What Could the LCS Do in the Middle East?

Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1]  The whereabouts of the third is unknown.  Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz?  Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they were designed for?  As you recall, the original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
 
So, why aren’t they there?  Well, we all know the answer.  The originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never materialized.  But, what if the original modules had become available as fully functioning equipment?  Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East today?
 
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original modules.
 
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
 
ASuW - This was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept.  The NLOS (not to be confused with the current Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles.  By removing all visible threats, it would allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
 
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
 
 
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats.  Such a group in the strait, today, would eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland.  UAVs would provide continuous surveillance with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.  Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged from hiding.  The MCM-LCS would search for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
 
Highly effective, indeed!
 
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for.  The concept was okay but it was dependent on non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
 
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need still exists, what do we have that could do the job?  Well, there’s always air power that could, for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats.  We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide targeting.  We could land Army/Marines in various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using G/ATOR or similar systems.
 
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the software to do so.  Why hasn’t the Navy ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability?  Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
 
 
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and wishful thinking.  We didn’t need the LCS.  The need could have been met with existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land forces.  The cost would have been minimal – free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
 
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment.  The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
 
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
 
Where are the LCSes?  The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “U.S. Navy Minesweepers Stationed In Middle East Are Now In Singapore”, Joseph Trevithick, 18-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/sea/u-s-navy-minesweepers-stationed-in-middle-east-are-now-in-singapore

Dropping Like Flies

The Air Force has publicly stated that large UAVs are not survivable on the modern battlefield.  ComNavOps has emphatically stated that, also.  Despite that, many commentators remained convinced that our UAVs will somehow, magically, provide us with total situational awareness.  Well, here’s some evidence that supports ComNavOps’, and the Air Force’s, belief.  From the Atlantic Council  (a supposed non-partisan think tank) website,
 

Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones …[1]

I’ve read unverified, updated reports that the Houthis have shot down as many as 20 MQ-9 Reapers.
 
I have no verification of the reports and no sense of the credibility of the Atlantic Council but it does fit exactly with what I believe and what seems patently obvious:  that slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are simply target drones on the modern battlefield.  Similar reports from other sources vary in number of Reapers shot down but all are in the 14-20+ range.
 
 
Further evidence comes from the current strikes against Iran, as reported by Air & Space Forces website,
 

MQ-9 Reapers are flying numerous orbits over Iran, gathering intelligence and taking out missile launchers in Operation Epic Fury. Yet Iran has managed to down about 10 of the armed drones …[2]

If a thoroughly decimated military like Iran can manage to down that many drones, imagine what a coherent, peer enemy like China could do.  Large UAVs have a lifetime measured in minutes against a competent peer enemy and have no place on the modern battlefield.
 
One of the fears that I have is that the US will take “lessons” from this Iran conflict and apply them inappropriately to a future war with China just as we seem to be doing with the Ukraine “lessons”.  Both conflicts involve utterly inept militaries which renders any “lessons” invalid.
 
The only valid lesson is that large, slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are not survivable in a contested air space and we are foolish to count on them.
 
 
 
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[1]Atlantic Council website, “How the Houthis’ strikes on US MQ-9 Reaper drones serve a wider regional agenda”, Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, 26-Feb-2025,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/houthi-strikes-on-us-mq9-reaper-drones/
 
[2]Air & Space Forces Magazine website, “MQ-9s Over Iran: Striking and Finding Targets—But Taking Some Losses”, Chris Gordon and Stephen Losey, 11-Mar-2026,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/mq-9s-over-iran-striking-and-finding-targets-but-taking-some-losses/

LCS Mine Countermeasures Assessment

Surprisingly, two of the Navy’s MCM configured LCS have been moved from the Middle East to a port in Malaysia despite the obvious possibility of Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz.  The ships were relocated about a week or so before the US strikes began.  If the Iranians do lay mines (there are no confirmed reports yet), we’ll desperately miss the LCS MCM capabilities … or will we?
 
From a Hunterbrooks website report, we learn that the LCS MCM capability is even more problematic and limited than we already knew.  The report provides information from a US Navy briefing.[1]
 
As you read it, bear in mind that the summarized information presented below is the Navy’s information, not mine.  If you want to dispute anything, you’ll have to take it up with the Navy.
 
By trying to be multi-mission, training time available for mine countermeasures is being significantly reduced to support ASuW, VBSS, and other missions.
 
The entire MCM package is pretty minimal and consists of just:

- 1x MH-60S Seahawk

• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
• mine neutralization system (underwater suicide drone)

- 2x Common Unmanned Surface Vehicles (CUSV) that can tow:

• AN/AQS-20 side-scan and volume-search sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

Each CUSV/AQS-20 mission is consuming large amounts of prep time, significantly reducing the overall clearance rate of an already glacially slow process.

• 4+ hrs pre-mission maintenance
• 1.5 hrs post-launch sonar calibration

 That’s 5.5+ hrs of time before the mission even begins!
 

AQS-20 sonar has a habit of failing to record data which is not detectable until after the mission, during the post-mission analysis.
 

CUSV still has a tendency to “runaway”, out of control.
 

CUSV comms are unacceptably short range requiring the LCS to operate in or near the minefield.
 

Navy MCM doctrine requires a visual ID of mines and the camera fails even in relatively clear waters.
 

The single CUSV crane is a single point of failure and is prone to failure.

 

 
With the preceding in mind, are we really missing much if the LCS-MCM vessels aren’t in the Middle East?  No matter how you slice it, this is an epic embarrassment for the Navy.
 
 
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[1]Hunterbrook website, “Demining Hormuz How The U.S. Navy Arrived At Worst-Case Scenario Unprepared”, Spendley & Johnston, 13-Mar-2026,
https://hntrbrk.com/demining-hormuz/

Moderation of Comments

Due to a spate of idiotic comments, largely by one or perhaps two people, I suspect, I’m going to institute moderation of comments until we move on to less “charged” topics.  Thank you.

This is Why You Don’t Depend on Allies

In my ongoing theme about the extremely questionable usefulness of training with, and depending on, allies, we get this:
 

President Donald Trump said Sunday that he has demanded about seven countries send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but his appeals have brought no commitments as oil prices soar during the Iran war.[1]

Any country that complains about increased oil prices has to explain why it won’t send military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Any commentator who criticizes the US military for not keeping the strait open and shipping moving has to explain why they aren’t also asking why the affected countries aren’t providing military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Each country has their own agenda but when those agendas frequently conflict with US interests, one has to wonder why we waste time, money, and resources training with countries that we can’t rely on.  Devoting resources to unreliable allies is illogical in the extreme..
 
The US is once again shouldering the burden of protecting the Middle East from terrorism, nuclear threats, and evil regimes with only Israel to aid us.  The rest of the world is content to stand off and reap the benefits without offering any support. 
 
Japan is bracing for potential gas shortages and increased prices.  Yeah?  Where are their military forces ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the strait?  Don’t complain if you’re not willing to do something about it.
 
This is entering into political commentary so I’ll leave it at that.
 
 
 
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[1]Navy Times website, “Trump asks ‘about 7′ countries for help to open the Strait of Hormuz”, Sam Metz, Will Weissert, Julia Frankel and Cara Anna, 16-Mar-2026,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/03/16/trump-asks-about-7-countries-for-help-to-open-the-strait-of-hormuz/

On Balance

There’s never been a 100% one-sided war and the strikes on Iran are no exception.  According to Newsmax website, as reported on 12-Mar,
 

… at least 11 American military bases or installations have been damaged …[1]

Now, compare that to the reported hundreds or thousands of targets hit per day in Iran.  That’s about as lopsided as you can get.
 
Too many people are trying to portray this as some kind nearly even war with Iran effectively fighting back.  Well, that’s about as far from reality as you can get.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Report: 17 US Sites Hit Across Mideast Since Iran War Began”, Charlie McCarthy, 12-Mar-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/u-s-military-iran-war/2026/03/12/id/1249244/

Secondary Effects From Iran Strikes

‘Multi-domain’, that beloved catchphrase of the US military, applies not only to combat but also to results as noted below.
 
 
Oil
 
Here’s an aspect of the strikes against Iran that you may not be aware of.  One of the secondary effects from the strikes on Iran and the toppling of the Venezuela Maduro regime has been the impact on China’s oil imports.
 

Almost all of Iran’s exported oil, and more than half of Venezuela’s, went last year to China, which remained one of the only purchasers of goods from the two heavily sanctioned nations. The two countries combined represented some 17 percent of China’s overall oil purchases …[1]

17% is not an insignificant amount of oil to lose!
 
In addition, the steady crackdown on the so-called shadow fleet of tankers is further reducing oil supplies to China and Russia.
 
 
Hezbollah
 
Apparently Lebanon is growing tired of Iran’s influence on Hezbollah, brought to a head by the strikes on Iran and Hezbollah.  From Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, as reported by Redstate website,[2]
 

… Lebanon called for direct talks with Israel on “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders,” while accusing the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah of betraying the country.
 
But it is his criticism of Hezbollah that is significant. Calling the Shiite Muslim group “an armed faction … that places no value on Lebanon’s interest nor on the life of its people,” Aoun said Hezbollah “wanted to achieve the fall of the State of Lebanon, under aggression and chaos.” He accused the group of working “for the sake of the calculations of the Iranian regime.” [...]
 
Aoun called for a new initiative, backed by the international community, which would establish a truce between Israel and Lebanon while helping the Lebanese armed forces disarm Hezbollah and confiscate its weaponry. The initiative would put in a place a “complete truce” with a halt to Israeli attacks as the two countries begin “direct negotiations under international sponsorship” to achieve a “final cessation of hostile acts” and “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders.[2]

Well directed force does produce positive results.

 
 
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[1]Politico website, “5 charts show China’s oil dilemma after US strikes”, Paroma Soni and Catherine Allen, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/02/iran-us-strikes-china-oil-supply-charts-00806415
 
[2]Redstate, “Lebanon Drops Some Bad News on Those Anti-American Hezbollah Terrorists”, Nick Arama, 10-Mar-2026,
https://redstate.com/nick-arama/2026/03/10/lebanon-wants-talks-with-israel-n2200042

Joint Bases

If you can’t use it when you need it, it’s not really a joint base, is it?  So why are we paying towards foreign “joint” bases?

NSC Frigate Commonality

Do you remember the main selling point of the Constellation, as originally stated?  It was to use an existing (parent) ship design with absolutely minimal modifications so that commonality would be high, thereby keeping costs low and schedules short.  Instead, the Navy heaped on so many changes that commonality dropped from 85% to 15% at the time of cancellation.  We saw what happened to cost and schedule, as a result.
 
For the National Security Cutter (NSC) frigate, the Navy’s main goal is to get AMERICAN hulls in the water as quickly as possible without worrying about lethality or combat effectiveness.  Setting aside the absurdity of the lack of lethality and combat effectiveness, the only way hulls can hit the water quickly and cheaply is to maintain maximum commonality with the parent NSC design.  Of course, the greater the commonality, the less the firepower and lethality … but, I digress.
 
Unfortunately, we’ve already seen many changes to the parent design.  The forward superstructure is being modified, stern platforms added, weapons changed, electronic warfare added, sensors added, presumably a new combat software system, etc. and those are only the changes we know about and only the external, visible changes.  Each of the listed changes requires modifications to the internal structure, ducting, cabling, bulkheads, layout, runs, utilities, etc.  Changes have a cascading effect far beyond the main change.  Further, the NSC is not built to Navy standards so, presumably, like the Constellation, the Navy will make significant internal structural changes for increased survivability just as was done to Constellation.  My slightly educated guess is that the commonality is already down to around 50% and it’s only going to get worse as the design progresses.  The Navy will continue to make changes.  They can’t help themselves.  It’s who they are and what they do.
 
Affordable and fast production?  I think cheap has already left town and quick is buying a bus ticket out as we speak. 

Follow the Data

I’m seeing far too much unsupported or contraindicated opinions in comments lately.  People are expressing their biases and wishful thinking as “opinions” while ignoring facts, data, history, and logic.  Yes, it’s a human tendency to form a viewpoint while ignoring actual data but, on this blog, we make every attempt to follow the data wherever it leads.  Do not form a viewpoint and then look for data.  Instead, look for data and then follow it to whatever logical conclusion results.
 
I have no problem with allowing comments expressing alternative viewpoints, if they’re supported by data and logic.  Of course, if they are, then they’re unlikely to be alternative viewpoints and, instead, will agree with ComNavOps.  Honestly, the number of subjects that have legitimate alternative viewpoints from the same set of data are few and far between and, generally, legitimate differing opinions arise from a lack of data.
 
Pick up the quality of comments or remain silent.

Mistakes and Experience

ComNavOps doesn’t report or repeat news, he analyzes it.  However, every once in a while something comes along that is just so good that all I can do is repeat it.  Following is a comment from a USNI News website post about the Navy relieving the CO of the USS Truxton for the recent collision with the oiler.  The author of the comment is listed as “Guest” so I am unable to give any further credit.
 

You learn from your mistakes. Mistakes come from bad judgement [sic]. Experience, comes from mistakes. Good judgement [sic] comes from experience.
 
If a mistake is more or less a automatic career ender, what do our officers learn? Answer; don't make mistakes. So are they learning anything other than to avoid risk?
 
Early WW2, we were relieving officers left and right, for not being aggressive enough. Why would we expect them to be aggressive, when we spent all the interwar years training them to avoid risk? That's where we're at now.
 
Who are our senior naval officers today? Survivors of command. The guys who took no risks. Who didn't make a career ending mistake.
 
Then we wonder why they're political animals to a man, going with the flow. Not taking risks. Avoiding responsibility aka "blame". Because that's exactly the type of naval officers our system spits out.
 
"Responsibility" shouldn't be an automatic death sentence.[1]

I have nothing to add to this.
 
 
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[1]USNI News website, “CO of USS Truxtun Removed from Command after Oiler Collision”, Sam LaGrone, 22-Feb-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/02/22/co-of-uss-truxtun-removed-from-command-after-oiler-collision

This Is Why You Don’t Depend On Allies

ComNavOps has repeatedly criticized our cross training efforts with allies as being pointless and because allies cannot be counted on when need arises.  Why train with someone you can’t count on?  Here’s the latest examples from the US strikes against Iran.
 
First up is Spain.  You’ll recall that it was Spain that abandoned the US by pulling an escort ship from the USS Lincoln carrier task force in 2019 during a threat from Iran (see, “This Is Why You Don’t Train WithAllies”).  This followed several months of training so that the Spanish ship would be qualified to join the task force for a deployment.
 

Spanish authorities have confirmed that they are not allowing U.S. forces to use bases in the country to support continuing strikes on Iran.[1]
 
Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares said Spain would not allow its military bases, which are jointly operated by the U.S. and Spain but under Spanish sovereignty, to be used for attacks on Iran, which Spain has condemned.[1]
 
What started as possible move of around half a dozen [Air Force] tankers from Spain to Ramstein Airbase in Germany, now appears to be a full-on withdrawal of the entire tanker fleet from Moron Airbase (LEMO) and Naval Air Station Rota (LERT) … [1]

Hey, Spain, I assume the refund for the US’ portion of the joint operating costs is in the mail?
 
 
Even America’s stalwart ally, the UK, got in on the ‘abandon your allies’ act by denying the US operating rights from bases.
 

The United Kingdom has reportedly refused U.S. requests to utilize key military facilities—RAF Fairford in England and the joint U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—for any potential strikes against Iran.[2]
 
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has withheld permission for American forces to operate from these bases in support of preemptive or offensive actions against Iran.[2]

I wonder what other countries denied us assistance?
 
Don’t get me wrong.  I fully acknowledge that every country has their own agendas and the right to independently pursue those agendas but this emphatically emphasizes why you don’t waste time cross training with supposed allies and you damn sure don’t contribute money to their bases or assets.  If some country wants to cross train with us or wants us to base forces in their country then they can pay the entire cost.
 
To paraphrase … With Allies like these, who needs enemies?
 
 
 
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[1]The War Zone website, “War With Iran Now In Its Third Day”, Joseph Trevithick, Thomas Newdick, Howard Altman, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.twz.com/news-features/war-with-iran-now-in-its-third-day
 
[2]Armed Forces Press website, “UK Denies American Use Of Diego Garcia And RAF Fairford For Iran Attacks”, L Todd Wood, 20-Feb-2026,
https://armedforces.press/foreign-policy/2026/02/20/uk-denies-american-use-of-diego-garcia-and-raf-fairford-for-iran-attacks/ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US Uses One-Way Attack Drones Against Iran

Among military websites, the headlines are all atwitter about the US’ use of the one-way, LUCAS, attack drone in the strikes against Iran. 
 
Here’s a Military Times website headline[1]:
 
US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes
 
This is a simply stunning development and marks a new chapter in strike warfare.  From the LUCAS performance specs, never before has any country had the ability to deliver a maximum 40 lb payload to a distance of 500 miles at a cruise speed of 85 mph (74 kts).  The closest the US has come to this in the past is the one-way Tomahawk attack drone (sometimes referred to as a cruise missile) with a 1000 lb warhead and a range of 1000 miles at a speed of Mach 0.74. (570 mph).
 
It’s embarrassing the way we’ve made a habit of proudly trumpeting “new” technologies that have actually existed for many decades.  That’s not to say that there isn’t a use for a small, very slow missile (which is what a one-way drone is) with very low end lethality but to brag that we’ve accomplished something remarkable is humiliating and deceptive (or ignorant).
 
Here’s an example of an embarrassing attempt at praise from Army Recognition website.
 

U.S. Central Command has moved Task Force Scorpion Strike into an operational posture, giving deployed forces a low-cost one-way attack drone capability designed to multiply strike capacity, absorb attrition, and overwhelm defenses through massed, distributed effects. Beyond adding another munition to the inventory, it effectively creates a new layer of “magazine depth” that can be launched quickly from dispersed sites, complicating enemy targeting and imposing unfavorable cost trades on air defenses. The shift matters less for a single drone’s performance than for what it signals: the U.S. military is now treating expendable systems as a scalable combat arm, not a niche experiment … [2]

“overwhelm defenses” ?  Isn’t that what we’ve done repeatedly when we’ve launched dozens of cruise missiles at targets over the years?
 
“massed, distributed effects” ?  Isn’t that a contradiction?
 
“expendable systems” ?  Haven’t missiles always been expendable?
 
“scalable” ?  Haven’t we always scaled operations as needed?
 
Well, sure, we’ve done all that for many decades but never before have assembled all the accolades into a single press release.  Now that’s an accomplishment!
 
Again, at $35,000 per unit, there may be a use for such a weapon but to believe it is something new is just ignorant and embarrassing.
 
 
Warning:  As usual, we are not going to discuss the politics of the US decision to strike Iran, only the military aspects. 

 

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[1]Military Times website, “US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes”, JD Simkins, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/28/us-confirms-first-combat-use-of-lucas-one-way-attack-drone-in-iran-strikes/
 
[2]Army Recognition website, “U.S. Central Command Deploys First Operational LUCAS Drone Unit for Potential Iran Strikes”, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/u-s-central-command-deploys-first-operational-lucas-drone-unit-for-potential-iran-strikes#google_vignette