatever policy the Navy may eventually settle on for counting unmanned vessels as ships of the fleet – or not - it is clear that the Navy already considers unmanned vessels to be fully qualified ships of the fleet.  Every recent fleet size proposal consists of regular ships plus unmanned ships with no functional distinction made between them despite there being a universe of functional difference.  Actually, I stand corrected.  The Navy does see a distinction between manned and unmanned vessels.  The Navy believes that unmanned vessels possess some kind of mystical, super-capabilities derived from their very ‘unmannedness’.  Every statement by every Navy spokesman about unmanned vessels claims that they will enhance our combat capabilities.

 

The problem with these kinds of claims is the failure to recognize that USVs are not ships.  They’re adjuncts, at best.

 

When carefully examined, recent fleet size proposals all call for increased total numbers and yet tend to result in smaller combat forces!  The increased total numbers are provided by unmanned and non-combat vessels (MUSV, LUSV, Light Amphibious Warfare transport, etc.).  Thus, actual warships are being replaced by non-warships which clearly demonstrates the Navy’s misguided view of the equality between manned and unmanned vessels.

 

 

Definitions and Distinctions

 

What is a ship from a practical, combat perspective?  It’s a vessel that is capable of independent behavior, action, judgment, and possesses a range of capabilities.

 

In comparison, what is an unmanned vessel?  It’s a vessel that has a single, very restricted function, has no ability to act independently, and cannot exercise judgment.  It’s the very antithesis of the definition of a combat ship.

 

When a task force goes into combat and ships are damaged or sunk, other ships – and ship commanders – will take their place.  Command will devolve, if necessary, so that someone is always in charge.  If a ship drops out of formation, another will take its place to the extent that numbers allow.  In addition, individual ship commanders will, in extremis, exercise initiative and take individual action which has, historically, often been key to victory.  What happens when the ‘next ship up’ is an unmanned vessel?  There won’t be any initiative.  There won’t be any independent action.  There won’t be any victory.  The ‘depth’ of our fleet will be diminished with every USV procured.

 

When that control link to the LUSV missile barge is severed – either by enemy electronic warfare or by damage/destruction of the controlling ship – that missile barge becomes simply a barge;  an inert, inoperable, nautical paperweight and hazard to navigation.  On a real WARship, the crew is the ‘local’ backup, able to take over and continue fighting in the event that command/control from higher authority is lost.  A USV with a severed command/control link is just a floating barge.  Does anyone realistically think we’ll be able to retain complete, unaffected communication links to an unmanned vessel?  I can’t maintain cell phone connections!

 

There is more to a ship than just the number of VLS cells it carries;  a ship – an effective WARship, that is – includes a commander, a crew, and a host of potentialities that an unmanned ship utterly lacks.  In other words, a WARship is more than just a missile launching barge (which is exactly what the LUSV is!).

 

Damage control by a manned ship can save a ship in circumstances that would sink an unmanned ship due to the absence of damage control capability.  Lacking the capacity for damage control, unmanned ships are one-hit kills;  not just mission kills but actual sinkings.  Do we really want a fleet that includes a significant number of one-hit kill vessels?

 

Today’s supposed combat ships are built very weak and with no armor other than, perhaps, a sprinkling of Kevlar shrapnel protection in a few spots.  The Burkes, for example, had to have additional strengthening strakes added just to withstand the stress of normal sailing![1]  Given the physical weakness of our front line warships, does anyone think we’re going to build unmanned vessels to a higher standard or even the same standard?  Of course not.  They’ll be built to a reduced standard which, again, makes them even easier one-hit kills.

 

Beyond survivability, we all recognize the old adage that no plan survives contact with the enemy.  With human crews and the clear pre-battle conveyance of commander’s intent, the task force can still function despite the disintegration of the battle plan.  Unmanned vessels have no capacity to adapt.  They’ll execute their instructions no matter how little sense those instructions may make after contact with the enemy.

This is NOT a WARship ! 

 

Conclusion

 

Is this discussion just about the issue of whether to count unmanned vessels as part of the fleet ship count?  Of course not!  That would just be a matter of definitions with no real world importance.  The real issue is that by counting unmanned vessels as fleet ships, we’re deluding ourselves into believing we have capability that we do not.  It’s human nature and it’s inevitable that, at some point, people will begin to believe that unmanned vessels are the equivalent of manned ships (we’re already seeing this) and this will lead to fatally flawed planning and doctrine.  It is vital that we clearly maintain the distinction between a WARship and an unmanned barge so that we can accurately and wisely factor them into our planning.

 

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Network World, “US Navy warships suffer serious structural defects”, Michael Cooney, 15-Oct-2007,

https://www.networkworld.com/article/2349234/us-navy-warships-suffer-serious-structural-defects.html

Recruiting and Standards

ComNavOps abhors this kind of post but today’s circumstances demand it.  I hope that I will not be forced to make this a regular occurrence.  The following post is largely Army based but the concepts apply equally to all the services.

 

We’re talking about recruiting and standards.  Redstate website offers an article on the subject[1] that is spot on.

 

Note:  In the interest of fairness, Redstate is a politically conservative news site and the article’s author is a former Army officer who commanded an infantry company and was an Inspector General investigator in US Army Recruiting Command so he has extensive, first hand knowledge.

 

The article is well worth the time for a complete read.  The author addresses recruiting standards, the rationale behind standards, the use of standardized recruiting assessment tests and how they’re interpreted.  The author also drops a couple of hysterically funny comments which are all the funnier for being true.  Read the article!

 

The author throws out gem after gem of wisdom.

 

Addressing the reason why dropping the diploma/GED requirement is a problem, the author states:

 

Quitting is a lifestyle choice. A kid that quits high school is exponentially less likely to complete a 3-year active-duty enlistment than an HSDG [High School Diploma Graduates], no matter the AFQT score.[1]

 

Any semi-intelligent person – meaning not a general officer – understands that a high school diploma, while hugely watered down in today’s world, still represents a demonstrated degree of determination and self-motivation.

 

The author goes on,

 

… if you are recruiting tens of thousands of soldiers each year, you have to focus on the profile of what makes a successful soldier and not on the high school dropout and convicted felon … [1]

 

We know what recruit profile makes for a successful soldier.  That we’ve chosen to jettison that wisdom and aggressively recruit from outside that profile is unbridled stupidity.

 

The author notes,

 

The Army’s willingness to fill a substantial portion of the 60% of the FY2022 recruiting goal with kids who they know will not complete their first term of enlistment shows the level of desperation.[1]

 

Indeed!

 

The author laments the current situation.

 

Now the Army seems hellbent on destroying 40 years of hard-earned reputation for the sake of being woke and dying its hair magenta.[1]

 

The author addresses the crux of the problem:

 

The reason for the Army failing to meet its recruiting goals is simple, it has essentially declared that it has no use for heterosexual males or integrity.

 

Over the past decade, Army leadership has decided that woke indoctrination is more important than the credo of Duty, Honor, Country.[1]

 

The young men who are attracted to concepts like duty, honor, and country have nothing in common with today’s military. Is it any wonder that recruiting has become a crisis?

 

Without explicitly stating it, the author notes the reality that the pool of people who make up the actual, fighting soldier is no longer valued or sought after by the military.

 

Ever since Obama Defense Secretary Ashton Carter issued his fiat that all combat arms are open to women, the Army has been engaged in a war on its history and on the culture and demographic that has historically provided it with recruits and young officers.[1]

 

Consider this unattributed and uncaptioned photo accompanying the article.

 

Seriously, do any of these people look remotely like soldiers?  For all I know, they could be actors in a recruiting ad.  Regardless of who/what they really are, they are the absolute worst representation of soldiers I have ever seen.  For starters, look at the stomach bulges.  None of them can possibly meet even the dumbed down fitness tests of today.  I can only pray that the photo is some type of spoof or satirical commentary.  God help us if the photo is real.

 

It should be noted that you recruit not only inductees but also – and primarily - parents.  Let’s face it, the biggest influence on children is their parents.  If you don’t – or can’t – successfully recruit the parents, you’ll have little success with the children when they come of age.  By abandoning the values that once made our military great, we’ve lost the parents and, therefore, their children.  There is no one with more [former] respect for the military and its traditional values than me and there is no way in hell I’d allow my children to consider entering the military.  That should scare military leadership to its core but it doesn’t.  They have become so focused on weeding out the recruits (and active duty personnel) who embody the traditional values that they can’t even see the broken reality they’ve created.

 

 

 

 

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[1]Redstate website, “Army Backs off Enlisting High School Drop Outs but the Woke Cancer Killing Enlistments Remains Stronger Than Ever”, by streiff, 3-Jul-2022,

https://redstate.com/streiff/2022/07/03/army-backs-off-enlisting-high-school-drop-outs-but-the-woke-cancer-killing-enlistments-remains-stronger-than-ever-n588076