One of the foundational principles of combat, throughout history, is local massing of firepower. Let’s examine that principle through the historical lens of battleship operations. If ever there was a ship that could successfully operate alone, it would be the battleship, one would think. However, in WWII, battleships always operated in groups, when possible, in accordance with the principle of massing of firepower. Thus, despite their individually impressive firepower and armor, naval commanders of the time understood that massing was the proper way to employ battleships.
For the US, earlier in the war, battleships sometimes operated as single units – though still as part of larger groups such as a carrier group – due to inadequate numbers. Later in the war, as numbers became available, battleships operated in groups, as discrete battleship task forces.
One of the earlier examples of US massing of battleship firepower was the pairing of the Washington and South Dakota to form Battleship Division 6 at Guadalcanal, culminating in the famous engagement and sinking of the Japanese battleship, Kirishima.
Oldendorf’s Task Force 77.2 consisted of the old battleships USS Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, Maryland, and West Virginia at Leyte Gulf.
The never-formed Task Force 34 at Leyte Gulf would have consisted of the battleships Washington, Alabama, New Jersey, and Iowa along with escorting cruisers and destroyers.
Task Force 58/38 included the battleships Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin although, of course, the individual ships rotated in and out of the Task Force as operational needs and availability dictated.
The British Home Fleet included 2nd Battle Squadron with the battleships HMS Royal Oak, HMS Royal Sovereign, HMS Ramilies, HMS Nelson, and HMS Rodney although, again, the ships rotated in and out as needs and availability dictated.
When the principle of naval massing in combat was violated, it usually didn’t turn out well:
- Bismarck operated alone and was sunk after inflicting only insignificant damage on Allied shipping.
- Tirpitz operated alone and was sunk having accomplished little.
- Kirishima was the only Japanese battleship at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and was sunk in the famous battleship duel with Washington.
- Graf Spee, a so-called pocket battleship, operated alone and was trapped and scuttled for little return.
- Yamato and escorts faced the firepower of several of Task Force 58’s carriers and was sunk.
- Yamashiro, of the Japanese southern force at Leyte Gulf (Fuso having been sunk earlier), was sunk after facing a US force of several cruisers and six battleships.
Of course, merely assembling multiple battleships doesn’t guarantee success. For example, the British Force Z battleship, Prince of Wales, and battlecruiser Repulse operated together but insufficient escorts, lack of air cover, and an operationally untenable position doomed the group regardless of their massing because their cumulative mass of firepower was less than the enemy’s. In other words, the enemy achieved greater local mass of firepower despite the pairing of the two ships.
This leads to the pointed reminder that massing refers to firepower, not numbers. One could assemble six battleships but if the enemy can assemble eight, it is the enemy that has achieved superior local massing of firepower. Similarly, assembling multiple battleships is pointless if the enemy can assemble superior firepower in the form of aircraft.
The need to achieve local massing of firepower seems obvious, now, right? So why are we belaboring it?
One reason is the persistent tendency by so many people to make the one-versus-the-entire-enemy argument for why –fill in the blank- weapon system or ship can’t succeed in naval combat. The reality, as revealed by WWII naval combat, is that it’s never one-versus-the enemy but a group-versus-the enemy. We should be evaluating systems and ships as groups because that’s how they’ll fight. How many times have I heard the argument that a battleship is as good as sunk against the enemy’s missiles, aircraft, submarines, and mines? As if a single battleship is ever going to attempt to take on the entire enemy war machine single-handed! The real question is whether, say, four battleships operating as a group with escorts and properly supported by air power, reconnaissance, and submarines has value for the kind of operations we envision (assuming we had a naval strategy … which we don’t).
Task Force Entering Ulithi |
I don’t want to turn this post into a battleship debate because that’s not the point. I’m using battleships just to illustrate the point about massing firepower. It’s not the firepower of a single battleship that matters. It’s the firepower of a group of battleships, relative to our operational plans and the resources of the enemy, that is the proper basis for evaluations.
Another reason to hammer on the principle of local massing of firepower is the Navy’s ill-conceived distributed lethality concept which envisions ships operating alone – the opposite of massing of firepower. Why is the Navy insistent on pursuing distributed lethality using the LCS which is the polar opposite of a battleship? If battleships have been shown to be unable to successfully operate alone, why do we think an LCS is going to sail blithely around in enemy territory?
Finally, we’ve thoroughly discussed the massing of carriers but we have not explored additional forms of massing of naval firepower. We should be exploring tactics for massing the firepower we have which, for the surface navy, is Burke class destroyers. Can a group of Burkes accomplish anything useful? How many ships would constitute a useful and effective force? How would they operate? What tactics would they use? What support do they need? What constraints should they operate under? Of course, not only are we not doing this but I haven’t heard anyone in the Navy even broach the subject of examining a Burke surface group. The idea may have merit or it may not but it should, at least, be examined.
One might be tempted to claim that a group of Burkes is never going to be used as a massed firepower unit but the same might have been said of Oldendorf’s group of obsolete, resurrected battleships and yet they wound up facing a Japanese battleship at Suriago Strait. One never knows what circumstances might arise and it’s best to be prepared and have thought/exercised through the possibilities before they happen.
It sounds like a bad case of tunnel-vision. For years, I have always believed that you must expect the unexpected. Think outside the box. The forementioned battleships were overhyped, but under evolved. Remember the unsinkable Titanic? The HMS Hood was billed as a badass ship with its 15-inch guns but it had bupkus for deck armor.
ReplyDeleteI don't know if having a mixture of Flight IIA and Flight III Burkes is going to make much of a difference. I would think that you would not want more BMD capable Burkes en masse than non-BMD capable ships.
It is also could depend the number of Burkes that are available outside those attached to CSGs. You could augment a group of Burkes with one or two SSGNs. With the SSGNs the loadout of Tomahawks could be mostly TLAMs one or two dozen MSTs.
"under evolved. ... The HMS Hood was billed as a badass ship with its 15-inch guns but it had bupkus for deck armor."
DeleteCome on, now. Let's be fair. Hood was built in 1918 and was classified as a battlecruiser, not a battleship. Classification aside, battleship design and armor advanced tremendously from the Hood to the US Iowa class.
"I would think that you would not want more BMD capable Burkes en masse than non-BMD capable ships."
DeleteThe BMD optimized Arleigh Burke class DDG, should be perfectly capable as a carrier escort, once her VLS cells are loaded with appropriate missiles. Even then, it's likely advisable to keep some ABMs in her cells in case the enemy uses antiship ballistic missiles against the Arleigh Burke or the carrier she's escorting.
A more important issue is whether or not the USN can build, man, and maintain enough Arleigh Burke class ships to perform all the missions demanded of the service. Not only does the US need to expand existing shipyards and build new ones, it needs to expand existing steel mills and factories as well as build new ones, so the shipyards have the necessary materials with which to build and maintain ships; the USN needs to improve recruitment and retention, while competing with the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, for those willing to serve.
The battleships Oldendorf faced were even older than his ships.
ReplyDeleteSometimes you need an antique to fight an antique.
Any want to take a Burke against the Yamashiro ?
After the 8 Harpoons bounce off the Yamashiro, you'd wish
you had a 30 year old, for real pukka Battleship.
Back to CNOs point, to have massed fire power, you need
some firepower to mass, anyone think 8 AShM is enough
for a Burke led surface fight ?
"anyone think 8 AShM is enough for a Burke led surface fight "
DeleteOf course, the idea of massing is that you assemble however many ships you need to achieve the requisite firepower. If you need four Burkes, or 10, or 200, that's what you assemble. Or, you conclude that you simply can't effectively mass sufficient firepower with that platform for whatever operation you're contemplating.
"Sometimes you need an antique to fight an antique."
DeleteThat only works if your opponent obliges to limit himself to matching you, e.g., in a fencing competition or a duel. It does NOT work in battle, when any competent enemy will try to outmatch you, just as the US military tries to outmatch its enemies.
Suppose the IJN had access to antiship ballistic missiles and a spy satellite to provide targeting data, for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Do you think the Japanese will limit themselves to using antique battleships to match ADM Oldendorf's? Hell no- at least, not if they're competent.
So why should we limit ourselves to using antiques- assuming we can get the antique to WORK, which is often difficult and/or expensive? If the USN needs battleships, it should design and build new ones- as well as factories to manufacture large caliber guns and ammunition- instead of trying to reactivate an 80-year-old battleship.
Well. As long as we're coming up with Burkes vs Yamashiro anyway, I'll posit one I think equally as likely as 'Bounce of the Armour'.
DeleteBurke comes in undercover of night with Radar. Launches 8 Harpoons into the upper works. Several ton's of HE and unused rocket fuel turn the bridge and upper works into an inferno that burns down to the waterline Bonne Homme Richard style.
" Burkes vs Yamashiro"
DeleteThis is a nonsense idea so I hate to waste much time on it but I hate inaccuracy even more.
The Harpoon has 488 lb warhead so 8 x 488 = 3904 lbs. That's not 'several tons of HE'. That's less than 2 tons. A WWII battleship was built with steel and would not burn the upperworks. In contrast, the BHR superstructure was, I believe, all or mostly aluminum.
I don't know about Japanese battleships but an American Iowa would largely laugh at Harpoons.
"Can a group of Burkes accomplish anything useful? "
ReplyDeleteWhile I always loved the BB SAGs, this might have merit. Not every task force needs to be centerpieced by a CVN. Especially when we consider the Burkes, not the airwing, as the "shooters". An appropriately numbered group of Burkes could, in concert with Air Force recon and anti-air assets and SSGNs, could create significant havoc as well as protect themselves (we hope), in lieu of, or in alternation, with CVBGs. We still need a new, smart, fast, long range ASM though. And, itd be really nice if those new frigates were ASW-centric, so the Burkes can (continue to) focus on the strike missions and group AAW...
-Jjabatie
I think your post is about employment. Battleships, notional at the moment, should NOT be deployed singly. Agreed. Seems to me that's what Combined Arms is all about. After all, you don't (shouldn't-) deploy tanks without supporting Infantry. Because ATGMs. And yeah, yeah I actually agree with COMNAVOPS carriers should defend the Burkes (shooters) and less the other way around. I'm available to accompany COMNAVOPS to the Pentagon to beat multiple Admirals over the head.
ReplyDeleteSo what's a battleship? Because that gets us back to platforms. Versus strategy. IF you're arguing for 16-inch (8s, multiple quadruple 5-inch) guns that's one thing. Which I'm not sure I agree with; because I advocate a Raiding strategy defined by smash-and-grab vs. Naval Gun Fire Support for real-estate acquisition.
OTOH. IF you're arguing for more heavily armored ships I'm onboard. Give me New Jersey class armor plus 300+ VLS tubes and I'm in. I agree with you.
So- Are you arguing for a WW2 battleship or a heavily armored Arsenal Ship (expanded capacity wrt to deployable munitions)? Because this is what I want. Launchers plus armor.
Oh. I also want weps-replinishment at-sea. Boy, is THAT a separate (for COMNAVOPS; I'm not knowledgeable enough) post.
You may have misunderstood part of the post. I was not calling for battleships, at all. That's a separate topic that I've already opined about. This post merely used battleships as an example of massing of naval firepower and to illustrate a few flaws in common thinking. It doesn't matter what type of naval force one has, it has to be massed to be effective. This rules out distributed lethality, among other things.
DeleteThe Burkes are really the poster child for the win-the-war-all-by-itself vein of thinking.
ReplyDeleteI think a good rule of thumb going forward should be that you should never have a helipad for ASW and an AEGIS system on the same ship.
Lutefisk
Wouldn't the massing of Burkes (with all their different radar systems, the AEGIS is different for each ship if I recall correctly and they are all "Black Boxes" [I would also argue we should not be accepting "Black Boxes" for our military and actually test them but that is another story]) cause them to interfere with each other's radar? Thus making them more effective when operating alone?
ReplyDeleteI mean look at the quote below, granted not AEGIS, but may be similar:
Rapier also suffered from problems with the IFF system[23] and suffered from interference with Royal Navy radar.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapier_(missile)#Combat_history
Feel free to correct me if I am wrong.
"interfere with each other's radar"
DeleteNot really. Ships in combat are separated by large distances so that, alone, reduces or eliminates most interference. All Burkes share that same radar. It may be slightly different versions but they're all the same frequency band so that's not an issue. It is rare for multiple ships to all operate their radars at the same time.
I don't know the particulars of the Rapier issue(s) but you're talking about a large powerful ship radar swamping a tiny missile unit. That's not equivalent to ships interfering with each other.
So, no problem that I'm aware of.
RE: the dispersed fleet.
ReplyDeleteAny chance that, if the fabulous network works as the Navy hopes, that it will be possible to achieve massed fires even if the individual shooters are dispersed? Would this make the proposal viable?
I do understand that there might still be a concern on defense, if the individual dispersed ship is attacked by an overwhelming number of missiles. Any way to avoid that?
Is it theoretically possible that the Chinese may sit back and do nothing to hinder a region-wide network or that they may be unable to do anything about it? I suppose it's theoretically possible but nothing I've read suggests it's even remotely likely. We can't keep networks running reliably even outside of combat. Why would we think they'll run in a combat zone under cyber and electronic attacks?
DeleteWe can't track giant cargo ships in relation to our destroyers without running into them. Does it seem likely that we'll be able to successfully track and coordinate the movements, actions, and precise timing of dozens of ships scattered across thousands of miles of ocean?
Operating a region-wide network will require extensive communications both sending and receiving. Does constant communications seem like a good idea in combat?
So, consider all this and then answer your own question. My assessment is ... no chance.
I probably should have mentioned that I do agree with you that it's a big "IF" ("if" the network works). OK, a galaxy sized "IF". And it doesn't seem likely to me either. But it does seem to be what the Navy is planning on.
Delete"But it does seem to be what the Navy is planning on."
DeleteIt is! Of course, Wile E. Coyote always had grand plans but they never quite worked out. Unfortunately, I think Wile E. Coyote's plans have a better chance of success than the Navy.
"Another reason to hammer on the principle of local massing of firepower is the Navy’s ill-conceived distributed lethality concept which envisions ships operating alone – the opposite of massing of firepower. Why is the Navy insistent on pursuing distributed lethality using the LCS which is the polar opposite of a battleship? If battleships have been shown to be unable to successfully operate alone, why do we think an LCS is going to sail blithely around in enemy territory?"
ReplyDelete"Distributed Lethality", according to the original authors, was meant to be a group of ships - a "Hunter Killer SAG" in their article.
They used an ungainly combination of an LCS, a Burke and a Zumwalt in their description of the HK SAG, maybe just as a hook for those surface warfare communities. Doesn't seem like a good combination or the right numbers, but it's still more than just one ship operating alone.
IMHO, the ideal task group structure should still be centered around an aircraft carrying ship, even if it's a CVL or LHA/D. Airpower still provides the lions share of scouting and virtually all missions will require this. Unfortunately the Navy's only option (the 43,000t LHA/D) is still large and expensive and not very numerous.
Personally, I'd like to see us stop building the current America class, and build an LHD based on the LPD-17. It would be about the same size and capability as the Spanish Juan Carlos class LHD. Instead of building two types of expensive amphibious ships (LHA/D and LPD), we could just build these. They would form the centerpiece of SAGs when not used for amphib duties.
Their air wings would be a mix of Marine aircraft, Navy helicopters and UAVs, depending on the role.
"Personally, I'd like to see us stop building the current America class, and build an LHD based on the LPD-17. It would be about the same size and capability as the Spanish Juan Carlos class LHD. Instead of building two types of expensive amphibious ships (LHA/D and LPD), we could just build these. They would form the centerpiece of SAGs when not used for amphib duties."
DeleteI could see where this has merits. Kind of a upscaled CVE from WWII. Having a dedicated UAV carrier with all the requisite tooling, 3d printers, and tech required for this would be an interesting asset. UAV's in the Navy seem to be currently restricted to refueling duties. Someday, folks with stars will wake up and realize that these are so much more capable. I can see a day when the MQ-25 serves as a mothership to get a drone swarm into its operating area for surveillance or a strike package. Or a flight of MQ-25's serves as the strike package itself.
""Distributed Lethality", according to the original authors"
DeleteWhatever it might have been in original form, it has come to mean isolated ships in common Navy usage today. In particular, it has come to mean distributed LCS (and even amphibious ships!) operating as pseudo-PT boats, as I've documented in past posts.
It would be interesting to know if an MQ-25 could fly off of a STOVL LHD like this. I was thinking more along the lines of the GA Mojave with folding wings. It's more compact, much lighter, and has better slow speed capability. Would probably require light weight arrestor gear. Might be useful to have a bit of a catapult too, though it could get by with just STOL.
DeleteQuestion: firepower today is delivered by missiles. If all those missiles arrive on the target at the same time, fired from different ships and aircraft that have been spread apart, is that not the massing of firepower? The warships might not necessarily be massed in the traditional sense, but their missiles are.
DeleteIn the Army, we call this a time on target barrage - multiple dispersed guns, timing their fire missions so that maximum firepower is delivered at the same time. The nice giant artillery parks, rows of tubes all lined up to fire - that doesn't happen in the real world: we're all scattered precisely so they can't kill us all at one stroke. Our tubes aren't physically massed, but our firepower is.
"is that not the massing of firepower?"
DeleteYes, it is. Absolutely! And that's what we're talking about - or, at least, one variation of it. Now, the drawback to dispersal of the ships is that they become individually weak and indefensible if detected whereas physically massing provides greater defensive capabilities. Also, the degree of communications required to coordinate a widely dispersed fleet of ships is extensive and would reveal positions (EMCON? what's that!).
Massing Burkes enables decisive offensive operations under emissions control. The US Navy fired 285 Tomahawk missiles from surface ships during the Gulf war. A group of ten or a dozen destroyers could carry this number while still retaining significant anti-air and anti-submarine weapon capacity. This strike force could spring several hundred miles without radiating in ten or twelve hours. The ships would likely communicate using signal lamps.
ReplyDeleteMassing, as opposed to dispersing, gives this force three benefits. First, it allows a synchronized launch which has a chance of coming as a tactical surprise. Not a certainty of surprise, but the possibility is worthwhile. Second, it provides redundancy. In the event a ship cannot complete its mission the massed force can adjust, although doing so may be slower than desired. Third, it provides mutual protection in the event the force is discovered by an enemy in spite of its efforts at stealth. A single ship, however well armed, is unlikely to survive once discovered within air attack range of an modern enemy.
This group would need assistance from screening forces. One or more attack submarines would be invaluable, as I doubt effective ASW work can happen from surface ships at these speeds. Support from AWACs and/or a sweep by friendly fighters to clear hostile maritime patrol aircraft would reduce the risk of detection and could give crucial warning that the destroyer force has been detected. A force this size might still choose to press the attack even if spotted.
The dispersed, networked firepower, attempt at this greatly increases the possibility of a chance detection while dramatically reducing the defense available to any individual destroyer. The dispersed force must also either communicate using radios or fire based only on pre-arranged instructions. Massing is superior for this kind of strike.
Doesn’t this fly in the face of the independent cruiser idea?
ReplyDeleteNo.
Deletethere seems to be a lack of different types of ships in this day and age. there used to be battleships, cruisers, battle cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and an assortment of auxiliaries.
ReplyDeletetoday we seem to have destroyers and a few frigates. Does this mean were missing capability and capacity of different mission types and functions?
We've got $2B Aegis Burkes chasing pirate skiffs so ...
DeleteHalfway through Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition, by Wayne Hughes and Robert Girrier, there is this paragraph:
ReplyDelete"Ground forces disperse over the battlefield in clusters, not evenly. A platoon of men is a small cluster of force, a tank is a big one. Ships at sea are still bigger clusters of force, whether measured in firepower, manpower, or dollar-value. The smallest unit that can be dispersed is a ship. When dispersion is an important means of defense, small ships and distributed firepower are an important advantage. Much of the modern debate over the size of warships concerns the comparative merits of dispersal in small ships, used to complicate enemy targeting, and of concentration of force in large ships to fight off the enemy. The Pacific carrier wars provided some insight that illuminated the problem. It was defensive fighting power that decided whether a force should mass or disperse. Today if fleets comprise large ships with strong defenses, commanders mass them and fight the enemy off. If they have small ships or weak defenses they must disperse. In either case they are buying time to carry out their mission, which is not to steam around waiting to be sunk. If the defense cannot buy time for the offense to perform, then the fleet ought to be somewhere else."
Admittedly, the text above is about defense, not offense. Also, the authors are not advocating a fleet of huge, expensive warships. I did a search on "distributed lethality" (mine is a Kindle book) and the phrase does not appear.
Be aware that there are some serious problems with Hughes' theories. I've talked about them in many past posts and comments. His work should be considered an introductory effort rather than an advanced, useful effort. For example, his main theory of salvos ignores almost all reality such as aerial forces, surveillance, travel time, logistics, etc. It is purely about salvo exchange. As such, it is an interesting introduction but not a useful work. For what it's worth, I disagree with almost everything he concludes.
DeleteThat said, it's well worth reading as it does provide an introductory vision to naval warfare which one can then move on from to acquire useful insight.
Thanks for the info.
DeleteFor a bit more on Hughes, see "Undisputed and Unaccepted"
DeleteThank you again.
DeleteI wonder if Hughes is influenced by the late Admiral Arthur Cebrowski's Streetfighter concept. I remember reading about a simulated battle in which the Streetfighters inflicted grief on the enemy, who was reluctant to take a Streetfighter out with a torpedo lest doing so reveal the submarine's position. I have tried a few times, but never was able to figure out how the Streetfighters were armed. I once saw an artist's conception of something looking like the Lockheed Sea Shadow armed with a Gatling gun, but I don't know how much engineering went behind the drawing. It was a cool picture, but maybe it was just meant to look good. The most detailed description I've ever found about the Streetfighter fleet is in this 10-year-old blog post (some of the links are broken). To me, it is a bunch of different craft for different missions. The Ambassador Mk III missile boats aren't mentioned here, but I do like the mention of Visby- and Sa'ar 5-class corvettes.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/streetfighter-2010-new-navy-fighting.html
"this 10-year-old blog post"
DeleteThe article you're referencing is about the 'New Navy Fighting Machine' which is a fleet structure derived, somewhat, from the Streetfighter concept. Look in my blog archives keywords list for the phrase, 'New Navy Fighting Machine' and you'll find a few posts on the subject.
One of the overarching themes in any of the Streetfighter / NNFM / littoral warfare concepts is an emphasis on peacetime or gray zone actions and an abandonment of peer war capabilities. Since peer wars are, by definition, existential threats to our national survival, it should be obvious that the MAIN purpose of our Navy is to fight and win existential, peer wars (we're talking about China, of course). Peacetime, littoral warfare, anti-terrorism activities are a SUBSET of the peer war force structure. Thus, any force structure that begins with an emphasis on the low end of combat is, by definition, wrong. Re-read the article you cited with this realization in mind and see what you think. Let me know.
"I remember reading about a simulated battle in which the Streetfighters inflicted grief on the enemy,"
DeleteYou need to be very, very careful about accepting the results of any wargame unless you thoroughly understand the conditions of the game. I can get a fleet of canoes to defeat a carrier group in a wargame if I set the conditions up just right. That doesn't mean it can happen in any remotely realistic scenario.
Thank you once again, because searching on "New Navy Fighting Machine" yielded some specifics that always eluded me.
DeleteAnd regarding Streetfighter /NNFM / littoral warfare, I've read that reorienting the Army to fight insurgents and terrorists will lead us unprepared if, heaven forbid, we get into a major conflict with a peer nation (near-peer seems to be the preferred term). It makes perfect sense that reorienting the Navy for anti-piracy will have the same effect.
I also recognize that you want smaller weapon systems such as the Ambassador Mk III and inexpensive ASW corvettes as well as a highly capable independent cruiser. A toolbox doesn't have just one wrench.
I also don't know how reliable the communication systems for these proposed networks are. I don't know how susceptible they are to jamming, either.
Delete"I also don't know how reliable the communication systems for these proposed networks are."
DeleteAnd that is the million dollar question! The Navy refused to test their systems realistically so we just don't know.
Consider the reliability of your personal network. If it's anything like mine, it's far from robust and reliable and that's without anyone trying to incapacitate it. When China starts jamming, cyber-attacking, hacking, spoofing, etc., how reliable do you think our networks will be? In combat, 80% or 95% is not good enough. Only 100% is acceptable. Do you think we can operate a contested network with 100% reliability?
"The ideal composition of a fast-carrier task force is four carriers, six to eight support vessels and not less than 18 destroyers, preferably 24. More than four carriers in a task group cannot be advantageously used due to the amount of air room required. Less than four carriers requires an uneconomical use of support ships and screening vessels." - Admiral Marc Mitscher
ReplyDeleteAnother example of local massing of firepower
#ComNavOps, do you know when was the last time US Navy did this ?
I have another question though off topic, during WW2, how where the submarines operated?
DeleteWere they assigned to particular Task force or they were assigned to a particular area and then they coordinated with whatever surface ships were deployed for mission in that area ?
"when was the last time US Navy did this ?"
DeleteWe massed carriers during the Cold War. Beyond that, we haven't really had a combat scenario requiring massing since WWII. Perhaps I should rephrase that. We haven't had a scenario we were willing to pursue since WWII. For example, there has been more than enough reason to mass some naval firepower to obliterate Iran's terrorist 'naval' forces but we've lacked the will to do so.
"Were they assigned to particular Task force"
DeleteYou need to read up on submarine tactics and operations. As a general statement, submarines do not operate in conjuction with surface ships due to the problems with identification and friendly fire. In WWII, submarines were assigned a patrol area that no other sub or surface ship would enter. This eliminated the identification and friendly fire concerns and the sub was free to engage anything it detected.
There are, of course, exceptions.
This will sound strange, but you can see this sort of thing in computer games, where you build up naval ships, or space ships, and have fleet battles. Unless the target is an unarmed civilian target, large fleet numbers are the way to go.
ReplyDeleteGiven how many games are out there, to demonstrate this, there really isn't much to dispute.
Another thing to learn from such games is concentrating firepower on 1 target at a time, preferably the strongest target. Once it goes, the rest will fall. This also reduces your losses, over the entire battle.
And another thing you can , which CNO touched on a while back- naval wars are not continuous 24/7/365 battles. You build up forces, meet, fight, then retreat/rebuild your forces again, so there's a lull of a few weeks/months.
Andrew