Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Agreement

After Ukraine voted for independence in 1991 and the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine retained a very large complement of nuclear weapons.  The country agreed to give up those weapons in exchange for security assurances.  The 1994 Trilateral Statement and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances involving Russia, the US, the UK, and Ukraine finalized the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine in exchange for assurances that Russia would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. (1,2)  Of course, in 2014 Russia invaded Crimea and officially announced their annexation of the territory.  This was quickly followed by a thinly veiled proxy invasion of the rest of Ukraine.

So, how did that security agreement work out for you, there, Ukraine?

The only real point to this post is that international agreements with our ‘enemies’ are often of little value or lasting applicability.  In particular, Russia, Iran, and China have been shown that they will adhere to agreements only as long as it suits their purposes and will abandon/violate those agreements without a second thought when doing so is to their advantage.

In our zeal to secure ‘peace’ we need to be exceedingly careful about agreements with enemies and recognize that those agreements are nearly worthless.

One might note that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and wound up being invaded.  ‘Might makes right’ is still a viable geopolitical factor in the world despite the desire of the US to view the world as a loving and caring place where everyone can be trusted.

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(1)NPR website, “The Role Of 1994 Nuclear Agreement In Ukraine's Current State”, 9-Mar-2014,

https://www.npr.org/2014/03/09/288298641/the-role-of-1994-nuclear-agreement-in-ukraines-current-state

(2)https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Ukraine-Nuclear-Weapons

Roles - Cruiser

Continuing our ‘roles’ theme (see, “Roles – Frigate”), let’s now examine cruisers.  What’s a cruiser?  Well, one classic and pretty good definition is that it’s a ship that’s strong enough to defeat anything it can’t outrun and fast enough to outrun anything it can’t defeat.  This concept can be traced back to the frigates in the age of sail.  Despite their name, sailing frigates did not give rise to modern frigates.  Instead, they filled the role that eventually became the modern cruiser.

Sailing frigates acted as scouts for the main fleet or acted independently by providing a cheap, plentiful, and reasonably powerful presence intended to keep/enforce the peace, secure trade routes, provide security from pirates and opportunistic foreign ships, provide a means of communication (if not particularly rapid communications), escort convoys, and generally patrol an area while upholding and reinforcing the parent country’s territorial claims and interests.

The English Navy’s famed frigates and captains, such as HMS Indefatigable and Edward Pellew, set the standard that would, ultimately, lead to modern cruisers.

HMS Indefatigable

Similarly, the United States’ sailing ship USS Constitution might be considered a prototype cruiser.  It was well armed and strong enough to defeat all existing frigates and even some larger ships and fast enough to run from any ship of the line that it couldn’t defeat.

When the age of sail gave way to steam and steel, the vastness of oceans and empires gave rise to the first modern cruisers such as the USS Olympia, Commodore Dewey’s flagship at the Battle of Manila Bay during the Spanish American War.  In keeping with the sailing frigates, cruisers were seen as ocean-ranging commerce raiders, scouts, and, often, the backbone of small surface groups.  Cruisers often were designed with great speed to enable them to operate with destroyers and to cover large areas quickly in the scouting role.  For example, the American Chester class ‘scout cruiser’, built beginning in 1905, was designed with high speed but light armor and armament.  Thus, cruisers of this era were used as ubiquitous global ‘presence’ ships while the battle line generally stayed in home waters.

USS Olympia

The advent of aircraft further emphasized the cruiser’s role as a scout as the cruisers now had the means to greatly extend their ‘sensor’ range.  The Brooklyn class light cruiser of the mid-1930’s, for example, carried 4 floatplanes and 2 catapults.

USS Brooklyn CL-40

In more modern times, the definition of a cruiser was a ship that was bigger than a destroyer and smaller than a battleship.  This was more a description than a definition, however.  Still, prior to the advent of WWII, the scouting role was still emphasized and cruisers were often used as scouts for the battle line. 

WWII saw the development of a wide range of cruisers from light anti-aircraft cruisers such as the Atlanta class which was armed with 5” guns to the near-battleship Alaska class cruisers with a main battery of nine 12” guns and heavy armor.  The range of designs reflected the range of missions that cruisers were used for.  The missions included,

• Scouting (early war)
•  Anti-air escort
•  Land bombardment
•  Independent surface group core

Thus, the WWII cruiser was, in a sense, a ship type that didn’t have a clearly defined role.  As an overall group of ships, cruisers could be considered multi-function ships in an era of single function design.  However, on closer examination, the multiple functions were filled not by one design type but by several designs, each specialized and optimized for the intended role.  Thus, the Atlanta class anti-air cruiser had numerous 5” anti-air guns while the Alaska class heavy gun cruiser was optimized for anti-surface and land attack.  So, while the overall classification of cruiser performed many roles, the roles were actually filled by purpose designed, single function classes.

Atlanta Class Anti-Aircraft Cruiser

The last true US cruisers were the California and Virginia classes – ‘true’ in the sense that they had a nice balance of speed, firepower, size, flag facilities, and some armor.  Their replacement, the Ticonderoga class, which the Navy labeled a cruiser, was just a modification of the Spruance class destroyer intended to fill the anti-air role and had none of the physical or operational characteristics of a cruiser.

This brings us to consider the question, what is a modern cruiser and what is its role?

The modern cruiser is represented by the American Ticonderoga class, the Chinese Type 055, and the SKorean Sejong the Great.  The common attribute among these is that all are focused on anti-air warfare.  Thus, they are defensive escorts rather than the scouts or independent sailors of earlier times.

Sejong the Great Class

Further, the distinction between cruiser and destroyer has been so badly blurred that the designations are now meaningless.  The designation ‘cruiser’ is now bestowed, or not, on a ship class for reasons of prestige, public relations, Congressional oversight, etc. rather than because the ships meet any particular historical or functional definition of a cruiser.

We might almost go so far as to say that modern cruisers no longer exist in the sense that there are no ships that fill the traditional roles of a cruiser.  Aviation has taken over the scouting role, AAW-focused ‘destroyers’ have taken over the escort role, and there are no ships performing the independent operations role.

The Soviet Union Kirov class cruiser is an interesting case.  It came very close to the traditional attributes of fairly heavy firepower, moderate armor, decent speed, and high endurance.  In terms of roles, it was used for strike operations, scouting, in a sense (hunting US carriers), and independent surface operations as the core of a surface group.  On the other hand, by modern standards, the Kirovs were so far beyond other countries’ ‘cruisers’ that they could easily be classed as modern battleships, lacking only heavy armor.  It is also interesting that no country has attempted to build a vessel equivalent to the Kirov.

Kirov Class

As stated, from a functional aspect, cruisers no longer exist and current discussions about ‘cruisers’ are merely semantic debates.  Interestingly, though, this blog has called for true cruisers to fill the traditional roles and lend some much needed firepower and presence in an alternative form to carrier groups (see, “Independent Cruiser”).

Thus, the cruiser is no more.  Naval strategists have dropped all the traditional cruiser roles or distributed them out among other platforms.  This seems unwise as the need for an ocean-ranging presence (meaning with firepower) has never changed and, when we find that our vaunted UAVs are nowhere near the omniscient and invulnerable assets that we assume them to be, we may well regret the disappearance of a far ranging scout capable of defending itself.

The trans-oceanic presence role of a cruiser is worthy of some additional consideration.  Once upon a time, cruisers were invested with significant authority and power by their parent countries to enforce national intent.  It was expected that they would, occasionally, exert their influence (again, firepower) for the betterment of their country.  Ship Captains wielded great autonomy and power.  Today, we have removed all such authority and power from ship Captains and have adopted a policy of appeasement instead of enforcement and might.  That being the case, there is no need for a cruiser – some might say there is no need for a navy if appeasement is the policy.  However, history strongly suggests that these changes have led to a worsening of international behavior, not an improvement.  For example, we now have third rate countries dictating policy in the Middle East, seizing ships of all nations, threatening international shipping lanes, etc.  Once upon a time, such Barbary Pirate behavior was terminated by the actions of Decatur and Bainbridge and the young American Navy.  There is still a need for forceful presence around the world.  Of course, that requires a modicum of courage and resolve by our civilian leaders and a willingness to invest ship Captains with autonomy and authority.

Stephen Decatur

In short, while the world navies have abandoned cruisers, the traditional roles of the cruiser have not vanished which makes the abandonment all the more curious.  We could use a couple dozen modern cruisers far more than a couple dozen frigates.

Chinese Type 05 Amphibious Assault Family

We’ve frequently noted that the US amphibious doctrine cannot be executed for a variety of reasons.  It’s pure fantasy.  China, on the other hand, is building a very capable and credible amphibious assault capability and is seemingly leaping right over the obstacles that have plagued the US. 

One example of a problem that has stymied the US is as basic as amphibious vehicles themselves.  Sure, we have the AAV/ACV but it’s a landing craft that, once landed, becomes a poor man’s Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) of sorts.  It has no significant firepower and little armor.  It’s not a combat vehicle by any stretch of the imagination.

The Marines played around with a high speed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) for many years before finally admitting failure and cancelling the program.

We’re left, currently, with an AAV which is slow, has no significant firepower, is limited to a few miles of effective swimming range, and lacks significant armor.

Leaping right over these problems, the Chinese have developed and are fielding a family of amphibious vehicles that put what we have to shame.  The vehicle family is the Type 05 which is made up of multiple, specialized variants all based on the common Type 05 chassis. 

Characteristics common to all the variants include:

• Planing hull powered by two water jets
• Diesel engine with 1475 hp water / 550 hp land
• 15 kts (28 km/h) water / 40 mph (65 km/h) land
• Hydraulic actuated, hinged bow plane that deploys out from the vehicle to create a low drag, hydrodynamic effect for high speed; steering is accomplished via water jets and transom flaps
• Standard hull armor provides (1):

• protection at the front against 12.7 mm AP round up to 100 m
• protection at the sides against 7.62 mm AP rounds
• protection at the rear against 7.62 mm AP rounds

Production began in 2006.  Production numbers are difficult to come by but estimates suggest 200+ vehicles deliver as of 2016.  The breakdown of variant types is unknown.

Let’s take a bit closer look at the major variants.

ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle

This is essentially an amphibious Bradley and gives the Chinese the ability to land a mechanized, semi-armored infantry force with mobility and serious firepower and anti-tank capability.

• Front engine,  rear passenger compartment
• 30 mm turret;  300 rds/min
• HJ-73C Anti-tank guided missile launcher; 2x single rail launchers each side of the turret
• 7.62 mm co-axial gun
• Crew of 3
• 7-8 troops (reports vary with some suggesting a carrying capacity of 10 troops)
• 2x 4-barrel smoke grenade launchers
• Rear troop door
• 58,422 lb (26,500 kg)
• Rated for Sea State 4 (2)

ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle

ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

This gives China an initial assault wave, heavy firepower vehicle that is very similar in concept to the US WWII LVT(A)-4 amphibious tank.  The US found this type of vehicle to be absolutely essential for amphibious assaults and I see no reason why the requirement has changed today.  In fact, given the absence of naval gun support, an initial wave heavy firepower vehicle is even more essential.

• Front engine,  rear passenger compartment
• 105 mm low recoil, stabilized, rifled gun

• armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS)
• high explosive (HE)
• high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds
• 105mm laser beam riding anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM); indigenous version of the Russian 9M117 Bastion anti-tank missile

• Capable of firing at sea
• 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun mounted on the turret
• 7.62 mm co-axial machine gun
• 2x 4-barrel smoke grenade launchers
• Turret face armored against 25 mm (3)
• Crew of 4

ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

Type 05 Command Vehicle

Type 05 Recovery Vehicle

Summary

Consider what this family of amphibious vehicles gives China.  It provides a complete package of amphibious capabilities ranging from heavy firepower (105 mm tank gun) to lethal mechanized infantry (IFV with 30 mm and anti-tank missiles) and including command and control and vehicle recovery – all able to swim ashore IN THE INITIAL WAVE.  The US Marines have nothing comparable although they have publicly expressed a desire for a 30 mm turreted variant of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) as well as command and control and recovery variants.  At the moment, however, the Marines have only the old AAV while China is building and deploying the entire family of vehicles.  Perhaps it's time to start copying Chinese assets like they've been copying so many of ours?

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(1)Defense Updates blog, “Chinese Amphibious Type 05 / ZBD05 / ZTD05 Family of IFV / AAV”, 8-Jan-2013,

https://defenseupdates.blogspot.com/2013/01/chinese-amphibious-type-05-zbd05-ztd05.html

(2)https://www.janes.com/images/assets/045/88045/Red_seas_Chinas_advancing_amphibious_force_capabilities.pdf

(3)http://ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AAAV.html

Radar Fallibility

I constantly hear from commenters about the infallibility of radar.  For example, I’ve repeatedly stated that it is quite likely most missile defense engagements will start at the horizon and yet there are always people quoting some maximum radar range and stating, with absolute certainty, that an E-2 Hawkeye, for example, will unfailingly detect the missiles and enable engagements hundreds of miles out.  Well, here’s a documented example of a Hawkeye’s (two actually!) failure to detect a low flying, inbound target. (1)

Note: thanks to Navy Matters commenter, “FM” for the link. (1)

The exercise in question occurred shortly after Desert Storm.  A B-52 bomber was tasked with attempting to reach attack range, inside 200 miles, against the USS Ranger and its air wing.  The defending force consisted of two E-2 Hawkeyes, F-14s for CAP, EA-6Bs, S-3s, and A-6s.  The short version is that the B-52 got within 20 miles of the carrier before being detected and announcing its presence.

This was a giant, hulking B-52, not some small, sleek, wave-clipping missile!

Radar is NOT the infallible, all-seeing, omniscient eye that so many believe. 

This is analogous to the documented Cold War exercise of a carrier group sitting off the Russian coast and remaining undetected for an extended period.

In the real world, detection of any object by any means is a challenge.  We need to keep that reality firmly in mind as we discuss the various Navy plans and concepts that all assume perfect situational awareness on our part and zero awareness on the enemy’s part.  The reality will be quite different and that reality strongly suggests that many of our plans and concepts desperately need to be re-evaluated.

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(1) Username: FM, Navy Matters, “USS Boxer – A Second Drone”, August 5, 2019 at 11:36 PM

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25572/confessions-of-an-e-2c-hawkeye-radar-operator

Freedom of Navigation Versus Innocent Passage

The US Navy engages in a practice they refer to as Freedom of Navigation (FoN) exercises as an attempt to enforce international rights as regards the movement of ships on the high seas.  While the term, ‘Freedom of Navigation’ is derived from the UNCLOS treaty (1), UNCLOS defines no such FoN procedure.  Thus, as practiced by the Navy, the procedure has no legal backing and is not a recognized enforcement act.  As such, it has no legal standing and accomplishes nothing from a legal perspective.  What it attempts to accomplish is the normalization and acceptance of the FoN rights related to a specific body of water as granted under UNCLOS.  Legally, there is no need to do this as FoN rights cannot be lost by failure to exercise them.  In a practical sense, the Navy procedure attempts to remind other countries of the FoN rights so as to prevent the acceptance of abridgement of those rights by countries making fraudulent claims to international waters.  The practice is intended to ‘send a message’ disputing the subject country’s fraudulent claim.

The US Navy’s FoN procedure is quite simple.  A ship passes through the disputed area, generally within 12 nm of the associated land. 

This passage is intended to demonstrate the UNCLOS FoN rights.  Ironically, the procedure actually reinforces the disputing country’s fraudulent claim because the procedure actually meets the requirements and definition of Innocent Passage, as described in UNCLOS (2).

Summarized, Innocent Passage is the right of a ship to pass through another country’s territorial waters in an ‘innocent’ manner.  The requirements of the passage are laid out in UNCLOS and, essentially, require that the passing vessel proceed in a continuous and expeditious movement with no prejudicial actions.  Thus, the passing ship cannot stop, land or launch aircraft or boats, use sensors to collect information (spy), exercise weapons, fish, or conduct research.

With this definition in mind, we can see that the Navy’s FoN exercises actually conform to the UNCLOS Innocent Passage definition.  Given that Innocent Passage can ONLY occur within a country’s territorial waters, the FoN can be construed as granting de facto territorial status to the waters in question, thereby reinforcing the disputed country’s territorial claim rather than disputing it!

If the Navy really wanted to dispute the territorial claim, the FoN procedure should be modified to have the passing vessel stop, exercise weapons, launch and recover aircraft, and operate sensors.  That would clearly demonstrate that the ship was NOT engaged in Innocent Passage but was, instead, exercising its Freedom of Navigation in the disputed waters.

Thus, sailing past one of China’s illegal, fraudulent, artificial islands actually reinforces China’s claim of sovereignty rather than disputing it because the passage meets the requirements of Innocent Passage which can only be associated with a valid territorial land mass.  The Navy is unwittingly granting and acknowledging China’s claims!



Discussion points:

1. If FoN doesn't work, what can more effectively accomplish the purpose?
2. How do you evaluate Iran's seizure of our riverine boats and crews in light of the legal requirements of Innocent Passage?
3. Does FoN accomplish anything?
4. Should we be using Innocent Passage to 'tweak' China and Russia's noses?  Before you answer, consider that they've done that to the US in Alaskan waters.
5. Is the actual FoN message, perhaps, that we're too weak willed to contest the Chinese expansion?

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(1)UNCLOS, Part VII High Seas, Section 1. General Provisions, Article 87 Freedom of the High Seas

(2)UNCLOS, Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Section 3. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea, Subsection A. Rules Applicable to All Ships, Article 19 Meaning of Innocent Passage

USS Boxer - A Second Drone

It is now being widely reported that the USS Boxer, which reportedly downed an Iranian drone using jamming, also engaged a second drone, at the same time.

U.S. Central Command says that one Iranian drone crashed into the sea after the USS Boxer took what Central Command called "defensive action" against it last Thursday. It said the Boxer also "engaged" a second Iranian drone at the same time, but could not confirm it was destroyed. (1)

Set that aside, for a moment, and recall that the Navy wants to operate a distributed lethality concept which is based on a vast network of all-seeing, all-knowing data links assembled into a master picture and then distributed to all the ships in the region.  Thus, every ship, whether it uses its own sensors or not, will know, with unerring accuracy, the location and targeting information about every enemy asset in the region.  This will allow the distributed ships to co-ordinate and mass their fires on the unsuspecting and hapless enemy fleets.

The Navy is applying the same basic concept of vast networks and data links to AAW defense in the form of an advanced co-operative engagement capability (NIFC-CA).

Now, let’s return to the Boxer engagement.  According to the Navy, one drone was downed and the Navy doesn’t know what happened to the other.  Consider the implications of that statement … they don’t know what happened to the other drone.  The ship had all manner of radars, sensors, optical sensors, EW equipment, Mk1 Eyeballs, and who knows what else applied to a drone that was, by all accounts within a thousand yards so of the ship, and they don’t know what happened to it.

Recall the Burke destroyer that supposedly engaged several incoming anti-ship missiles off Yemen a while ago?  Despite Aegis and all manner of other sensors, the Navy couldn’t say whether any of their missiles hit any targets or what happened to the targets.  In fact, careful analysis of the reporting revealed that they couldn’t even say for sure that there were any actual incoming missiles.

Recall the giant hulking cargo ships that two Burke destroyers never saw and collided with.

Are you seeing the pattern?  Despite the manufacturer and the Navy’s claims of omniscient sensing, we can’t actually keep track of ships, UAVs, and incoming weapons right next to us!  So, how are we going to achieve this regional, distributed lethality, all-seeing, all-knowing master sensor picture or the perfectly networked NIFC-CA AAW defense?

We’re basing our naval offense and defense on a claimed capability that has been proven, time and again, to be woefully inadequate.  When you can’t keep track of a drone a thousand feet from you under non-combat, perfect conditions, how are you going to track every enemy asset in a regional distributed lethality network under electromagnetically challenged conditions?  The answer is obvious – you’re not!  And yet, we’re proceeding with the assumption that we can and will.  At what point do you stop believing unfounded claims and start believing actual field performance evidence?  I think that point is now.  The Navy needs to stop believing in Unicorns and Fairy Dust and start looking at reality.

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(1)Miami Herald website, “US now says it ‘engaged’ 2 Iranian drones, not 1”, Associated Press, 23-Jul-2019,

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article233033167.html

Amphibious Assault - Port Seizure

I’ve previously discussed amphibious assaults and stated that I consider the need for such assaults to be extremely unlikely under any foreseeable strategy.  Sure, there could be the odd small scale raid or diversionary feint but there just is no need for large scale assaults. 

However, the Marine Corps insists that such a capability is needed so let’s address what I consider the most likely amphibious assault scenario: a port seizure.  The Marines refuse to discuss it or even consider the possibility so we’ll do it for them. 

Short of a massive, multi-year buildup there is just no possibility of logistically sustaining a sizable invasion across a beach.  That only leaves the option of seizing an existing port to support the unloading of cargo ships at a rate sufficient to sustain a major invasion.  The astute historian will note that this is exactly what the objective of the WWII Normandy D-Day assault was.  Since all ports are associated with city structures and infrastructures, the roads leading to and from the port will prove every bit as critically important for quickly dispersing the unloaded supplies as the port itself.

Here are the main aspects of an amphibious port seizure and the more detailed points associated with them.

Initial Seizure

Port – The port, itself, must be seized, obviously.  The key is to seize it as quickly as possible, to minimize the time the defenders have to destroy the facilities such as cranes, piers, docks, ramps, and warehouses.  The best method of seizure is an initial airborne assault to quickly place infantry in and around the port to seize the facilities.  Simultaneous with the airborne assault must be an amphibious assault with heavier weapons, artillery, and armor to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the port.

Roads – Airborne troops should also be used to seize key roads leading in and out of the port so as to prevent immediate counterattack.  As with the port, additional amphibious troops will be required to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the roads.

Warships – It will be necessary to operate warships in the closed and congested waters of the harbor/port to provide cruise and ballistic missile defense, gun support, and counterbattery fire.  This is completely contrary to current Navy doctrine and will require new doctrine and tactics.

Mine clearance – It is hard to imagine that any modern port will not be heavily defended with mines.  Given that speed is the key to successful assaults, in general, and seizure of an, at least, semi-functioning port, mine clearance must be accomplished extremely rapidly to allow warships, supply ships, transports, and repair vessels access to the port.  For example, the WWII D-Day assault involved hundreds of minesweepers to achieve the necessary clearance in a combat-useful time frame.  Currently, we utterly lack the capability to perform this chore.

Holding/Defending

C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) – Being a known, fixed location, a seized port will be subject to intense mortar and artillery fire.  Mobility, the mantra of modern militaries and the presumed solution to mortar and artillery fire, does not apply to seizing and holding a port.  Our forces will be static and fixed.  Uh, oh!  That’s an operational and doctrinal oversight!  C-RAM protection will be required. 

Missile Defense – Aegis warships will be required to establish a protective missile defense umbrella over the port.  This may be complicated by large buildings obscuring the radar view of the ships and may require an offboard, networked sensor.  However, we currently lack a communications and network system that is proven capable of functioning in the face of electronic and cyber countermeasures.

Road Defense – Roads are simultaneously the avenue for enemy counterattacks and the means of moving supplies out to the main invasion effort.  Defending the road system, especially early on, will be manpower (infantry) intensive and require large quantities of armor for mobile defense.

Repairs and Rebuilding

Barring some incredibly good luck, the enemy will likely destroy the port facilities to a very large degree.  We will need to rebuild most of the facilities.  We will need the ability to unload with only minimal port support while repairs are on-going.  We will need to rebuild under fire.  Who will do this?  How will they be protected?  What equipment is needed?  Are we trained to rebuild port facilities while under fire (hint:  we aren’t)?

Loading/Unloading Operations Under Fire

Since the port’s cranes will have likely been destroyed, we’ll need ships with their own large cranes as a stopgap unloading measure until we can rebuild facilities.  A dedicated crane ship or two would also come in very handy.  We’ll also need large numbers of fork lifts, trucks, etc. for quickly moving the unloaded supplies out and to the invasion force.  Initially, all of this will occur while under fire.  Are we prepared and trained to unload and disperse supplies while under fire?  Are we prepared to disperse supplies very quickly so as to avoid the buildup of large stockpiles (meaning very attractive targets)?

Dispersal

The key, and the entire point, to seizing and using a port is the ability to quickly disperse incoming, unloaded supplies out to the main invasion force.  The dispersal (meaning transport of supplies) will be complicated by the fact that there will only be one or two routes and those routes will be known to the enemy and, thus, subject to continual attack.  Are we prepared to fight our supply convoys through?  Do we have the necessary doctrine to secure roads, establish defended zones around the roads, and protect convoys?  Are we mentally prepared to inflict the degree of collateral damage on the surrounding areas that will be required to clear them of enemy forces?  Ironically, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines, the bane of our Iraq/Afg efforts, will be a non-threat in this scenario since, presumably, we’ll kill anyone/anything even remotely approaching the transport roads – unless, you know, we try to fight a zero-casualty, zero-collateral damage type of war which would be incredibly stupid but is exactly what we’ve done in Iraq/Afg.

Summary

Other than for occasional small scale raids, over the beach assaults are neither feasible nor operationally warranted.  Port seizure, however, is mandatory.  There is simply no other way to logistically supply a modern, major assault force with the required volume and tonnage of supplies.  I believe that this is, or should be, the Marine’s core mission. 

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that port seizure requires a specific and specialized force with specialized equipment, doctrine, and tactics – almost none of which exists, today.  Being amphibious, the Marines are ideally situated to provide much of this capability although it would require a complete rethinking of their purpose and a complete rebuilding of their force structure. 

The issue of airborne troops, alone, is an interesting one.  Would these troops come from the Marines or from existing Army units?  Would the preferred airborne delivery be parachuting or helo insertion?  These are the kinds of questions that need to be explored in realistic exercises.  Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there has never been a port seizure exercise by the US military in recent decades.

If port seizure is as important as I believe it to be then we need to begin developing the force necessary to do it.  If one would argue that port seizure is not important then I need to hear how we’ll logistically support a major invasion force.