In WWII, a dozen or more shipyards built Fletcher class
destroyers. The yards were given a set
of blueprints and contracted to build the ships according to the plans. It didn’t matter which yard built any given
destroyer, they were all the same. This
worked because the Navy designed the ship and generated the blueprints. Once that was accomplished, any yard could
build the ship. It was just a matter of
following the plans.
In contrast, because the Navy no longer designs ships,
generates blueprints, or even requires complete designs and blueprints prior to
the start of construction, only the contracted yard can build a given
ship. The LCS is the standout example of
this badly flawed approach. Lacking any
guidance or blueprints, both Lockheed and Austal generated their own LCS
designs, spec’ed their own equipment and combat systems, and no one else could
build them. Thus, we wound up with two
LCS classes that had almost nothing in common;
the epitome of inefficiency.
What should have happened is that the Navy should have
generated a complete design concept – and locked it down instead of
continuously changing it! – followed by a complete set of construction
blueprints. They could have then shopped
around for the best manufacturing deal and, if necessary, utilized multiple
shipyards to in competition to ensure that costs and quality were well
controlled.
Our ship design and contracting approach is badly broken and
yet the Navy is not only embracing it but doubling down on it. Ignoring common sense, best practices, and
all previous experience, the Navy began the Constellation class frigate
construction without a complete design or complete set of construction
blueprints (see, “Lesson Learned?”).
How do we expect the shipbuilder to accurately bid on the
construction without a locked in design and a complete set of blueprints? They can’t!
And yet we turn around and try to blame the manufacturer when costs inevitably
balloon out of control.
The Navy absolutely must regain control over the ship design
and construction process. We must
reinstitute the General Board (design) and BuShips (blueprints). Without those capabilities, the Navy is just
going to continue producing failure after failure.
I agree with your approach, but this will be hard to implement and will require a Rickover type person to be in charge.
ReplyDeleteThe ship design companies are being bought by the Defense Contractors (Gibbs & Cox by Leidos). So the Navy can't even get independent support to design a ship.
Also design houses that cannot get realtime feedback from the builders tend to make inefficient or non producible designs. Designers need feedback from the builders to make the most producible design.
This can be done, it just requires smart contracts that reward participation throughoput the design process. Plus an extreme Type A person in charge.
"will require a Rickover type person to be in charge."
Delete"Plus an extreme Type A person in charge."
That's what leadership is! No organization will thrive with a bunch of average people in charge.
💯 We need to clone Rickover, Musk, Feynman and Erik Prince. They would solve our Navy problems. And many others. Type A constructive disruptors- they take no prisoners.
DeleteOut of curiosity, does the Navy "own" the Arleigh Burke design, since its built at multiple yards? What was the last class the Navy designed and "owned"??
ReplyDeleteGibbs & Cox produced the design and then Bath and Ingalls split the construction contracts. I don't know whether the Navy acquired the design information or not.
DeleteNavy wanted a common design for the Burke Flt III but that proved impossible as unable to reconcile differences and Ingalls and Bath have their own separate designs.
Delete"Ingalls and Bath have their own separate designs."
DeleteNot to my understanding. G&C produced the design. Do you have information to the contrary?
I have been aboard both. They are largely the same but some passageways and spaces are laid out differently, and some of the preservation coatings are different. Once you see them both, it's easy to tell which yard built which destroyer.
DeleteI wonder who designed OUSV-3 Vanguard? swiftships was to build it, austal built it, the propulsion plant is from the similar Overlord ships built at Gulf Craft LLC to an Incat Crowther design. We know Incat Crowther is working with L3 on MUSV which was to be built at Swiftships, but I am pretty sure is actually being built at Gulf Craft. I am sure the navy has even this very small ship program well in hand.
ReplyDeleteAre you talking today's Chinese Navy? Different shipyards build type 054*, 052D, 055, 071, 075, ....
ReplyDelete?????
DeleteJust like you mentioned during WWII, Navy gave design to be built by different shipyards. Today, we see same design, for instance, 052D ...., etc. are built in different shipyards.
DeleteGenerally support your view. One question though.
ReplyDeleteObviously we do have serious problems with ship acquisition.
But are these due to (especially for detailed design)
(1) Huntington Ingalls (just as a random example) being incompetent at designing the ship
or
(2) Huntington Ingalls builds the ship that the Navy says they want, but the Navy doesn't actually know what it wants, and keeps changing its mind. In addition, perhaps the Navy doesn't actually understand the 80-20 rule (you get 80% of the capability with the first 20% of the money, and additional increments of capability come with rapidly escalating incremental cost) and therefore over-specs the systems.
Regarding (1), at least for detailed design, I can't think of an a-priori reason to expect that engineers employed by the Navy are on average more competent than engineers employed by H-I. If anything, given the different incentives facing public employees vs private sector employees, the reverse might be true. After all, it's not for nothing that the Department Of Motor Vehicles is a standing joke in many states.
If (2) is the problem, then it won't be solved by bringing the design in house.
The shipbuilding "problem" has many parts but, ultimately, the entire blame lies with the Navy.
Delete-Incredibly poorly constructed contracts (no warranties, no guarantees, overrun cost sharing, etc.) are entirely the fault of the Navy
-Constant change orders are the fault of the Navy
-Poorly defined requirements are the fault of the Navy
-Beginning construction without completed designs is the fault of the Navy
-Lack of competition is the fault of the Navy
-Acceptance of incomplete and damaged ships is the fault of the Navy
Yes, the shipyards have quality issues but it is the fault of the Navy for accepting poor quality instead of refusing delivery AND PAYMENT.
Ultimately, the entire fault lies with the Navy.
"I can't think of an a-priori reason to expect that engineers employed by the Navy are on average more competent than engineers employed by H-I."
DeleteFirst, the Navy doesn't have engineers, at least not on the design side of things and, apparently, few if any on the mechanical side. Second, who claimed that the Navy has better engineers???
"If (2) is the problem, then it won't be solved by bringing the design in house."
No one is claiming that the Navy hiring a few engineers will solve the entire shipbuilding mess. However, an in-house design and engineering capability would, at least, allow the Navy to discern between a good design and a bad design (no galvanic corrosion protection???). It would also allow for accountability. You can fire an in-house employee; you can't fire an outside firm's people and you can't choose an alternate source when you've systematically eliminated the competition. Would the Navy actually apply accountability? Likely not.
There are many good reasons for an in-house design and engineering capability. The proof is that it worked for many decades and produced the best ships in the world until the Navy stupidly abandoned it.
2 reasons why HII is partly to blame for the current state of design disasters.
Delete1) HII (then NGC) execs said there were 2 parts of NGC that live for design changes and they both build ships. With that attitude coming from the top how much and how rigorous do you think the QA reviews of design maturity etc is?
2) Look at the LPD-17. HII did not realize that the engine alignment bolts were missing from the design until 5 ships had been built and were eating reduction gears.
That is just two examples without and the Navy "engineers", who have seldom if ever built anything, missed it also. There is not enough space here to discuss the Ford fiasco.
As CNO says it will be hard but we have to start injecting accountable good engieers into the process. Industry presently has no incentive to do this, it cuts the revenue flow, so we need to get them in the Navy and support them.
"HII did not realize that the engine alignment bolts were missing from the design "
DeleteI'm familiar with various reduction gear/gearbox bolt problems (wrong type of bolts, loose bolts) but I've not heard of missing bolts. Do you have a reference for this?
Regardless, the Navy is 100% ultimately responsible for the completeness of the design, final approval of the design, and monitoring and accepting the quality of the finished product. THAT'S NAVSEA'S JOB!!!! It doesn't matter how badly the builder screws up, it's the Navy who failed to catch the problems and accepted a poor product. We've posted about the widespread use of waivers required to pass acceptance trials and this, again, is purely the Navy's fault.
The builder may not be helping matters but, ultimately, it's the Navy's responsibility and fault. NAVSEA has failed utterly but, to be fair, CNO has led the way with waivers.
Here are two websites. I used the term alignment bolts as the descriptor for the fitted bolts that stop flexing or shifting. I am not a ship fitter so excuse the terminology change, the message is the same. Also using a non-fitted bolt means the correct bolt was missing.
Deletehttps://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL34476.pdf
https://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2010/10/colton-goes-salamander-on-lpd-17.html
Yes, I'm familiar with the fitted bolt issue. Again, though, it's the ultimate responsibility of NAVSEA and the Navy to monitor construction, inspect the equipment, and decide whether to accept a flawed, out-of-spec product. 100% the Navy's fault that we have sub-standard ships and equipment. The builder isn't helping matters but theirs is not the ultimate responsibility ... it's the Navy.
DeleteNAVSEA's/SUPSHIP's entire reason for existence is exactly this - to monitor, inspect, and assess production quality. They failed utterly and did so with CNO's blessing and active aiding and abetting and I mean that in the criminal sense.
A couple more random thoughts.
ReplyDelete- Recreating Buships today will take time, since we would have to recreate a lot of knowledge, experience, skill, and institutional memory that no longer exist. Of course the rule of trees does apply: the best time to plant a tree is 20 years ago, but the second best time is NOW.
- We definitely need to focus on resolving the internal Navy problems (not knowing what they want and constantly changing their mind) as soon as possible. It seems to me that something like the General Board would be very useful here.
- If we want to have more flexibility in which yard to build things at, even before the new BuShips is ready to take on the full design process, perhaps we could separate the design and production into two contracts. A shipyard (or maybe even two shipyards) would produce a design with the requirement that it not require capabilities unique to that shipyard to build the ship. Then the deliverable would be the design. Since the Navy paid for development of the design, it doesn't seem unreasonable that the Navy should own it. Then once the design is complete, a construction contract could be bid separately.
"perhaps we could separate the design and production into two contracts."
DeleteThis is already the case for many programs. For example, Gibbs & Cox was contracted to produce the Burke design and then shipyards were contracted to build it. The same for the Freedom class LCS. And so on. Some builders do their own design work, for example, I believe Austal generated its own design for the Independence class LCS.
In many cases, it's very difficult to discern who the actual design company was as it all gets lumped under one "builder".
I’m not clear on what would it take to restart the General Board and BuShips. Is that something the Navy can do on its own or is authorization/funding required from Congress?
ReplyDeleteThe General Board was established simply by an order from SecNav. A simple internal Navy matter.
DeleteBuShips was originally established by Congress although it was eliminated merely by an order from DoD. It could be re-established as just another group within the Navy, like NAVSEA or any other.
The Navy could re-establish both by a simple internal decision.
Taking the CNO's fleet structure as a starting point for the needed vessel types. The UAV carrier and the ASW carrier would be good vessels to have the reconstituted General Board and BuShips cut their teeth on since they could be based on the commercial knowledge base that already exists and would allow the team to learn best commercial practice. Design for Manufacture.
ReplyDeleteThe GAO May report "NAVY FRIGATE Unstable Design Has Stalled Construction and Compromised Delivery Schedules" GAO revealed of the 39 blocks that make the Constellation build as of October '23 not one of the blocks designs was 100% complete.
ReplyDeleteF/MM won the contract April 2020 and since then the Navy has been continuously tinkering with the design so whereas reported separatley on contract award the Constellation was 85% compatabile with the parent Italian FRMM now reported at less than 15%, post contract award e.g. Navy changed to a newly designed topside arrangement.
One of the basic criteria in successful shipbuilding is you do not commence build until design is 100% complete, not 90 or 95% , as nearly always the the last few percent of the design the most difficult, but Navy authorized F/MM start build in August 2022 even though they said the detail design was only just over 80 percent finished. Congress had previously mandated in 2020 that design must be "complete" before build can commence, as the Navy doesn't understand the meaning of the word "complete" in the FY2025 NDAA House legislators were said to be changing the wording to "100% complete", though Senate draft wording reported to be 95% of functional design drawings have to been approved.
No wonder Constellation expected delivery will be three years late and 10 percent above the shipbuilder’s June 2020 weight estimate.
A major issue has been concurrency in developing and introducing systems & ships before designs are mature. The lack of a solid CONOPS is a big problem as you mention in your prior posts ! ( F35, LCS, USS Ford, Zumwalt and weapon systems are prime examples ) . You also mention the lack of testing for weapon systems, like cruise missles etc. , in a electronic countermeasures environment.
ReplyDeleteWe can add the USS Constellation to my list above. We see major travestys in the way the navy has handled the above list & now the Connie !
Delete"A major issue "
DeleteQuite right and we've discussed this at length. Care to go a step further and offer a solution(s)?
As mentioned here in your post is re-cretaing the General Board / Bu Ships. Congress should demand reform and make this happen ! Congress has held hearings but nothing comes of this and the Navy continues with the travesty created by them. (See Nick's post above ) Also it would require the DOD to put pressure on the Navy to reform.
DeleteNot having a full understanding of the history of the General Board/BuShips, did some surfing and reading. Reading about what things have morphed into today, the amount of commands under Sea Systems Command is simply staggering. It seems like there could be a decent amount of engineering knowledge in places like Carderock. I read the other day that the Navy has approximately 1600 various commands. Its mind numbing to contemplate the true vastness of the USN. I understand that many of the commands under Sea Systems have true value, BUT, in contemplating a return of BuShips/General Board/SCIB, I get the feeling that a true, complete reevaluation and restructuring of all the commands, with an eye towards streamlining and trimming fat is needed first. I think that there are way too many indivudual rice bowls that suck resources and warm bodies, and any discussion about bringing back older institutions has to address a larger effort to completely reorganize and redistribute resources and manpower. I tried to skim through some things and sketch out some streamlining that would accommodate reinserting the old institutions, and honestly it was so overwhelming that it caused a near-migraine and had to quit. The size and sprawl of the Navy today is mind-boggling and almost incomprehensible!!!
ReplyDelete"Not having a full understanding of the history of the General Board/BuShips"
DeleteA great source for understanding the role of the General Board and BuShips is any of the Norman Friedman Illustrated Design Histories. He discusses at length the role of the General Board/BuShips. In fact, they are the main focus because they were the ones generating the conceptual designs. It's fascinating to read about the process whereby multiple initial designs are proposed, feedback is collected from the fleet, revisions are made, and a final design is developed.
If you have an interest in the workings of the General Board, the design process during WWII, and the history of a particular ship type (cruiser, carrier, battleship, etc.), I wholeheartedly recommend any or all of Friedman's books. They are an invaluable resource for me.
"engineering knowledge in places"
There are isolated pockets of engineering but they aren't being applied to the ship/weapon development and procurement process so they're largely a waste.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1930/august/general-board-navy
ReplyDeleteAn interesting vintage look at the Board. Could we create a new version today, one where the members were highly respected and were absolutely above politics and self service while carrying out the duties of a Board member?? Do we have a pool of such men to draw from today??
"Do we have a pool of such men to draw from today??"
DeleteThat's a good question. Previously, the Board was comprised of retired admirals, among others, and being retired they were considered above and beyond politics and career maneuvering and, hence, beyond the reach of special interest groups or self-promotion. Today, it seems as if every retired admiral has joined the board of some defense company and would, therefore, not be qualified.
The other problem is the today's retired admirals have no relevant combat experience or even realistic exercise experience to offer to the design process. In other words, their experience and insights are no better than yours and likely worse since they've been indoctrinated in a broken Navy system. Even if free of influence, I wouldn't want them on any design board! I can think of half a dozen bloggers I'd rather have.