tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post2254592287782603756..comments2024-03-28T07:56:09.239-07:00Comments on Navy Matters: Open PostComNavOpshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comBlogger122125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70895220090537731682022-12-10T13:10:33.415-08:002022-12-10T13:10:33.415-08:00The easiest way is to spell out your contact email...The easiest way is to spell out your contact email address (for example, something at dot com) to avoid bots and spam and then I'll send you an email greeting and go from there. As soon as I see it, I'll immediately delete your comment to avoid exposing your address any longer than necessary.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-59185095504176450982022-12-10T11:19:09.929-08:002022-12-10T11:19:09.929-08:00How do I contact you other than on here? Do you h...How do I contact you other than on here? Do you have an e-mail?John Galthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05479269386331792318noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-4861635157734947812022-12-09T07:27:23.645-08:002022-12-09T07:27:23.645-08:00TOPIC How will the congress, press, people, etc. r...TOPIC How will the congress, press, people, etc. react the first time a nuclear vessel is actually sunk? How should the Navy react? In a conflict using our carriers and subs this is inevitable. But the US isn't the same as it was when Rickover and others tried to make an all nuclear fleet. The subs may not be as problematic--the will literally be out of sight out of mind for the general public. But a carrier getting hit and radioactive steam being released? In fact, even it it isn't released (doubtful in fact) every bit of smoke and steam will be treated as if it was radioactive by segments of the media and probably by many sailors who don't know any better. <br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-62742673205987880022022-12-07T15:30:43.858-08:002022-12-07T15:30:43.858-08:00"I was more interested in your thoughts on th..."I was more interested in your thoughts on the role of the navy in times short of war, what missions that force might be properly tasked with, and how that force might execute those tasks."<br /><br />My answer is 'the blog'. In the thousands of posts, I've pretty well described the kinds of missions I'd use the Navy for. Here's a few recent, specific examples of plausible missions that could have happened or still could.<br /><br />-Physically impede and prevent the construction of Chinese artificial islands.<br />-Ensure the safety of the Persian Gulf and the Straits by sinking any Iranian boats/aircraft acting in an unsafe manner.<br />-Conduct freedom of anchoring exercises in international waters illegally claimed by the Chinese.<br />-Sink Chinese fishing vessels found in Philippine water (with permission from, and as part of a larger diplomatic push to make Philippines an ally.).<br />-Conduct anti-terrorist surveillance and strikes in Africa<br /><br />And so on.<br /><br />Of course, missions such as these require a degree of fortitude on our part. Lacking that fortitude, there's no point in having ships outside our home waters. They don't accomplish anything.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-50339972611951988842022-12-07T15:07:18.927-08:002022-12-07T15:07:18.927-08:00Thanks for the reply, cno. I was more interested ...Thanks for the reply, cno. I was more interested in your thoughts on the role of the navy in times short of war, what missions that force might be properly tasked with, and how that force might execute those tasks. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-34059512754527597702022-12-07T11:31:50.646-08:002022-12-07T11:31:50.646-08:00What about Jutland? I came across an interesting l...What about Jutland? I came across an interesting <a href="https://youtu.be/l427CERpUgU" rel="nofollow">lecture</a> not long ago. The speaker thinks that the Home fleet won. Is he right?Radekhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02834704550892068850noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-77628424766340690792022-12-07T06:04:11.697-08:002022-12-07T06:04:11.697-08:00I'm not quite sure what you're asking for....I'm not quite sure what you're asking for. You seem to have an answer in mind that you'd like explored but it's not clear to me what it is.<br /><br />Motivating business to engage in specialized commodity production is an economic/market issue and beyond the scope of this blog.<br /><br />Help me understand where it is you want a discussion to go. Alternatively, I'm open to hosting a guest post on the subject since it sounds like you have both the practical experience/knowledge and the motivation to address the topic. Let me know.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-21108149793533995462022-12-07T05:48:09.858-08:002022-12-07T05:48:09.858-08:00"what does a week or month in the life of tha..."what does a week or month in the life of that force look like?"<br /><br />You just answered your own question with, "I assume short, intense drills,realistic training and frequent live fire exercises".<br /><br />While the ship is in port, undergoing maintenance, the crew is going through various types of training on shore. Frequently, the ship/crew put to sea to exercise either individually or as a group with other ships. From time to time, a specific mission may arise and a ship may leave for a somewhat extended period (a few weeks, typically) to execute that mission.<br /><br />A major point of emphasis is to develop viable doctrine and tactics.<br /><br />Yearly giant Fleet Problem exercises would occur.<br /><br />I'm not sure what other insight you're looking for? Do you have specific questions?ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-49422008815028001782022-12-07T04:48:40.242-08:002022-12-07T04:48:40.242-08:00I thought these were topics for an article and the...I thought these were topics for an article and then discussion not a one and done. While I agree we need alot more warshots during training and that would help keep the line open, there are many other ways to do it also. We also have to not break the bank and figure out how to convince businesses that a lower margin profit commodity is in their best interest to produce. Otherwise no one but the Chinese will take on commodity work.John Galthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05479269386331792318noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46727995221613049162022-12-07T03:26:17.529-08:002022-12-07T03:26:17.529-08:00CNO, really enjoy your site, and support your effo...CNO, really enjoy your site, and support your efforts. I would appreciate a post from you, doing the following;<br />Assume the navy has rational, competent leadership, adequate funding, and the ability to move toward the kind of force structure you advocate....what does a week or month in the life of that force look like?<br />I assume short, intense drills,realistic training and frequent live fire exercises, but I would like to understand how the force functions, what it's focus is, and how it accomplishes its tasks from your pov....Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-31981199286642228042022-12-06T12:24:10.761-08:002022-12-06T12:24:10.761-08:00"a UAV/DASH could already be in the area when..."a UAV/DASH could already be in the area when a contact is made"<br /><br />Come on, think this through operationally and tactically. A group of ships will have escorts ranging out 20-50 miles in all directions. That's a search area of some 300-2000 sq.miles. Where in that total area are you going to pre-position your UAV/DASH? If you guess wrong, you have no coverage.<br /><br />Helicopters (UAV/DASH) are notorious maintenance hogs. Not knowing when a contact will occur, how are you going to keep an aircraft continuously in the air without extensive maintenance? <br /><br />Interesting fact: Wiki states that over half of the Navy's 746 DASH drones were lost during operations.<br /><br />"VL-ASROC isn't an option for the LCS"<br /><br />As we've discussed on this blog, the Navy has cancelled the LCS ASW module. The LCS won't be sub hunting so VL-ASROC is not required nor is a DASH helo.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-32427595380089149492022-12-06T11:05:26.418-08:002022-12-06T11:05:26.418-08:00Except, VL-ASROC isn't an option for the LCS. ...Except, VL-ASROC isn't an option for the LCS. And, with sufficient loitering time and range, a UAV/DASH could already be in the area when a contact is made. Or, positioned ahead in anticipation of a contact. Fighting Irishhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03062665701910071556noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-4738336191888582552022-12-06T07:48:27.118-08:002022-12-06T07:48:27.118-08:00" How do we keep lines open during peacetime ..." How do we keep lines open during peacetime and make them scaleable for war?"<br /><br />One way to increase production is to expend more ammo! Currently, we 'mothball' our weapons and bring them up to operational status once per year, or so, for a scripted exercise. We should be live firing ALL our weapons on a much more frequent basis, if not daily, depending on the specific weapon system. That, alone, would greatly increase ammo production.<br /><br />Beyond that, we need to build up inventories. It is extremely worrisome that we've drasticlaly depleted our inventories simply by supplying Ukraine for a year. War with China will see weapon expenditures many times that. Every war every fought in the history of the world has used many times more weapons than anticipated. Recognizing that, we need to build up our inventories accordingly.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-41607047310752577562022-12-06T06:47:34.453-08:002022-12-06T06:47:34.453-08:00Let's discuss losses and ammo expenditure and ...Let's discuss losses and ammo expenditure and how the services should plan for them both. Watching the B-21 at $700M a copy roll out, what happens when we lose 1-10 (either through mechanical failure or combat action)? That is 1-10% of the planned force. We lost 52 fixed wing aircraft in 1991 and 24 during the 2nd Iraq campaign. And helicopters were worse. We lost use of 2 ships during Desert Storm. Ukraine (and our Desert Storm experiences) have shown we need to plan for much higher than planned ammo expendtiture rates. How do we keep lines open during peacetime and make them scaleable for war?<br /><br />We need to start planning for how to deal with REAL war and not the perfect technological dream we are in now.John Galthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05479269386331792318noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-29243682117304192652022-12-05T21:44:17.238-08:002022-12-05T21:44:17.238-08:00To aim9snake: APS systems don't knock missiles...To aim9snake: APS systems don't knock missiles off their course causing them to miss tanks. "Soft Kill APS" systems misdirect missiles by electronic warfare/decoy to cause them to miss. "Hard Kill APS" systems use explosives to damage incoming missiles(and sometimes fin stabilized sabot rounds) and disrupt he trajectory of APFSDS rounds(fin rounds) not so that they miss the target, but so that they are no longer able to penetrate the armor of the target. All armored vehicle solutions except for some ceramics would be able to be scaled up to armor ships.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-37168156615312977892022-12-05T15:43:20.037-08:002022-12-05T15:43:20.037-08:00Very nice video on the subject. Without disagreei...Very nice video on the subject. Without disagreeing with your premise, in these scenarios I always like to examine the thinking of the person under question. We have the benefit of perfect hindsight as we analyze the situation. The person under question, Pye, in this case, had far less than complete information. What did he know? What did he not know? What considerations was he factoring into his thinking? What weight did he give the various factors? <br /><br />For example, at that point, we had a very limited supply of carriers and no battleships. The Japanese had several of both. Preservation of our then limited carriers had to have been a primary concern as demonstrated shortly thereafter by Nimitz's order to Spruance prior to Midway: “You will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.” <br /><br />At that time, there was little standing between the Japanese and Pearl Harbor or, indeed, the US west coast. A degree of caution (calculated risk, as Nimitz wrote) was warranted.<br /><br />Another consideration was that the US carriers and pilots had no combat experience whereas the Japanese did.<br /><br />Yet another consideration was Japanese submarines. We had no idea if any were in the area and it would have been disastrous to lose one or more carriers to submarines as actually happened to the USS Wasp during the Guadalcanal campaign.<br /><br />Having said all that, please don't take it as disagreement with your premise or agreement with Pye's actions. I merely point out my intense interest in hearing the 'other side'. There's always another side that makes perfect sense to the person in question, at the time. Pye had a distinguished career up until that point and there is no reason to believe he was a coward. He simply saw the situation differently and it would be incredibly interesting to know what his thinking was. <br /><br />Spruance elected to preserve his forces and retired from Midway rather than press the battle. His caution was judged wise whereas Pye's was judged cowardly. <br /><br />Again, very nice video!ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-37319354664239575102022-12-05T14:58:38.384-08:002022-12-05T14:58:38.384-08:00From your questions, I suspect that you're mis...From your questions, I suspect that you're misunderstanding a few aspects of submarine and ASW warfare. <br /><br />- From a constant barrage of peacetime publicity photos, many of us have come to believe that ships sailing a couple hundred feet apart is normal. It is not! At least, not for combat. A group will be spread over vast areas of ocean with ASW escorts and assets ranging 20-50 miles or more out, depending on circumstances.<br /><br />- Radar is limited to the horizon and for a submarine with the radar a few feet above the surface, that puts the radar horizon at around ten miles. If a sub is using radar to confirm a targeting setup, they're way too close and should have already launched or they've already been detected and are dead.<br /><br />- The main weakness associated with anti-ship missiles on a sub is targeting. Missiles are long range weapons: twenty to hundreds of miles. A sub's sensors are short range although certain combinations of factors could occasionally provide longer range detections. Given the difficulty in obtaining over-the-horizon targeting, loading up with too many missiles is generally going to be a waste of space.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-14730733811209616012022-12-05T13:23:39.320-08:002022-12-05T13:23:39.320-08:00(part 1)
Here's something I'd be intereste...(part 1)<br />Here's something I'd be interested in: an evaluation of whether an SSGN with a primary ASuW mission (think Oscar II and Yasen) would be worthwhile for the USN to field, with a particular eye towards whether existing assets could be retasked in lieu of designing a new class for this mission. Quick bullet points:<br /><br />MOTIVATION: the PLAN will likely have local numeric superiority of surface combatants in a war in the South China Sea and the East China Sea/Sea of Japan. They also will be operating many land- and air-based AAW and ASuW assets from their home turf, which is much closer than ours to the theater. It would be greatly advantageous during this stage of the war to have a capable ASuW asset that was not directly countered by this A2/AD 'bubble'.<br /><br />IDEA: the VPM-equipped Virginias (Block 5, and potentially Block VI) are not especially useful land strike platforms in the scenario of a war with China, largely due to their limited magazine size (40 VLS cells). This magazine size, however, *may* be sufficient for attacking surface combatant groups, either by taking out ASW-capable escorts first with torpedoes and then attacking non-ASW-capable targets with missiles, or by performing passive TMA with sonar and the ESM mast followed by a hit-and-run attack from standoff range where the sub launches a salvo of missiles and then immediately submerges and clears datum before enemy ASW assets (helos, maritime patrol aircraft, etc) are able to localize it.<br /><br />POTENTIAL ARMAMENT: the torpedo room would likely have the same equipment as a 688 or Blk I-IV Virginia - namely, four Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP/CBASS. The 40 VLS cells would be stuffed with Block Va Tomahawks, which regain the ASuW capability that we've lacked in submarine VLS cells since the TASM was retired in 1994. Numerically, this compares favorably to the Oscar I and II ASuW-tasked SSGNs (24 missiles each) and the Yasen class ASuW-tasked SSGNs (36 missiles). However, the Block Va Tomahawk is likely to have a lower probability of hit than the purpose-built ASuW cruise missiles carried by the Russian platforms.<br /><br />(comment broken up for length)cheezitnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-84204515370920556902022-12-05T13:22:01.532-08:002022-12-05T13:22:01.532-08:00(part 2)
QUESTIONS TO PONDER:
* what standoff dis...(part 2)<br />QUESTIONS TO PONDER:<br /> * what standoff distance for a salvo of 1-40 missiles is required for survivability against a group with organic ASW assets, or a group operating in concert with land-based ASW assets?<br /> * what is the probability that a passively-calculated firing solution for Tomahawks fired from this survivable standoff distance will get a given missile close enough to the enemy surface targets to acquire when their seekers activate?<br />* does a brief active radar emission by the sub prior to launching a salvo improve the firing solution meaningfully? Does said brief transmission worsen survivability meaningfully?<br />* what is the probability that a Tomahawk that acquires will make it past the defenses of a surface group with point-defenses only? How much does the probability of a hit suffer when targeting ships in a group that includes area-AAW defenses in addition to point defenses?<br />* how much damage does the ~1000 lb blast fragmentation warhead on a Tomahawk do to surface combatants of various types and sizes? Is it worthwhile to pursue a shaped charge warhead (for comparison, the AS-4/Kh-22 has a ~2,000 lb shaped charge warhead, and the Kh-32 has a ~1,000 lb shaped charge warhead) for potentially increased effect against ships at the expense of likely reduced effect against at least some land targets?<br />* is it feasible for multiple of these ASuW-SSGNs to act in a 'wolfpack' without substantial risk of friendly fire? How about working in concert with friendly surface assets in areas where enemy subs may also be found? (Nb. part of the answer here is likely to be impossible to determine from open sources - real details about stuff like GERTRUDE and JANUS is almost all classified). How about working in concert with friendly air and space assets that may be able to provide better targeting information, or targeting information from a greater firing distance, or both?<br />* Does the greatly increased magazine size of the Ohio SSGNs (154 vs 40 missiles) make them dramatically more capable in this role? If so, is it worthwhile to retask them towards ASuW at the cost of their incredible value when tasked with striking land targets? Does their reduced survivability in a get-out-of-dodge-fast scenario preclude their use for this mission?<br />* to what extent can we test and validate this concept at AUTEC in the Bahamas? That is to say, when doing sub-vs-sub or sub-vs-ship engagements at AUTEC (or on other ranges) we load up exercise torpedoes that have no warheads and perform a terminal turn-away maneuver instead of smacking into the target, but I don't think even the AUTEC range would let us accurately simulate some parts of an engagement where a sub fires missiles at a group of surface ships. Maybe simulate one end of the engagement at AUTEC (launching dummy missiles that make the right amount of noise coming out of the VLS cell but don't go anywhere, to determine how hard it is for the sub to evade detection when launching a salvo) and simulate the other end using the Self-Defense Test Ship at Port Hueneme?cheezitnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-46937259713367089592022-12-05T13:21:43.206-08:002022-12-05T13:21:43.206-08:00Here's something I'd be interested in: an ...Here's something I'd be interested in: an evaluation of whether an SSGN with a primary ASuW mission (think Oscar II and Yasen) would be worthwhile for the USN to field, with a particular eye towards whether existing assets could be retasked in lieu of designing a new class for this mission. Quick bullet points:<br /><br />MOTIVATION: the PLAN will likely have local numeric superiority of surface combatants in a war in the South China Sea and the East China Sea/Sea of Japan. They also will be operating many land- and air-based AAW and ASuW assets from their home turf, which is much closer than ours to the theater. It would be greatly advantageous during this stage of the war to have a capable ASuW asset that was not directly countered by this A2/AD 'bubble'.<br /><br />IDEA: the VPM-equipped Virginias (Block 5, and potentially Block VI) are not especially useful land strike platforms in the scenario of a war with China, largely due to their limited magazine size (40 VLS cells). This magazine size, however, *may* be sufficient for attacking surface combatant groups, either by taking out ASW-capable escorts first with torpedoes and then attacking non-ASW-capable targets with missiles, or by performing passive TMA with sonar and the ESM mast followed by a hit-and-run attack from standoff range where the sub launches a salvo of missiles and then immediately submerges and clears datum before enemy ASW assets (helos, maritime patrol aircraft, etc) are able to localize it.<br /><br />POTENTIAL ARMAMENT: the torpedo room would likely have the same equipment as a 688 or Blk I-IV Virginia - namely, four Mk 48 Mod 7 ADCAP/CBASS. The 40 VLS cells would be stuffed with Block Va Tomahawks, which regain the ASuW capability that we've lacked in submarine VLS cells since the TASM was retired in 1994. Numerically, this compares favorably to the Oscar I and II ASuW-tasked SSGNs (24 missiles each) and the Yasen class ASuW-tasked SSGNs (36 missiles). However, the Block Va Tomahawk is likely to have a lower probability of hit than the purpose-built ASuW cruise missiles carried by the Russian platforms.<br /><br />(comment broken up for length)cheezitnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-38686503840201811812022-12-05T13:17:32.376-08:002022-12-05T13:17:32.376-08:00Blockade China's coast, very difficult and dan...Blockade China's coast, very difficult and dangerous. Blockade China's sea routes through Indonesian and Philippine straits is simple. Even mines and subs can do it alone.G2milhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07868802317861555096noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-44356158509771358612022-12-05T13:12:05.296-08:002022-12-05T13:12:05.296-08:00Most of the carrier support is suppose to come fro...Most of the carrier support is suppose to come from Japan (Sasebo and Yokosuka) Those bases will be blasted by thousands of short range missiles and air attacks at Sasebo. Submarines will lurk outside their port entrance. We really need these support elements moved to eastern Australia or the Central Pacific islands. Otherwise Hawaii is all we will have.G2milhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07868802317861555096noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-88177695331116867532022-12-05T11:15:10.597-08:002022-12-05T11:15:10.597-08:00At the moment, unlike WWII where we had to mount a...At the moment, unlike WWII where we had to mount assault after assault and fight an enemy who was spread across the entire Pacific, we already own the Pacific and there's no significant Chinese forces outside the first island chain. This fact, alone, hugely reduces the logistics demand. <br /><br />That said, how would we fight China? Guam will likely be rendered inoperable in the first hour of a war. What does that leave us? Only the very long range bombers of the Air Force and the Navy's carriers. The carriers will have to supported and that will require significant logistics.<br /><br />If you believe my ever so brief analysis, you've got to wonder if we have enough carriers to conduct a war against China. I think not and have called for more - which, in turn, requires more logistics support - but that's a separate topic.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-70250467953370135672022-12-05T11:09:40.697-08:002022-12-05T11:09:40.697-08:00"a blockade of China"
That would requir..."a blockade of China"<br /><br />That would require almost no effort. It is necessary to realize that the easiest blockade to implement is not trying to intercept ships at sea but to prevent them from setting sail to begin with. China has few trading partners who are significant and would stand against an anti-China alliance. Thus, we could easily implement a blockade by preventing any Chinese merchant ships from loading or leaving the various ports around the world. It's mainly a diplomatic and paperwork exercise in coordination with other countries.ComNavOpshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09669644332369727431noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5579907756656776056.post-47287048227829621682022-12-05T10:45:38.736-08:002022-12-05T10:45:38.736-08:00How about something on the logistics of a Pacific ...How about something on the logistics of a Pacific war? We have the historical knowledge of WW2. What would it take to either sustain a blockade of China, or challenge their blockade of Taiwan (two likely scenarios in the near future)?Son of a Sailorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11504337759762282702noreply@blogger.com