We haven't done one in a while so it's time for an open post.
What's on your mind?
What do you want to discuss that we haven't covered?
What topic would you suggest for a future post?
Any general feedback about the blog? Things you like? Things you don't like?
Sound off !
Test your knowledge. Do you recognize this class with its number removed?
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Claude Jones DE
ReplyDeleteWell, that didn't take long. I'm impressed!
DeleteWhat If? State sponsored modern privateers. The Russians and US both use private armies in overseas operations why not privateers to prey on those other than friends. (ie. N.Korea, China (fishing fleet/militia fleet), Iran, ect.). This probably already exists in covert form, but Im talking about actually taking prizes for monetary gain, (and political).
ReplyDeleteSee, "Letter of Marque and Reprisal" post which reviews a book about a Letter of Marque and Reprisal being issued to a carrier group.
Delete"Im talking about actually taking prizes for monetary gain, (and political)."
DeleteThe acquisition and sustainment costs of any privateer flotilla capable of taking on North Korean paramilitary forces, will be far beyond the market value of any "prizes" seized- to say nothing of a Chinese one, which will likely have Air Force and Navy units on call, to hammer the privateer ships with missiles that will require VERY EXPENSIVE countermeasures to protect those issued "letters of marque."
Then there's the political humiliation that'll result from the privateers being forced to confess in public trials, unless they're issued cyanide pills and ordered to use them if at risk of capture. How many of our allies and potential allies (Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.) will back or continue backing us once it's revealed we're responsible for the "pirates" attacking their shipping? (The accusations may be false or even the result of "false flag" operations, i.e., the other side committing the crimes our privateers are accused of; but evidence in support of the defense, WILL be viewed with suspicion once it's known we supported privateers.)
There are also questions of accountability. Iraqi insurgents regularly used Blackwater contractors' actions to justify attacks against US military units. How much control will we have over those issued "letters of marque"? If this control is complete, like that over a military unit, then why bother using privateers instead of a military unit? If this control is incomplete, then can we trust the privateers to NOT screw things up for us, the way Blackwater did?
In short, don't fall for the romanticism some idiots have for the Golden Age of Piracy. There's a reason that age has passed.
" don't fall for the romanticism"
DeleteBefore dismissing the idea out of hand, recall that there are multiple international mercenary organizations available for land combat so why not sea combat? Yes, the cost issues are significant but instead of envisioning pitched battle with another country's front line naval forces, consider the more likely use which would be seizing merchant shipping around the periphery of a combat zone. Take a merchant ship, fit it with some basic weapons, seize enemy merchant ships, and now you begin to pay for your effort from the value of the seized ship and cargo.
Also, bear in mind that a ship acting under a Letter of Marque is NOT a pirate. It is an officially sanctioned state actor bound by that state's documented limitations and constraints. Therefore, there are no 'crimes' to be considered any more than a naval ship would/could be guilty of 'crimes'.
I'm not saying the idea is feasible or desirable but I wouldn't dismiss it out of hand. It might have applicability under the right circumstances.
"... But instead of envisioning pitched battle with another country's front line naval forces, consider the more likely use which would be seizing merchant shipping around the periphery of a combat zone."
DeleteWhere will this "combat zone" be? If it's in the South China Seas, China will have the necessary logistical advantage to CRUSH any privateers operating there. Yes, it'll be a drain on Chinese resources, but it'll also be a drain on American ones- any seaman serving as a privateer, will be unavailable for service on our warships, just as any fuel the privateer ships use, will be unavailable for our warships and warplanes' use.
"Take a merchant ship, fit it with some basic weapons, seize enemy merchant ships, and now you begin to pay for your effort from the value of the seized ship and cargo."
Like German merchant raiders in World Wars I and II? I have my doubts whether their achievements can be repeated in this day and age.
"Where will this "combat zone" be? If it's in the South China Seas,"
DeleteYou'll note that I stated operations around the periphery of a combat zone. It doesn't matter where the combat zone is. The periphery is the area where active combat can't generally reach.
"any seaman serving as a privateer, will be unavailable for service on our warships"
We are a country of nearly 400 million people and in a time of war, we'd have a draft. In WWII, we managed to man a 6000 ship navy as well as massive armies. I don't think a handful of privateer seamen would have any impact, whatsoever, on our ability to man navy warships.
Why the periphery of a combat zone? Why not the indian ocean, the red sea, the horn of africa, hell, all the coasts of africa, the med, the west coast of the US, south american coasts, the carribean, the straits of malacca and it's environs, the persian gulf, around borneo, indonesia, the bay of bengal, malayasia?
DeleteThe carribean. aywhere the chinese navy isn't and anyone that thinks the Chinese navy is gonna be everywhere at once is a fool.
"Why the periphery of a combat zone? Why not the ... "
DeleteOf course everywhere! The periphery is not a narrow hundred foot band around an active battle. It's wherever combat is not active and likely.
I wonder if you discuss what you think about South Korea's military. This is because I feel like not many topics about South Korea is done.
ReplyDeleteMy other suggestion feasibility of using airships for military purpose. My thought on this is how airships would fulfill niche capability as lighter than air vehicle. You can look at my previous open post for more detail.
"South Korea's military"
DeleteThis is a naval blog so I'd only discuss SK's navy and I just don't have access to much information about it. Is there some particular aspect you'd like examined?
"airships"
This has come up many times by many people. I've yet to see a concept of operations (CONOPS) that is viable for them. Do you have a task/mission in mind that you think they'd be suited for?
The major, unavoidable drawback is that they're a large, radar target that shouts where they are and where their host ship (assuming you mean ship-launched) is. That outweighs any benefit they might offer. Add to that their slow, barely mobile speed, power issues, etc. and there just is not a viable CONOPS, that I can see.
What task/mission are you thinking they could perform?
One aspect that I would like to examine about the South Korean Navy is how I don't think that the South Korean Navy's attempt to be a blue water navy is a good idea in my opinion. This is because it is not geographically advisable. This is because South Korea is a peninsula and enemies like North Korea and China can invade South Korea by land route from the North. Of course, there are some exceptions like Incheon Landing from the Korean War or the Imjin war (Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), but I believe that a blue water navy is not necessary when a brown water navy is more than capable and cheaper. So I am basically saying that South Korea is more incentivized to focus more on Army and Air Force which would be more relevant in most likely conflicts rather than the Navy which South Korea doesn't need as much except for guarding against enemy's amphibious landing and protecting naval supply convoy. South Korea is not like Japan or America where having a blue water navy makes sense for them.
DeleteWith regard to airships, I do have CONOPS. I think that airships are suited for heavy cargo, cheap surveillance, and defensive roles against submarines and missiles. And I also have a few things to say about the drawbacks that you listed before I explain my reasons. First of all, I think that you are thinking of Zeppelins when you are thinking that they are large radar targets that are slow and barely mobile speed. My airships are not that as they are small to medium size hybrid airships. Hybrid airships are a modern concept that makes use of both lighter-than-air (LTA) airships and heavier-than-air methods of generating lift. They have a decent speed of 90-140 mph. Of course, this is slower than airplanes but as I will explain below, airships do not serve in a role where speed or stealth is essential. And keep in mind that each role would be specialized for a single function.
The reason why I think that Airships can serve as heavy cargo air transports is due to how they are cheaper than aircraft due to their mechanical simplicity and low power requirements. For example, airships are more fuel-efficient and thus longer range, 1/3th the cost of airplanes and 1/10 the cost of helicopters, and for Hindenburg-sized airships, they can carry up to 500 tons of heavy cargo. While the cost associated with old airships can be expensive as old airships need mooring masts, ground crews, and hangars for storage; modern hybrid airships need little to no infrastructure to deliver heavy cargo. And while there is a helium shortage, people often mistook this as helium running out when it is more to do with how there are delays with new production facilities, helium reserves being abandoned, helium production breaking down due to lack of maintenance, increasing demand, and waste that occurs when helium is not recycled after being used for medicine and industry. The United States alone has enough proven helium reserves in natural gas to last sixty years, and the country's unproven reserves are estimated to be 1,000 times bigger. As our technology improve, there is no doubt that helium can be used for a long time. Not to mention how you can also extract helium from the atmosphere as well. It might be 3 times more expensive than the ground's 0.07 dollars per liter, but it is viable. There is also the fact the cost of helium initial fill-up is a small percentage of the airship's cost and the cost of keeping it inflated is relatively negligible as there is very little leak. If helium is still not viable for some reason, however, hydrogen can be used. While hydrogen is more dangerous because it can catch on fire like in the Hindenburg disaster, people should remember that Hindenburg was an old design using outdated technology. It is just public fear that stops us from using extremely safe hydrogen-filled airships. So I envision that airships' role is to be cheap and yet decently fast aerial transports.
DeleteThose airships' flight characteristics would serve as another alternative to surveillance as well. I think that there would be two types of surveillance airships. One would be small, numerous airships where that are able to loiter around longer than conventional surveillance drones would be able to. Another type would be high-altitude surveillance airships that perform more like satellites but would be more numerous due to how it would be a cheaper alternative to satellites in its role.
DeleteLastly, I think that airships are interesting in regard to defense. This is because people often mistook airships for being easy to hit with being easy to shoot down. Airships are actually incredibly resistant to attacks because they are fragile as various weapons don't detonate against the fabric. There is also the fact that Airships' nearly nonexistent radar and heat signatures also make missile targeting difficult. Any leak that would happen during battle is negligible even with over 500 holes and can stay afloat for hours. Even hydrogen airships are safe from incendiary bullets as long as oxygen is not mixed with hydrogen. There is also the fact that airships are safe due to loads of redundancies like lots of gas cells, many engines, several steering gondolas, etc. There is also the fact that some new hybrid airships are even capable of flying with no lift gas at all. Lastly, while it is true that past airships have a reputation for being disaster-prone and vulnerable to weather, this isn't true for modern airships as technology improved. Airships are in fact well suited to ride out storms that grounded other aircraft due to their natural buoyancy, lengthy endurance, and ability to maneuver at low speeds. Of course, there are still some weather conditions that are unsafe for airships to fly and some high-profile disasters happened because of overconfidence. When necessary precaution is taken, however, airships are quite safe. Regarding airships' defensive roles, however, I think that they are suited for base/convey defense. This is because they have the unique ability to stay in the air for a long time and this means that practically every airship can stay up longer for defense while planes have to land in order to refuel and such. Of course, their speeds are not suitable for an offensive operation, but they are fast enough to escort convoys.
DeleteSo in summary, I am saying that we should make use of characteristics that only airships would have in our military.
Wind and other weather effects have far greater impact on the performance of airships and other lighter-than-air aircraft, than they do heavier-than-air aircraft. This impact also greatly restricts an airship's speed- we won't be seeing supersonic or hypersonic airships within our lifetime, or even our grandchildren's lifetime- which also increases their vulnerability, i.e., the fact an airship is practically immobile, compared to heavier-than-air aircraft, meaning enemy air defense has all the time in the world to shoot and KEEP SHOOTING to down an airship.
DeleteAgain, we have to admit airships' potential military use will be a niche one- a niche most military services aren't interested in developing, compared to heavier-than-air aircraft with far less limitations.
They are the world's first or second largest shipbuilder by tonnage. They are a penninsula and can flank their primary opponent with their navy. They defend the other 3 sides with their navy. They support the alliance structure and the free world that akkowed their country to flourish. They are the most natural naval power that isn't an island. More natural than the U.S. potentially.
DeleteI don't want to outright dismiss airships without a thorough discussion, but I am skeptical. Large cargo transport companies such as Federal Express have their own fleet of cargo planes; why are they not using airships?
DeleteAn interesting study on Korean naval warfare is Admiral Yi Sun Sin. During the 1590's, Japan invaded the Korean peninsula. In land warfare, the Japanese performed better and nearly conquered the Joseon (Korean) kingdom, but they could not stay reinforced and supplied due to the efforts of Admiral Yi. In most engagements, his fleets were vastly outnumbered by the Japanese. To see a re-enactment, watch the movie "The Admiral, Roaring Currents", a very well-made film with top box office earnings in South Korea. A prequel was recently released, and filming will start soon on a sequel. It was not the mere possession superior naval technology that led Admiral Yi to victory but being able to use it to his advantage.
MM-13B
"What topic would you suggest for a future post?"
ReplyDeleteModern types of armour that could be applied to a large warship?
Tough post to write, but I'd be very interested.
We have to built new steel mills and MASSIVELY expand the factories building armor for the US Army's armored vehicles, to get anywhere near enough USEFUL armor to defend our ships against contemporary antiship weapons.
DeleteI thought of mounting active protection systems (APS) as used on contemporary tanks, to ships; but an APS only has to knock a 50 kg (or lighter) antitank missile off target, so it'll miss a ten-meter-long vehicle. A proper warship will be HUNDREDS of meters long; the weapons an APS must then defend against, will weigh HUNDREDS if not THOUSANDS of kilograms. An APS designed to defend a tank, will be useless in defending a warship.
"Modern types of armour that could be applied to a large warship?"
DeleteThat would be an excellent post if there was any solid information. Unfortunately, it would be pure speculation about whether any of the modern schemes could be scaled up to a ship and whether they'd still be effective and, if so, to what degree. For example, one of the modern 'armors' against shaped charge anti-tank weapons is spall lining. Would spalling even be a factor in a ship? I'm inclined to doubt it but who knows? And so on.
Love the suggestion but I'm a little unsure how to approach it. I don't mind speculating but I'm not sure how to go about it.
How about some slightly more specific aspects of land-to-ship armor adaptation? Any thoughts?
"An APS designed to defend a tank, will be useless in defending a warship."
DeleteYou're being far too literal. You're correct that simply mounting actual tank APS systems along the length of a ship would not be feasible or effective. If for no other reason, the relatively tiny explosive effects of an APS would have effect on a hundreds/thousands pound anti-ship missile. HOWEVER, the concept is completely valid and, in fact, is already standard on ships. Conceptually, a CIWS is an APS system. Now, the concept, here, would be take the existing CIWS and apply the tank parameters to it in terms of density of coverage (most ships are fortunate to have a single CIWS and have almost no useful density of coverage), placement, mode of operation, etc. and see what modifications to a CIWS/APS would be beneficial.
Don't be literal ... expand you thinking a bit !
" MASSIVELY expand the factories building armor ... to get anywhere near enough USEFUL armor to defend our ships"
DeleteYes, this is how the free market system works. If the Navy were to begin designing ships with armor, some company would see that as a profit potential and begin supplying the armor. Demand ... fulfillment. Free market at work.
"Love the suggestion but I'm a little unsure how to approach it. I don't mind speculating but I'm not sure how to go about it.
DeleteHow about some slightly more specific aspects of land-to-ship armor adaptation? Any thoughts?"
One of my thoughts was to add more armor beyond thick plates of steel, not like there's anything wrong with that, and in fact one should ideally combine both.
For example, reactive armour is very popular, but would it work on a large ship?
Chobham armour also comes to mind.
Frankly, it's baffling that the "pros" ignored those questions.
To aim9snake: APS systems don't knock missiles off their course causing them to miss tanks. "Soft Kill APS" systems misdirect missiles by electronic warfare/decoy to cause them to miss. "Hard Kill APS" systems use explosives to damage incoming missiles(and sometimes fin stabilized sabot rounds) and disrupt he trajectory of APFSDS rounds(fin rounds) not so that they miss the target, but so that they are no longer able to penetrate the armor of the target. All armored vehicle solutions except for some ceramics would be able to be scaled up to armor ships.
Delete"What topic would you suggest for a future post?"
ReplyDeleteThe invention of proximity fuse in WW2 and its usage by US Navy in the Pacific Ocean, the British Air Defense in Europe. Also new 76-mm Mark 26, new 127-mm gun Mark 42 and 152-mm Mark 16.
After WW2 the new shells with proximity fuses were developed. Sure the guided missiles were the failure that stopped to develop warship designs. Nowadays warships have only about ten or so Anti-Ship Missiles. The battleships and cruisers in theirs time had hundreds and thousands shells which could be equipped with proximity fuses to hit moving targets over the horizon with targetting.
Also there was one more experiment program Zeus. Sure you see the stupid USN trend to develop the guided missiles when you have thousands of shells.
I'm not quite sure what you're asking for, here. Missiles were developed to take advantage of the greatly extended range offered by a powered 'projectile' as opposed to the unpowered shell. Fuzing and guidance are just the terminal act.
DeleteAs I said, I'm unsure what you want to see more explanation of. Try again and give some more detailed explanation of what you'd like. I'm open to the idea but I'm missing your exact thought on this.
Guided missiles are really powered. Do you think the shells can't be powered in such was as the missiles? The Germans in WW2 proved it. Look for the E4, C3 shells. https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/trommsdorff-projects-ww2.6832/
DeleteHad we developed both these technologies (fuse proximity with ramjet or smth else), then we could succeeded.
"Had we developed both these technologies"
DeleteFor practical purposes, we have developed those. We call them missiles, rockets, or rocket assisted projectiles. The major stumbling block is, of course, cost. We attempted to develop the Zumwalt AGS LRLAP, a rocket assisted projectile but the cost rose to nearly a million dollars per round and that's when the Navy cancelled it.
We did the Excalibur shell. Europeans have Namo. Look at Germans and what they did in WW2. True cheap shells. You don't need have the LRLAP or smth like it. At least it's not difficult to design simple guided shell for AAD and make significant contributions to few amount of surface-to-air missiles. Once you offered to design a new generation cruiser class with WW2 Atlanta class light cruiser features. But there's no need in 96 or so VLS Mark 41, when you can have at least 2 twin gun mountings. But there's nothing to design a powered anti-air guided shell. It will cost at least 10 times less than the SM-2 or ESSM missile. The overhauling of gun store for new types of shells won't be difficult.
DeleteAlso we need to return back the Mark 42 gun. It's much survivable than modern Mark 45 Mod 4 gun system. Also it has own sensors.
This force plan that was released finally suggests an FFL to build some numbers and expand the surface fleets ASW options. Uses OPC as the option available. Vs nothing, I'd take it, but I'll agree in advance, it missing the ground up design needed. The plan also intentionally avoids unmanned. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/30/an_expeditionary_navy_for_an_era_of_great_power_competition_867490.html?utm_source=spotim&utm_medium=spotim_conversation&spot_im_redirect_source=notifications&spot_im_comment_id=sp_DzWAHE1J_rcd200867490_c_2IGpsAZAPgeQYxnPgu64xubC3cy_r_2IIWvueMp5LkgCiaGbHqb59ijbi&spot_im_highlight_immediate=true
ReplyDeleteThe force structure referenced in the link you provide is mildly interesting but uninformative in that it lacks any empirical base for its assumptions. For example, the article makes the statement that the current force structure has too many large surface combatants but fails to offer any empirical rationale for that statement. What real world experience leads to that conclusion? What exercises lead to that conclusion? What combat analysis leads to that conclusion. Without an empirical basis, the statement has no validity. In fact, the Navy might have too few large surface combatants ... or just the right amount ... or too many. Without empirical data, we don't know. And so on for many/all of the article's assumptions.
DeleteThe Navy regularly publishes this kind of force structure report that is based on nothing. This is just another in a long list. The only difference is that it's written by someone other than the Navy.
That said, the article offers interesting thoughts but, again, they're entirely unsupported.
What aspect(s) caught your interest?
Navy's major new programs - DDG(X) and SSN(X), as both are still on design stages, what do you think about them?
ReplyDeleteTheir DDX idea isn't worth pursuing. They should clean up a flight II DDG-1000 if they need anything like it or they will burn cash and time on a lesser ship.
DeleteSSNX as a Columbia back end without tubes mated to a Seawolf like front end will do fine. The cost will be there either way so its low risk by comparison and could actually grow the fleet.
Admittedly, details are lacking but ...
DeleteThe DDG(X) is just a Burke with a slightly different hull form and offers no substantial improvements in combat lethality or survivability.
Similarly, the SSN(X) will likely be a simple, slight improvement on the Virginia and offer no significant improvement.
As such, both are a waste of time and resources.
SSNX if using the quieting going into Columbia should be an order of magnitude quieter than Seawolf and Virginia. A 40 year reactor will help maintain the force down the road if the ships are designed with updates in mind.
DeleteBeing probably incremental upgrades, that's fine. We know what chasing fantasyfuturetech gets us. BUT... if theyre just incremental upgrades, they need to plan for a class of say 20 DDG and 10 or so SSNs. Finalize the designs. Start building. Then IMMEDIATELY start designing the follow on classes!!! Building the same thing for more than a decade isnt a great idea...
DeleteDDG(X) and SSN(X) are two biggest naval projects now. Their success or failure makes profound effects on the nation.
Delete"ships are designed with updates in mind."
DeleteWith the exception of carriers, ships are almost never updated to any significant degree. We've early retired the LA class subs and most other surface ship classes without doing significant upgrades.
Upgrades are one of those things that sounds good in theory but rarely/never happens.
"Building the same thing for more than a decade isnt a great idea."
DeleteSpot on! Small production runs done frequently.
I think I pitched my NAVROC idea here before. The problem is that $100,000 rockets are not that profitable for the industry that rules. Here it is from G2mil.com
ReplyDeleteThe US Navy has spent billions of dollars each year to develop futuristic ship weaponry that remain stuck in research and development. Meanwhile, it desperately needs simple systems like a big rocket launcher. The MK-16 launcher (pictured) was used to fire ASROC and Harpoon missiles from Navy cruisers and destroyers. It was retired several years ago, but this design provides an aiming system for firing powerful rockets at nearby targets. The only needed improvement is a stabilization system. The Harpoon carried a 488lb high explosive warhead. A cheap "NAVROC" wouldn't need as much range or a guidance system, so would cost far less and could carry a larger warhead for these four missions:
1. Hip Shoot - A naval engagement may begin as an ambush by a civilian boat or cargo ship, or from a tiny island. The 5-inch gun can begin firing 70lb projectiles, but unleashing a barrage of eight huge rockets with 600lb warheads should instantly destroy the threat. Ships would arm and aim NAVROC at anything suspicious to allow an instant, overwhelming response.
2. Small boats - Exercises have shown that ships have difficulty with small boat swarms. They bounce up and down and may disappear from sight and radar as they ride ocean swells. They are very difficult to hit and can launch an anti-ship or anti-tank missile beyond the range of CIWS. Firing a 420mm NAVROC with a 600lb warhead at a small boat would literally "blow it out of the water" just by exploding within 50 meters.
3. Flak - Drones and missiles are a major threat, especially if they attack in swarms. A rocket with a proximity fuze or timed to explode in front of an incoming missile should knock it down if within 100 meters, while the debris confuses guidance systems of other missiles.
4. Shore bombardment - Navy destroyers haven't much firepower to blast targets ashore, just a 5-inch gun. If an enemy lacks anti-ship missile systems, the ship can approach shore so NAVROC can blast targets.
Sailors would love this simple, reliable, low-tech system that provides instant firepower at nearby threats.
Adapting the MLRS or HIMARS launcher for naval use, may be worthwhile. Of course, the ship will then need an elevator leading to a below deck armory, to bring up reloads for the launcher; but it can be done if the Navy is determined to use the weapon, and willing to accept the additional costs in acquiring and maintaining ships with the necessary additions.
DeleteHow about adding a small landing pad and hangar to your corvette and destroyer escort concepts? This would be to add two modern versions of the DASH helicopter to the ship. The drones would carry a couple of torpedoes, and that is all. Would the extra capability be worthwhile?
ReplyDeleteWell, what do you think? Would adding a flight deck, hangar, maintenance facilities, extra fuel storage, additional magazine space, additional operating and maintenance crew, additional berthing, additional food and potable water storage be worth it to transport one or two torpedoes 10-30 miles or so from the ship?
DeleteBear in mind that we have VL-ASROC which travels 12 miles at Mach 1.
Would it be better to put effort into extending the range of the existing VL-ASROC?
The helicopter also carries radar, sonar, and other sensors. We also have to ask if the effort will be better put increasing the size of the ship's radar and sonar, and what consequences that'll have on the ship, e.g., will a bulbous bow to accommodate a larger sonar, reduce the ship's speed.
DeleteI'm pretty sure @Phil was referencing a very austere, stripped down aircraft like the DASH that he mentioned so no sonar, radar, etc. Just a torpedo delivery mechanism.
DeleteYes, I was referring to a simple torpedo delivery system.
Delete"Would it be better to put effort into extending the range of the existing VL-ASROC?"
Yes, that's a better idea.
"Would adding a flight deck, hangar, . . . be worth it to transport one or two torpedoes 10-30 miles or so from the ship?"
DeleteWith the MQ-8C, the Navy might already have that capability. It's supposed to have an internal payload capacity of 700 pounds and sling load nearly 3,000 pounds, albeitly short range. I have to think somebody can figure out how mount one or two torpedoes underneath them.
Maybe you get a few hours of endurance at thirty miles out. It's a capability the Navy doesn't have, nor does it seem too difficult to develop.
The MQ-8C is already qualified for use on the LCS. And, because they have to return to port every few weeks, they wouldn't need to store too many torpedoes.
"With the MQ-8C, the Navy might already have that capability"
DeleteOne of the major problems with a UAV/DASH concept is the separation of the weapon from the sensor. Thus, when a sensor has located a target sub, it cannot immediately launch a torpedo but, instead, has to wait for some other platform to arrive to deliver the torpedo. For VL-ASROC, which travels at Mach 1, that's not really a problem. The torpedo will arrive promptly. However, if the torpedo delivery platform is a UAV/DASH/MQ-8C, the delivery time becomes extended and the sub is likely to slip away. For example, an MQ-8C with a cruise speed of 130 kt would require around 15 minutes to deliver a torpedo 30 nm and that involves the unlikely assumption that the vehicle is sitting on the flight deck, torpedo loaded, engines running, and beginning to lift off. In reality, the aircraft will require fueling, torpedo loading, flight prep, and launch. The sub will be long gone.
My preference is that the sensor and weapon be on the same platform or that we use VL-ASROC but greatly extend its range.
Except, VL-ASROC isn't an option for the LCS. And, with sufficient loitering time and range, a UAV/DASH could already be in the area when a contact is made. Or, positioned ahead in anticipation of a contact.
Delete"a UAV/DASH could already be in the area when a contact is made"
DeleteCome on, think this through operationally and tactically. A group of ships will have escorts ranging out 20-50 miles in all directions. That's a search area of some 300-2000 sq.miles. Where in that total area are you going to pre-position your UAV/DASH? If you guess wrong, you have no coverage.
Helicopters (UAV/DASH) are notorious maintenance hogs. Not knowing when a contact will occur, how are you going to keep an aircraft continuously in the air without extensive maintenance?
Interesting fact: Wiki states that over half of the Navy's 746 DASH drones were lost during operations.
"VL-ASROC isn't an option for the LCS"
As we've discussed on this blog, the Navy has cancelled the LCS ASW module. The LCS won't be sub hunting so VL-ASROC is not required nor is a DASH helo.
Gun-launched ASW Munition(s).
ReplyDeletehttps://www.navylookout.com/the-kingfisher-gun-launched-anti-submarine-munition/
It has been in development since 2018 and it is fired from the 127mm (5-in) Mk 45 Mod 4 Naval Gun which happens to be manufactured by BAEs as well. If successful, it could complement current ASW weapons or a cheaper alternative to popping off the limited number of VL-ASROC in a MK41 VLS.
Well, I thought I had made a post here a little while ago but apparently not. I thought I hit publish.
ReplyDeleteThe comment went into the spam folder. It's been restored and now appears. This is an occasional but on-going problem and I don't know why it happens. I check the spam folder several times a day so delays should be fairly minimal.
DeleteBZ, Sir! Tango Mike!
DeleteWhat are the top few things you would have done differently beginning with, say, collapse of USSR?
ReplyDeleteOooh...with what we know now thatd be a fun exercise in capability retention!!! Lots of subtopics to cover with this... Would even make a great alternate history story!!
DeleteI've pretty well covered what actions I would have taken although I've done so in a disjointed fashion. In no particular order,
Delete- Bring home the fleet and establish home port operations with an emphasis on maintenance and training
- Establish a Top Gun for ASW so as not to lose the ASW expertise we developed during the Cold War (and which we've now lost).
-Develop a modern battleship
-Develop modern armor
-Stick with Forrestal size carriers
-Emphasize ship stealth (radar, acoustic, IR, visible) and mandate EMCON operations as the standard mode of operation.
And so on.
A modern version of the Forrestal class carrier. I just commented about that on the recent shipyard post (comment waiting moderator approval). That would be the best carrier in terms of cost vs capability.
DeleteA modern battleship. A battleship's guns and armor are designed to do battle with other battleships. Currently, no one in the world is fielding battleships. The US would have the fastest path to battleships by once again reactivating the Iowa class, but that would be a short-term solution of squeezing a little more use out of an excellent but old platform. For a new design, I would make a modern version of the Alaska class super-cruiser, the entry point. The Alaska's 12-inch guns are very big guns with 1000-pound shells. For a given tonnage of munitions, 12-inch gives you twice the number of rounds compared to 16-inch. If a potential adversary were to build a counter to our modern Alaska class, next design would be a true modern battleship.
Thanks,
MM-13B
"(comment waiting moderator approval)"
DeleteI believe that post has been published and should be visible to you. Let me know if you don't see it.
What do you think of the 60mm ETC CIWS gun trailed in the 1990s? Each round individually should carry substantially more heft when compared to the 20mm CIWS in the missile defense role. If I recall, you seemed skeptical of the effectiveness of the smaller 20mm CIWS when compared to the beefier 30mm Goalkeeper.
ReplyDeleteI wonder why the Navy didn't mount the Phalanx CIWS radar and infrared sensors atop the Mk 110, to create a 57mm cannon that's actually useful as a CIWS, which needs to independently acquire and engage targets to be useful.
DeleteThere's not much public information about the technology. It's interesting but there seems to be no performance data, probably because it never reached a sufficient stage of development for actual use testing - just a proof of concept prototype.
DeleteI believe two reasons for the Navy not marrying the Phalanx/CIWS sensors to the Mk110 57mm are: 1) Rate of Fire. Block 1 & Block 1B have selectable 3,000 or 4,500 rounds per minute cyclic and 2) Ammunition:
DeleteAmmunition
Type Fixed
Weight of Complete Round Mark 149: 0.58 lbs. (0.263 kg)
Mark 244: N/A
Projectile Types and Weights 1a 2a APDS Mark 149 3a - 0.22 lbs. (0.10 kg)
APDS Mark 149-2 - 0.22 lbs. (0.10 kg)
APDS Mark 149-4 - 0.22 lbs. (0.10 kg)
APDS ELC Mark 244-0 - 0.33 lbs. (0.15 kg)
Bursting Charge N/A - Solid Tungsten Penetrator
Projectile Length 6.62 in (16.8 cm)
Propellant Charge N/A
Cartridge 20mm x 102
Muzzle Velocity Mark 149: 3,650 fps (1,113 mps)
Working Pressure N/A
Approximate Barrel Life N/A
Ammunition stowage per gun Block 0: 989 rounds per magazine
Block 1: 1,550 rounds per magazine
The Mark 149 projectile was developed to provide a significantly increased anti-armor capability, optimized exterior ballistic performance and short time-of-flight over the previous Mark 50 round. The original Mark 149-2 projectile was a depleted-uranium sub-caliber penetrator. In 1988, the Navy switched to the Mark 149-4 which uses a tungsten penetrator. The Navy changed over to tungsten in order to reduce radiation exposure to personnel and lessen the environmental impact. Tests with the tungsten penetrator showed acceptable results against likely missile and aircraft threats. The Mark 149-4 round includes a red tracer.
The Mark 244 Mod 0 ELC (Enhanced Lethality Cartridges) uses a heavier optimized tungsten alloy penetrator that extends the effective range of this weapon. However, these rounds have been found to increase the likelihood of jams in the ammunition feed system. These jams were the result of the cartridge case getting dented when it was trapped between the feeder unload sprocket and the guide bar just after handoff from the gun bolt. This problem was traced back to the new round having a different center of gravity than previous rounds, which causes the Mark 244 to be mis-positioned in the feed system during the handoff. Alterations of the feed sprocket wheels and guide bars have been recommended to reduce the problem.
The sub-caliber penetrator of the Mark 149 is 0.502 inches (12.75 mm) in diameter.
A wall of lead (Tungsten actually) goes along ways to stop stuff.
The Mk110 Mod 0/57mm (same as the Swedish Mark 3) has a cyclic rate of fire of 220 rounds per minute. Ammunition: 120 ready rounds, 1,000 rounds in mounting
(source: navweaps.com)
"I believe two reasons for the Navy not marrying the Phalanx/CIWS sensors to the Mk110 57mm are"
DeleteAs you know, the Mk110/57mm does NOT have radar guided fire control. I think the original comment suggestion by 'Aim9snake' was directed at that lack of radar control and the suggestion was to provide that control by adding the Phalanx sensors. If so, that would be largely independent of rate of fire or ammunition.
Now, just having the Phalanx radar fire control would not, by itself, make the Mk110 an effective anti-missile weapon (the rate of fire and ammunition concerns you mention are valid for that role) but it would, potentially, make the Mk110 a more effective anti-small boat or anti-UAV weapon.
57mm is really small for CIWS use, tbh. You're better off with the Sovraponte 76mm, which can fire DART guided rounds and has its own radar. Rate of fire is worse than the 76mm, at 120 rpm, but this is offset by the bigger rounds and guidance - there's greater phit and pk on the moving target that is an incoming missile.
DeleteNote that this is for using it as a CIWS weapon, which means you're putting it in places where the Phalanx or SeaRAM go; for a foredeck mount, there's no reason not to use the standard 76mm Super Rapid.
" greater phit and pk on the moving target"
DeleteIs there any actual data to support that?
Manufacture's data, comparing guided DART 76mm to unguided 76mm rounds.
DeleteYou can basically expect higher phit and pk vs unguided 20mm, but lower phit and pk vs RAM.
"Manufacture's data,"
DeleteSo, no data. Do I need to list all the examples of manufacturer's claims being hugely overstated, bordering on false?
For sure it needs to be taken with a certain amount of skepticism - however, let us consider several points, of which the physics are known and have already been demonstrated:
Delete1. 76mm rounds are historically known to have superior range to 20mm rounds, even in direct fire mode.
2. The larger warhead of a 76mm round allows it to impart more damage than a 20mm round, if it hits.
3. Guided rounds have an greater probability of hit versus unguided rounds.
4. Greater probability is a relative term on a sliding scale.
5. A shell on a ballistic trajectory has limited energy to maneuver; a missile has more energy to maneuver as it is under powered flight.
At the end of the day, gun-based CIWS is a last ditch roll of the dice - with the Sovraponte 76, it's an attempt to roll the dice in a different way, trading volume of fire for further engagement range and a larger warhead.
My point to Aim9Snake was that 57mm, while an acceptable gun for corvettes and patrol boats (it's the de facto corvette gun of the Western-aligned world), is neither fish nor fowl as a CIWS gun. The round has more damage but less ROF vs 20mm or 30mm. I don't consider 200 rounds per minute to be sufficient ROF for a gun firing unguided rounds, that's not enough lead in the air. 76mm's lower ROF is compensated for with guided rounds.
Mind, that's assuming guided 76mm vs unguided 57mm; if guided 57mm rounds enter service, I think the 57mm gun could have potential as a point defense gun.
Do note that I'm not trying to imply that 76mm DART is a viable competitor to RAM - there's no way a gun-based system could outperform point defense missiles in terms of phit and pkill. Rather, it's another approach to gun-based CIWS.
DeleteThe Italians have an impressive and proven dual 40mm CIWS called DARDO.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DARDO
I vote for more fiction!!! Return of the Broadside and the alternate PearlHarbor/Midway posts were awesome, as were all the others, and I still reread them for fun!!
ReplyDeleteAnother line of posts could be Comnavops Mythbusters!! Obvious topics could be things like "EABO: On WHAT ISLANDS??", or "Carrier Killers: But Really??", or "Ford Deployment Success: Fantasy FlightOps"... There might be some rehash of previous info, but the amount of questionable or downright absurd material out there being presented as fact is ludicrous, and CNO, youre just the guy to set things straight!!!
-Jjabatie
I've got more fiction in the works.
DeleteHere is a topic of interest. What if Admiral Kimmel had remained in command? He suspected a Japanese force would return to Wake Island and had deployed three carriers to destroy it. But he was sacked and the force showed up supported by two Japanese carriers. They didn't detect the American ships in the region so could have been attacked to save the island, but the temp PacCom Admiral was spineless and ordered his ships to return to Pearl.
DeleteI did a short mini-doc about this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmTmYdgVACI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QmTmYdgVACI
Very nice video on the subject. Without disagreeing with your premise, in these scenarios I always like to examine the thinking of the person under question. We have the benefit of perfect hindsight as we analyze the situation. The person under question, Pye, in this case, had far less than complete information. What did he know? What did he not know? What considerations was he factoring into his thinking? What weight did he give the various factors?
DeleteFor example, at that point, we had a very limited supply of carriers and no battleships. The Japanese had several of both. Preservation of our then limited carriers had to have been a primary concern as demonstrated shortly thereafter by Nimitz's order to Spruance prior to Midway: “You will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.”
At that time, there was little standing between the Japanese and Pearl Harbor or, indeed, the US west coast. A degree of caution (calculated risk, as Nimitz wrote) was warranted.
Another consideration was that the US carriers and pilots had no combat experience whereas the Japanese did.
Yet another consideration was Japanese submarines. We had no idea if any were in the area and it would have been disastrous to lose one or more carriers to submarines as actually happened to the USS Wasp during the Guadalcanal campaign.
Having said all that, please don't take it as disagreement with your premise or agreement with Pye's actions. I merely point out my intense interest in hearing the 'other side'. There's always another side that makes perfect sense to the person in question, at the time. Pye had a distinguished career up until that point and there is no reason to believe he was a coward. He simply saw the situation differently and it would be incredibly interesting to know what his thinking was.
Spruance elected to preserve his forces and retired from Midway rather than press the battle. His caution was judged wise whereas Pye's was judged cowardly.
Again, very nice video!
I’d say make a post about the postwar DE/FF (Dealey/Claud Jones/Bronstein/Garcia/Brooke/Knox classes). They have a gradual transformation from the single-purpose mass production ASW escort in the form of the Dealeys to more high end vessels of the Garcia and Knox classes which were still focused on ASW but also filled many DD roles.
ReplyDeleteI think the Bronstein class is of particular interest as I would argue they’re the last truly single purpose ASW ship built by the US navy. They are the the only single purpose ASW ships built with AN/SQS-26 and ASROC. They were even built with the ill fated DASH QH-50 in the early 1960s. USS McCloy even had AN/SQR 15 TASS installed in the 80s. Despite their slow speed of 26 Knots(Friedman’s US destroyers) these vessel are probably the best US built examples for conceptualizing a task force ASW escort. Also of note they were typically commanded by LCDRs for the entirety of their nearly 30 yr career.
Delete"post about the postwar DE/FF"
DeleteWikipedia has good writeups about all those ships. The challenge is to discuss some aspect(s) that isn't obvious from the straightforward Wiki articles. Otherwise, I'd just be repeating those articles.
What aspect(s) catch your interest that aren't covered in the Wiki articles?
"Bronstein class is of particular interest "
DeleteIs there an aspect of interest that isn't covered in the Wiki or Navsource writeups?
I was doing some reading about the various DD classes that were built during WWII, and how the designs changed and matured from '39 to wars end. Not a post suggestion, but its actually interesting to see how far off the rails things have gone from those well focused days...
DeleteAs an aside note, remember the USS Glover AGFF 1 used to tie up across the pier from us from time to time. Kind of a one of ship built to test the latest ASW equipment. I think it was part of the Garcia class, but had a unique "poop deck" aft for the VDS and had a early model jet pump (shrouded propeller).
DeleteThat actually could be pretty interesting to go back and write about a particular class of ship. Wouldn't be easy on some of the foreign classes but still could be interesting. Have a look at a particular CG, DD. ,FG starting 1900s or so....wouldn't even necessarily be pertaining to today, just a small paragraph history overview?
Delete1) United States access to critical natural resources, current reach and future reach,
ReplyDelete2) no of dry docks require build back navy, ship building industry in US and it's future
Are dedicated flagships like the Blue Ridge really a better choice for commanding fleets then cruisers or battleships? How does the survive-ability compare to compared to other fighting ships? Should a flagship be highly survivable? What should it be protected against? Is it a liability to dedicated flagships that can't offensively fight?
ReplyDeleteYou may have a misunderstanding of the ship type and purpose. It is a command, control, and communications ship intended to support amphibious groups. In practice, it has become a floating headquarters. It is not an underway flagship of a combat surface task force.
DeleteA new negative article about the USS Ford, noting it never spends much time at sea.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/12/02/the-strange-missed-opportunities-in-the-uss-gerald-r-ford-cvn-78-deployment/?sh=2fd929ef6b26
I have found Forbes articles on defense to be extremely unobjective and very weak on detail. Only thing I saw different here was the author.
DeleteThis looks like a computer generator "bot" reply. Please elaborate about your objections.
Delete"USS Ford, noting it never spends much time at sea."
DeleteAs you know, I'm no fan of the Ford but the article was pure speculation. The speculation might be correct or it might not but it's totally unsupported by any facts.
There is no evidence that any of the port calls or the timing of the return was due to malfunctions. The only malfunction I've read about was the single note by a journalist that only one arresting wire was operational at his time of landing and, personally, I find that dubious as it seems unlikely that the Navy would allow flight ops, especially involving civilians, with only one functioning wire.
The other major 'negative' in the article had to do with sorties. The author disparaged the Ford's sorties by comparing it to carriers operating during Desert Storm. Well, come on, those carriers were conducting combat ops and generating something in the vicinity of maximum sorties. The Ford, on a publicity stunt cruise, had no such motivation and, likely, the number of sorties was not an objective. In other words, the Ford wasn't trying to generate max sorties so comparing to carriers that were is highly misleading.
Even the consecutive days at sea that the author mentions is a non-issue for a cruise whose main objective was publicity. The cruise was never intended to be anything but a PR stunt and I'm actually surprised that they didn't have more port visits and fewer days at sea.
In short, not knowing the Navy's detailed, specific objectives and having no actual maintenance or performance data, the article was pure speculation and bordered on irresponsible because it presented that speculation almost as if it were fact - meaning that the author made no great effort to emphasize that he was engaged in pure speculation.
Again, I'm the farthest thing from a Ford fan but I also try to be fair and objective. The Ford is quite capable of failing on its own, legitimately, without anyone engaging in unsupported speculation (rumor mongering?) that is almost - but not quite - presented as fact.
I've read Mr. Hooper's work before and this was not one of his noteworthy efforts.
I agree that it lacks any hard proof, but I expected a few more port calls, like Rota, Spain and somewhere mid Atlantic on the way home. With only four days offshore at Portsmouth, I doubt all the crew got shore leave due to the shuttle issue. And coming home two days after Thanksgiving?
DeleteAs I noted before, a reporter noted that it didn't conduct any flight ops one day due to stormy weather, the captain of the ship publicly said that EMALS needs more work (a career sin) and the next news was the Ford was back in Norfolk one week short of its two month deployment. With the fleet worn out, there is no firm date for a real deployment, except early 2024. Why the delay? Is it so the third and fourth Ford get two more years of funding?
"I've read Mr. Hooper's work before and this was not one of his noteworthy efforts."
DeleteMy thoughts exactly... Was struck by it being somewhat out of character for him...
Lauren Thompson is their major writer. He also has a think tank funded by the companies with the products he typically advocates for in his articles.
DeleteI think we could have a discussion with regard to changing the definition of 'Sea Control'. Because that would shape the fleet.
ReplyDeleteThere will likely never be a replay of WWII, wherein the fleet enables conquering land masses to the extent we can change cultures. CF Iraq/Afghanistan.
I propose changing CONOPS to Raid(s) and Interdiction(s). Especially if you're talking about China. No need to go in to the South China Sea when we can just strangle them from sea lanes afar.
I agree with COMNAVOPS, "Bring home the fleet and establish home port operations with an emphasis on maintenance and training." And then sortie out on the offensive. Interdiction of shipping would require the least amount of effort and expense with max effect. China can't feed or fuel itself organically. Same for Europe/Russia.
Nope. I don't have a answer for how to handle Taiwan. But if they aren't nuclear already they will be soon so keep a eye on Taiwanese advances with IRBMs and cruise missiles. Likewise South Korea and Japan (and Ukraine and Poland and others...). We're headed to substantial nuke proliferation and best I can hope for is that they all cancel out future land-grabs a la Crimea.
So. Raids to execute governments (and then make a deal with the surviving gov't while explicitly noting they're NEXT if they don't play ball) and sink shipping to apply pressure to populations. Ummm... The more I think about taking pain out on pops the more I think about downsides. But let's leave the option on the table for the moment.
What the USN has had, pretty much, since WWII is Sea Dominance. We clearly can't afford that any more. Not platforms, not maintenance, not manning, not infrastructure (all the way from drydocks to SOSUS). Sea CONTROL will be cheaper. Because it allows us to pick and choose time and place of engagement. No longer have to be everywhere and all at the same time.
For now.
"No need to go in to the South China Sea when we can just strangle them from sea lanes afar."
DeleteOur greatest rivals can conduct trade over land- including via oil pipelines, like the ones in Siberia, transporting Russian oil and natural gas to China- meaning naval interdiction will NOT be the "I win" button you think it is. Do more research.
"China can't feed or fuel itself organically. Same for Europe/Russia."
Russia EXPORTS oil, natural gas, and components critical to the manufacture of fertilizer. China has her own oil fields deep in its territory, where naval strikes can't reach; oil pipelines between her and Russia; and will certainly impose rationing to stretch its supplies during war. Meanwhile, we Americans are facing high gas prices because our current government halted oil drilling within our borders, and shutdown construction of the Keystone pipeline, out of a misguided push for environmentalism.
Do more research. A tit-for-tat attack on oil supplies- not just military, but also economic and diplomatic, i.e., sanctions- will affect us more.
"Raids to execute governments (and then make a deal with the surviving gov't while explicitly noting they're NEXT if they don't play ball) and sink shipping to apply pressure to populations."
Anything short of a nuclear strike on an enemy's military headquarters- including their capital cities- will be USELESS, and only serve to fuel anti-American propaganda and justify (in our enemies' minds) anti-American activities, including terrorist attacks against our civilian population. As for your plan to "sink shipping to apply pressure to populations," how effective have sanctions been on Russia during the past eight years? On China? On Iran?
DO MORE RESEARCH.
The Chinese Navy currently has 340 ships. In 2025, there will be 400, according to a report from the Pentagon, with China's focus is on large surface ships.
ReplyDeleteThe CBO November 2022 report "An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 Shipbuilding Plan" saying they estimate the new ~13,500t DDG(X) will cost would range from $3.1 billion to $3.4 billion compared to a Burke Flt III at $2.2 billion, similar story with the SSN(X) with CBO estimating up to $7.2 billion twice the cost of a Virginia, is there an argument that Congress should impose cost cap on both new classes of no more than current build costs if not lower so as funding available to keep fleet numbers at current levels if not higher.
Nick
" is there an argument that Congress should impose cost cap"
DeleteI had to chuckle at this suggestion because of the Navy's history of cost caps. For example, you'll recall that Congress imposed a cost cap on the Ford of $10.5B in 2007. The Navy quickly blew through that and Congress obligingly raised the cap repeatedly. The cap currently stands at $12.9B and the Navy has gotten around that using accounting gimmicks such as phased delivery, incomplete delivery, acceptance of incomplete compartments and equipment, etc. The Ford is still not operational and is still being 'constructed'. The work on the elevators, EMALS, and AAG have likely racked up billions more costs. I'm estimating that the current Ford cost is around $15B and still accumulating! So much for cost caps.
You have touched on this issue before, but a refinement of survivability/weighting capability when damaged. During WW2 most weapon systems had the capability of local control if the bridge was knocked out. To what extent could modern ships continue fighting if the bridge/CIC were out of action - can there be local control of all of the weapon systems?
ReplyDeleteI'm not aware that there is local control of any major weapon system.
DeleteThere are articles in Defense News about UUVs unmanned submersibles being experimented with as mine layers and potentially being used for mine mitigation. This would be a development for the future, if feasible. In the meantime what to do we have for mine mitigation off our shores ? It seems like our Navy is pushing mine mitigation off to the future !
ReplyDeleteHow about something on the logistics of a Pacific war? We have the historical knowledge of WW2. What would it take to either sustain a blockade of China, or challenge their blockade of Taiwan (two likely scenarios in the near future)?
ReplyDelete"a blockade of China"
DeleteThat would require almost no effort. It is necessary to realize that the easiest blockade to implement is not trying to intercept ships at sea but to prevent them from setting sail to begin with. China has few trading partners who are significant and would stand against an anti-China alliance. Thus, we could easily implement a blockade by preventing any Chinese merchant ships from loading or leaving the various ports around the world. It's mainly a diplomatic and paperwork exercise in coordination with other countries.
At the moment, unlike WWII where we had to mount assault after assault and fight an enemy who was spread across the entire Pacific, we already own the Pacific and there's no significant Chinese forces outside the first island chain. This fact, alone, hugely reduces the logistics demand.
DeleteThat said, how would we fight China? Guam will likely be rendered inoperable in the first hour of a war. What does that leave us? Only the very long range bombers of the Air Force and the Navy's carriers. The carriers will have to supported and that will require significant logistics.
If you believe my ever so brief analysis, you've got to wonder if we have enough carriers to conduct a war against China. I think not and have called for more - which, in turn, requires more logistics support - but that's a separate topic.
Most of the carrier support is suppose to come from Japan (Sasebo and Yokosuka) Those bases will be blasted by thousands of short range missiles and air attacks at Sasebo. Submarines will lurk outside their port entrance. We really need these support elements moved to eastern Australia or the Central Pacific islands. Otherwise Hawaii is all we will have.
ReplyDeleteBlockade China's coast, very difficult and dangerous. Blockade China's sea routes through Indonesian and Philippine straits is simple. Even mines and subs can do it alone.
ReplyDeleteHere's something I'd be interested in: an evaluation of whether an SSGN with a primary ASuW mission (think Oscar II and Yasen) would be worthwhile for the USN to field, with a particular eye towards whether existing assets could be retasked in lieu of designing a new class for this mission. Quick bullet points:
ReplyDeleteMOTIVATION: the PLAN will likely have local numeric superiority of surface combatants in a war in the South China Sea and the East China Sea/Sea of Japan. They also will be operating many land- and air-based AAW and ASuW assets from their home turf, which is much closer than ours to the theater. It would be greatly advantageous during this stage of the war to have a capable ASuW asset that was not directly countered by this A2/AD 'bubble'.
IDEA: the VPM-equipped Virginias (Block 5, and potentially Block VI) are not especially useful land strike platforms in the scenario of a war with China, largely due to their limited magazine size (40 VLS cells). This magazine size, however, *may* be sufficient for attacking surface combatant groups, either by taking out ASW-capable escorts first with torpedoes and then attacking non-ASW-capable targets with missiles, or by performing passive TMA with sonar and the ESM mast followed by a hit-and-run attack from standoff range where the sub launches a salvo of missiles and then immediately submerges and clears datum before enemy ASW assets (helos, maritime patrol aircraft, etc) are able to localize it.
POTENTIAL ARMAMENT: the torpedo room would likely have the same equipment as a 688 or Blk I-IV Virginia - namely, four Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP/CBASS. The 40 VLS cells would be stuffed with Block Va Tomahawks, which regain the ASuW capability that we've lacked in submarine VLS cells since the TASM was retired in 1994. Numerically, this compares favorably to the Oscar I and II ASuW-tasked SSGNs (24 missiles each) and the Yasen class ASuW-tasked SSGNs (36 missiles). However, the Block Va Tomahawk is likely to have a lower probability of hit than the purpose-built ASuW cruise missiles carried by the Russian platforms.
(comment broken up for length)
(part 2)
DeleteQUESTIONS TO PONDER:
* what standoff distance for a salvo of 1-40 missiles is required for survivability against a group with organic ASW assets, or a group operating in concert with land-based ASW assets?
* what is the probability that a passively-calculated firing solution for Tomahawks fired from this survivable standoff distance will get a given missile close enough to the enemy surface targets to acquire when their seekers activate?
* does a brief active radar emission by the sub prior to launching a salvo improve the firing solution meaningfully? Does said brief transmission worsen survivability meaningfully?
* what is the probability that a Tomahawk that acquires will make it past the defenses of a surface group with point-defenses only? How much does the probability of a hit suffer when targeting ships in a group that includes area-AAW defenses in addition to point defenses?
* how much damage does the ~1000 lb blast fragmentation warhead on a Tomahawk do to surface combatants of various types and sizes? Is it worthwhile to pursue a shaped charge warhead (for comparison, the AS-4/Kh-22 has a ~2,000 lb shaped charge warhead, and the Kh-32 has a ~1,000 lb shaped charge warhead) for potentially increased effect against ships at the expense of likely reduced effect against at least some land targets?
* is it feasible for multiple of these ASuW-SSGNs to act in a 'wolfpack' without substantial risk of friendly fire? How about working in concert with friendly surface assets in areas where enemy subs may also be found? (Nb. part of the answer here is likely to be impossible to determine from open sources - real details about stuff like GERTRUDE and JANUS is almost all classified). How about working in concert with friendly air and space assets that may be able to provide better targeting information, or targeting information from a greater firing distance, or both?
* Does the greatly increased magazine size of the Ohio SSGNs (154 vs 40 missiles) make them dramatically more capable in this role? If so, is it worthwhile to retask them towards ASuW at the cost of their incredible value when tasked with striking land targets? Does their reduced survivability in a get-out-of-dodge-fast scenario preclude their use for this mission?
* to what extent can we test and validate this concept at AUTEC in the Bahamas? That is to say, when doing sub-vs-sub or sub-vs-ship engagements at AUTEC (or on other ranges) we load up exercise torpedoes that have no warheads and perform a terminal turn-away maneuver instead of smacking into the target, but I don't think even the AUTEC range would let us accurately simulate some parts of an engagement where a sub fires missiles at a group of surface ships. Maybe simulate one end of the engagement at AUTEC (launching dummy missiles that make the right amount of noise coming out of the VLS cell but don't go anywhere, to determine how hard it is for the sub to evade detection when launching a salvo) and simulate the other end using the Self-Defense Test Ship at Port Hueneme?
From your questions, I suspect that you're misunderstanding a few aspects of submarine and ASW warfare.
Delete- From a constant barrage of peacetime publicity photos, many of us have come to believe that ships sailing a couple hundred feet apart is normal. It is not! At least, not for combat. A group will be spread over vast areas of ocean with ASW escorts and assets ranging 20-50 miles or more out, depending on circumstances.
- Radar is limited to the horizon and for a submarine with the radar a few feet above the surface, that puts the radar horizon at around ten miles. If a sub is using radar to confirm a targeting setup, they're way too close and should have already launched or they've already been detected and are dead.
- The main weakness associated with anti-ship missiles on a sub is targeting. Missiles are long range weapons: twenty to hundreds of miles. A sub's sensors are short range although certain combinations of factors could occasionally provide longer range detections. Given the difficulty in obtaining over-the-horizon targeting, loading up with too many missiles is generally going to be a waste of space.
(part 1)
ReplyDeleteHere's something I'd be interested in: an evaluation of whether an SSGN with a primary ASuW mission (think Oscar II and Yasen) would be worthwhile for the USN to field, with a particular eye towards whether existing assets could be retasked in lieu of designing a new class for this mission. Quick bullet points:
MOTIVATION: the PLAN will likely have local numeric superiority of surface combatants in a war in the South China Sea and the East China Sea/Sea of Japan. They also will be operating many land- and air-based AAW and ASuW assets from their home turf, which is much closer than ours to the theater. It would be greatly advantageous during this stage of the war to have a capable ASuW asset that was not directly countered by this A2/AD 'bubble'.
IDEA: the VPM-equipped Virginias (Block 5, and potentially Block VI) are not especially useful land strike platforms in the scenario of a war with China, largely due to their limited magazine size (40 VLS cells). This magazine size, however, *may* be sufficient for attacking surface combatant groups, either by taking out ASW-capable escorts first with torpedoes and then attacking non-ASW-capable targets with missiles, or by performing passive TMA with sonar and the ESM mast followed by a hit-and-run attack from standoff range where the sub launches a salvo of missiles and then immediately submerges and clears datum before enemy ASW assets (helos, maritime patrol aircraft, etc) are able to localize it.
POTENTIAL ARMAMENT: the torpedo room would likely have the same equipment as a 688 or Blk I-IV Virginia - namely, four Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP/CBASS. The 40 VLS cells would be stuffed with Block Va Tomahawks, which regain the ASuW capability that we've lacked in submarine VLS cells since the TASM was retired in 1994. Numerically, this compares favorably to the Oscar I and II ASuW-tasked SSGNs (24 missiles each) and the Yasen class ASuW-tasked SSGNs (36 missiles). However, the Block Va Tomahawk is likely to have a lower probability of hit than the purpose-built ASuW cruise missiles carried by the Russian platforms.
(comment broken up for length)
Let's discuss losses and ammo expenditure and how the services should plan for them both. Watching the B-21 at $700M a copy roll out, what happens when we lose 1-10 (either through mechanical failure or combat action)? That is 1-10% of the planned force. We lost 52 fixed wing aircraft in 1991 and 24 during the 2nd Iraq campaign. And helicopters were worse. We lost use of 2 ships during Desert Storm. Ukraine (and our Desert Storm experiences) have shown we need to plan for much higher than planned ammo expendtiture rates. How do we keep lines open during peacetime and make them scaleable for war?
ReplyDeleteWe need to start planning for how to deal with REAL war and not the perfect technological dream we are in now.
" How do we keep lines open during peacetime and make them scaleable for war?"
DeleteOne way to increase production is to expend more ammo! Currently, we 'mothball' our weapons and bring them up to operational status once per year, or so, for a scripted exercise. We should be live firing ALL our weapons on a much more frequent basis, if not daily, depending on the specific weapon system. That, alone, would greatly increase ammo production.
Beyond that, we need to build up inventories. It is extremely worrisome that we've drasticlaly depleted our inventories simply by supplying Ukraine for a year. War with China will see weapon expenditures many times that. Every war every fought in the history of the world has used many times more weapons than anticipated. Recognizing that, we need to build up our inventories accordingly.
I thought these were topics for an article and then discussion not a one and done. While I agree we need alot more warshots during training and that would help keep the line open, there are many other ways to do it also. We also have to not break the bank and figure out how to convince businesses that a lower margin profit commodity is in their best interest to produce. Otherwise no one but the Chinese will take on commodity work.
DeleteI'm not quite sure what you're asking for. You seem to have an answer in mind that you'd like explored but it's not clear to me what it is.
DeleteMotivating business to engage in specialized commodity production is an economic/market issue and beyond the scope of this blog.
Help me understand where it is you want a discussion to go. Alternatively, I'm open to hosting a guest post on the subject since it sounds like you have both the practical experience/knowledge and the motivation to address the topic. Let me know.
How do I contact you other than on here? Do you have an e-mail?
DeleteThe easiest way is to spell out your contact email address (for example, something at dot com) to avoid bots and spam and then I'll send you an email greeting and go from there. As soon as I see it, I'll immediately delete your comment to avoid exposing your address any longer than necessary.
DeleteCNO, really enjoy your site, and support your efforts. I would appreciate a post from you, doing the following;
ReplyDeleteAssume the navy has rational, competent leadership, adequate funding, and the ability to move toward the kind of force structure you advocate....what does a week or month in the life of that force look like?
I assume short, intense drills,realistic training and frequent live fire exercises, but I would like to understand how the force functions, what it's focus is, and how it accomplishes its tasks from your pov....
"what does a week or month in the life of that force look like?"
DeleteYou just answered your own question with, "I assume short, intense drills,realistic training and frequent live fire exercises".
While the ship is in port, undergoing maintenance, the crew is going through various types of training on shore. Frequently, the ship/crew put to sea to exercise either individually or as a group with other ships. From time to time, a specific mission may arise and a ship may leave for a somewhat extended period (a few weeks, typically) to execute that mission.
A major point of emphasis is to develop viable doctrine and tactics.
Yearly giant Fleet Problem exercises would occur.
I'm not sure what other insight you're looking for? Do you have specific questions?
Thanks for the reply, cno. I was more interested in your thoughts on the role of the navy in times short of war, what missions that force might be properly tasked with, and how that force might execute those tasks.
Delete"I was more interested in your thoughts on the role of the navy in times short of war, what missions that force might be properly tasked with, and how that force might execute those tasks."
DeleteMy answer is 'the blog'. In the thousands of posts, I've pretty well described the kinds of missions I'd use the Navy for. Here's a few recent, specific examples of plausible missions that could have happened or still could.
-Physically impede and prevent the construction of Chinese artificial islands.
-Ensure the safety of the Persian Gulf and the Straits by sinking any Iranian boats/aircraft acting in an unsafe manner.
-Conduct freedom of anchoring exercises in international waters illegally claimed by the Chinese.
-Sink Chinese fishing vessels found in Philippine water (with permission from, and as part of a larger diplomatic push to make Philippines an ally.).
-Conduct anti-terrorist surveillance and strikes in Africa
And so on.
Of course, missions such as these require a degree of fortitude on our part. Lacking that fortitude, there's no point in having ships outside our home waters. They don't accomplish anything.
What about Jutland? I came across an interesting lecture not long ago. The speaker thinks that the Home fleet won. Is he right?
ReplyDeleteTOPIC How will the congress, press, people, etc. react the first time a nuclear vessel is actually sunk? How should the Navy react? In a conflict using our carriers and subs this is inevitable. But the US isn't the same as it was when Rickover and others tried to make an all nuclear fleet. The subs may not be as problematic--the will literally be out of sight out of mind for the general public. But a carrier getting hit and radioactive steam being released? In fact, even it it isn't released (doubtful in fact) every bit of smoke and steam will be treated as if it was radioactive by segments of the media and probably by many sailors who don't know any better.
ReplyDelete