Lessons From Ukraine

What are the combat lessons from Ukraine?  There are no lessons from Ukraine!  Huh???

 

I didn’t want to do this post but the analysis from military observers is getting out of hand and we’re being fed a bunch of invalid conclusions and lessons that are beginning to take hold and that’s got to stop.  Everyone is spouting lessons they think they see from the Ukraine-Russia conflict but there are no valid lessons to be had.  Commenters on this blog have offered conclusions about the efficacy of UAVs, the demise of armor, and so on.  Now, the Marine Commandant seems to be doing the same thing.  From an interview he did,

 

The success of Ukrainian forces in countering Russian armored vehicle columns with missiles and rockets in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine shows the vulnerability of tanks to missile-armed infantry, the Marine Corps commandant said, and seemed to reinforce his decision to shed tanks from the Corps as part of his Force Design 2030 concept.[1] 

 

Unless Berger has inside information direct from both Ukraine (unlikely but possible) and Russia (impossible), then he’s just speculating on largely public domain news bits just like the rest of us and, just like the rest of us, he’s lost sight of what that public information is.  It’s propaganda!  Whichever side is offering it, it’s propaganda.  As yet, there is absolutely no authoritative combat information in the public domain, that I’m aware of.  That being the case, how can he, or anyone, draw any valid conclusions?  Attempting to do so is a classic example of garbage in, garbage out!  Invalid information in, invalid conclusions out.

 

Here’s an example … I just watched a video on YouTube purporting to be a Ukrainian attack on a lone Russian tank.  The video showed an isolated tank with not another Russian unit visible within the quarter mile radius or so of the scene.  The tank was meandering along a road, in the open, by itself and it was hit by some weapon and blew up.  A tremendous individual victory for Ukraine and proof that tanks can no longer survive on the modern battlefield in the face of individual soldiers with anti-tank weapons.  …  …  …  …  Or is it? 

 

How do I know that the video wasn’t staged by Ukraine using a captured Russian tank and was intended as propaganda?  The mere fact that there was someone with a video camera in this remote, isolated area, in perfect position to capture this event clearly and cleanly on film strongly suggests that it was, in fact, staged.  So, now what’s the conclusion?  There isn’t any!  There’s no conclusion and no lesson to be had from this because it isn’t authoritative and verifiable.

 

In addition to the total lack of authoritative information, it also seems as if this is a very atypical ‘war’ for the following reasons:

 

• Initially, Russia appears to have significantly restrained their firepower, presumably to avoid angering the populace that they hoped to eventually rule.
• Multiple reports suggest that many Russian units did not even know they were in a combat situation and believed it was all part of an exercise.
• Reports suggest that some Russian units have refused to fight.

 

Note:  Bear in mind my own warning:  these reports may or may not be accurate.  I’m looking at the pattern of the totality of reporting to discern broad truths but, again, they may or may not be correct.

 

 

All those videos showing Ukraine UAVs roaming freely over the battlefield and raining destruction on the Russians clearly demonstrates the power of UAVs and the ineffectualness of Russian anti-air systems, right?   Wrong.  For a variety of reasons, it is likely that the Russians weren’t even trying to operate anti-air systems during the period those UAV videos were made.  Again, no valid conclusion or lesson can come from that.

 

The atypical nature of the Russian’s conduct of the war was acknowledged by Commandant Berger:

 

During a live-streamed conversation with Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, Gen. David Berger said the Russian forces seemed to be ineffective in using a combined arms approach in that they were not using “maneuver to bolster your fires or using fires to set up your forces for maneuver. In both cases, one without the other … is very ineffective.”[1] 

 

So, Berger acknowledges that Russian forces were not using maneuver or firepower in a supporting manner as any semi-competent military would.  This lends credence to the reports that the Russians were initially restraining themselves to avoid civilian casualties and civil facilities destruction.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

What other atypical indicators does Berger recognize?

 

Berger also said Ukrainian forces seemed to be effective at causing confusion among Russian forces by stripping away Russian reconnaissance — which he said parenthetically that U.S. Marines “were very, very good at.”[1]  

 

So, another atypical behavior by the Russians in that they apparently didn’t conduct reconnaissance in force or in a supportive manner and did not, apparently, operate screens or counter-recon forces.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Is there more atypical behavior?

 

The commandant also noted Russian forces seemed to have planned for a very short war and lost momentum with poor logistics planning. He said the Ukrainian forces seemed to be able to strike at the Russian “logistics backside.”[1]  

 

So, acknowledging that Russia seemed to have planned for a very short conflict and did not bring the necessary logistic support, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Berger’s invalid conclusions are not limited to the Ukraine war.

 

“Instead of tank-on-tank formations, I would say if you look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon, or even right now in Ukraine, it’s pretty clear the top-down missile attacks on the top side of heavy armor makes [tanks] pretty vulnerable,” he said.[1]  

 

None of those regions saw armor deployed in doctrinally correct fashion.  Every report I’ve seen indicates that tanks were deployed piecemeal and unsupported by air or infantry.  The only valid conclusion is that stupidity is a good way to die on the battlefield.  I’m pretty sure China isn’t going to be that stupid.

 

As best I can tell from very questionable reports, Russia attempted to half-ass a war with Ukraine in an attempt to pre-emptively placate a populace that they would eventually control and want to have good (or at least not fanatically hostile) relations with when the fighting ended.  If true, that’s theoretically laudable but realistically stupid.  As we’ve harped on in this blog, ‘in it to win it, or don’t get in it’.  You can’t half-ass a war.

 

As far as attempting to draw conclusions and lessons, I’m pretty sure China is not going to half-ass a war with us like Russia seems to be doing in Ukraine so why are Berger and the rest of us drawing conclusions from an atypical war?

 

My fear and suspicion is that Berger is doing the same thing with the secret war games he claims to be using to reshape the Marine Corps.  I suspect that he’s generating invalid war games and, therefore, drawing invalid conclusions.  If he’s clearly doing it with the Ukraine lessons, why wouldn’t he do the same with his war games?

 

For the rest of us, be patient and withhold your judgment.  Lessons will eventually come from the Ukraine war but not yet.

 

 

 

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Though not relevant to this post, Berger did make one baffling statement:

 

Berger noted that amphibious operations are very complex and the Russian forces seemed to unnecessarily delay their limited amphibious operations. He said amphibious operations remain very much the core mission of the Corps.[1]    

 

So, despite publicly and repeatedly stating that the Marines are out of the frontal amphibious assault business and saying that large deck amphibious ships were of limited value, Berger is now saying that amphibious ‘operations’ (he didn’t use the word assault but what other significant amphibious operation is there for Marines?) are the core mission of the Corps.  Wait, now.  I thought small unit, missile shooting was the core mission?  How many core missions do the Marines have?  By definition, you can only have one core mission.  That’s what the word, ‘core’, means!  Okay, Berger, which is it?  What is the Marine’s single, core mission?  If amphibious ‘operations’ is the core mission, why have the Marines shed their tanks and reduced their artillery? 

 

Does this guy have any idea what he’s doing?  It doesn’t seem like it.  He seems to be floundering and flinging everything he can think of at the budget wall to see what sticks and can get funded.

 

 

 

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[1]Seapower Magazine, “Berger: Ukraine War Demonstrates Vulnerability of Tanks to Missile-Armed Infantry”, Richard Burgess, 16-Mar-2022,

https://seapowermagazine.org/berger-ukraine-war-demonstrates-vulnerability-of-tanks-to-missile-armed-infantry/

Hellcat and F-35

We’ve come to believe that long, drawn out development programs spanning decades are the norm for new aircraft.  That’s our paradigm and because we labor under that paradigm, we see decades long development programs as normal and don’t question it.  In fact, we question when someone suggests a shorter development cycle.  For example, read the responses to the post, “How To Build A Better Aircraft” to see the knee jerk, paradigm-inspired, negative reactions.

 

The reality is that our paradigm could not be more wrong.

 

Let’s consider the example of the F6F Hellcat, the aircraft that won the naval aviation war in the Pacific.  The Hellcat went from prototype contract award in Jun-1941 to first production aircraft in Oct-1942, a period of only 16 months and then entered squadron service on the USS Essex just 4 months later in Feb 1943.

 

F6F Hellcat

In contrast, the F-35 has been under development for well over two decades with the first X-35 demonstrator prototype contract having been awarded in 1997.  Development is still ongoing with the Block 4 full combat software suite still not ready and likely never will be !!!!!!

 

What if the F-35 had been needed for WWII?  It would have been the mid-1960’s before the aircraft would have been ready even in the limited form it is today.  We’d have lost the war while waiting for the F-35 (well, no we wouldn’t but I’m making a point).

 

Most of you are already pounding out a reply pointing out (rationalizing failure, actually … think about that … about what you’re defending …) that the F-35 is vastly more complex than the Hellcat so, of course, it would take more time.  Well, why don’t you pause your typing for a few minutes and let’s examine that argument.

 

First, is the F-35 really more complex than the Hellcat was, for its time?  The Hellcat incorporated new technology such as laterally distributed, hydraulically actuated, landing gear that rotated 90 degrees while retracting.  It had a new powerplant, the Pratt & Whitney R-2800-10 with a two stage, two speed, supercharger.  The propeller featured variable pitch which was regulated by oil pressure via the propeller governor.  And so on.[1]

 

Adding to the complexity and degree of difficulty was the fact that all design work was done by hand.  There were no computers, no computer aided design (CAD), no computer drawn blueprints, and no computer performance modeling and simulations.  Calculations were done by hand or, perhaps, with the aid of a slide rule.  Aeronautical theory was barely out of its WWI infancy.  Aircraft design was largely a matter of corporate institutional knowledge, trial and error, and ‘feel’ from the designers. 

 

Production was a challenge.  There was no automated, robotic assembly;  everything was hand built.  New production techniques, such as the use of flat aluminum sheets on the Hellcat, were being conceived and put into use on the fly.

 

The Hellcat was a complex undertaking, for sure!

 

It’s highly debatable that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was.  However, that’s an unproductive debate.  For the purposes of this discussion, let’s stipulate that the F-35 is more complex than the Hellcat was.  [uh … I’ve got a bad feeling about this]  In fact, let’s stipulate (with no supporting evidence) that the F-35 is the most complex undertaking man has ever attempted.  That should satisfy the F-35 apologists and allow us to move on with our discussion.  [oh, oh … why does this feel like a trap coming?]   

 

Having reminded ourselves about the development time of the Hellcat and the F-35 (and blamed the complexity of the F-35 for the extended development time!), let’s ask ourselves, which is better:  a short development time or a long development time?  It’s not a trick question.  The answer is obvious.  A short development time is infinitely preferable to a long development time.

 

The F-35’s protracted, glacially slow development time is all kinds of bad and wrong.  The F-35’s original design requirements, established well over two decades ago, are no longer relevant.  Many aspects of the F-35, such as the IRST, now border on obsolete because they were spec’ed a couple of decades ago.  What might have been revolutionary capabilities two decades ago, such as the sensor fusion, are now commonplace and likely better in other aircraft.  The degree of stealth that might have been useful and very effective two decades ago is now considered merely semi-stealthy and is losing its effectiveness every day. 

 

Far worse, this kind of protracted development is simply not acceptable in a world that might go to war at any time.  The Hellcat is the model for useful development time.

 

Now, let’s re-examine our reason (rationalization) for the F-35’s prolonged development.  What did all you apologists just clamor about?  Oh yes … the complexity of the F-35.  [and the trap closes!]

 

So, if complexity is the reason for protracted development times and if prolonged development times are bad then it stands to reason that complexity is bad.  Simple logic.  Also, blindingly obvious.

 

Thus, the very complexity that the F-35 supporters and apologists proudly proclaimed earlier in the post is, in reality, the reason why the F-35 has been such a failure!  The fanboys have proudly latched onto the root cause of failure and are promoting and defending it.  [… oops!]

 

So, having identified what’s wrong with the F-35, let’s now address the ‘why’.  Why is the F-35 the most complex undertaking ever attempted by man?  Again, it’s not a trick question.  The answer, of course, is because we attempted to leapfrog generations of rational, methodical, educational development in an attempt to jump into the future.  In other words, we unwisely latched onto revolutionary instead of evolutionary.

 

In contrast, the Hellcat, while it had new features which were then state of the art, was still an evolution of the F4F Wildcat and, as such, was a magnificent and timely success.  Revolutionary development usually fails and, if it succeeds, takes decades.  Evolutionary development produces a useful, timely product.  Which approach should we be following?  Again, not a trick question …

 

There’s nothing wrong with pursuing revolutionary developments … as long as they stay in the lab until they’re ready.  It is folly to base production programs on non-existent, revolutionary technology.

 

We have to break this cycle of attempting to develop exquisite, leap ahead technology that winds up consuming billions/trillions of dollars and never actually pans out.  We’ve had enough LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, Ford programs that reach for the stars and land in the mud.  We need Hellcats.  If the Navy is right about their prediction of war with China (assuming we opt to contest China’s assault on Taiwan), we need Hellcat’s, now, more than ever.

 

Consider the F-35.  What if, instead of trying to create a sensor fused, holographic, multi-dimensional, subspace, see-through image displayed on a magic helmet in an aircraft that tried to do all things for all services by implementing horizontal and vertical takeoff and landing and can’t communicate with anyone other than itself, we had designed a state of the art (but no further!), single function aircraft, using only existing technology?  We’d have had an optimized, operating aircraft fifteen years ago and it would have been the best aircraft in the world, at the time!  We’d have had a modern Hellcat!  Instead, we have a flying black hole of a money pit … you know, the 50% of the time it’s actually ready to fly (F-35 readiness rates being what they are;  see, “The Real Aircraft Readiness Rates”).

 

So, what do we conclude from all this?

 

• As regards development time, complexity is the enemy of brevity.
• As regards war, complexity is the enemy of timeliness.
• As regards usefulness, complexity is the enemy of relevance.
• As regards budgets, complexity is the enemy of affordability.
• As regards numbers, complexity is the enemy of quantity.

 

Wow!  Complexity is the enemy of many things, isn’t it?  Maybe that should be telling us something about our obsessive desire for complex technology? 

 

Maybe that should be telling us something about the next generation aircraft the Navy is pursuing? 

 

Maybe that should be telling us something about the cruiser replacement the Navy is pursuing? 

 

What was that old caution?  Oh yeah …

 

Keep It Simple, Stupid

 

K.I.S.S.

 

The Navy needs to K.I.S.S. their next aircraft and next ship.

 

 

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[1]LCDR Richard Dann, USNR, Walk Around F6F Hellcat, Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1996, ISBN 0-89747-079-6

Turkish UAV Carrier

Although it is not yet 100% certain, it appears that Turkey is following through on plans to modify a LHD amphibious ship (the Anadolu, L400) to act as a drone carrier after having the option of operating F-35Bs terminated due to political issues and removal from the F-35 program. 

 

As previously reported by Defense News, the Turkish government hopes to convert its landing helicopter dock Anadolu into a carrier ship for attack drones because the Turkish navy lost the ability to launch a fixed-wing aircraft from Anadolu after the United States removed Turkey from the F-35 project.[1]

 

Anadolu will be capable to deploy between 30 and 50 Bayraktar TB3 folding-wing drones.[1]

 

Let’s take a closer look at Turkey’s UAV carrier.

 

 

Air Wing

 

As with any carrier, the carrier’s value lies entirely in its air wing.  In this case the air wing consists entirely of unmanned UAV drones.

 

Turkish UAV Carrier Anadolu

 

The Turkish UAV carrier will use an indigenously designed and built drone, the TB3, based on the Baykar TB2 family.

 

The new armed drone will have a takeoff weight of 1450 kilograms [ed. 3190 lbs] and will be able to fly 24 hours a day, according to an infographic in the presentation. In addition, the TB-3 will be able to fly at high altitudes, and its wings will fold when on the ship.[1]

 

Turkey’s Defence Industry Chief Ismail Demir stated that Anadolu will be capable to deploy between 30 or 50 Bayraktar TB-3 drones.[5]

Turkish UAV Carrier Concept Illustration - Note 

Size of Aircraft and Folding Wings

 The TB3 is a modification of the TB2, already in operation.  The TB3 will launch using a ‘roller’ and pulley/cable mechanism powered by an electric motor [4] and recover by flying into a net, the belief being that having the propellers mounted to the rear will allow the net recovery with no damage.  Other reports have suggested that aircraft recovery will be via a ‘hook’ of some sort.[5]

 

TB3 Drone

Roller Style Launch System

 

Here’s some basic specs and features of the TB3 [2]:

 

 

TB3 Drone Specs and Features
Wingspan	14 m (45.9 ft)
Length	8.35 m (27.4 ft)
Height	2.6 m (8.5 ft)
Max Take Off Weight	1450 kg (3190 lb)
Cruise Speed	125 knots
Max Speed	160 knots
Max Payload	280 Kilograms (616 lb)
Endurance	24+ hrs (one report claims 50 hrs[8])
Communications	Line Of Sight and Beyond Line Of Sight
Take Off and Landing	Fully Autonomous

 

 

 

As shown in the specs, this is a big drone.  It’s about the same size as the well known MQ-1 Predator.

 

Turkey is also developing an unmanned air-to-air combat UAV.

 

Selcuk Bayraktar [Chief Technology Officer of Baykar Co.] also stated that MIUS, an unmanned combat aircraft currently in concept design, would operate alongside the TB-3 on the LHD Anadolu. A MIUS prototype is planned to fly in 2023. LHD Anadolu would deploy two types of fixed-wing unmanned air assets once trials were completed.[1]

 

The first flight of prototype MIUS is expected in 2023. Currently in design phase, MUIS will be jet-powered, with a payload of up to 1.5 tons, Baykar top boss added. The autonomously maneuvering craft will be capable of operating in tandem with piloted aircraft, and may carry air-to-air missiles.[3]

 

“MIUS will operate at a cruising speed close to the speed of sound; the further prototypes will fly at the supersonic speed. It will have a payload of around 1500 kilograms. It will be able to deploy air-to-air, air-to-ground missiles and cruise missiles.”[5]

 

Turkish MIUS Combat Drone Illustration

 

It appears that Turkey is attempting to develop both a strike/ISR and an air combat drone and their schedule is extremely aggressive.

 

On a related note, Turkey has developed a UAV air-to-surface weapon, the MAM-L smart micro munition.  It is 1m long, weighs 22 kg, and has a range of 8-15 km, depending on options.[6]

 

 

CONOPS

 

We have no formal information about the Turkish UAV Carrier Concept of Operations (CONOPS), however, we can reason out a general concept.

 

Turkey is clearly aiming to develop combat drones as opposed to surveillance drones although I’m sure they’ll use the drones for surveillance, as needed.  This would provide them with a carrier-mobile strike/combat aviation capability to replace the lost F-35B capability, to a degree.  The TB3, in particular, seems to be a surveillance drone with a surface-to-ground missile capability, likely akin to the US Hellfire equipped drones.  The MIUS drone, on the other hand, appears to be a pure combat UAV.

 

Of note is the fairly large number of embarked drones.  Numbers in the 30-50 range have been reported.[7]  This is significant in that it allows for massing of firepower effects to produce a militarily significant impact and allows for inevitable attrition. 

 

Note: some reports have suggested that simultaneous control is limited to around 10 UAVs.[8]  If true, this would limit the massing benefit.

 

On the negative side, the Turkish TB3 drones are large and slow and, as has been demonstrated in the real world, large, slow drones will have a very short life over a high end battlefield.  The MIUS, as described, would be quite fast and maneuverable, making it potentially quite suitable for high end combat.

 

All of this suggests that the carrier is intended to operate in lower threat scenarios (as opposed to a China/US type high end combat setting) where the larger, slower TB3 can still be effective.  The apparent control limit of ten or so UAVs also suggests lower threat scenarios where the UAV can provide situational awareness and an ‘aerial sniper’ type of ground support/attack as opposed to mass attacks.

 

If successfully developed (an ambitious undertaking by any standard!), the MIUS will be fully capable of high end combat and would, presumably, come to eventually comprise the majority of the air wing.

 

All of this strongly suggests that the UAV carrier will be used as a ground support platform rather than a stand alone strike asset.  The MIUS would be used to establish local air superiority thereby allowing the TB3 drones to conduct sniper attacks on ground targets.  An ambitious concept, if correct!

 

 

Summary

 

As stated, the value of any carrier is its air wing.  Turkey’s UAV carrier air wing is, currently, mostly conceptual although the scope of that concept is impressive, to say the least.  Of course, as the US has seen, repeatedly, the road from concept to working asset is difficult and, more often than not, results in failure.  The more ambitious the concept, the greater the chance of failure and Turkey’s concept is ambitious in the extreme with the envisioned MIUS supersonic air combat vehicle as the cornerstone of the concept.  It will be fascinating to see whether they can make it work.

 

ComNavOps has long advocated a UAV carrier although with a different intended mission from Turkey’s LHD.  The Turkish CONOPS may work for whatever uses Turkey has in mind but they would not work for the US.  The US has many different forms of strike and air-to-air capability, all far more efficient and effective than a large, slow drone or even an air-to-air combat UAV.  What the US needs is a large amount of small, cheap, expendable surveillance drones for which a UAV carrier would be ideal.  Similar ships, different CONOPS.

 

One cannot help but admire the vision and ambition of the Turkish arms development industry.  If they can transform their visions into successful, working assets they will, if not revolutionize, certainly significantly impact the future conduct of war.  The US Navy considered a combat UAV but ultimately settled on an unmanned tanker, instead.  Our vision was more restrained, opting to take the safer route and develop unmanned carrier operating experience before revisiting the combat UAV.  Which country’s approach will prove more successful (or both, or neither) remains to be seen.

 

I find it embarrassing that Turkey is exploring a UAV carrier when the US Navy will not.  We have amphibious ships to, literally, throw away and it is nothing short of criminal to not use one as a prototype for a UAV carrier.  The USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41), for example, is being retired this year and could easily serve as a prototype for a year or two.

 

We’re enamored with unmanned aircraft and yet, inexplicably, we seem to have no interest in figuring out how to integrate them into the fleet.

 

 

 

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[1]Defense News, “Turkey’s Baykar preparing shipborne fleet of combat drones”, Tayfun Ozberk, 6-Aug-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/08/06/turkeys-baykar-preparing-shipborne-fleet-of-combat-drones/

 

[2]https://baykartech.com/en/bayraktar-tb3/

 

[3]https://www.defenseworld.net/news/30761/Baykar_to_Test_Bayraktar_TB3_Sea_Based_UAV#.YiFGcfZFyM8

 

[4]https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/05/10/behold-the-turkish-navys-drone-aircraft-carrier/?sh=dcfa87839daa

 

[5]Naval News website, “Turkey to deploy MIUS unmanned combat aircraft from LHD Anadolu”,Tayfun Ozberk, 22-Jul-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/07/turkey-to-deploy-mius-unmanned-combat-aircraft-from-lhd-anadolu/

 

[6]https://navyclippings.nl/index.php/2021/03/18/turkish-navys-ucav-engages-sea-target-for-the-first-time/

 

[7]Defense News, “Turkey plans to deploy attack drones from its amphibious assault ship”, Tayfun Ozberk, 11-Mar-2021,

https://www.defensenews.com/global/2021/03/11/turkey-plans-to-deploy-attack-drones-from-its-amphibious-assault-ship/

 

[8]https://vpk.name/en/579043_in-turkey-the-flight-of-the-deck-bayraktar-was-announced.html

Scrap Two Carriers! - Part 1

We are honored today to have a guest post from Carlton Meyer.  You may know him as username ‘G2mil’ and the author of many outstanding articles posted on his website at www.g2mil.com.  Carlton has a two (maybe three?) part series of posts describing his proposal to scrap two carriers.  In today’s post, he lays out the background and basis for his proposal.  The second part, which will come later in the year, will describe the results and ramifications of his proposal.

 

_____________________________________ 

 

 

Scrap Two Carriers!

Carlton Meyer

The US Navy is out of balance. Most funds are devoted to maintaining a fleet of eleven supercarriers to keep two or three "on patrol" for eight months at a time, ready for the Soviet Navy to reappear. If war begins with a major power, carriers should remain far from danger. Aircraft carriers are useful, but must remain in safe seas until land-based aircraft and submarines clear the seas of most enemy subs and destroy enemy long-range missile sites and air bases. Then they can arrive for strike missions or to escort amphibious groups to support an invasion. They are also useful against weak nations, but the USA doesn't need 11 supercarriers, in addition to the 10 large carriers used by the Marines, which are larger than World II Navy carriers. Shrinking to nine supercarriers frees funds and manpower to rebalance the fleet with more surface combatants and aircraft.

If admirals quickly dispatch carriers to the Western Pacific in time of war with China, they will suffer the fate of the mighty British battleship HMS Prince of Wales along with the heavy cruiser HMS Repulse when they sailed from Singapore to confront the Japanese Navy at the beginning of World War II. As their respected admiral executed World War I era tactics for a great ship battle, his first-class warships were attacked by a swarm of pesky land-based aircraft and sunk. Experts agree that if Japan had focused production on aircraft and submarines rather than battleships, it would have taken the USA another year or two to prevail. For example, tremendous resources were devoted to the three massive Yamato class battleships. Admirals feared committing them to any serious naval engagement knowing the embarrassment should one be sunk, as will be the case with current American supercarriers. When forced to deploy toward the end of the war, all three super-battleships were easily sunk by torpedoes from submarines and aircraft. 

This occurred before torpedoes and bombs had guidance systems! Japanese kamikaze attacks were the first guided attacks on ships. These older aircraft were flown by new pilots with no experience and 81% were shot down or crashed at sea. Yet these attacks killed more American sailors than kamikaze pilots, sunk 47 ships and damaged 365 others. This tactic may not be dead. A nation may send four dozen old supersonic fighters flying Mach near sea-level toward an American carrier, loaded with dumb bombs and blazing away with 20mm gatling guns. These need not even be suicide missions if pilots eject prior to impact.

American admirals fear war with a peer nation because they know a single hit may explode an aircraft carrier filled with aviation fuel, missiles, and bombs, alongside 6000 sailors. One hit below deck and the ship may blow up like an ammo ship - killing everyone! Or carriers may be sunk by a single lurking submarine or a volley of long-range cruise missiles. The USS Forrestal was severely damaged during the Vietnam war after a minor fire caused a single 20mm round to fire, which set off a chain of explosions that caused mass casualties and set the ship ablaze. In 1969, a small rocket fired off an aircraft aboard the USS Enterprise set off a series of 18 explosions, blowing eight holes into the flight deck and killing 28 sailors, with 314 injured and 15 aircraft destroyed.

The US Navy needs only nine supercarriers that can still rotate deployments so that one can arrive anywhere within a week or two for small crises. Carrier cuts may soon occur automatically because of the USS Ford disaster this blog has recently covered. It looks certain that the Ford program will require billions more dollars and several years to modify the two completed Fords and two more under construction. Will cuts to naval aviation and surface combatants be required to fund this, making the current imbalance worse? Today’s US Navy fleet has become imbalanced as the number of escorts for each carrier has fallen to about half that common in the Cold War, so each carrier is even more vulnerable. Two fewer carriers solves this problem as it frees their escorts for other carriers and frees funding and manpower to procure more escorts, and helps solve the Navy 5000 man shortage for at-sea billets recently covered in this blog.

Half of the savings from two carrier deactivations would allow for increased purchases of naval aircraft to fill the decks of the remaining carriers. US Navy carriers now deploy with around 25% fewer aircraft than during the Cold War due to rising aircraft costs. Admirals excuse this by claiming carriers need fewer aircraft since they are now more capable, although they can’t deny that more aircraft are better. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps have almost no spare aircraft for wartime attrition. Downsizing to nine carriers would allow them to deploy with a full complement of aircraft and fleet replacement or reserve squadrons with 100 spare aircraft for wartime attrition. Another option is to maintain two carrier air wings ashore overseas that incorporate Marine Corps squadrons. A post about this concept will appear later this year.
 

 

 

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Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.

China is the Priority?

Apparently, the Navy can’t even hear its own words.  If they did, the contradictions that leap out of them would shame even the Navy.  For example, let’s take a look at a recent Navy Times article.[1]

 

The U.S. Navy sees the 2020s as presenting the “peak risk” for China making a move against Taiwan, driving the service’s effort to prioritize readiness over fleet size … [1]

 

“The Navy brings a strong view that the decade of concern is 2020 — and in some respects, that’s not a universal view in the department, but we consistently believe and have thought that that’s the decade that we see of peak risk and that we’re going to be ready for.”[1]

 

So, lacking even an internal consensus, the Navy has decided that China will invade Taiwan before the end of the decade.  Okay, that sets the stage for the article.  The Navy has established a clear objective: to get ready for a major war that will occur sometime in the next 8 years.  Common sense suggests that most of us would put an immediate halt on ship retirements for the next 8 years, right?  So, what did the Navy opt to do?

 

In its budget request for this fiscal year, the Navy asked to decommission 15 ships, including seven [Aegis] cruisers.[1]

 

So, the Navy’s approach to getting ready for a major war in the next 8 years is to early retire 7 of the most powerful ships in the world and 15 ships in total.  Given that our build rate is around a half dozen ships per year, few of them actual warships, can you see any problem with that approach?  Any, at all?  Even a tiny bit?  The Navy can’t.

 

How did the Navy justify these ship retirements during a time of maximum need?

 

He [Adm. William Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations - VCNO] did not specifically address why cutting the cruisers made sense for a near-term fight, though Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday told Defense News last month the cruisers were eating up time and resources the Navy didn’t have. With the cruiser modernization program facing significant challenges and cruisers experiencing maintenance emergencies during training and on deployment, Gilday said tens of millions of dollars were being rerouted to repair them instead of paying for important fleet training, maintenance and operations.[1]

 

You know … I might buy into Gilday’s thinking about spending on training and maintenance except for the fact that the Navy has claimed to be focused on training and maintenance for the last several years and not only has there been no improvement in training or maintenance, there has been a noticeable degradation in training and maintenance.  Throwing more money at a proven losing proposition is insane.

 

By the way, did you catch Gilday lumping ‘operations’ in with training and maintenance?  What operations?  What are we doing, operationally, that is preparing us for this monster fight in the next 8 years?  I don’t know of any operations.  Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPS) are certainly not preparing us for peer war. 

 

Did you also catch Gilday’s bit about the cruisers ‘eating up time’?  Do you recall several years ago when the Navy sold Congress on the 2-4-6 cruiser modernization plan?  Do you recall that we documented that the cruisers were left idle, literally rusting away pier side for four years (see, “Ticonderoga Class Modernization”)?  There’s your window of time, Adm. Gilday.  You had years of time to modernize the cruisers but you didn’t.  Of course, this was because the Navy didn’t really want to modernize the cruisers.  They wanted to retire them either officially or, when Congress wouldn’t allow that, unofficially by letting them sit idle and rotting with no crews.  You did that and now you complain about the lack of time, Admiral?  What a deceitful hypocrite. 

 

As I’ve repeatedly stated, we need to stop deployments, bring our Navy home, and focus on actual training and maintenance instead of continuing to send ships on nearly year long deployments that … wait for it … degrade our training and maintenance!  You know … the exact opposite of what the Navy claims to have prioritized.

 

Is ComNavOps the only one who doesn’t believe the Navy is actually preparing for war in any serious way?  No …

 

Rep. Rob Wittman, the top Republican on the House Armed Services seapower and projection forces subcommittee, remains skeptical of the Navy’s approach. In opening remarks at the hearing, he said it was “disheartening” to see a perceived lack of urgency from the Navy in preparing to deter or fight China.

 

“Last year, the Navy requested only one destroyer, no amphibs, and proposed to retire seven large surface combatants whose firepower exceeded that of the entire British Navy. The Navy provided a ‘30-year shipbuilding plan’ that was only good for one year,” he said. “The Navy submitted a shipyard recapitalization plan with little financial backing. And the Navy continues to underman our surface navy who currently is lacking over 5,000 sailors.”[1]

 

Now, the cynical among us might suspect that the Navy is simply crying wolf about the Chinese intentions and timetable in order to coerce Congress into increasing the Navy’s budget.  On the other hand, I do believe the Chinese are looking quite seriously at moving on Taiwan and nothing we’ve done with respect to Ukraine has given them any reason to think we’d attempt to stop them.  Heck, we won’t even recognize Taiwan as a country!  That’s not exactly a commitment to defend the island, is it?

 

So, let me see if I’ve got this right …

 

The Navy claims to anticipate a peer war in the next few years and their response is to retire as many powerful ships as possible?

 

The Navy claims to anticipate a peer war in the next few years and their response is to attempt to early retire a carrier, as they’ve proposed on multiple occasions?

 

The Navy claims to anticipate a peer war in the next few years and their response is to scrap nearly brand new LCS ships while continuing to build brand new LCS ships?  Which is it?  If the LCS is so worthless that they need to be dumped, why are we continuing to build new ones?  Alternatively, if the LCS is worth continuing to build, why are we dumping nearly new ships?  You can’t have it both ways, Navy.

 

The Navy claims to anticipate a peer war in the next few years and their response is to restructure our fleet around small, weak, unmanned ships that, at the moment, exist only on paper as developmental concepts?

 

The Navy claims to be prioritizing maintenance and yet keeps degrading ships by sending them on several month long useless cruises and executing double-pump, back-to-back carrier deployments?

 

The Navy claims to be prioritizing training while barely – or not even – providing enough flight hours for non-deployed air wing pilots to stay flight certified?

 

The Navy claims to be prioritizing training and maintenance while showering waivers around as if they were confetti?

 

 

The hypocrisy and duplicity of Navy leadership is breathtaking.

 

 

 

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[1]Navy Times, “Navy says China fight is most likely in 2020s, sharpening its focus on readiness”, Megan Eckstein, 3-Mar-2021,

https://www.navytimes.com/naval/2022/03/03/navy-says-china-fight-is-most-likely-in-2020s-sharpening-its-focus-on-readiness/

LCS Second Life

At this point, not even the LCS’ most ardent supporter would call the LCS a successful program.  Even the Navy seems to be trying to get out from under the LCS given that they’ve retired, or announced the retirements of, six vessels, each with only a few years of actual service.  Talk about early retirement!

 

However, beating up on the LCS is not the purpose of today’s post.

 

The LCS has made many changes since its initial incarnation and, to be honest, most of the changes have been for the better (they’d almost have to be, right?).  The list includes:

 

• Adding the anti-ship Naval Strike Missile
• Adding Hellfire missiles to deal with small boats
• Standardizing on SeaRAM over RAM
• Standardizing on one combat software system
• Dropping the ridiculous 3:2 crewing scheme in favor of a simpler blue-gold scheme
• Increasing crew size
• Eliminating the module swap concept
• Somewhat de-emphasizing the shore maintenance concept and attempting to return some of the maintenance to the on-board crew

 

Of course, there are many other things they should have done and have not but, let’s be fair and acknowledge that the changes listed above are pretty clearly improvements to varying degrees.

 

With that said, and those changes in mind, is it possible that the LCS can now serve a useful function as a member of a combat fleet?  Or, is the ship burdened with so many built-in constraints, weaknesses, and limitations that there is simply nothing productive they can do?  Let’s take a look at some possible combat missions/roles for the ‘new’ LCS.  Let’s see if the LCS can have a second life.

 

For the moment, I’m going to ignore the mine counter-measure (MCM) and ASW roles since there are no active, functional modules and may never be.  In addition, while useful, those roles are not direct combat.

 

So, let’s consider the following possible roles:

 

Hunter-Killer Surface Sweep Squadrons.  The LCS could operate in squadrons, using its numbers, UAVs (surveillance), and anti-surface missiles to sweep ahead of larger surface groups such as amphibious groups and clear the way.  Ironically, this is somewhat akin to the original concept wherein the LCS would clear the littorals (littoral - a discredited notion) ahead of a larger group.  This sweep mission would be somewhat analogous to the WWII fighter sweeps that routinely preceded air strikes.  This kind of sweep could be useful in the Middle East or the islands around the E/S China Seas.

 

Choke Point Patrol and Interdiction.  While not a ‘battleline’ combat function, this kind of peripheral patrol is vital and would likely result in some direct combat.  One issue with this is that the LCS does not possess a ship-killing capability when facing a large commercial vessel.  The Naval Strike Missile is the heaviest anti-ship weapon and it is far too light to pose a lethal threat to large commercial ships.

 

Dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) Escort Vessel.  This is a long time ComNavOps favorite.  By eliminating the aviation element, the LCS has the deck and internal space to mount numerous large EW antennae, jammers, sensors, etc.  The existing SLQ-32/SEWIP units are small, low powered, and effective only for the host ship (at best).  Just as we have area anti-air warfare protection from Aegis Burke/Ticonderogas, we should have area EW protection using very high powered systems.  One or two dedicated area EW vessels per surface group would be highly beneficial.

 

Peripheral Scout Ship.  This is an intriguing role wherein the LCS would be loaded with passive sensors of all types (EO, IR, SigInt, radar warning receivers, etc.) as well as passive UAVs and operate as distant scouts, far from surface groups, to provide early passive detection of ships and aircraft.  The LCS stealth, such as it is, would aid in keeping the scout ship undetected.  Some external modifications such as removing deck equipment, railings, etc. could further enhance the ship’s stealth.

 

Armed Transport.[1]  The Marine’s Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) vessel appears to be the key to the Corps’ advanced base concept.  Setting aside any discussion of the wisdom of that concept, the LAW is a weak link in the concept with its very slow speed and lack of defensive weapons, among other drawbacks.  It is also highly questionable whether the Navy will purchase the LAW in the quantities the Marines desire, given the Navy’s many other budget priorities.  As an alternative to the LAW, the LCS could be used as a high speed transport for Company size (or smaller) units in support of the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.  In contrast to the slow, defenseless LAW, the LCS is fast and has a degree of short range anti-air defense as well as anti-surface capability.  Loading and unloading would, of course, be a challenge due to lack of equipment, facilities, and crew.

 

Network/Communications Support Vessel.[1]  On a more speculative level, the hangar space and large flight deck could allow the LCS to act as a host for communications drones or high altitude balloons if we anticipate significant satellite losses.  In this case, balloons and communication relay drones could establish temporary local network communications.

 

 

Summary

 

One of the fundamental assumptions in this second life concept is that two of the LCS’ original missions should be dropped.  The MCM mission does not require a high speed vessel and the LCS is not optimized for the mission.  A dedicated, smaller, more conventional MCM ship needs to be designed and procured in large numbers.  Similarly, the LCS is a very poor choice for ASW for a variety of reasons and the Navy needs to design and build a small, dedicated ASW corvette.  Dropping these missions frees up LCS vessels for one or more of the second life roles.

 

So, with the anticipation of having more vessels available, one or more of the preceding second life roles would seem viable and would certainly offer more utility than the neutered vessels we have now that are doing nothing but sitting around waiting for the eternally-under-development modules to mature.  At the very least, with so many LCS sitting around, idle, why not convert some of the ships to prototypes of the various roles and see what benefits they can provide?  If they don’t pan out, they can always go back to sitting round waiting for modules with no harm done.

 

Of course, there’s no escaping the inherent limitations of the LCS such as limited range, lack of ship-board maintenance capability (shops, parts storage, fabrication facilities, technicians, etc.), stability issues, weight limitations, and very limited endurance (lack of food and water storage).  Again, though, modifications could alleviate some of those limits, to some degree.  The modular bays, for example, could be converted to storage and maintenance compartments.

 

It costs money to crew (two crews per ship!  what a stupid idea!) and operate these ships even when they’re doing nothing.  It is crystal clear that we need to either retire the entire LCS fleet, wholesale, to save the operating costs or find something productive for them to do.  These second life roles are at least worth a look.

 

The only caution in this is that, whatever second life role we want to convert to, we need to treat it as a single function role.  We cannot do the typical Navy approach and try to make them multi-role, gold-plated, do-everything vessels with a second life role added on.  We need to strip the ships of everything that isn’t required for the particular second life role.  Generally speaking, we need to remove more than we add for the second life role.  In addition, we need to abandon the idiotic dual crew and shore maintenance concepts.  We need to return to traditional manning and maintenance.

 

The Navy has a chance to give the LCS a second life and salvage something useful out of a disaster of a program but it needs to be done right, as we’ve described, here.

 

 

 

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[1]Sincere thanks to Steven Wills for suggesting this concept during private discussions.