I generally avoid simply repeating information from other sources but I occasionally make an exception for truly amazing works. One such is this link[1] to a brief summary of the numbers and causes of US submarine losses in WWII. The Navy lost 52 submarines, almost all of them in the Pacific. Amazingly, only one was lost in the open ocean of the central Pacific. The rest were lost near land.
Below is a map showing the location of each loss.
Please follow the link and check out the site. You’ll find it fascinating and informative.
Here’s a few open questions you might want to ponder or comment on:
- What does this suggest about future submarine actions against the Chinese?
- What does this suggest about likely operating areas in future actions?
- What does this suggest about mid-ocean enemy submarine threats?
- What does this suggest about submarine support and basing requirements?
- What does this suggest about where our ASW resources should go in a war with China and how will we support and protect those resources?
- What does this suggest about the number of submarines we’ll need to prosecute a war relative to the number of submarines we have or are capable of building (2 per year)?
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[1]http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/SubLosses/SS_losses-Intro.html
Most of the East China Sea is shallow, with almost three-fourths of it being less than 200 metres (660 ft) deep as is a large southern area of the South China Sea is rather shallow - under 100m (328 feet) in depth.
ReplyDeleteWould not this suggest smaller displacement submarines than the ~10,000t Virginia Blk V and the planned SSN(X) even larger in displacement more suited to operating in the South and East China seas?
"Would not this suggest smaller displacement submarines"
DeleteThat's an intriguing question. Consider this illustrative example ... a sub that was one foot shorter would, technically, be smaller. However, would that offer any operational advantage? I think we'd all say, no, the difference in size is too small to offer any significant advantage. So, would a sub like an SSK, say the Janpanes Soryu class at 275 ft long, offer an operational advantage over the US Virginia class at 377 ft long? In other words, would a 102 less feet make a sub more effective? Given that the area of the South China Sea is 1.35 million square miles and the East China Sea is 300,000 square miles, will 102 ft make a signnificant operational difference? I don't know.
I suspect that other factors such as submerged endurance, speed, quietness, etc. would be more important than a hundred feet of length.
What are your thoughts? Do you see a significant advantage conveyed by a hundred less feet?
Would note that with the insertion of the mid-hull plug of the VPM extends length of the Virginia Blk Vs to 460 feet. If were to say the area of the submarine is the more important metric than length (if you measure by the crude metric of area of cylinder based on the submarines length and beam) the Blk V is approximately twice the area size of the newest 3.000t IJN SSKs Taigei (Great Whale) class,.
DeleteAs the newer generations submarines much quieter understand passive sonars becoming less effective and active sonar coming more to the fore eg SURTASSS -LFA, to counter high powered active sonars one way is to change shape of hull from cylinder to diamond shape, with chine running along the hull along hull so directing sonar reflections go off at an angle and not back to hunting sonar array, current tech is for the submarines is to fit anechoic tiles, the anechoic tiles job is to nullify the powerful sonar ping sound waves that hit the hull, reducing the submarine's sonar reflections, the larger the target the more chance of stronger returns, though its said successful R&D of anechoic tiles hold out the promise of much better performance in nullifying any sonar returns, could see the point where the active sonar array gets a zero return, but the larger the submarine eg, 10,000t plus of the future SSN(X) etc though have seen mentioned the bigger will be the " black hole" shown on the active sonar, suggesting bigger stealthy submarines might not be better?
Wouldn't ASW's ability to functional operate within the region also be something to consider?
ReplyDeleteAnti-sub aircraft and helicopters would be operating - for the most part - under very contested air. Definitely would be easy prey to counter air operations and, of course, blanket SAMs.
Ships conducting ASW operations would also be in very contested waters as well.
I think we should look at the overall operational situation and not just what a sub should displace or what its performance should be. We might be surprised that a nuke sub might be able to survive within the region for quite some time. Or...maybe not.
You've raised the question ... now offer your thoughts on an answer!
DeleteWell, I think the TO that we're focusing on would be jammed packed with all sorts of assets doing what they were designed to do. Not to mention that you would have numerous navies all slugging it out simultaneously so, IFF would be an issue as well.
DeleteIts very, very hard to speculate given that we're dealing with modern naval assets and weapon systems. We cannot even compare this to the North Atlantic WW2 convoys being attacked by the German wolf packs.
My only conclusion is that there would be extreme attrition on both sides especially of AWS assets. And given that maybe the submarines would be able to survive for longer periods of time.
I was thinking that a game like Cold Waters still cannot effectively simulate that particular scenario and actually feels way too sparse when it comes to overall surface action.
I think that the key takeaway is that the submarines were operating where the ships were. Their primary mission was to interdict Japanese merchant shipping.
ReplyDeleteDuring the Cold War, wasn't our submarines' primary role to shadow Soviet missile boats?
That is a blue-water mission.
What is going to be the primary mission for our submarines in a future conflict, say with China?
Are our current attack submarines optimized for whatever role they will be doing against the Chinese?
I don't know that they aren't, but it seems that our current attack subs evolved from the Cold War mission requirements.
Lutefisk
"What is going to be the primary mission for our submarines in a future conflict, say with China?"
DeleteThat's CONOPS and it's the million dollar question ... for which the Navy currently has no answer, as best I can tell.
"Are our current attack submarines optimized for whatever role they will be doing against the Chinese?"
Since we have no CONOPS, we have no idea whether our subs are appropriate or not.
"I don't know that they aren't, but it seems that our current attack subs evolved from the Cold War mission requirements."
Exactly!!!!! You're hitting on all cylinders today! We're continuing to build evolved versions of the Cold War sub force with no idea whether that's really what's needed for a China War.
What will our subs do in a China war? Will they enter the E/S China Seas? Will they stay outside and establish a blockade/barrier to keep the Chinese bottled inside the first island chain (why would the Chinese want to come out ... but that's another issue)? Will they ...... ? Who knows? Clearly not the Navy!
Really great comment/questions. Now, offer your thoughts on some answers!
"I think that the key takeaway is that the submarines were operating where the ships were. Their primary mission was to interdict Japanese merchant shipping."
DeleteYes, our subs went where the Japanese shipping was with the strategy of cutting off Japan's imports of raw materials since Japan was an island nation.
Will we attempt the same with China? China is not an island nation although it is dependent on sea-borne imports to a significant degree. If we can't seriously hurt China's imports and raw material situation, is it worth the effort and losses to attempt an at-sea submarine blockade?
It would also seem that a far more effective blockade of China's shipping could be achieved by cutting off shipping at the point(s) of departure rather than in the open seas. China does not have that many friendly trade partners.
In previous post we discussed that most shipping would stop. What would there be for subs to target if that was the case?? If the PLAN doesn't come out hold the USN at arms length, and stays in home waters under protected airspace, there won't be many naval targets either, except those involved in the (assumed) Taiwan invasion. So the typical sub role of ship hunting with torps might not really exist, and missile strikes will be their only use. The exception being sub hunting and surface fleet protection... Hmmm...
Delete"In previous post we discussed that most shipping would stop."
DeleteThat's a reference to non-belligerent shipping. China would, of course, attempt to maintain its shipments and the US would attempt to cut them off.
"If the PLAN doesn't come out hold the USN at arms length, and stays in home waters under protected airspace"
This is the German 'fleet in being' strategy which we've shown to be a failed concept. If China were to do this, this would be a win for the US as it would allow the US to operate freely outside the first island chain, picking and choosing where and when to strike.
"...offer your thoughts on some answers!"
DeleteSure, the tough part. I thought we were only supposed to complain. ;)
Well, if I was suddenly tasked with operating our subs in a war with China I'd probably start with this:
What are the enemy's capabilities?
Approximately:
- 6 boomers
- 6 nuclear attack sub
- 50 SSK
- 17 AIP
(At least according to the internet, which is never wrong, of course).
So, reactively, what do I need to do?
I need to have my attack subs acquire and shadow their boomers. This is my highest priority as those missile subs are a legitimate threat to the United States.
The PLAN might keep their missile boats in the South China Sea where they can benefit from protection from their surface ships and air cover. That will make finding them a dangerous necessity for our attack subs.
I would also have a cordon of attack subs around the seas immediately around China (which realistically would be functionally controlled by the Chinese).
The intent would be to try and intercept any of their subs from breaking out into blue water. I would expect their nuke boats and AIP to try to do this.
Proactively I would use my attack boats to strike at the enemy.
The first way I would do this would be to try and interdict oil tankers from the Middle East (and other merchant shipping) crossing the Indian Ocean .
I might not always have the subs make the kill, however. I might use them to spot the tankers and have aircraft or surface assets sink (or seize) them.
All of those missions are probably, more or less, a good fit for the 688/Seawolf/Virginia classes.
But I would also want to run some 'ballsy' missions.
I'd like to have a few attempts to Royal Oak/Scapa Flow the PLAN, striking deep inside the Chinese ASW zone. Maybe cruise missile strikes against high value targets like fuel storage, or up close and personal torpedoing of ships.
My intent would be to shock them and cause them to freak out and pull assets back deeper towards China so they can't use these assets to expand their area of control.
I think that a different type of attack boat might be better suited for these type of missions rather than the big blue water classes we currently have.
I don't know a lot about AIP attack boats, but a smaller boat using that propulsion might be stealthy enough to give the Chinese fits in their own front yard.
Lutefisk
" I thought we were only supposed to complain. ;)"
DeleteSure, but think how much more satisfaction you'll get from providing the solution, too!
"try and interdict oil tankers from the Middle East"
Sure, but it's a lot easier to 'interdict' shipping BEFORE it ships. We know what countries/ports the shipments originate from so why not shut those ports down either diplomatically or militarily? If we do that, we don't have to have subs sailing around looking for them.
"China is not a island nation..."
DeleteI myself think it pretty much is:
“Approximately 4.3 percent of cargo between China and Northern Europe is moved via rail,” Caroline Wu, area manager for Greater China at Damco, said in an October 2018 press release.
6.5% to 7% of all China imports are food. They've done a great job working towards food independence. So, let's look at oil-
72% of Chinese oil imports come through the Malacca straits. 9% overland. ( https://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2013/02/Brutlag_Daniel.pdf )
In 2014, Iranian oil exports to China amounted to about 558,000 b/d (representing 9 percent of China’s oil imports). In 2014, Iranian oil exports to China amounted to about 558,000 b/d (representing 9 percent of China’s oil imports). ( https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/deconstructing-chinas-energy-security-strategy/ )
Those are random facts but illuminating ones, I think.
IF you look at a globe you see quickly we may need to take out a Pakistani port or two. And a pipeline which doesn't currently exist. Seems doable.
None of the countries providing overland routes to China can withstand USAF B-21s interdicting rail depots/pipelines/dams/highways.
CONOPS presumably requires clearing the South China Sea of Chinese submarines so- Have USAF seed ports and waters with Quickstrike (ASW version) mines. Because we don't have enough Virginias to survive the exchange ratio in a straight-up protracted littoral (shallow water) fight. Don't need a sub vs. sub approach.
The CONOP I don't have a answer for is how to easily interdict surface forces attacking Taiwan.
- Prospective SECNAV
"Chinese oil imports"
DeleteIf you're thinking about an oil blockade bringing China to its knees, as so many people do, the question is not what percentage of oil imports comes from what source but, rather, what is the percentage of ADDITIONAL oil China would need over and above its internal sources AFTER WARTIME RATIONING WAS IN EFFECT. Add to that external energy sources that would be imported from places we can't/won't touch due to politics, such as the major - and expanding - Russian pipelines. The answer is that China could last a very long time without needing additional imports.
One might also ask about the US oil situation. We went from being energy independent a short while ago to seriously hurting our energy position now.
"Quickstrike (ASW version) mines"
How do you see those being delivered inside the first island chain without prohibitive losses of the delivery platforms?
Your point on oil is a semi-reasonable one. Researching percentage of oil China imports, for daily use, I see numbers that range from 59% to 73%. So if they can withstand a 60% cut over some extended time, well- Nah. I still think we can bring their manufacturing to a stop.
DeleteRegarding Quickstrike. My original thought was deployment by B-2 and B-21; now that I think about bomb doors opening up I think I was overly optimistic. I'll give you that one.
Except now I'm wondering about range gained by lofting Quickstrikes from B-52s and B-1s from international airspace. Heck, add in the stealth bombers, too. We'd get away with doing that. Probably once. Would take out lots of subs, IMHO.
On your Christmas list, please add 'Stand-off Quickstrike delivery.' Along with new Ticos (Burke superstructure) and a re-engined/glass cockpit/re-radared A-6.
Your original post, if I read it right, was 'What can we learn from WW2?' And it's not clear to me a WW2-op is the way to go. We won't be fighting over island real-estate. We won't be fighting to land an invasion force on the mainland. Seems to me, still, we have the luxury of strangling them from afar a la Mahan. China won't go outside the first island chain. And we won't go past the first island chain. But neither will anybody else. The equation is far more complicated on the Chinese side if we choose not to get in to a SC Sea knife fight.
Nope. I still don't know how to handle Taiwan.
As an aside, I'd like to point out to your entire readership the graphic at https://twitter.com/LouisMVezian/status/1605240888774787073/photo/1 which depicts ranges, and range densities, for missiles fired from the Chinese mainland. Fascinating.
- Prospective SECNAV
I see it this way:
ReplyDeleteNot much has changed sinche WW2, apart from nuclear powered boats most conventional submarines have low silent transit speeds and limited endurance. Back in the day submarines transited mostly on the surface and at night at higher speed, today all movements are done under the surface and aside from nuclear powered vessel at relatively low speeds. Sensors, weapons and capabilities have grown exponentionally but are still somewhat limited by the platforms.
The losses of german subs during WW2 are interesting (https://uboat.net/fates/losses/ -> select a year an you obtain a clickable map with all losses), while the majority of losses is attributed to ships, airplanes are not far behind. As the air cover gap closed more and more, the number of losses to aircraft in open waters grew. As escorts became more and more capable, the number of submarine losses in open waters grew.
Today we have all kinds of real time or near real time capabilities (image, data, voice and so on) which were not available in during the war, which can be game changers (but only if you happen to have forces positioned in the right place to attack the enemy effectively).In the end geography hasn't changed, it's still the same.
What has changed is that the number of avalable merchant vessels which the US and allies can really use during wartime to support a pacific war, they are prime targets and the numbers are substandard. Convoys are bad, but still the best option to protect merchant shipping. To protect convoys you need escorts.
The chinese have built a number of nuclear powered, but the number is relatively limited. Chinese SSK are still the largest potential threat and they will be used on and around choke points, as due to their limitations (especially speed) they can't relocate quickly to intercept fleets and convoys. Only in case of a preemtive chinese attack we'll se much of a chinese submarine presence outside the second island chain. In case of war we'll see Wolf Pack tactics with a mixture of torpedoes and missiles.
In some areas around the island chains there could be contested airspaces, but aircrafts, UAVs and helicopters could still represent a valid tool in countering submarines in the larger area. As it stands today no player can effectively contest large protions of airspace, as aside from the US no one has the needed enablers (manly air refuelers), we'll see contested areas mostly around choke points. The chinese at the same time have only a limited number of MPA and antisubmarine helicopters, so the aerial threat to submarines can be considered limited. Those limited forces will probably used around bases and choke points. While there will be losses i think they will mostly come from surface vessels.
I'm still not convinced that submarines are the best weapon to counter submarines. I think that US and it's allies need a larger number of smaller escorts to cover al sorts of missions that emerge during wartime. They should be something along the lines of the chinese Type 054A class or the south korean Daegu class, possibly even simpler.
As I see it, the role of american SSNs will be protecting capital ships (carriers), preemtive attacks, destroying chinese SSBN, hunting chinese capital ships, in depth attacks with cruise missiles (which are highly vulnerable to interception themselves) and raiding merchants inside the first island chain. They will be important, but alone they aren't really changing that much.
There will be losses of all kinds of ships, submarines, planes, helicopters and UAVs on all sides. These losses will be heavy. Today replacing losses is much more difficult than in past wars and the conflict could be a shorter or a longer one, so possibile wartime replacements could probably become online after the end of the conflict.
So as i see it there is a need for a larger number of simple escorts without gold plating (and AEGIS)...
Hunting / Destroying the SSBN will probably lead to the use nuclear weapons.
DeleteBased on what logic or evidence?
DeleteMe again.
DeleteWhen you attack a country with nuclear weapons i think it is wise to be a little cautios. Espe cially when the attack is targeting their nuclear capability.
I have no knowledge about documents or analysis that prove that if you destroy a chinese SSBN nothing bad will happen. Do you have?
In rattlesnake county before i put my hand somewhere where a snake can be i need proof that there is no snake there.
To ask:
"You have proof that there is a snake?"
"No"
"Then i will put my hand there"
Is not a way to live a long life.
With some things you can make a mistake and live to tell the story and with others you make a mistake and it is the end of the story.
So, your approach is to be afraid of everything. I'll stay inside my house and never come out because there could be a snake on my front porch.
DeleteWhat if we hunt/destroy a conventional sub? That might be enough for the Chinese to launch an all out nuclear attack. We have no proof one way or the other so we'd better be safe and not do that.
What if we support Taiwan. That might provoke the Chinese to launch an all out nuclear strike against us. We have no proof one way or the other so we'd better be safe and not do that.
The Chinese are constantly telling us to leave the E/S China Seas and the western Pacific. What if they get tired of us ignoring them and decide to launch a nuclear strike? We have no proof one way or the other so we'd better be safe and retreat to our own west coast.
Caution/fear is a good thing if not taken to the point where it paralyzes you.
China or Russia, on the other hand, don't seem to have the slightest fear, whatsoever. They invade countries, violate territorial waters, annex territory, build illegal islands, seize US military assets, etc. and do not have the slightest fear of nuclear retaliation from the US. Why is it only the US that you think should be cautious/paralyzed?
Do you really think that losing an SSBN in the middle of a war where assets on both sides are being destroyed right and left will trigger a nuclear strike - knowing that China would be obliterated in response? Do you really think the Chinese dictator will sign his own death warrant by initiating a nuclear strike over a sunken sub? Simple logic would suggest not. Simple logic suggests you've allowed your fear to paralyze you.
I believe the argument being made is that attacking Chinese SSBNs is attacking their nuclear forces. This then forces the "use it or lose it" problem the Chinese: Either they stay their hand and their nuclear forces are lost to American attack, or they use their nuclear arsenal before they lose it - and then the nuclear retaliation issue comes into question.
DeleteOn the other hand, it seems to be an article of faith that China is more willing to absorb civilian casualties than America is?
"use it or lose it" problem"
DeleteThere might be some validity to that if SSBNs were the only nuclear delivery system the Chinese had. However, the SSBSs make up only a very small part of the Chinese nuclear force.
While sinking a strategic asset is serious, and could be seen as an "escalation" (thats meaningless if youre already at war. The word is often thrown about and misused. Look to reporting about Ukraine and youll hear about lots of "escalations", its absurd. But i digress...). Frankly if I was SubPac Id make Chinese SSBNs a #1 priority target, if allowed to do so. But I dont believe that losing one or even a few is a tripwire to a nuclear exchange. At least for now, the disparity in weapons is more than enough reason not to. To be fair, receiving 300-350 Chinese warheads isnt somthing you can survive, or "win", even if we launch twice as many in return. But yes, Id still go after the SSBNs, and do it from behind the shield known as MAD. I think it still works...
Delete"There might be some validity to that if SSBNs were the only nuclear delivery system the Chinese had. However, the SSBSs make up only a very small part of the Chinese nuclear force."
DeleteIt depends on how the Chinese view their SSBN force. Consider America: the US would regard any threat upon the its SSBN force with concern, because the SSBNs are the second strike capability; even if all the USAF's bombers and ICBMs are wiped out, the remaining SSBN force can survive to deliver a retaliation strike.
The point of having SSBNs is that you have a survivable second strike that can ride out the first exchange of warheads - your ICBM fields and strategic bomber bases have already been pre-targeted with ICBMs assigned to them, because these are static known targets, as opposed to SSBNs hiding in the ocean. If we go after their SSBNs first, it implies that we're going to completely remove their second strike capability, which then risks forcing the PRC leadership into the use it or lose it problem.
I feel it should be pointed that while America BEHAVES as though it follows No First Use, formal American policy allows for America to shoot first with nukes. To the duplicitous Chicoms who think everyone is like them, that's the sort of rules lawyering that might lead them to conclude that attacking their SSBNs is a prelude to a devastating first strike by America.
Are you seriously suggesting that SSBNs are immune from attack by an enemy because they're part of an enemy's nuclear force????
DeleteAre you suggesting that we should allow enemy SSBNs to freely come and go, as they please?
What if an enemy SSBN decides to sail up to our fleet and start launching torpedoes. Are you suggesting that we take no action?
You're putting words in my mouth. All I'm saying is that attempts to deliberately hunt Chinese SSBNs, the survivable second strike retaliation force, may be interpreted by the Chinese as an attempt to eliminate their nuclear arsenal from the get-go so that America can freely attack with nuclear weapons, without fear of nuclear retaliation.
DeleteLet's look at their arsenals. We know where their ICBM fields and airbases are. They know where our ICBM fields and airbases are. They also know that we have more ICBMs than they do, and that if we shoot first, we stand a good chance of taking out their landborne ICBM force. Sure, they've got a fleet of truck MRBMs on TELs, but that only lets them reach out to Japan and Diego Garcia at max range from the coast - in order to countervalue us by hitting our cities in a retaliation strike, they need their SSBNs to do that.
"What if an enemy SSBN decides to sail up to our fleet and start launching torpedoes. Are you suggesting that we take no action?"
You're deliberately contriving a scenario. SSBNs are not used for fleet attack, they conduct deterrence patrols far away from fleet actions, awaiting orders to launch. We didn't train our SSBNs to act tactically, the Russians didn't train their SSBNs to act tactically, why are you thinking that the Chinese are going to do things differently?
Now, note that I said this is a potentiality if we start sinking their SSBNs from the get go. What we can do instead is what we did with the Soviets: find their SSBNs, and have an SSN surveiling it, ready to plant four Mk48s into the boomer as soon as it goes to launch depth and starts launching missiles, because it's declaring itself a valid target by its actions.
The same way an SSBN attacking a fleet with torpedoes is declaring itself hostile and a valid target, but that is a stupid action to take, and we should never ascribe stupidity to our adversaries - that way leads to complacency.
I hope I've explained my position in a way that you can better understand now.
The Soviets historically, were not entirely quite as concerned about this use it or lose it dilemna, because their arsenal had parity with us in terms of warheads, and they had their SSBN bastions where they'd hide their SSBNs, keeping them for countervalue second strikes. They were confident in being able to find and kill any of our SSNs that got into the bastions, before we could kill their boomers.
Delete(Given how regularly we penetrated their bastions, this might have been unfounded confidence.)
Anyhow, they had enough ICBMs and decoy silos that they were confident enough of their ICBM force could survive, even if we shot first. That's not the same calculus with China tho - we massively outnumber them in warheads and missiles, and we have a good chance of taking out their land-leg in a first strike. An imbalance like that can lead to bad decisions on their part.
"interpreted by the Chinese as an attempt to eliminate their nuclear arsenal "
DeleteDon't you think that would be a most wise objective for any enemy? To eliminate their enemy's nuclear capability, if they can?
What sane country would fight an all-out war but make it an objective to NOT eliminate their enemy's nuclear capability, if the opportunity presents itself? Similarly, what sane country would not understand that their enemy would attempt to do exactly that?
Let's arrest the murderer but let's let him keep his gun!
"You're deliberately contriving a scenario."
DeleteYes. I'm contriving a scenario that is an absolute certainty if we make it known that we consider SSBNs off limits. The Chinese would be idiots not to take advantage of that and do exactly what I described. Why, an SSBN could, literally, sail unmolested into a US harbor and fling torpedoes around, if it wanted, since it would be off limits to attack.
"SSBNs are not used for fleet attack"
BECAUSE THEY'D BE SUNK!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Do you really not grasp that?
"I hope I've explained my position in a way that you can better understand now."
Yep, you've made your position crystal clear. I'll leave it to readers to assess the wisdom of it.
"Yes. I'm contriving a scenario that is an absolute certainty if we make it known that we consider SSBNs off limits."
DeleteI didn't say that SSBNs were off limits. Reread again what I suggested:
"What we can do instead is what we did with the Soviets: find their SSBNs, and have an SSN surveiling it, ready to plant four Mk48s into the boomer as soon as it goes to launch depth and starts launching missiles, because it's declaring itself a valid target by its actions."
There is a difference between not shooting first, and letting the adversary act with impunity. Plus, it makes for better PR: "Ladies and Gentlemen, at this time, the Chinese boomer proceeded to launch depth. The sound you are hearing now is them flooding their tubes and opening their launch doors. You can hear and count all these doors being opened, a clear sign they are about to attack. At which point, our SSN sunk the boomer. This was repeated for every single SSBN the ChiCom navy put to sea."
It's a lot easier to claim self defense if the murderer pulls his gun out first.
"What sane country would fight an all-out war but make it an objective to NOT eliminate their enemy's nuclear capability, if the opportunity presents itself? Similarly, what sane country would not understand that their enemy would attempt to do exactly that?"
A country that is trying to keep the war as a limited war, not escalate it into an existential war. The use of nuclear weapons escalates a conflict from a limited confict which can be concluded with a negotiated settlement where terms are dictated, into a fight to the death.
Attacking China's ICBM fields, attacking the Three Gorges dam, attacking their SSBNs - this increases the risk that they view the conflict as an existential conflict and use their nuclear arsenal before they lose it. Can we afford to trade America's biggest cities for a total Chinese defeat? (I think we can, it would be extremely painful, but we could recover. I don't think the American people agree with me.)
But what about the Cold War, you ask? From the start, we had already decided that the Cold War would be an existential conflict between us and the Soviets. It was going to end with either one of us dead. We behaved with that posture, we presented that messaging to the American people, we got the buy in to prosecute an existential war that was gonna end with the complete destruction of the Soviet state. We don't have that same buy in today.
But looking back at your question, I think I see where our disconnect lies. You've already decided that this conflict is going to be an existential conflict. In that case, I think we shouldn't pussyfoot around with these fleet actions. That's just pointlessly drawing things out. If this is an existential war, as opposed to a limited war, then nukes are on the table and we should use them. In which case, yes, IF WE'RE GOING TO USE OUR NUKES, let's take out the PLA's SSBNs so that we can act freely without fear of nuclear retaliation from China.
But I don't think we will use nukes. I think we're going to try fight this war as a limited conventional war. My read of the administration and Pentagon and public statements have lead me to believe that national leadership does not view a conflict with China as an existential war, the way we prepared for the Cold War to go hot. They seem to think any potential war with China as a limited war, and they can keep it a limited war without escalating to an existential war where the nukes are flying.
So that's where our disconnect is: you're talking about an existential war from the start; I'm talking from the perspective of a limited war, because that how I see our leadership trying to fight a future conflict with China.
I think we'll find out for sure, in the next three decades, who's read the room correctly. At least I won't be around to see it.
"They also know that we have more ICBMs than they do, and that if we shoot first, we stand a good chance of taking out their landborne ICBM force"
DeleteThe problem with that idea is that as soon as our launches are detected, they launch. Im assuming they have that detection capability. I dont think anyone is going to wait out a strike, and then retaliate with whatever is left. Yes, the seaborne leg is the most survivable, and it ensures a large and credible response, but its still not the only response available, to either side...
"I dont think anyone is going to wait out a strike, and then retaliate with whatever is left."
DeleteIf we were playing purely with nukes, I'd agree, but it seems the Chinese are now banking that we'll take a wait and see approach to their massed ASBM salvoes that they'll use to attrit our ships at port and crater our airbases.
Of course, the problem is that purely based on trajectory, an ASBM strike looks a lot like a MRBM strike going after counterforce targets...
The role of subs in a WestPac conflict is a complex issue. Its hard to pin down their utility without having the enemys objectives spelled out, as well as our goals and victory conditions being defined. We usually assume the conflict centers around the invasion/defense of Taiwan. If thats the scenario, I dont see it taking more than a few months(weeks??) to reach a conclusion (the invasion will either succeed, or not, and after that, we are left with a general US vs China war.) In that scenario, any kind of blockade will have minimal effect, and the focus will be on defeating the invasion and killing as many Chinese naval assets as possible to allow US units to move as close as possible. Thats certainly an SSGN/SSN operation. But once the invasion has succeeded or failed, then what are the next set of goals??
ReplyDeleteShallow water (Littoral) submarine operations could be facilitated by using smaller submarines as stated before. Looking at the venerable NR-1:
ReplyDeletePrinciple Characteristics
Length overall 145 ft 9-7/16 in. (44.4 m)
Pressure hull length 96 ft 1 in. (29.3 m)
Diameter 12 ft 6 in. (3.8 m)
Maximum beam (at stern stabilizers) 15 ft 10 in (4.8 m)
Maximum navigational draft 15 ft 1 in. (4.6 m)
BOX keel depth (below base-line) 4 ft O in. (1.2 m)
Design operating depth 2375 ft (724 m)
Displacement submerged 366 long tons, 409.92 short tons
Speed, surfaced/submerged 4.5/3.5 knots
Mean Draft 15 ft 3/4 in. (4.6 m)
Endurance 210 man-days (nominal)
330 man-days (maximum)
(Source: seawifs.gsfc.nasa.gov)
Instead of a nuclear reactor, AIP could be used in this case. To minimize "wear and tear" on both crew and vessel, this "midget" submarine can fit into the well decks of the San Antonio LPD's (well deck is 170 x 50 feet), Wasp-class LHD's (well deck- 267 x 28 Feet), the Flight I LHA's of the America-class, LHA-8 and on, will have the well deck added back. I haven't found those well deck dimension yet, but they would have to be closer to those of the Wasp-class.
Good use of the well decks.
The shallow depths in the East and South China Sea, like the Sea of Japan in WW2 sounds like a sub would be "a fish in a barrel" once ASW found it, regardless of size.
ReplyDeleteThere is nothing to support that contention and much to dispute it. Every exercise involving subs, whether SSK or SSN, has demonstrated the difficulty in trying to fix and kill submarines, regardless of external conditions (water depth, for example). What evidence leads you to believe subs would be at a disadvantage?
DeleteBear in mind that much of the E/S China Seas has depths greater than 1000 m. While it certainly has shallow areas near land, it is considered 'shallow' only relative to the open ocean. Much/most of It is still quite deep.
The navy lost a few subs in WW2 due to mines. Sonar on our modern subs should be able to detect these right ?, but then again one of our subs scraped a sea mount recently. Mines have evolved into sophisticated weapons that wait.
ReplyDeleteA mine sensor would be hard-pressed to detect a sub and trigger. If it were that easy, every surface ship would have a mine sensor as its primary ASW sensor! The use of mines by the enemy would equally preclude the enemy's forces from operating in the area - arguably, a 'win' for us as it would restrict enemy options more than ours.
DeleteThere is the possibility that a modern sub could blunder into a defensive mine field ?
DeleteThere is one message: Take the fight to the enemy! Shut down all their ports and stop all their merchant ships.
ReplyDeleteIn the same vein, we should also expect Chinese subs lurking up and down both of our coasts, and on the hunt all through the Carribean.
Readers seem to be confused about how effective submarine warfare in the WW2 Pacific really was. The Japanese plan was to use subs as anti-warship weapons and fleet adjuncts. They were NOT very effective at this as it was very difficult for them to find warships to attack with only a few high-profile victories. The US plan was to use subs as unrestricted civilian ship commerce raiders. The US was incredibly ineffective at this as well for the same reasons until late in the war. It was ONLY when the Japanese ordered their merchant ships to TRANSMIT THEIR LOCATIONS at least DAILY (on penalty of court martial) on frequencies that the US COULD MONITOR did commerce raiding become successful. (Commerce raiding is MUCH MUCH easier when the target is telling you his location and speed all the time than when you actually have to FIND HIM). In this ComNavOps topic, readers seem to believe that modern ACTIVE SONAR and "our" torpedo technology has solved the "finding the enemy warships in open sea" problem (as maybe they won't counter attack with their ACTIVE SONAR and ASW technology when they detect us?) As far as using nuclear subs for commerce raiding, they seem to believe that the merchants WILL CONTINUE TO broadcast their locations, courses, and speeds like the Japanese did in WW2. If the merchants do NOT do this, however, commerce riding might be much more difficult and minimally effective -- as it was early in WW2.
ReplyDeleteThere is a degree of truth to your comment but you leave out a LOT of additional explanation. For example, we began the war with only 56 subs and 12 of those were the obsolete S-boats so, effectively, we had only 44 subs. By 1-Jan-1944, we had around 100 fleet boats so, naturally, we would have more success in 1944-45 simply due to numbers of available subs.
DeleteSimilarly, the lack of success in 1941-2 was due far more to torpedo problems and commander's hesitancy from peacetime training than lack of intel on enemy ship locations.
Here's an incredibly brief summary, by year, of relevant performance and factors (link below):
1941-42
Effectiveness improved as 1942 progressed and the torpedo and command deficiencies began to be addressed. By the year’s end, U.S. submarines had mounted approximately 350 war patrols, sinking about 180 Japanese merchant vessels of 725,000 tons. That's 2,071 tons per patrol, on average.
1943
This year saw major enhancements to the submarine campaign. In the spring, Allied codebreakers fully mastered Japanese merchant ship codes, yielding critical aid to U.S. submariners. And by September, the defects in the Mark XIV torpedo were largely cured.
The raw figures for 1943 show 350 patrols, almost the same amount as for the 13 prior months, but now accounting for about 335 Japanese merchant ships totaling approximately 1.5 million tons. That's an average of 4285 tons per patrol.
1944
On January 1, 1944, the central and southwest Pacific submarine commands numbered almost 100 excellent fleet boats. Well-seasoned, aggressive commanders and crews comprising mostly patrol veterans exploited new and superior radar and sound sensors and effective torpedoes. Codebreaking, much of it done by now highly proficient women, showered the patrolling submarines with intelligence that set up fatal rendezvous with targets,
In about 520 war patrols in 1944, 603 Japanese merchant ships, totaling about 2.7 million tons, fell victim to American submarines. That's an average of 5,192 tons per patrol.
1945
U.S. submarines sunk only 156 vessels in 1945. The immense destruction of Japanese shipping and warships in 1944 markedly reduced the number of potential targets for U.S. submarines. No tonnage available.
Here's a link to the source:
https://www.historynet.com/american-subs-were-a-far-more-lethal-force-in-the-pacific-war-than-previously-known/
So, you can see that many factors, in addition to code-breaking, contributed to increased submarine success in the later years of the war. The intel played a role, certainly, but factors such as improved torpedoes, doubled numbers of fleet subs, doubled numbers of patrols, radar, better sound sensors, enhanced command aggressiveness, etc. were major factors in the submarine success.
I would also note that, as the war progressed, Japanese ASW forces were continually reduced via combat attrition allowing the US subs to operate more aggressively.
Subs capabilities and "reach" have grown a lot since WWII. But somthing to note is that US subs sank somewhere around 5M tons of shipping. We lost dozens of subs, and thousands of sailors doing it. Aerial deployed mines sank almost half that tonnage figure in roughly the last 6 months of the war. A handful of planes were lost, and the mining campaign accounted for less than 10 percent of the AAF sorties at the time.
DeleteObviously an aerial mining campaign off the Chinese coast isnt an easy option for lots of reasons, and technology has changed the ocean battlefield, but it still brings into question why mining isnt being given more attention as an offensive tactic. Mine laying and sweeping are often labeled "unsexy" compared to other systems. But to me, there isnt much that's "sexier" than a huge list of closed porys and enemy ships sunk for minimal risk and investment!!!
Australia is certain to factor into how we support our ships and submarines in the Pacific. This might be a decade or more away, but if China were to establish a credible base in the Solomons, they could make getting to Austrailia more difficult.
ReplyDelete"Australia is certain to factor into how we support our ships and submarines in the Pacific. This might be a decade or more away, but if China were to establish a credible base in the Solomons, they could make getting to Austrailia more difficult."
DeleteAnd if the USA and its partners establish a credible force in the area, that could make getting to or from the Solomons a very difficult proposition for China. If our objective is to contain China before the first island chain, then they have already breached that in the Solomons. We need to endeavor steadfastly to ensure than 1) their ability to use the Solomons is severely constrained, and 2) they don't do any more like that.
The Soviets had outposts beyond the Iron Curtain--Cuba and Vietnam, both monuments to incredibly stupid USA foreign policy, come quickly to mind. But in Europe NATO held the line for four decades, long enough for Reagan finally to apply the pressure on the Soviet economy that brought the Evil Empire down.
In the linked article it mentioned the Japanese had a superiority complex, however the Chinese (as I understand) has a inferiority complex (they see themselves as victims of colonization) so our losses against China might be higher and our kills less as I do not expect them to be as arrogant as the Imperial Japanese Navy. Thus a more dangerous foe, maybe we should let Australia copy and build some of our high performance nuclear submarines to better replace losses as well as have some closer support areas.
ReplyDeleteAlso, as we have an all-nuclear submarine navy: it would work to our advantage as they do not need to refuel thus taking longer routes (I hope we have smart commanders able to take full advantage of this) thus avoid minefields and choke points (I'm thinking of midnight dashes through shallow areas the Chinese would not think to defend and use the laser below to blind any drone covering those areas
https://futurism.com/the-byte/us-navy-arm-nuclear-submarines-laser-cannons
decoys should take care of any "blind-fired" torpedoes).
By the way it mentioned how pampered our submariners were (and how the pampering increased their performance) and given how hated our military are in some parts of the U.S.A. (traitors!!) do you think it may be wise to have some sheltered R & D facilities just for our military people so they do not get, demoralized during what is supposed to be their R & D time?
Perhaps important to consider changes in technology between 1945 and now.
ReplyDeleteSubmarines.in WW2 were really just torpedo boats that could submerge when needed. Compare that to nukes or AIP boats. Surface exposure and detection opportunities will be far less. .
Submarines in WW2 were equipped with short range, unguided torpedoes. Nearly all modern boats today have wire guided torpedoes and long-range ASCMs. Standoff engagements are far more likely.
"Standoff engagements are far more likely."
DeleteNo, that's unlikely. WWII torpedoes had ranges of 4000-9000 yds (2-5 miles) for the US Mk14 to 24,000-44,000 yds (14-25 miles) for Japanese Long Lance torpedoes. In comparison, the current Mk48 torpedo is credited with a range of 24-31 miles.
Bear in mind that what enables a stand off engagement is the ability to detect, identify, and obtain a firing solution on the target. A submarine's ability to do long range detection, IDENTIFICATION, and obtain an actionable firing solution is quite limited.
For example, passive sonar, under certain favorable conditions can detect a target twenty or fifty or so miles away (convergence zone detection) but that doesn't provide range or identification, just a bearing.
As I've said a million times and, apparently, I'll have to say a million more times, a missile/torpedo with infinite range is useless if your sensor is short range (horizon, essentially).
For example, the Japanese Long Lance torpedo had amazing range but was limited to short range firing due to the inability to 'sense' targets at the max range of the torpedo.
"Oh god."
DeleteYou're welcome to make your points but you'll do so politely or you won't comment.
ComNavOps a happy new year, thanks for your dedication in running your site for another year, much appreciated.
ReplyDeleteI keep thinking we would use the API subs to mind the gaps in the first island chain to contain the Chinese Navy. Stay quiet, little movement and need for speed. Mini version on the GUIK gap. I'm less confident the lawyers/environmentalists would allow us to use them to put a pinch on incoming energy supplies.
ReplyDeletePardon me, and Happy New year, Robinton,
DeleteBut might I ask about API subs? As in what do you mean?
A quick google search got me below (that sells API subs no less):
https://www.diedrichdrill.com/tooling/subs/api-subs/api-subs/
From above:
"We at Diedrich Drill understand the urgency involved when an entire job is stopped for lack of one sub"
I mean yes they seem to be important but I fail to see how those little API subs would "mind the gaps in the first island chain " unless you really bulk order and do like china's land reclamation with islands made up of API subs (which seems wasteful why not use concrete, dirt, rocks, etc.)
I assume Robinton means 'AIP' which is Air Independent Propulsion'.
DeleteHappy new year!!!
ReplyDeleteAnd at least in modern warfare we do not have to worry about circular runs of one of our own torpedoes unlike in World War 2 (at least I hope so, we lost at least two confirmed subs in the Pacific due to circular runs according to article in link, our wire guided torpedoes are not that faulty are they?)