Shipbuilding costs have skyrocketed, generally exceeding the rate of inflation, exceeding all reasonable expectations, and blowing away all historical precedents. The reasons for this cost explosion are many and not always obvious. Unfortunately, the lack of obvious reasons leads to simplistic, sensationalistic explanations among naval observers and, disappointingly, they are largely wrong.
One of the most common complaints/explanations is that the shipbuilding industry, in cahoots with government and corrupt admirals, is rife with fraud and if we could just eliminate the fraud, shipbuilding costs would drop precipitously. While this explanation makes for a compelling and, in a sense, satisfying (because we have an identifiable ‘villain’) story, it is unsupported by any significant body of evidence and fails to stand up to analysis. This is not to say that a degree of corruption and fraud does not exist but it is not responsible for the magnitude of the cost increases we see on every new shipbuilding project.
A far more significant explanation for runaway costs is simple overhead. We’ve previously covered this in depth (see, “Shipbuilding Costs – Impact of Low Volume”) but it warrants some follow up. For those who may not be familiar with the basics of accounting and cost allocation, the following is a brief and grossly simplified explanation of overhead.
A product’s cost is the sum of two components: direct costs and overhead costs.
cost = direct + overhead
Overhead is the cost of business not specifically and directly related to producing a product.
For example, regulatory compliance costs (diversity, gender, environmental, maternity leave, etc.) are necessary costs (are they really?) but they are not directly related to the cost of production. A department of lawyers or accountants provide no direct contribution to production but their cost is indirectly included. Taxes must be paid on land and facilities but they have no direct relation to production. And so on.
Direct costs, on the other hand, include raw materials, cranes, assembly facilities, and labor.
So, again, a product’s cost is the sum of direct costs plus overhead.
cost = direct + overhead
Seems simple enough, right?
The thing is, direct costs are fixed whereas overhead is variable. I know, you think overhead is also fixed but we’re going to demonstrate that it’s not and we’re going to demonstrate how/why that variation impacts shipbuilding cost.
As an illustrative example, let’s pretend there’s an item that has $100 of direct costs to produce, regardless of the time required. Let’s further assume that the overhead costs are $100/yr.
If that item takes us one year to produce then the total cost is
cost = direct + overhead
cost = $100 + ($100 * 1 yr)
cost = $100 + $100
cost = $200
Now, let’s suppose that item takes us two years to produce. The total cost becomes
Cost = direct + overhead
Cost = $100 + ($100 * 2 yr)
Cost = $100 + $200
Cost = $300
Now, let’s suppose that item takes us five years to produce. The total cost becomes
Cost = direct + overhead
Cost = $100 + ($100 * 5 yr)
Cost = $100 + $500
Cost = $600
Wait a minute, how can the costs vary widely if it’s the exact same item with the exact same direct cost? It’s the overhead, of course. More specifically, it’s the time required to complete the item; the longer the time, the more overhead that has to be applied to the item’s final cost.
Now, suppose that the item is a US Navy aircraft carrier that has $10B of direct cost to produce and the shipyard has an additional $1B of overhead per year.
If the yard could build the carrier in one year, the total cost would be
Cost = direct + overhead
Cost = $10B + ($1B * 1 yr)
Cost = $10B + $1B
Cost = $11B
In reality, we have historically produced a carrier in four to five years (we’ll call it five) which makes the total cost
Cost = direct + overhead
Cost = $10B + ($1B * 5 yr)
Cost = $10B + $5B
Cost = $15B
However, the Navy sometimes stretches out the build times to around seven years which makes the total cost
Cost = direct + overhead
Cost = $10B + ($1B * 7 yr)
Cost = $10B + $7B
Cost = $17B
We see, then, that the carrier could cost anywhere from $13B (3 yr build time) to $17B (7 yr build time), depending on the build time and the number of years of overhead that have to be applied.
Why does overhead have to be applied? A company does not produce products for free. It has to pass on all its costs to the buyer. Therefore, the overhead accumulates, year after year, for every year that it takes to build the carrier and, at the end, the total accumulated overhead gets dumped on the carrier and the Navy/taxpayer pays the cost.
Now, let’s take a look at the actual build times for Navy aircraft carriers, as shown in the table below.
Carrier Build Time, yrs Laid to Commissioning |
|
CV-63 Kitty Hawk |
5 |
CV-64 Constellation |
4 |
CVN-65 Enterprise |
3 |
CV-66 America |
4 |
CV-67 Kennedy |
4 |
CVN-68 Nimitz |
7 |
CVN-69 Eisenhower |
7 |
CVN-70 Vinson |
7 |
CVN-71 Roosevelt |
5 |
CVN-72 Lincoln |
5 |
CVN-73 Washington |
6 |
CVN-74 Stennis |
4 |
CVN-75 Truman |
5 |
CVN-76 Reagan |
5 |
CVN-77 Bush |
6 |
CVN-78 Ford |
8 |
We see that build times went from 3-5 years, pre-Nimitz, to 5-8 years. That means that recent carriers are being hit with 2-5 years of added shipyard overhead. Of course the total cost is going to increase and increase substantially!
Someone with too much time on their hands is going to point out that the shipyard likely has other work and 100% of the yard’s overhead isn’t dumped on a single carrier. That is true, of course, however, for our simplified discussion, the concept is valid and substantially correct.
While it may be satisfying and cathartic to blame all our shipbuilding cost problems on fraud and corruption, the reality is that those are minor factors. Overhead is a much larger factor and may well be the main culprit. Of course, without an itemized breakdown of the production costs, I can’t say for sure.
And this is why "slowing down procurement to reduce costs" works a lot less well than politicians expect. Of course, being politicians, they try quite hard to ignore things that don't accord with their plans.
ReplyDelete"Of course, being politicians, they try quite hard to ignore things that don't accord with their plans."
DeleteSadly, this problem isn't limited to politicians. I served in the US Army, under sergeants who took in privates who DID NOT RECEIVE Advanced Individual TRAINING (AIT) on the tasks the sergeants would ask them to perform, and thought on-the-job training would bring them up to speed.
It wasn't.
Overhead, as a percent, is only applied to the direct cost incurred that year, not over the total cost each year. So if overhead is 100% then the cost of the item does double over the time to build.
ReplyDeleteAlso you are refering to total overhead loading (everyone uses slightly different terms). That includes G&A, labor, and material loadings.
G&A is usually 30-40%. But it gets applied to the cost of labor and material AND their overheads. This is what you describe in the article.
The really big loading is the labor overhead. That is usually 150-200%. This is to pay for vacation, sick time, training, etc.
Material is also often loaded when there is a large material pool. This is usually about 5% and covers costs of receving, inspection, scrap, rework.
All told overhead rates total about 200-350% for labor and about 7-10% for material.
This is jsut he way DoD mandates it to be done so everyone does it the same way and you can evaluate different companies proposals equally. In commercial business, the overheads are not usually calculated separately. Instead they look at the Margin ratio. For example if gross margin is not greater than 40% some companies won't do the work because they can't get enough return to justify their costs. This is a way that does not require any computation but can hide what the overhead costs consist of.
While I appreciate the expanded explanation for those interested, I did preface the post with,
Delete"the following is a brief and grossly simplified explanation of overhead."
I'm trying to make a point in the post, not teach a course. Every topic I write on has to be simplified to varying extents in order to appeal to, and be understood by, the overall audience with their widely varying backgrounds.
So, again, thanks for the expanded explanations for the benefit of those interested.
If you want to beat this bad dog, the PLAN is the perfect stick. Almost a mirror image..
ReplyDeleteAnd now there's post-construction construction, too.
ReplyDeleteOne other aspect is a workforce that needs to remember a task they do once every 5-8 years will not remember the task. VOlume is a big part of it though. Like Ingalls building the first 5 LHAs, commissioning one a year while also building the Spruances where 8 commissioned one of those same 5 years. Lets at least get yards brining in 2 ships a year. Right now that honor only falls to Austal and potentially MMC and then with only small ships.
ReplyDeleteThis makes sense. My question is, how do we fix it?? I can see where lowering yearly costs to stay within budget makes sense. Theres only so much money to spend. But considering that Id expect the carrier production line to stay rolling non-stop for at least a decade or two, what can we do to fully fund them faster?? Do we have a Burke line holiday, and shift those funds? Of course then those lines suffer. Id think that temporarilly shuttering any line takes the chance of it never reopening, since our main yards are dependent on the navy. Do we allow that, and then make them public yards? Are public yards the answer?? Its a complex issue, and don't know if there's one answer or ten, or if there's an actual fix at all, but Id love to hear the ideas!!
ReplyDeleteOf course, the amount of wasteful spending all across the board is somthing that could likely "find" billions. The amount of flags and joint staffs, the crazy amount of shore duty billets, etc need to be addressed. Never mind the $600 hammers, which Im sure still exist in one form or another. While our procurement is clearly broken and needs reworked, Id really like to see some kind of independent auditing body with a mandate to ruthlessly weed out waste throughout the service. All the services, actually, but I digress... CNO is right in that we cant run a military on a business model, but at the same time, bang for the buck is a thing, and one that isnt somthing being considered by those with the purse strings...
DeleteAmerican made corvette sinks
ReplyDeletehttps://www.foxnews.com/world/video-shows-moments-before-us-made-thai-naval-vessel-sinks-rough-seas-dozens-sailors-missing
This is related to construction but maybe should be a different post. I am no expert, so is this a design flaw? Don't such ships have an emergency generator? It does have impressive armament for its size, to include a 76mm gun!
This was built in the US but was a foreign design, apparently based on a Saudi vessel. I have no information on the design spec's or features so I can't offer any specific comments.
DeleteIn way of generalities, no small combatant should be able to suffer a water-induced short circuit. Every electrical connection should be inside a sealed, watertight junction box of some type.
Yes, you would think an emergency generator would be standard equipment on a combat vessel.
Photos of the vessel suggest it was top heavy, as most modern vessels seem to be. The superstructure appears too large for the hull. Contrast this to the superstructure of a WWII Fletcher which is pretty minimal.
No warship should sink in ten foot seas. This goes to one of my overarching themes - that the modern naval world no longer builds ships for combat/damage. The Helge Ingstad, which sank due to flooding through shafts and junction/cable ports, is another example of a ship that was not built for combat/damage.
A warship should also be compartmented and watertight enough so that a single point of water entry cannot sink the vessel.
Delete"The thing is, direct costs are fixed whereas overhead is variable."
ReplyDeleteExcept fixed costs are not fixed. Over time, the cost of labor and materials generally increase. And, one also has to factor in complexity of building an aircraft carrier. If it took X million man-hours to build a Nimitz and it takes X+Y million man-hours to build a Ford-class, then your direct labor costs have increased.
Plus, there is the problem of the customer making design changes while you're trying to build their product. Design changes can result in sunk costs for direct labor and materials. And, as is often the case, design changes can extend the duration of a project resulting in increased direct and overhead costs.
You didn't grasp the point of the post at all, did you? Within the span of a single ship construction period, the direct construction costs are fixed, for practical and relevant purposes. What varies is the amount of time it takes to do the construction which is the overhead.
DeleteThe post illustrated that stretching out construction periods was a/the major cost variable and 'increaser' of costs.
As noted in the post - and apparently missed by you - the discussion was simplified in order to illustrate the main point and keep the discussion from becoming bogged down in a purely academic and unproductive discussion. Here's the relevant disclaimer from the post:
" the following is a brief and grossly simplified explanation"
Thanks for understanding.
Yikes!
DeleteAnd now that we've dispensed with the irrelevancies, what productive contribution would you like to make to the discussion? Perhaps you'd care to speculate on the alternative of building several ships at the same time followed by an extended idle period as it relates to total costs? Perhaps you'd care to discuss the competing pressures to reduce yearly costs versus the pressure to reduce total cost? Which should be favored and why? Perhaps you'd like to suggest ways to reduce overhead to a significant degree? Perhaps you'd like to discuss the effect of consolidation in the shipbuilding industry as it impacts overhead? Perhaps you'd like to discuss the trend towards fewer, multi-function ships as opposed to more numerous single function ships and how it impacts costs due to reduced numbers and longer build times? Combat rationale aside, would we have a healthier and cheaper shipbuilding industry if we built single function ships instead of multi-function ships?
DeleteAnd so on. There's much that is discussion-worthy from this post but quibbles about accounting technicalities when the post specifically acknowledged the use of 'grossly simplified' details is not one of them. You have interest and you have knowledge so contribute something worthwhile! Be the kind of reader/commenter I want.
" the shipyard likely has other work "
ReplyDeleteNot the case for the nation. Domestic ship building industry now practically equivalent to naval ship building industry.
Civilian ship building has died decades ago thus ship building costs are far more expensive than nations still have sizable civilian ship building industry - China, Kora, and Japan.
"Not the case for the nation."
DeleteWe're talking about naval construction and those few naval shipyards that still exist DO have other work. It's a small but steady work flow.
The other factor is the quantity. If you build 3 ships per year instead of 1, you spread the overheads (of course at a certain point you'll have to increase overheads eg. lawyers & accountants).
ReplyDeleteSee, "Low Voume"
DeleteAs a former cost accountant, the principle is spot on. We are paying a lot of overhead (both civilian and military) for not a lot of hulls in the water.
ReplyDeleteGenerally, we should be picking specialized single-purpose designs, proof-of-concept prototype, building a few quickly, tweaking the design (small, evolutionary improvements), rinse-and-repeat. Keep producing quickly, knowing they will be scrapped in 30 years or less. Also, fire half the admirals and don't replace their overhead staff.
The only arguments for 'excess overhead' are the value of having offline capacity that can be ramped up quickly, or the value of having supplier competition that otherwise wouldn't exist in the shipbuilding world. We could partially solve both with policies that incent/require domestic commercial shipbuilding.
We need to recognize that shipping, from construction to operation, is a national strategic interest and treat it as such. If that means looser regulations or construction, ownership, and operating subsidies then that's a price we need to pay. When a significant portion of our economy depends on ocean shipping, that's a vulnerability which means it's a national strategic interest.
Delete