Protecting the Sea Lanes?

The Navy is out there, every day, protecting the sea lanes.  That’s why we do deployments, right?  So, how’s that sea lane protection working out?  According to shipping giant, Maersk,
 

Attacks in the Red Sea by Iran-aligned Houthi militants have disrupted a route vital to east-west trade, with prolonged rerouting of shipments, pushing freight rates higher and causing congestion in Asian and European ports.
 
Maersk said recent data showed that the number of ships crossing through the canal has fallen 66% since carriers began diverting their vessels around Africa.
 
Maersk in July said disruption to its container shipping via the Red Sea had extended beyond trade routes between the Far East and Europe to its entire global network, and warned of a "cascading impact" causing congestion.[1]

 
So, what is the mightiest navy in the world doing about this threat to the sea lanes?  Well, we’ve shot down a few drones and missiles and bombed some suspected launch sites … to no effect.  Attacks on shipping continue and ships continue to get hit.
 
Similarly, Iran continues to harass shipping, attacking, seizing, and mining passing ships while our navy stands by and does nothing.
 
 
Conclusion
 
I know I’ve criticized our endless deployments but if we weren’t out there protecting the sea lanes, bad actors might attack shipping with drones and missiles so thank goodness we’re out there, continuously deployed.
 
Our presence is deterring nothing.  We’re clearly not effectively protecting the sea lanes.  Tell me again, why are we doing deployments?
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Maersk: Impact From Red Sea Attacks Intensifying”, 5-Sep-2024,
https://www.newsmax.com/finance/streettalk/maersk-red-sea/2024/09/05/id/1179157/

MEU vs. Army/Air Force Rapid Response

MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) currently deploy without tanks, artillery, or heavy mortars.  Thus, they are no different than light, air mobile infantry in terms of firepower and, barring dumb luck that a crisis just happens to break out right next to them, are much slower to respond to a global crisis, requiring days or weeks to reach the area of concern.
 
One of the limitations of a MEU is that, contrary to popular impressions, a MEU cannot conduct an opposed landing although, presumably, they could deal with minor resistance.
 
Now, consider the Army’s global crisis response units which are supported by Air Force transports and can deposit troops anywhere in the world in 24 hours. 
 
A common objection to the Army as the global crisis response force is that they must have a secure airfield to land and that is not a sure thing and might even be considered unlikely.  However, it should be noted that the airfield requirements are pretty minimal with dirt strips being adequate.  From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example, 

The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).

 
In addition, the Army does have the capability to seize an airfield.  The 2^nd Ranger battalion, 75^th Ranger regiment is specifically tasked with airfield seizure.  Of course, an airfield is not even absolutely necessary as troops can be parachuted in.
 

In fact, once upon a time, the Army had some fairly significant airborne armor support with the ability to air-unload M551 Sheridan tanks using the LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) method (an impressive operation readily viewable on Youtube!) or medium altitude multi-parachute drops.  Similarly, I’m aware that the Army conducted Stryker air drops, at one time.  I don’t know whether the Army still maintains such a capability, or not.
 

LAPES - Sheridan Air Drop

Stryker Parachute Drop

 Up until around 2014, airborne forces also included artillery.  From Wiki, 

1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field Artillery Regiment maintained a full capacity to provide 155mm howitzer fires anywhere in the world within 18 hours in support of the 82d Airborne Division and while supporting other global responsibilities. The unit had the unique ability to employ 155mm howitzer platforms through a "Howitzer Heavy Drop Package" capability which essentially allowed for the weapon system to be dropped from an aircraft while its paratroopers would then place the weapon into action.

Again, I don’t know whether the Army still maintains airborne artillery capability.
 

Air Dropped 105 mm Howitzer

The following units are considered to be rapidly deployable.  I don’t follow Army matters that closely so there may be others.
 
- XVIII Airborne Corps 

• 3rd Infantry Division
• 10th Mountain Division
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 101st Airborne Division

- 75th Ranger Regiment - Can deploy can deploy one Ranger battalion within eighteen hours of alert notification.[1]
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Army/AF can provide firepower and numbers equal to, or greater than, a MEU and with much quicker response times.  Given the Marine’s elimination of tanks and a great deal of artillery and mortars, one can’t help but wonder why we don’t eliminate the MEUs and use Army units as our crisis response force.
 
One of the key aspects of this discussion is armor.  At one time, the MEU deployed with tanks which offered a justification for the use of MEUs.  Unfortunately, the Marines eliminated their tanks several years ago – along with heavy mortars and much of their artillery - and that justification has now vanished.
 
In light of the Marine’s ill-advised move away from being a medium weight combat force and toward being a light infantry force, we need to re-evaluate the rationale for MEUs.  Add to that the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a fleet of amphibious ships to give the MEUs something to ride around on and the rationale looks very suspect.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
Note:  I’m trying to assemble a current list of the combat equipment of a deployed MEU.  As best I can tell, this is the current list: 
 
7 to 16  Light Armored Vehicle  
15         Assault Amphibious Vehicle      
6          155mm howitzer: M777 
8          M252 81mm mortar       
63         Humvee           
 
That’s not much in the way of firepower.  Anyone have any modifications to the list?  In particular, I’m very unsure that MEUs deploy with any artillery, today.  Anyone know?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (Fourth ed.). MacDill AFB, Florida: Joint Special Operations University. June 2015. pp. 78–82. ISBN 9781933749914. Archived from the original on 28 March 2017. Retrieved 27 March 2017.

Bringing Home the Fleet

In a recent post, a reader, referencing the current ‘3 ships to keep one deployed (3:1)’ model, asked this, 

Can we alter or change the maintenance, training, and deployable cycle we have into something better? Obviously with the shipyard logjam, we couldn't have all ships "up" at once, but could we somehow tinker, and maybe flip that to 2/3 ready, or more?[1]

My initial reaction was slight irritation and disbelief that after all the time I’ve spent advocating ending deployments and bringing the fleet home, people still didn’t understand the concept.  A few more seconds thought and I realized that the question was perfectly apropos because I’d failed to adequately explain the concept.  Yes, I’d talked endlessly about bringing the fleet home and some of the gross benefits that would derive from that (improved readiness, enhanced training, better maintenance, etc.) but I’d never bothered to explain exactly how all these benefits would come about.  What procedures would change to allow this?  What circumstances would change?  How, exactly, would these benefits occur?
 
I’d like to apologize to that reader and rectify my oversight, now, and explain how and why this would work.
 
 
Circumstances
 
Let’s look, first, at the change in circumstances that would result from a switch to home basing the fleet.
 
Miles – The most obvious change in circumstance would be that the ships wouldn’t deploy.  They’d be home based.  Okay, so how does this help?  Well, the home basing means that the ships wouldn’t be racking up endless miles which is another way of saying wear and tear.  A ship at home simply doesn’t wear out as fast as one on a 6-12 month deployment.
 
Support – Being home based means that every ship is within arm’s length of ready maintenance support.  That support takes the form of a ready supply of parts, repair technicians, machine shops, skilled trades, cranes, etc.  There would be no more delayed/deferred maintenance that piles up during an extended, many-month deployment.
 
It’s embarrassing for the Navy to even have to say this but the support would include corrosion control so that our ships don’t look like rusted out garbage scows.
 
Training – Did you know that a deploying group loses capability and readiness as the cruise goes on?  That’s because they don’t do what they’re trained to do while on a cruise.  They aren’t attacking or defending.  Instead, they’re just showing the flag and dozens of other utterly useless tasks.  A deployed group is less combat capable when they return from deployment than when they started.  How backward and unproductive – indeed, counterproductive! – is that!  A group that goes out should come back more combat capable than when they began.  After all, they were at sea and sea time should be all about high intensity, realistic training, not scut work (to borrow a medical term for pointless tasks).
 
The home base circumstance eliminates deployments and the associated, unavoidable degradation of readiness and, instead, allows continuous training.
 

Method
 
This is the key part.  Unless executing an actual mission, every home based ship is constantly doing one of only two things:
 

• Training
• Maintaining

 
That’s it.  Just those two things.  There are no other activities. 
 
In fact, even during maintenance, the bulk of the crew will still be training.  While a ship is in dry dock or tied up pier side for maintenance, the crew is still training (simulators, walkthroughs, courses, etc.)
 
So, what does this mean?  This is what I’ve failed to convey.  Every ship is always ready to surge to a real mission because there is no maintenance backlog because every maintenance item is attended to immediately.  If you haven’t deployed and developed a backlog of hundreds of maintenance items, there won’t be dry dock and pier side maintenance scheduling issues.  Every issue is addressed immediately.  Thus, at any given moment, no ship can have more than a single open maintenance item because every maintenance item is dealt with immediately.  That makes every ship continuously ‘ready’ and readiness is always 100% of the fleet.
 
Relax.  I know there are scheduled – and occasionally unscheduled! – major repairs or overhauls that are required and that results in a certain percentage of the fleet being hard down and unavailable.  We have something like twenty dry docks of various types so say twenty ships are always unavailable.  As of this writing, there are 296 ships in the Navy (includes various logistic and support ships that are active but not commissioned).  So, that leaves around 276 ships that should always be classified as ready and available.   That’s 93% of the fleet in a constant state of readiness. 
 
In contrast, currently, the Navy is attempting to achieve a state of around 75 deployable ships.  Out of a fleet of 296, that’s just 25% readiness and despite having been trying to achieve that for some time now, they’ve failed.  Fifty ships is the current readiness level and that doesn’t look to be changing anytime soon.  Fifty ships represents just 17% readiness of the fleet.  No wonder Lincoln only got three escorts!
 
Even ships that are undergoing some kind of pier side maintenance (tear down of a piece of equipment, for example) can be made ready almost instantly with a quick restoration of the affected equipment.  At most, the ship would have a single item in a degraded state which would still classify the ship as ready.
 
Today, ships routinely sail with long laundry lists of down or degraded equipment.  The Port Royal grounding, for example, saw that the ship’s navigation systems and many other systems were down or degraded despite having just come out of maintenance!  Every deployed ship has a long list of down or degraded equipment (casualties, as the Navy calls them).  A deployment is the worst possible thing you can do to a ship as regards readiness and maintenance and the longer the deployment, the worse the situation becomes.
 
With home basing, here’s what a typical ship’s month might look like:
 

• A week spent training for an upcoming exercise and/or general training.
• A week at sea in an exercise which includes 24 hour, intensive training leaving the crew exhausted each night and with no desire or energy to even think about video games, lounges, haircuts, weight lifting, movies, or any other crew comfort activity.
• A week spent debriefing and re-training the just completed exercise.
• A week spent performing preventive/routine maintenance.
• An occasional day sprinkled in addressing any emergent, unscheduled maintenance need.

 
Individual crew members might be sent to a shore training course at any time, subject to instant recall, if needed.
 
 
We see, then, that the keys to making this work are:
 

• Address maintenance issues instantly, as they arise.  No deferred maintenance.
• Constant training.
• Regular, short episodes of sea time conducting realistic exercises.  The short time frames eliminate the need for all but the most basic and necessary crew comforts.  Toilets? – squat over the stern!  Berthing? – hang a hammock somewhere!

 
 
Maintenance

Hand in hand with home basing is the requirement to return to ship-supplied maintenance instead of depending on contractors and shore support.  Yes, there will always be things that require a contractor (Aegis software or hardware support, for example) or shore support (specialized repair equipment, for example) but we need to return the majority of the maintenance responsibility back to the ship’s crew.  What better training is there for a crew than to maintain and repair their own equipment?
 
We need to include much more extensive machine shop facilities, electronic shop facilities, welding shops and equipment, etc. in our ship designs.  Let’s remove the now unneeded crew comfort spaces and replace them with ship maintenance and repair shops.  The crew can collect their mail, get a haircut, visit the bank, and watch a movie on shore since they’ll only typically be at sea for a few days or a week at a time.
 
Returning ship maintenance to the ship will also alleviate the burden on the shore maintenance support resources.  We shouldn’t need shore support to rebuild a pump, tear down a valve, replace seals, etc.  Those skills and capabilities should be inherent within the ship.
 
 
Benefits
 
So, to sum up, what do we gain from home basing the fleet?
 

• Constant training instead of just occasional pre-deployment training every year or so
• Constant maintenance instead of delayed/deferred maintenance at the end of a deployment
• 93% fleet readiness instead of 17% readiness
• No forward exposure offering an enemy a free ‘Pearl Harbor’ opportunity
• Maximum flexibility;  if all the ships are ready and available, our mission options are unlimited

 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Jjabatie, “Lincoln Escorts”, August 20, 2024 at 2:17 PM,
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/08/lincoln-escorts.html?showComment=1724188632892#c8797956642859824661

Lincoln Escorts

In a previous post noting the deployment of the Lincoln strike group (can you really call a carrier and three destroyers a strike group?), reader ‘BA 1959’ posted a comment asking where all our destroyers are since they certainly aren’t escorting our carriers.  This is an excellent question and it illustrates one of ConNavOps’ overarching themes which is that the Navy should be home based, training and maintaining, instead of on deployment or, worse, trapped in the useless phases of the interminable deployment cycle.
 
How come the Lincoln is deploying with just three escorts?  Well, partly it’s the fault of a hopelessly lost Navy leadership that either foolishly thinks carriers don’t need more escorts or believes that destroyers are better employed on worthless tasks like show-the-flag, pirate chasing, freedom of navigation exercises, forward presence, trading one-at-a-time shots with the Houthis and praying that a stray missile doesn’t get through, etc.
 
Think about it … if the Navy were home ported and engaged in continual training and maintenance, every ship that wasn’t in dry dock would have been available to surge as an escort for the Lincoln.  That, in a nutshell, is the justification for home basing the fleet.
 
 
Home Basing
 
Let’s consider the example of Pearl Harbor.  Many of you think the Pacific fleet has always been based in Pearl Harbor but that’s not the case.  Pearl Harbor did not become a functioning naval base until 1919 and, even then, did not have any permanently based ships.  Instead, the fleet was home based in San Pedro, California.
 
It wasn’t until 1940 that the Pacific fleet, under Admiral James Richardson, Commander in Chief US Fleet, was ordered (by President Roosevelt)  to make Pearl Harbor its home port.  Richardson was vehemently opposed.  When he queried Admiral Stark about why the fleet was being moved to Pearl Harbor, Stark replied, 

You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs (sic) going into the East Indies.[1]

Even then, the President and Admiral Stark, among many others, believed that forward presence would provide deterrence.  We know how that turned out.  The result was WWII in the Pacific and a disastrous defeat for the Navy.  Deterrence has never succeeded. 
 
Richardson believed the fleet could not begin hostilities from Pearl Harbor. 

Richardson wrote to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark, cautioning him that should the fleet need to move west, “it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.”[1]

Richardson testified to Congress that, in his opinion, 

… the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. I further stated that we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations.”[1]

What came of Richardson’s concerns?  

In January 1941, Roosevelt prematurely relieved Richardson of command and replaced him with Admiral Husband Kimmel.[1]

Richardson understood what Roosevelt and others did not:  that deterrence doesn’t work and that the fleet needs to be home ported where it can train, maintain, and prepare for war.  In fact, there is a very good case to be made that forward presence increases the likelihood of conflict rather than acting as a deterrent (see, “ForwardPresence – Deterrent or Provocation?”).
 
Our ship utilization priorities are badly misguided. We desperately need to return to a home basing concept and get the fleet back into shape in terms of maintenance and training, the product of which is readiness.  The Lincoln example is just the latest example that hammers home the wisdom of that approach.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]The National WWII Museum website, “Solely a Bluff: Relocating the US Fleet to Pearl Harbor”, Kali Martin,
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/fdr-bluff-relocating-us-fleet-to-pearl-harbor

The Jolly Roger

 
USS Kidd flies the Jolly Roger.
 

USS Kidd Flying the Jolly Roger

USS Kidd Flying the Jolly Roger

Those are not photoshop’ed pictures.  The USS Kidd is authorized to fly the Jolly Roger.[1]  The tradition began with the Fletcher class destroyer, USS Kidd, in 1943 and the tradition has passed down the line of ships named Kidd. 
 
The tradition is associated with Medal of Honor winner  Admiral Isaac Kidd and a nickname related to privateer/pirate Captain William Kidd.  The usage of the Jolly Roger was blessed by Admiral Kidd’s widow.
 
In addition to the flag, paintings of the Jolly Roger appear around the ship.
 

Jolly Roger on the rear of the Kidd's 5" gun.

Enjoy it.  I’m sure some woke idiot in the Navy will be coming for it soon.

 
________________________________

 
[1]https://www.warhistoryonline.com/ships/uss-kidd-ddg-100.html

The Mighty Carrier Strike Group 3

The USS Abraham Lincoln and escorts, comprising Carrier Strike Group 3 (CSG-3), are headed to the Middle East in reaction to a potential attack on Israel by Iran.  The mighty CSG-3 consists of,
 
Ships

• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
• USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
• USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG-121)
• USS Spruance (DDG-111)

 
Air Wing

• Strike Fighter Squadron 14 F/A-18E
• Strike Fighter Squadron 41 F/A-18F
• Strike Fighter Squadron 151 F/A-18E
• Strike Fighter Squadron 314 F-35C
• Electronic Attack Squadron 133 EA-18G
• Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 E-2D
• Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 14 MH-60S
• Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 71  MH-60R

 
There you have it … CSG-3;  one carrier and three destroyers.  The carrier’s air wing (Carrier Air Wing 9) consists of three Hornet squadrons, one F-35 Marine squadron, and the usual mix of AEW, EW, and helos.
 
The mighty CSG-3.  Awesome combat power.
 
 
As you know, CSG-3 has existed for many years.  Purely as a point of historical interest, Wikipedia describes the group’s composition in 1992 as the Lincoln, five cruisers, four destroyers, and two frigates. 
 
The carrier’s air wing consisted of two Tomcat squadrons, two Hornet squadrons, one Intruder squadron, one Viking squadron, and the usual mix of AEW, EW, and helos.
 
Ships

• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
• USS Shiloh (CG-67)
• USS Princeton (CG-59)
• USS Texas (CGN-39)
• USS California (CGN-36)
• USS Sterett (CG-31)
• USS Ingersoll (DD-990)
• USS John Young (DD-973)
• USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62)
• USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53)
• USS Ingraham (FFG-61)
• USS Gary (FFG-51)                  
  

 
Air Wing

• Fighter Squadron 213: F-14A    
  
• Fighter Squadron 114: F-14A    
  
• Strike Fighter Squadron 94: F/A-18C     
  
• Strike Fighter Squadron 22: F/A-18C
• Attack Squadron 95: A-6E, KA-6D
• Electronic Warfare Squadron 135: EA-6B
• Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117: E-2C
• Sea Control Squadron 29: S-3B
• Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 6: SH-60F, HH-60H

 
 
Does this really need any discussion?  The decreased in numbers, firepower, and capability is self-evident.  We are on the wrong path.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Wikipedia, “Carrier Strike Group 3”, retrieved 12-Aug-2024,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_Strike_Group_3

Ford Class Notes

Here’s some tidbits pertaining to the Ford class, as noted in the recent CRS report.[1]
 
 
Carriers – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(b)) required to maintain 11 operational carriers.  Note that one (now, two due to chronic maintenance delays) carrier is always in long term overhaul so we only have 10 (now 9) operational carriers.  Note that the Navy’s own 30 year plan indicates that the Navy would operate less than the mandated 11 carriers for over half of the 30 year period of the plan.  This is blatant disregard for Congressional mandates.
 
Air Wings – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(e)) required to maintain 9 air wings.  The original statute required 10 air wings but Congress acceded to the Navy’s request for 9.
 
Early Retirement – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(g)) prohibited from retiring a nuclear carrier prior to its first refueling.  This was implemented in response to the Navy’s attempt to early retire Nimitz class carriers prior to their refueling.
 
CVN-79 John F. Kennedy – CVN-79 has already exceeded its cost cap and the Navy has revised the cap upward.
 
CVN-80 Enterprise – The Navy now estimates that CVN-80 delivery will be delayed 18-26 months.
 
CVN-81 Doris Miller – The Navy estimates the cost of CVN-81 to be $14B.
 
Cost Cap – The provisions that established and later amended the cost caps are listed below.  Note the continual increases in cap levels.  It’s not really a cap if it’s continually increased, is it?
 

Section 122 of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion … and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each …

 

Section 121 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66 of December 26, 2013) amended the procurement cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,887.0 million for CVN-78 and a revised cap of $11,498.0 million for each follow-on ship

 

Section 122 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $11,398.0 million for each follow-on ship in the program

 

Section 121(a) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,568.0 million for CVN-80 and subsequent ships in the program … The cap for CVN-79 was kept at $11,398.0 million … The provision also amended the basis for adjusting the caps for inflation, and excluded certain costs from being counted against the caps.

 

Section 121 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide revised caps of $13,224.0 million for CVN-78, $11,398.0 million for CVN–79, $12,202.0 million for CVN–80, and $12,451.0 million for CVN–81. The provision directs the Navy to exclude from these figures costs for CVN–78 class battle spares, interim spares, and increases attributable to economic inflation after December 1, 2018.

 
 
Discussion
 
What these notes demonstrate is the blatant disregard the Navy has for Congress’ wishes (and laws!).  Most of these legal mandates are the result of the Navy ignoring Congress’ directives.  The problem is that there are no consequences for the Navy’s disregard of Congress.  New laws need to have statutory criminal penalties associated with them.  Currently, the Navy can ignore Congress and there is no criminal penalty.  A minimum penalty for failure to meet Congress’ mandates should be termination from service, forfeiture of pay and pension, and a year in jail for everyone associated with a particular failing, beginning with the CNO and moving down the line.  Perhaps that would encourage compliance with Congress’ wishes.
 
To be fair, Congress is not blameless in this, by any means.  Congress keeps appeasing the Navy by raising cost caps, approving flag positions, and increasing the Navy’s budget.  Congress needs to institute a moratorium on approval of flag positions until the Navy begins obeying Congress, hold firm on cost caps, and begin decreasing the Navy’s budget 10% per year until the Navy begins obeying Congress.
 
The Navy has forgotten that it serves Congress and the people, not the other way around.
 
 
 
[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 12-Jul-2024, RS20643