High Speed Transport

Here’s a topic that was inspired by reader “Jjabatie” in the “Buckley Vs. Constellation” post.

 

As we know, the Marines have come up with … how can I put this somewhat politely? … an ill-conceived concept to insert small units onto far forward bases and shoot missiles at passing ships while also hunting subs.  The key to this scheme is a new class of … how can I put this somewhat politely? … ill-conceived Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships that are small, slow, not particularly stealthy, and have no defenses.  The idea is that these LAWs would transport troops and supplies to, and between, various islands while making round trips for resupply … all while China remains oblivious (from laughter, one presumes).

 

Okay, this concept is idiotic but there is a historical antecedent at least for the type of small transport that the Marines describe and one whose characteristics would much better serve the concept.  I’m talking about the WWII high speed transport.

 

In WWII, with a need to move smaller units of troops between islands, some destroyer escorts were converted to high speed transports (APD). 

 

From Wikipedia,

 

APDs performed arduous service. They transported troops to beachheads, served as escorts for transports and supply vessels, conducted anti-submarine patrols and survey duties, operated with Underwater Demolition Teams and commando units, performed messenger and transport duties, conveyed passengers and mail to and from forward units, and were involved in minesweeping operations.

 

Typical of these ADPs were the 90+ Buckley and Rudderow class conversions. 

 

USS Bowers (DE-637 / APD-40);  Buckley class APD conversion;

note 5" gun forward and landing craft in davits

 

As an example, in the Buckley conversions, the superstructure was enlarged to house some 160 troops.  This provided a useful degree of both troop and cargo transport capacity while also retaining a useful defensive and ground support capability.  The Buckley’s weapons fit was changed to: (1)

 

• 1x 5-inch/38 dual purpose gun
• 3x twin 40mm gun
• 6x single 20mm gun
• 2x depth charge tracks
• 3x torpedo tubes
• 8x K-gun depth charge launchers

 

Thanks to their 5” gun (upgraded from a 3” gun!), the APDs could provide a degree of fire support for their embarked troops.

 

Of course, the ships retained their inherent speed and maneuverability.

 

Notably, the APDs typically carried four LCVPs (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel) in davits.

 

The destroyer history website lists the following specs: (1)

 

Troop capacity: Officers:  12; Enlisted: 150.

Troop accoutrements:  4x LCVP landing craft; 6x 1/4 ton trucks; 2x 1 ton trucks; 4x ammunition carts; 4x pack howitzers.

Ammunition:  6,000 cubic feet.

General cargo:  3,500 cubic feet.

Gasoline:  1,000 cubic feet.

 

 

Compare the WWII APDs with the Marine’s LAW (see, “Berger’s Amphibious Warships”, “Light Amphibious Warship Update 1”, and “Light Amphibious Warship Update 2”) and we see that the APD specs put the LAW to shame in every conceivable way.  If the Marines insist on pushing ahead with their idiotic scheme, an APD type vessel would make far more sense.

 

 

 

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(1)https://destroyerhistory.org/de/apd/

Burke Close In Defense

Here’s a simple awareness post.  Are you aware that our main (and only!) surface combatant has almost no close in self-defense weapon fit?  It consists of a single aft mounted CIWS and … nothing else.

 

As an example, here is a photo, dated 13-Oct-2009, of the USS McCampbell (DDG-85) showing the single aft mounted CIWS and … nothing else.

USS McCampbell - Note the single CIWS aft.

 Again, here is a Jul 2016 photo showing the Spruance and Momsen with no forward CIWS.

Spruance and Momsen without forward CIWS

Lest you think there was some temporary shortage of CIWS and that the ships have since been equipped, here is a photo of USS Nitze (DDG-94) dated 12-Oct-2020 and it shows the same single CIWS configuration.

USS Nitze, DDG-94

Although exact information is hard to come by it appears that DDG-51 to DDG-84 have two CIWS and DDG-85 on have only a single CIWS.  None have RAM or SeaRAM.

Alternatively, SeaRAM appears to have been installed on four Burkes (DDG-64, DDG-71, DDG-75, DDG-78) in place of their CIWS. 

 

Here is a Feb 2021 photo of USS Carney (DDG-64) showing a SeaRAM in place of the aft CIWS mount.

USS Carney with aft SeaRAM in place of CIWS

I don’t know whether the Navy’s experiment with SeaRAM will be continued and expanded or not.  New construction ships do not appear to show any SeaRAM so I’m assuming this is a dead end trend but we’ll see.

So, what’s the problem with only a single close in weapon system?  As we’ve previously demonstrated, naval anti-air engagements are likely to start at the horizon rather than hundreds of miles out as the Navy seems to believe (see, “Detection and Engagement Range”).  That means there will only be time for a few defensive missile launches which, in turn, means that close in weapon systems will assume vital importance.  Given the likelihood of saturation attacks and the number of missile likely to get through the very brief medium range (horizon) ESSM engagement zone, large numbers of close in weapons will be needed.  A single CIWS is going to be quickly overwhelmed.

 

The more recent CIWS versions have a ready magazine of 1550 rounds and a firing rate of 4500 rds/min.  That means the CIWS has a total firing time of 20 seconds before the ammo drum is depleted.  Even if one optimistically assumes, say, 5 seconds per engagement, that’s only 4 engagements before the CIWS is rendered inoperative due to emptying the ammo drum.  Yes, the drum can be replaced but that is a manual operation and time consuming.  Any attack will be over long before reload occurs.  The arithmetic makes it painfully obvious that a ship needs several CIWS to have any chance of survival.

 

Another problem is CIWS coverage area.  As you can see, the aft CIWS covers only the aft 180 deg or so sector.  Our main surface ship doesn’t even have full 360 deg close in defensive coverage!  If a missile approaches from a forward aspect, Burkes have no close in defense whatsoever!  Our main surface warship has no close in defensive coverage for half its aspect??!

 

I wonder if the lack of CIWS installations is the result of the Navy having bet – and lost! – that fully functional AAW lasers would be available by now and that the Navy could, therefore, save money by not installing CIWS?  That’s pure speculation on my part but it certainly fits nicely with the way the Navy thinks, doesn’t it?

 

 

In any case, we need to immediately begin adding CIWS and/or SeaRAM mounts to our Burke class destroyers.  We might also begin considering new forms of close in AAW defense (see, “A New AAW”).

 

Buckley vs. Constellation

As naval observers and analysts, we need a solid grounding in naval history.  The Navy is currently in the process of designing and building an ?ASW? frigate, the Constellation class.  Functionally, the WWII analog to the Constellation would be the Buckley class destroyer escort (DE), the iconic DE of WWII.  Let’s refresh our memory about the Buckley class DE and see how it compares to the Constellation.

 

The Buckley was an ocean going, anti-submarine (ASW) vessel.  As such, it was optimized for ASW and, more importantly, minimized for ASW.  Huh?  Minimized for ASW?  Yes!  This is another way of saying that it had a single, primary purpose as opposed to being a multi-function design.  It was built for ASW and nothing else (hence, the minimized statement!).

 

Here’s a brief comparison of the Buckley and the Constellation FFG.

 

	Buckley	Constellation
Length, ft	306	496
Displacement, tons	1740	7291
Speed, kts	26	26
Range, nm	5500 @ 15 kts	6000 @ 16 kts

 

 

USS Buckley

Role - DE’s were intended to be ocean-going ASW vessels, providing escort for convoys and acting as dedicated submarine hunters (often as part of escort carrier hunter-killer groups).  Notably, they were not normally carrier and battleship group escorts – that role being generally filled by destroyers.

 

Constellation is, presumably, intended to be the Navy’s main ASW surface ship although the limited numbers render that intent nearly irrelevant barring a massive wartime construction program.  Unfortunately, the Constellation design also attempts to be an area anti-air warfare (AAW) ship with VLS, Standard SM-2 Blk IIIC missiles, and SPY-6 Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) and an ASuW ship … in other words, it’s a do-everything, mini-Burke that is not specialized or optimized for anything.

 

Design Focus - As mentioned, the DE was a very focused, limited design.  Nothing was added to the design that was not absolutely required for the role.  One of the key aspects of the design was the recognition that the DE’s combat risk was limited due to the role’s reduced likelihood of combat.  The reduced combat risk allowed for reduced armor, reduced armament, and reduced sensors.  Contrast that with today’s attempts to include every capability, sensor, and weapon on every ship which, automatically, makes every ship over-spec’ed and over-priced.

 

Numbers – Because the DE was a focused, limited design, they were cheap and several hundred were built in WWII.  Enemy submarines will go to great lengths to avoid detection (translate:  mission kill) and the DE’s large numbers allowed them to be everywhere and hindered submarine operations by their mere presence as much or more than their actual combat actions.  In contrast, there are only 20 Constellations planned and they’re likely to cost $1B+.  History suggests that even this meager number of ships will be reduced.  Twenty ships – if that – are not going to be much of a hindrance. 

 

Range – It is noteworthy that the Buckley is half the size of the Constellation and has the same range.  We’ve forgotten what we were once capable of designing in a ship! 

 

Size – Buckley’s focused and minimized design allowed a much smaller size;  compare the Buckley to the Constellation’s much greater size which equates to much greater relative cost for what ought to be the same mission as Buckley.

 

Armament – A direct comparison between the Buckley and Constellation is meaningless as the weapons are from different eras but it is interesting to note the weapon density of the Buckley: 

• 3x 3"/50 guns
• 1x Bofors twin 40 mm gun
• 8x 20 mm Oerlikon AA guns
• 1x Hedgehog, 24 round, 144 rounds total
• 200x depth charges in stern racks and eight K-gun depth charge throwers
• 3x 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes in a triple mount

 

While we can’t directly compare the weapons of the two classes, it is, as we said, worth noting the weapon density of the Buckley and that density is hammered home by examining photos of the ship which show weapons mounted in almost every available space.  WWII ship designers understood that numbers of weapons mattered and Buckley had every weapon it needed and in sufficient numbers.  In contrast, the Constellation lacks one of the main ASW weapons, the VL-ASROC, and has only a single close in weapon, the RAM, with only 21 rounds per use.  The Buckley’s 3x 3”/50 guns (76 mm) put the Constellation’s single 57 mm gun armament to shame.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The Buckley class had the same speed, range, and role as the Constellation but was half the size, or less.  What’s wrong with this picture?

 

What’s wrong is that the Constellation is unfocused and, therefore, large and expensive (only building 20!).  Yeah, but it can fill multiple roles!  No, not really.  The area AAW role, for example, will be filled by the Burkes, not the Constellations so what’s the point of giving them an area AAW role?  It just increases the size, complexity, and cost of the Constellation.

 

The Buckley was an example of a focused design that was optimized for its intended role of ASW and, as a result, was cheap enough to risk in battle and cheap enough to procure in large numbers.  In short, the Buckley was an excellent example of intelligent naval force structure design.  It was everything it needed to be and nothing it didn’t.  We would do well to take that lesson to heart.

Maternity Flight Suit

Here’s the new maternity flight suit.

 

 This is everything that is wrong with the Navy.

Feelings Are More Important Than Standards

Navy Times website has an article about the CO, Cmdr. Frank Azzarello, of the USS Forrest Sherman who was ostensibly fired for trying to make a commemorative trophy out of a seized AK-47.(1)  The article presents a much more in-depth description of what got the CO fired and it boils down to accusations that the CO was routinely abusive, foul-mouthed, and demanding.

 

I’ll leave it to you to read the article and draw your own conclusion although I’ll note that we have no way of knowing the truth of the matter so any conclusion you or I may draw is purely speculative.  That said, reading between the lines strongly suggests to me that this was a case of a CO attempting to set standards, demanding people meet those standards, and actively trying to get rid of those who would not or could not meet them.

 

Some examples that lead me to my conclusion:

 

“I have seen officers called idiots, retarded or useless wastes,” one anonymous crew member wrote in a command climate survey cited in the investigation. (1)

 

Given the demonstrated propensity for naval officers to fail at the most basic seamanship tasks, run their ships aground, collide with merchant ships, and surrender to Iranians, it is obvious that a significant percentage of naval officers are, indeed, ‘idiots, retarded or useless wastes’ and by saying so the CO is merely stating a fact rather than being abusive.

 

Consider this example,

 

“Get your hands out of your pockets when you speak to me, you son of a bitch,” one officer recounted Azzarello saying … (1)

 

So now we’re firing COs for demanding a degree of respect from junior officers?

 

Apparently, the CO opted to try to get rid of poor performers as evidenced by this passage,

 

It found that Azzarello … overused letters of instruction with junior officers, allegedly in the name of booting underperformers off his ship. (1)

 

A CO that tries to get rid of poor performers?  Good!  We need much more of that.

 

Perhaps he is one officer who understands the potentially fatal results of poor performing officers.  Consider the CO’s statement,

 

Azzarello told investigators of responding to the 2012 collision of the U.S. destroyer Porter with a supertanker in the Persian Gulf, and how he ran the basic division officer course for a year following the fatal Fitzgerald and John S. McCain collisions.

 

“I admit that I am passionate, intense, aggressive, sarcastic, direct and sometimes use colorful language,” Azzarello said in a statement at his NJP hearing. “I am painfully aware of the potentially deadly impacts of substandard watchstanding.” (1)

 

 

While the CNO of the Navy and the rest of Navy leadership ignored the multiple groundings and collisions, this CO apparently took the lessons to heart and demanded performance.  Good!

 

Here’s another disturbing example,

 

The anonymous IG complaint against Azzarello also accused him of assault while he was serving as executive officer of Vella Gulf before arriving at Forrest Sherman.

 

During the summer of 2018, Azzarello “repeatedly poked” the ship’s ordnance officer “in the collarbone area while alone in his cabin following an issue with preparations for a maintenance spot check.”

 

The officer later “noted that the area was sore and tender following the alleged interaction.” (1)

 

The disturbing part is not the alleged ‘assault’ – which apparently consists of ‘poking’ an officer – but the fact that the officer on the receiving end considers being ‘poked’ an assault.  This is not someone I’d want to go into battle with.  I want people who are tough enough to take a ‘poke’ and not break down into a simpering, sobbing mess who needs someone to fight his battles for him.

 

Here’s a comment from a Bradley Martin, a retired SWO,

 

“Holding people to standards is essential, but simply berating them just demotivates them,” he added. “That doesn’t improve, it just makes them feel bad.” (1)

 

‘Feel bad’?  Oh no.  We don’t want people to feel bad.  What does Mr. Martin think the enemy will do to these people in a war?  They’ll do a lot more than make them feel bad.  If you don’t want to feel bad and be criticized, how about improving your performance?

 

What did the ship’s department heads think?

 

The ship’s department heads “noted no significant issues, with several noting that the ship was a professional work environment,” the investigator wrote. (1)

 

Could it be that they supported the CO’s efforts to set standards?

 

Let me repeat … I have no way of knowing the true story here – and neither do you – but reading between the lines sounds like a CO’s attempt to correct the litany of everything that’s wrong with the Navy and, predictably, the Navy opted for public relations over standards and performance.

 

 

 

 

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(1)Navy Times, “‘Passion bordering on anger’: The inside story behind the CO’s firing on the destroyer Forrest Sherman”,Geoff Ziezulewicz, 23-Jun-2021,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/06/22/passion-bordering-on-anger-the-inside-story-behind-the-cos-firing-on-the-destroyer-forrest-sherman/

(2)https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy-uss-forrest-sherman-captain-fired-abusive-language/

4th of July

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. …

Read and Analyze

Lately, the blog has been getting a number of commenters repeating claims from various sources that, upon analysis, turn out to be highly suspect.

 

This blog rarely reports news.  Instead, it analyzes news.  This analysis takes the form of intelligent questioning of the news, asking whether what has been reported actually makes sense and agrees with other bits of data.  Far too often, the naval news of the day fails to withstand the scrutiny of intelligent analysis.  Manufacturer’s claims, Navy claims, and naval observer/analyst claims are almost invariably overstated or just flat out wrong.  Blog readers/commenters are, likewise, encouraged to read with analytical and questioning intelligence rather than just accepting what they read out in the wild – it’s safe on this blog to accept what you read but everywhere else …

 

Let’s hammer this home with a very recent example.

 

From a Naval News website article comes this breathless report of ‘Sea Breaker’, a new cruise missile from Rafael that will revolutionize warfare (that’s what, the five thousandth reported ‘revolutionary’ weapon development just this year?).  After citing an endless list of amazing capabilities, the article closes with this statement about the missile:

 

… ensuring a high probability of mission success, with a 250 lb. penetration, blast and fragmentation warhead, making a single hit effective enough to neutralize a frigate-sized ship. (1)

 

Wow!  One hit neutralizes a frigate size ship.  That’s tremendous.   …  …  Or is it?  Is a 250 lb warhead really enough to ‘neutralize’ (whatever that means) a frigate size ship?  Let’s briefly step through the analytical examination.

 

What do we know?

 

Well, it’s a given that the manufacturer didn’t actually shoot any missiles at a frigate so there’s no actual data.  That alone casts doubt on the claim.

 

Since there is no actual data, what about historical evidence that could shed light on the claim?  What about the Perry class frigate, the USS Stark, that was hit by not one but two Exocet missiles on 17-May of 1987.  Let’s look up the Exocet missile warhead size …    Hmmm …    Wiki gives an Exocet missile warhead size of 364 lbs which is 114 lb greater than the Sea Breaker.  Reports suggest that the first Exocet did not explode but did deposit several hundred lbs of burning fuel (very short missile travel time) causing fires at 3500 degF.(2)  The second missile did explode and also contributed burning fuel.

 

Having read the book, ‘Missile Inbound’ (see, the post “Missile Inbound” for a review of the book), which tells the story of the attack and the subsequent damage control efforts, we know that the ship was ‘neutralized’ to a degree, depending on the definition of ‘neutralized’.  Fires were extinguished within 20 hrs and the ship arrived in Bahrain the day after the attack. 

 

So, we can now ask ourselves, does it seem likely that a single 250 lb warhead can ‘neutralize’ a frigate given the example of the Stark surviving two significantly larger missiles plus well over a thousand lbs of burning fuel?  Or, is the manufacturer’s claim overstated?

USS Stark Damage

 

I’m not going to offer an opinion since the purpose of the post is to illustrate the analytical process and encourage readers to do the same in their own reading.  The point is that we have to stop accepting claims at face value and start analyzing them intelligently.

 

 

 

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(1)Naval News website, “Rafael Unveils A New Long Range Guided Missile System, ‘Sea Breaker’”, Martin Manaranche, 30-Jun-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/06/rafael-unveils-a-new-long-range-guided-missile-system-sea-breaker/

 

(2)https://news.usni.org/2017/05/17/the-attack-uss-stark-at-30