In recognition of the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, here’s a couple of related posts that might be of interest.
First is a discussion of one possible future Pearl Harbor scenario involving our biggest naval vulnerability, shipyards and cranes.
"The Next Pearl Harbor – Shipyards"
Second is an alternate history vision of what might have happened if the Japanese had opted to invade and occupy Pearl Harbor after the attack instead of withdrawing.
"Japanese Invasion of Pearl Harbor"
It is no secret that the Navy has nowhere near enough amphibious and logistic support ships to prosecute a sustained war with China. New construction of sufficient numbers and types of ships when war comes will be impossible given the state of US commercial shipbuilding. An alternative to new construction is to acquire and convert commercial ships as was done routinely during WWII, especially at the start of the war.
Consider the case of troop transports. At the start of WWII, we had nowhere near enough Attack Transports which were the backbone of the entire Pacific campaign. Instead, we converted commercial ships to troop transports until we were able to ramp up our wartime shipbuilding. Here’s a few examples:
McCawley Class - The McCawley class consisted of two converted commercial ships built for the American shipping company, Grace Lines, by Furness Shipbuilding Company. The ships were completed in 1928 as Santa Barbara and Santa Maria. They were bought by the Navy in 1940 and converted to troop transports as the USS McCawley (AP-10) and USS Barnett (AP-11).
USS Harry Lee (AP-17) - The Harry Lee was built as the passenger ship SS Exochorda by New York Shipbuilding Co. in 1931 before being acquired by the Navy in Oct-1940 and converted to the Harry Lee (AP-17) in Dec-1940.
USS John Penn (AP-51/APA-23) - The John Penn was built as Excambion in 1931 by the New York Shipbuilding Company as one of American Export Lines's original "Four Aces." She was acquired by the Navy 8-Jan-1942 and converted to a troop transport in Apr-1942.
Even prior to WWI, the US recognized the need for vastly increased numbers of commercial ships that could be converted to wartime use. With the 1916 Shipping Act, Congress established an organization to do just that – the United States Shipping Board which, in turn, founded a business, the Emergency Fleet Corporation whose mission was to acquire merchant ships for war needs.
Paraphrased from various Wikipedia entries,
The Shipping Board had been established while the United States was at peace, with the intent to restore the nation's Merchant Marine.
Ten days after declaration of war, on 16 April 1917, the Board created the Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) in the District of Columbia with a capital stock of $50,000,000. The EFC’s purpose was to acquire, maintain, and operate merchant ships to meet national defense, foreign and domestic commerce during World War I.
When the United States declared war against Germany the purpose and policy of the Shipping Board and the Fleet Corporation changed from a body established to restore the American Merchant Marine to a military organization tasked with providing transport of war materials to Europe.
The EFC was renamed the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation in February 1927, then abolished entirely in October 1936. Its functions were transferred to the United States Maritime Commission.
The EFC operated together with some 80 shipyards throughout the country to design commercial ships suitable for conversion to war use. For example, the Design 1029 ship (full name Emergency Fleet Corporation Design 1029) was a steel-hulled passenger/cargo ship designed to be converted in times of war to a troopship.
Today, China does something along these lines with their commercial ships being designed for rapid conversion to wartime vessels.
We see, then, that acquisition and conversion of merchant ships to wartime use has been a common practice throughout history.
Given our appalling shortage of transport and logistic ships, we will definitely need to acquire and convert merchant ships. Unfortunately, the US flagged merchant fleet is lacking in numbers. The U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, lists only 180 US flagged, privately owned, oceangoing ships of 1,000 tons or greater, as of 2021.[1] The breakdown by type is shown in the table below.
|
Ship Type |
Qty. |
|
Containership |
63 |
|
Dry Bulk |
4 |
|
General Cargo |
20 |
|
Ro-Ro |
26 |
|
Vehicles Carrier |
3 |
|
Tanker |
64 |
|
Total |
180 |
Of the 180 vessels, 157 were deemed militarily useful.[1]
We don’t need to attempt to build more amphibious or logistics ships but we do need to ‘change the landscape’, so to speak, with the following actions:
Most of all, we need some kind of organization tasked with the described acquisition and conversion. It is unclear to me whether such an organization exists within the government/military. The ‘s responsibilities have, over the decades, been diluted and distributed among various organizations such as the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) but none seem to have the charter to produce/ensure that commercial ships are designed for easy and rapid conversion to wartime configurations.
Of course, converted merchant ships won’t be perfect fits for wartime uses since they are, after all, merchant ships at heart. For example, we can easily convert a merchant ship to a troop transport, like we did in WWII, but we can’t convert it to a big deck, aviation ship of the type the Navy currently procures. However, this fits well with the blog’s overall ship design philosophy of single function, cheaper, smaller ships. The Navy needs to institutionally come to grips with this reality – and desirability! We then need to revise our doctrine and operations to include these types of ships instead of the big deck, aviation ships we have today.
One final consideration is the cost of naval amphibious or logistic ships – they’re expensive to buy and operate! By having a fleet of merchant ships capable of being usefully converted to wartime work, the Navy largely avoids the cost of procuring and operating the ships while still having access to the numbers and capabilities the ships represent. Thus, the cost of administering such a program would easily pay for itself.
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Related Note: Following is an example of a commercial ship, the SS United States, designed for conversion to wartime needs. The ship was designed and acquired under the direction of the United States Maritime Commission (MARCOM) which succeeded the United States Shipping Board. From Wikipedia entries,
… the US government sponsored the construction of a large and fast merchant vessel that would be capable of transporting large numbers of soldiers. Designed by American naval architect and marine engineer William Francis Gibbs (1886–1967), the liner's construction was a joint effort by the United States Navy and United States Lines. The US government underwrote $50 million of the $78 million construction cost, with the ship's prospective operators, United States Lines, contributing the remaining $28 million. In exchange, the ship was designed to be easily converted in times of war to a troopship. The ship has a capacity of 15,000 troops, and could also be converted to a hospital ship.
The vessel was constructed from 1950 to 1952 at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. The hull was constructed in a dry dock. United States was built to exacting Navy specifications, which required that the ship be heavily compartmentalized, and have separate engine rooms to optimize wartime survival.[2]
 |
| SS United States |
____________________________________
[1]https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-04/DS_USFlag-Fleet_2021_0316_Bundle.pdf
[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_United_States
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The Navy, today, seems to have a fascination with small guns – the smaller the better, it seems. The Constellation FFG, for example, has an incredibly small gun given the size and role of the ship. Following is a table of some smaller ships and the guns they carried. The list is sorted by gun size. It’s illuminating, to say the least.
Note that the Constellation FFG, despite being the largest ship listed by a significant margin has the smallest gun. Also, note that the two most modern ships in the list are also the two lightest armed.
|
Ship Type |
Ship Length, ft |
Gun(s) |
Gun Range, yds |
|
Knox Class FFG |
438 |
1x 5” (127mm) |
25,000 |
|
Landing Craft LSM(R) |
203 |
1x 5” (127mm) |
17,500 |
|
Flower Class Corvette |
205 |
1x 4” (102mm) |
13,850 |
|
Perry Class FFG |
453 |
1x 3” (76mm) |
20,122 |
|
Harris Class APA |
435 |
4x 3” (76mm) |
14,600 |
|
Buckley Class DE |
306 |
3x 3” (76mm) |
14,600 |
|
Gato Class Submarine |
311 |
1x 3” (76mm) |
14,600 |
|
Pegasus Class PHM |
133 |
1x 3” (76mm) |
20,122 |
|
LCS - Freedom |
378 |
1x 2” (57mm) |
19,000 |
|
LCS - Independence |
418 |
1x 2” (57mm) |
19,000 |
|
Constellation FFG |
496 |
1x 2” (57mm) |
19,000 |
Naval guns are no longer considered main weapons but still … this is embarrassing. If this trend keeps up, it won’t be long before our main naval gun will be a guy with a pistol sitting in a lawn chair on the bow. Or, maybe we’ll upgrade to a dual mount with two guys sitting side by side?
I’m seeing more and more examples of military observers and analysts drawing conclusions about future warfare from the Ukraine-Russia war, particularly as they relate to unmanned assets.
I suspect most of the desire to draw conclusions and lessons stems not from any attempt to better understand combat but, rather, to support pre-existing opinions and positions. For example, the US military, having long ago staked out a firm commitment to unmanned assets, despite absolutely no supporting evidence of their high end combat effectiveness, is eager to latch onto any glimmer of news that would support and justify continued funding of unmanned forces. Whether those conclusions and lessons would apply to any but an unbelievably incompetent enemy like Russia, is of no concern to US military leadership. Their concern is to use the ‘lessons’ to obtain continued (or increased!) funding from Congress.
I cannot stress enough that the Ukraine-Russia war is exquisitely unique – and largely useless – as it relates to war with China. Russia has been astoundingly inept in every facet of war. It is extremely unlikely that China will be equally inept. Therefore, attempts to draw lessons from Ukraine-Russia are likely invalid.
More and more observers and analysts are latching onto unmanned assets as the future of combat based on the Ukraine-Russia results. If we fight an utterly inept enemy then, yes, the lessons will be valid. However, does anyone really believe that China will be so inept as to allow unmanned boats to approach naval assets unobserved and unhindered? Does anyone really believe that China will be so inept as to allow UAVs to fly over the battlefield unobserved and unhindered?
Consider the highly publicized Ukrainian unmanned suicide drone boats (USV) that are reported to have attacked Russian naval forces at Sevastopol. Each quarter million dollar boat is reported to be 18 ft long with a payload of 400 lbs and a range of 500 miles and a maximum speed of 50 mph.[1] That’s nice, I suppose, but in a harbor the boats can be thwarted by simple patrol boats, booms, nets, or a guy sitting on a lawn chair with binoculars. At sea, radar, optical sensors and lookouts are sufficient to detect the boats. We claim to have radars that can detect periscopes at vast ranges; how difficult would it be to detect these boats? I can’t imagine China allowing these USVs to approach their naval forces undetected and unhindered. So before we scrap our Burkes and commit to a fleet of these USVs, we need to understand what kind of threat, if any, they pose to an enemy that is even slightly competent.
 |
| Ukraine Drone Boat |
 |
| Drone Boats |
 |
| Drone Boat - Note Wake at Speed |
Similarly, we see observers latching onto reports of Ukrainian UAVs leisurely cruising the skies over the battlefield and sniping/suiciding Russian forces. Again, I can’t imagine China allowing UAVs to cruise over the battlefield undetected and unhindered. We wouldn’t allow it so why would we think China will? In fact, the US military has already stated that large UAVs are not survivable over the battlefield.
Unless we have reason to believe that China will perform just as incompetently, we should be very , very, very, very, wary of drawing conclusions and lessons from the Ukraine war.
___________________________________
[1]The Drive website, “Ukraine’s Shadowy Kamikaze Drone Boats Officially Break Cover”, Howard Altman, 11-Nov-2022,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-shadowy-kamikaze-drone-boats-officially-break-cover
As we’ve often discussed, the Marines currently have an identity crisis. They have no viable mission or, at least, none that they’re articulating very well. We’ve discussed this and offered our view of things. Now, let’s approach this from the Marine’s side of things. What do the Marines think about themselves as documented in their own Force Design 2030 annual update report for 2022? As we look at this, bear in mind that the document is written by the Marines and, as such, is a self-congratulatory, public relations piece. Still, let’s see what we can learn about the Marines from their own mouth.
Campaign of Learning - One of the interesting sections of the report is titled, Key Findings From the Campaign Of Learning. For those of you who might be unfamiliar with The Campaign of Learning, it is described as an on-going series of examinations to ensure that the Marines are covering all the bases and making all the right decisions. An alternative description might be that it is a public relations exercise designed to validate decisions already made. Be that as it may, let’s see what the Marines claim to have learned.
Regarding the Campaign, itself,
This past year we invested in the Campaign of Learning itself by taking a more structured approach to collaborating with partners and by applying sophisticated modeling and simulation methods and tools. This is reflected through the refinement and analysis of mission engineering threads we developed in partnership with the Navy.[1]
How’s that for some Class A, unadulterated, worthless, buzzword vomit?
Communications - Moving on, we come to our first nugget of useful information:
Our FD 2030 communication has not been effective with all stakeholders.[1]
Read the phrase, ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’, and remember that statement was written by a Marine Corps desperately trying to put the best possible spin on it. If ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’ is the best possible spin, what are they really saying when the spin is removed? They’re saying that they’ve had an abysmal communications failure that has utterly failed to convince people and generate support.
On the one hand, it’s good that the Commandant recognizes his communication failure but, on the other hand, he clearly has no intention of actually communicating any useful information. Secrecy has been the hallmark of his vision and there is no sign that anything about that will change. If you recall, the Marines promised to begin releasing information about their wargames, as documented in the passage below.
MCWL will publish unclassified executive summaries of all Service-level war game reports related to FD 2030 no later than 1 November 2022 and make these available on the FD 2030 website. Going forward, MCWL will publish unclassified versions of all Service-level war game reports within 90 days of event completion.[1]
To date, I’ve heard found no information about war games. Commandant, are you puzzled why you have a communications failure? You promised information and have not provided anything useful. There’s your problem.
Here’s the referenced FD2030 website, as best I can tell:
https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/
Missions - Here’s an interesting tidbit:
… a modernized Marine Corps must still be capable of performing global crisis response operations.[1]
On the face of it, this suggests that the Marines want to maintain their traditional roles and missions while adding the small unit, missile-shooting force. That might be fine except that their actions, as opposed to their words, point to an abandonment of their traditional roles and missions. They’ve totally eliminated tanks, the most powerful weapon they had and significantly reduced artillery, their second most powerful weapon, while simultaneously publicly stating that they are out of the amphibious assault business. Does that sound like they want to ‘still be capable of performing global crisis response operations‘? This statement sounds to me like they’re trying to hang on to their traditional funding while abandoning the missions. This demonstrates the identity confusion that has gripped the Corps.
Effectiveness - Continuing, we find what may be the most profound passage in the document:
… our initial observations linked to A Concept for Stand-in Forces, especially for reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, indicate we focused the MLR [ed. Marine Littoral Regiment] too much on lethality and not enough on sensing, the ability to make sense, maneuverability, and deception. While our initial assumptions about the value of the MLR to the FMF and fleets were anchored on the enhanced lethality it could provide via long-range fires, further analysis demonstrates the even greater value of resilient sensing and enabling of kill chains.[1]
What they’re saying that they found that the small, missile-shooting units could not produce enough lethality to make a difference. This is exactly what we’ve discussed many times. A handful of scattered units, working with only a handful of missiles, and lacking any long range targeting, simply can’t generate any significant combat impact. That’s just common sense that becomes readily apparent with just a moment of logical consideration. You didn’t need a Campaign of Learning to come to that conclusion but, hey, better incredibly late than never.
Re-read the quote and un-spin it. It’s saying that the Marines have come to the realization that the Commandant’s vision of defeating China with a handful of missile-shooting, platoon size units is not viable.
It is noteworthy that they are belatedly recognizing that simple surveillance may be more useful than a scattering of nearly useless missiles. This is the old WWII coastwatcher concept. Of course, this doesn’t require entire Marine Littoral Regiments and a fleet of Light Amphibious Warships (LAW). A couple of guys with binoculars and a radio can do the job. Perhaps this is also why the Navy seems so unenthused about acquiring the LAW. If the Marines would give up on the missile-shooting and convert to simple surveillance than the Campaign of Learning would have been worth the effort and the Marines would have a worthwhile, if exceedingly small, mission.
Of course, if coastwatching is the new mission, one can’t help but wonder why we need the Marines when we already have an abundance of SEALs who could do the job. But, I digress …
Logistics - Here’s an issue that has screamed for an explanation since day one and yet gone unaddressed the entire time:
To persist inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone, our Stand-in Forces must be set and sustained by logistics capabilities designed for distributed operations over long distances in a contested environment.[1]
How long have I been harping on this gap in the Commandant’s concept? So far, the Marines have hand-waved away the challenge of transporting, landing, establishing, and resupplying a force without detection. The challenge seems impossible under the conditions of the concept and the Marines have utterly ignored it, at least publicly. Now, it seems some glimmer of recognition of the problem has emerged. The statement sums up the requirement – that is, a logistic contribution under challenging circumstances – yet still ignores the solution. Oh well … I’ll keep harping on it.
By the way, you recall the recent post wherein the Marines stated that the LAW would never operate in a combat zone (see, “The LAW is Confusing”)? Is the above quote the first public glimmer of recognition that the LAW concept is not viable?
Delusional Foundation – The following statement exemplifies the delusional foundation of the Marine’s missile-shooting concept:
Our continued experimentation demonstrates that infantry and LAR battalions that field teams or small units with the organic ability to sense, decide, and shoot have a competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield.[1]
If small units truly have an inherent competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield, why do we have brigades, divisions, and armies? Why do we have tanks and artillery? Wouldn’t a handful of squads be sufficient to win any war? Reality, as seen through history, demonstrates the opposite: that small units are simply targets waiting to die and that massed firepower is what wins battles and wars.
Summary
So, what do the Marines say about themselves in the Force Design 2030 annual update report?
That’s what they say. However, it is clear that the Force Design 2030 annual update report is heavy on spin and light on reality. The impression one gets is that the Marines – meaning the Commandant – are brooking no alternative opinions or dissent and that the report is purely a public relations tool intended to support continued or increased funding. However, an analytical reading and ‘un-spinning’ of the document reveals numerous serious problems, as we’ve just discussed, and suggests that the Marines, themselves, are beginning to recognize and, ever so grudgingly, admit that the Commandant’s grand vision is not viable. The Commandant won’t say it in those words, of course, but the ‘un-spun’ reading is saying it. The Commandant won’t easily give up his dream but the handwriting is on the wall. When his term expires in July of 2023, I suspect his successor will begin walking back the Commandant’s failed vision.
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[1]Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022
The Marine’s new Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program is a mystery. The Marines have repeatedly stated publicly that they’re out of the frontal amphibious assault business which instantly raises the question, why do they need ACVs? From their statements, the Marines should be shedding ACVs, not buying them and yet, from a recent Breaking Defense website article,
The Pentagon announced it was purchasing an additional 30 Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACVs) for $153 million … [1]
 |
| No Justification = Accelerated Acquisition? |
To date, the service has purchased roughly 260 ACVs in previous years and are expected to purchase 74 in fiscal 2023, including the 30 announced this week.[1]
The Marine Corps’ goal for the program is to buy 632 Amphibious Combat Vehicles to replace the legacy fleet of Amphibious Assault Vehicles.[1][3]
This makes absolutely no sense. Even the Marine’s ACV acquisition program acknowledged the reduced need for ACVs as evidenced by a sharp reduction in acquisition quantity plans.
Last year [2020], the Marine Corps reported a plan to manufacture 1,122 production vehicles, but according to program officials, the amount was reduced as part of the Marine Corps’ Force Design restructure that was formalized in August 2020.[2]
So, the Marines appear to recognize that the justification for the ACV has decreased and yet they continue to acquire the vehicles in substantial quantities. Given their unhesitating leap to eliminate their entire tank inventory, one would think that, logically, they would eliminate their ACV inventory, as well.
Despite the lack of justification, the Marines are not only pushing ahead with acquisitions but are also pushing ahead with development of additional ACV variants.
The four planned variants will include a personnel variant, a command and control variant, a recovery variant and a 30-mm gun variant.[1]
As noted in the 2021 GAO annual report,
… the ACV contractor plans to deliver three production-representative ACV-C [command and control variant] prototypes to support testing in fiscal year 2021 and start production of the first 10 ACV-Cs in fiscal year 2022.[2]
If all they want the ACV for is to use it as a low end armored personnel carrier (APC), there are much better, proven APCs available on the market.
Alternatively, the $2B being spent on the ACV program [2] could be much better spent on anti-air defense vehicles and systems, anti-UAV systems, electronic warfare systems, self-propelled artillery vehicles, etc.
The ACV program seems to be inherently contradictory. The Marines say they are out of the assault business and, indeed, have eliminated all their tanks and much of their artillery, which would be vital in supporting assaults, while also shifting their focus to small, missile-shooting, platoon size units that are supposed to act as deterrents more so than combat forces. Despite this, they continue to acquire ACVs whose main purpose is amphibious assault – the very mission the Marines have publicly abandoned. Huh????
The Marines are confused and seem to have no consistent purpose or core reason for existence and the illogic of the ACV acquisition program typifies their confusion.
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Marine Corps buys 30 more ACVs following rough year of waterborne ops training”, Justin Katz, 17-Nov-2022,
[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2021
[3]Reference [2] cites a total acquisition of 678 ACV
