Modern Battleship

Let’s face it, battleships are a combination of beauty and power that appeals to all of us.  Many still want to return the battleships to duty and, honestly, there’s a lot of reasons why that would be a good thing.  However, that’s not what this post is about.  Along with lamenting the absence of the battleship, people often wonder if we could build a modern battleship.  Let’s take a look at that – a modern battleship.

The first question is what would a modern battleship (BB) be?  Would it be a simple rebuild of the last BB built?  It could be and that’s certainly a worthwhile thought but there is another answer.  A modern BB would encompass the qualities and characteristics of the old BBs but in a modern form.  Thus, a modern BB would not incorporate 16” guns, for example. 

OK, so what would a modern BB look like?  To answer that, we have to understand what an old BB was intended to be.  Here’s a reasonable list of the characteristics of an old BB.

• Striking Power – a BB was built to apply offensive firepower in overwhelming amounts.  The 16” gun was the hardest hitting, longest ranged weapon of its day (carrier aircraft not withstanding).

• Stand and Fight – a BB was intended to stay in the fight, not run.  It was built to slug it out, to take damage, to give damage, and to be able to fight damaged.  It was not a ship that was susceptible to mission kill from a single hit like today’s vessels.

• Defense – a BB was an awesome anti-aircraft platform with huge numbers of 5”, 40 mm, and 20 mm AA guns.  A BB was the area AAW platform of the time.

• Command – BBs were often used as flagships and contained facilities for embarked Admirals and staff.

• Independence – BBs were envisioned to be capable of independent operations as the center of a surface action group and, indeed, did so.  The Washington and South Dakota’s action at Guadalcanal is a notable example.

• Endurance and Speed – a BB was fast at 30+ kts and long ranged at 15,000 nm.

Those are the characteristics of a BB.  Now, how do those characteristics translate to a modern ship.  In other words, what kind of ship would we build, today, that embodies those qualities?

• Striking Power – Missiles have taken the place of guns but a modern BB should have the heaviest, fastest, most powerful missiles.  The modern BB should have large, supersonic anti-ship/land missiles along the lines of the Soviet/Russian P-270 Moskit (also reported as SS-N-22 Sunburn) or Indian Brahmos.  Further, a BB might well carry intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) for deep strike.  Secondary armament would include a long range, high subsonic anti-ship missile like the Naval Ship Missile or Swedish RB-15.  Finally, a gun fit of two 6” triple mounts would provide inshore or close range gun power and four 25-30 mm guns would round out a self-defense fit.

• Stand and Fight – there’s no getting around it, a modern BB needs armor that incorporates traditional armor, meaning thick steel, and modern advances in armor along the lines of tank composite and layered armor.  Double layer void and crush spaces would be included below the waterline and along the keel along with reinforced keel and bulkhead structures.  Weapons and sensors need to be enclosed within armor to the extent possible consistent with their function (there’s a limit to how much armor you can place over a radar and have it work!).  This might take the form of retractable weapons and sensors to some extent.  Stealth shaping of the hull and superstructure would contribute to the ability to stand and fight.  Stealth would include extensive IR suppression.  Redundancy is key to fighting damaged and would be an important characteristic.  The AMDR would be backed up by a multiple, lesser radars, for example.

• Defense – a BB would incorporate a Ticonderoga’s AAW capabilities including AMDR and VLS fits with 120 or so VLS cells, not counting any IRBM cell requirements.  Passive defenses like ECM and decoys would be far more emphasized than those on current ships. 

• Command – a modern BB would have extensive communications facilities for flag staffs.

• Independence – a modern BB would be able to act as the centerpiece of surface action groups in concert with Burke escorts.

• Endurance and Speed – as with the old BBs, a modern version would have a range of 15,000 nm and be capable of 30+ kts.

Notable among missing characteristics is any ASW fit.  Just as the old BBs did not have an ASW role, neither would a modern BB.  We have plenty of Burkes to conduct ASW.

Also absent is a helo hangar.  A small flight deck for a single helo would be incorporated but there is no need for a hangar, one of the huge consumers of volume and deck space on modern ships.  With Burkes always around and no role in ASW, there is simply no need for hangars or permanently embarked helos.

Clearly, this would not be a cheap ship.  For those concerned with budgets, go build frigates and wait to be destroyed.  This is somewhat akin to the Zumwalt but with added guns and VLS cells plus a conventional hull.  Thus, the cost would probably be comparable or a bit more, say $4B-$5B per ship.

Size would be comparable to the old Virgina class CGN or the Long Beach which would put it in the range of 600-700 ft, probably leaning to 700 ft and a displacement of around 20-25,000 tons.  Hey, I’m not a naval architect so don’t bother telling my why those numbers may not be feasible.  This is just moderately informed speculation.  We have engineers to generate the actual numbers.

Automation would be a part of this ship but would not significantly affect crew size.  This ship is expected to fight and would need plenty of crew to man combat stations, replace casualties, and conduct damage control.  What automation would do is make the crew more efficient.  I would guess a crew of around 500 might work.

This would be a ship built to go in harm’s way.  No, this is not a ship intended to take on the entire Chinese military single-handed.  It is a ship intended to fight, hit hard, take damage, and keep fighting.  Consider a surface group of three modern BBs and several Burke escorts – today’s fantasy/idiocy of individual ships will quickly give way to large groups as in WWII when combat starts.  Such a group would present a formidable defense against any aircraft and missile attack while simultaneously carrying out heavy strikes against land or surface targets.  With strike ranges of 1000 – 1500 nm, such a group could strike key Chinese naval and air bases without need of carrier air protection.  The number of anti-ship weapons that could reach such a group ought to be well within the capability of the group to handle.

Added Cost for Final Zumwalt

The naval-technology.com website reports that the Navy has issued a contract to Raytheon for $255M (options to $349M) for “mission system equipment” engineering for the third and final Zumwalt ship, DDG-1002 (1).  Aside from being another quarter of a billion dollars added to the cost, I’m wondering what this is for?  This is the third and final ship of the run.  The engineering has already been worked out.  Further, the program was based on a fixed price contract.  There can’t be any price increases unless the Navy issues a change order.  Is this what’s happening here?  Is this a change order in support of a rail gun that was rumored to be under consideration for installation on the third and final Zumwalt?  That would certainly be a major change that might justify this kind of cost addition. 

These are limited mission ships which are already hugely expensive at several billion dollars per vessel, including construction and R&D.  Adding another quarter billion dollars or more is eye opening at this stage.  Let me know if anyone has any insight on this.  In the meantime, I’ll see if I can find out anything more about this.

(1)http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsraytheon-bags-255m-contract-extension-for-us-navys-third-zumwalt-class-destroyer-4767133

The "Real" Goals for the Navy

I reviewed and strongly criticized the Navy's goals and objectives in the last post.  OK, so what should the goals be?  Well, here's my list.  Anything you'd add or modify?

Combat

• Terminate the LCS
• Initiate a true frigate design
• Initiate a dedicated MCM vessel design
• Intiate a dedicated, small ASW vessel design
• Develop a long range, supersonic anti-ship missile
• Reinvigorate offensive mine warfare
• Terminate the F-35 and initiate a new fighter design
• Reactivate the S-3 Viking for use as ASW and tanking

Readiness

• Increase maintenance
• Publicize INSURV results
• Make training exercises more realistic
• Reduce deployments to 6 months max

Leadership, Integrity, and Accountability

• Overhaul the broken command selection process
• Institute long term program acquisition assignments to foster accountability
• Re-establish the General Board and BuShips
• Reduce Admiral count to 30

Tactics

• Establish a standing surface and subsurface OpFor
• Establish a Top Gun-like training program for surface and subsurface warfare
• Establish unbiased, free form wargaming

Project Management

• Generate realistic cost estimates and link directly to career penalties
• Assign program-long managers with career penalties for poor performance
• Re-establish Congressional trust and transparency
• Establish routine audits of acquisition programs

Compare this list to the Navy's.  Remember I asked how the Navy would be improved if, somehow, the entire list could be magically accomplished and the answer was it wouldn't?  Now, look at my list.  If all those could be magically accomplished, what would the Navy look like?  It would be a much improved, combat ready fleet.  'Nuff said.

Navy Goals for 2016

Let’s look at the just released memo, “Department of the Navy Goals and Objectives for FY16”.  The memo is authored by CMC Neller, CNO Richardson, and SecNav Mabus.  It lists 4 main categories and several specifics under each.  Here are the categories and a brief summary of the specifics.

People – contains 10 specifics with the usual mix of sexual assault, gender neutral standards, etc.

Platforms – contains 10 specifics, one of which states “buy more ships” and the remainder deal with cyber, information, unmanned systems

Power – contains 5 specifics, dealing with green or alternative energy

Partnerships – contains 5 specifics, dealing with innovation, transformation, diversity, cost effectiveness, and strategic sourcing (huh?).  Lot’s of buzzwords, no substance.

Want to know what’s wrong with the Navy?  Read this memo.  There’s virtually nothing in it about combat other than “buy more ships” which is nice but not even necessarily wise.  A much better specific would have been “buy more useful ships”.

The rest of the Navy’s goals are largely non-combat political issues.

One of the four most important categories for the Navy is green/alternative energy???  Seriously?

Is this really what our top leadership considers to be our most important goals?  Apparently so.

Think about this.  If the Navy were to somehow, magically, achieve all of its stated goals how much more combat capable and ready would the Navy be?  The answer is slightly larger (buy more ships) and that’s it.  None of the other specifics actually contribute to the Navy’s core mission. 

CMC Neller, way to contribute and promote the Corps.  There’s not a single item in this memo pertaining to the Marines.  Pathetic. 

CNO Richardson, I'm watching to see whether you will be an improvement over your predecessor.  This was a giant swing and a miss.  You need to up your game.  Show me you have what it takes to lead my Navy.

Sad.  Very sad.  Very disappointing.

Update:  I was unable to generate a link to the memo in the original post but I think this one may work.  Give it a try:  Goals and Objectives

Women SEALs

You’ve all seen by now that SecNav Mabus has instructed Naval Special Warfare (SEALs) to integrate women into the SEAL teams.  He has not qualified his remarks with “if they can meet the standards”.  He has simply told the Navy to make it happen.  Of course, out of the other side of his mouth, he claims that standards will not be modified.  Well, I’m sorry but there is only one way any woman can become a SEAL and that’s by lowering the standards.  We’ve all seen film of SEAL training.  Only a few of the toughest, strongest men can meet the standards.  There is no possible way that any woman can do it.  The Rangers were told to pencil whip a woman into the unit and now the SEALs are being told to do the same.

You’ll also recall that SecNav ignored the Marines documented performance shortcomings of women in training.

This is simply a political agenda placed ahead of national security, combat performance, and common sense.  Worse, this actually does a disservice to women by mandating their inclusion in a job they aren’t qualified for.  This is affirmative action at its worst.  Every woman in every job will be looked at with suspicion and the belief that they didn’t get their job fairly.

If CNO Richardson had an ounce of integrity he would resign in protest as would his replacement and his and his …  If the CNO isn’t safeguarding the integrity of the Navy and the trust of the sailors and American people then who is?  It’s certainly not SecNav Mabus.  Mabus is an embarrassment to the nation and an affront to true women’s rights.

MEU/ARG Final Analysis

We’ve been discussing the MEU/ARG for a few posts and we’ve looked at the number of MEU/ARGs deployed at any given moment, the fact that ARGs are being split up and the ships are operating independently, the LSD is being replaced by a highly questionable LX(R) based on the LPD-17, and so on.  The central issue, however, is whether the MEU/ARG concept represents a useful military force in today’s world.  In order to answer that, we need to look at a few specific questions.

• Is the MEU sized and equipped to perform useful missions?
• Is an amphibious assault (whether airborne or waterborne) a viable operation?
• Can low end, peacetime operations be better and more cheaply performed by Army units?
• Can the MEU/MEB/MEF contribute to high end combat operations to a degree sufficient to justify their cost?

Let’s answer these one at a time.

Is the MEU sized and equipped to perform useful missions?

The Marines state that the MEU is the smallest unit capable of the full range of combat operations. 

A MEU is certainly adequately sized for many peacetime missions such as hostage rescue, embassy protection or evacuation, or very small scale raids.  That said, the MEU operates under one severe limitation.  Marine tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment can’t get ashore other than by waterborne delivery over a beach or through a port.  This limits the range of operations requiring that kind of combat power to those within a relatively very short distance from the beach or port.  This also eliminates the possibility of quick reinforcement of an operation.  Loading, transporting, unloading at the beach, assembling, and moving to the site of an operation takes far too much time to be a practical option in most scenarios.  Inland aviation assaults, the current Marine trend, all but eliminates the use of armor/artillery or the possibility of heavy reinforcements.  That raises the question, then, of whether the MEU is properly equipped for these missions as just a light infantry force.  The specter of Mogadishu looms over any light infantry operation  - what seemed like overwhelming force to arrest two men turned out to be woefully inadequate.   

This suggests the following question.  Given the types of missions commonly undertaken or anticipated, should the MEU be equipped not with tanks and artillery but rather with lighter gunned vehicles and more heavy mortars that can be air-transported?  The answer would seem to be a resounding yes.  Whether such a vehicle is practical is a question. 

Alternatively, should the MEU retain its armor and heavy artillery but add the aforementioned lighter equipment?  Of course, that leads to budgetary and ship storage issues (which might be solved by adding a fourth ship to the notional ARG?) that are not easily overcome.

Thus, the MEU seems to be inappropriately equipped for the common peacetime missions it might be called on to perform.  However, a MEU is also tasked with high end combat as part of a larger MEB/MEF.  Is the MEU adequately equipped for high end combat?

Every potential enemy is gearing up for high end, high explosive combat with new tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, artillery, etc.  This is the world the MEU will enter if it comes to high end combat against a peer or near-peer.  The MEU is lightly armed and armored for such encounters.  The magnitude and intensity of high end armored combat is beyond the scope of this post but it seems fairly evident that the MEU is under equipped for high end combat.

Thus, the overall conclusion is that the MEU is inappropriately equipped for both the low end peacetime missions and high end combat.

Is an amphibious assault (whether airborne or waterborne) a viable operation?

In past posts we’ve discussed and analyzed the ability of the MEU to conduct waterborne assaults and found that a lack of connectors leaves the MEU unable to get armor ashore in the initial waves and sustain combat operations.  We’ve also noted that aviation assaults are extremely vulnerable to shoulder launched SAMs and guns, lack the ability to transport any heavy weapons, and do not have the transport capacity to sustain an operation.  Thus, an aviation assault is viable only for the very low end of the combat spectrum and even that is risky (Mogadishu, for example, though that was not a Marine operation).  Combine this with the Navy’s complete absence of gun support and an assault doctrine that is total fantasy and it’s clear that assaults are not viable under any but the most benign conditions.

Can low end, peacetime operations be better and more cheaply performed by Army units?

I don’t know enough about Army units to evaluate this.  I simply pose the question in light of the immense cost of maintaining a 30+ ship amphibious fleet for relatively little return.  There have been very, very few actual amphibious operations over the last several decades.  Yes, Marines have been involved in a great deal of combat but as regular ground troops rather than amphibious assault forces.  Given today’s global reach by the Air Force, Army units could probably handle any peacetime operation that a MEU might be tasked with.  What are the economics of the two approaches?  I don’t know.  I suspect that the Army approach is much cheaper.  Let’s face it, 30+ amphibious ships don’t come cheap!

Can the MEU/MEB/MEF contribute to high end combat operations to a degree sufficient to justify their cost?

The Corps, in general, is shedding tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment in favor of “lightness” and crisis response, which means low end operations.  Again, this means that the MEU (for the rest of this discussion, MEU is understood to include MEB/MEF) is ill-suited for high end combat.  That’s basically the Corps’ stated position.

The purpose of the Marine Corps, at the high end of the spectrum, is to seize landing spots, whether beach or port, for follow on forces.  In addition, they may perform flanking or diversionary assaults.  The key part of this, the part that sets the Marines apart from the other branches and represents their unique contribution to the US military is their ability to conduct amphibious assaults.  As WWII taught us, assaults are violent affairs and require as much “explosive” power as possible.  Unfortunately, this is almost opposite of the direction the Marines are now headed. 

So, how does a lightly equipped MEU contribute to the violent and explosive world of high end combat?  Well, since armor and heavy equipment can’t be transported inland that means that inland combat contributions can only be light infantry affairs.  In high end, peer combat that’s a scenario for disaster.  For the beach/port seizure scenario the MEU lacks connectors to get armor ashore in the initial waves, lacks naval gun support, can’t get AAVs ashore without violating the 50+ mile standoff that the Navy insists on, and has inadequate numbers of tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment even if they could get them ashore.  The MEU lacks AAW and Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) protection.  Further, port seizure is a specialized operation that will, undoubtedly, require specialized equipment, doctrine, and tactics which we don’t currently have. 

Considering all this, it seems clear that the MEU is not well suited to high end combat and, worse, is steadily moving further away from that capability as it sheds tanks and artillery in addition to personnel. 

To return to the main question of whether the MEU/ARG concept represents a useful military force in today’s world, the answer seems to be either no or a very limited, qualified maybe.

Now, some of you have already decided that ComNavOps is anti-Marine Corps.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  What I am, is dead set against the path the Marines are currently on which is converting a potent fighting force to a light infantry, crisis response and humanitarian assistance organization. 

I believe we do need the capability to seize beach/port landing spots and engage in high end, violent combat to do so.  The lesser, peacetime missions are simply subsets of that.  We need to analyze the requirements of beach/port seizure and begin rebuilding to that capability.  We need to figure out how to get armor ashore in the initial waves, how to get AAVs ashore, how to provide AAW and C-RAM protection, completely revamp our assault doctrine to something we can actually do, and figure out how to provide large explosive naval gun support, among many other needs.  Do that and the MEU will again be a useful military force.  Right now, it is not.

Disaggregated ARG Operations

Continuing our discussion of the LX(R) and amphibious groups, let’s look at the current Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) trends. 

Marines traditionally deploy as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) consisting of around 2300 troops, 4 tanks, a half dozen artillery pieces, a dozen or so LAVs, a dozen or so AAVs, and a couple dozen mixed helo and fixed wing aircraft.  This force is distributed among three amphibious ships which comprise the ARG.  Historically, the MEU/ARG train together and deploy together so that the full capability of the MEU is available at all times.  Two or three ARGs have usually been deployed at any given moment.

The MEU/ARG is the nation’s forward deployed, quick reaction force.  The idea is that the force is already on site and ready for action when trouble occurs.  There is no need to assemble, train, and transport those forces.  The MEU/ARG is already there.  Of course, that assumes that the MEU/ARG is in the right spot to begin with.

Now, however, we are seeing new trends in ARG deployments.

1. Only one ARG is deployed at a time.
2. The ARG is splitting into individual ships rather than staying as a group.

These trends are a consequence of budget constraints.  Well, more accurately, they’re a consequence of priority constraints rather than budget.  The Navy has prioritized new construction over deployments, maintenance, training, etc. but that’s a topic for another time.

Considering the size of the world and the number of potential hot spots, a single deployed ARG is less than optimal, to say the least.  Of course, one can debate the entire forward deployed MEU concept but that, too, is a topic for another time.  The Navy/Marines are committed to the MEU/ARG concept so we’ll go with it for the sake of this discussion. 

The hope is that the MEU/ARG is deployed to the most likely place it will be needed and is, therefore, on-scene when trouble occurs.  With only a single ARG deployed, what are the odds that the group will be at the right spot at the right time?  Consider all the potential hot spots in the world right now:  Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Africa to name a few.  Consider the immense geographical area those spots cover.  One, or even a few, ARGs cannot hope to cover all those.  Even covering a single general area is a challenge.  Consider the Chinese area which includes the East and South China Seas out to the first island chain and beyond.  That’s a huge area to cover even for a dedicated MEU/ARG and that’s just one of the potential hot spots in the world.  I don’t envy the person who has to decide where in the world to send the only deployed ARG.

In addition to having only a single deployed ARG, the Navy has taken to dispersing the ARG.  Each of the three ships is being sent off on independent operations.  As long as the MEU is not called on to act, that’s fine.  Three ships can do more port visits, flag showing, partner training, or whatever than a single group can.  Of course, most of those types of missions don’t call for an amphibious ship and could be handled by lesser, much cheaper ships.  However, if the MEU has to act, the dispersed force becomes a problem.  A single ship contains only a third of the MEU’s combat capability (that’s not true since the ships are different sizes and the combat capability is not necessarily uniformly distributed but we’ll conceptually treat it as thirds for the sake of discussion) and that’s not much if combat is required.  Of course, the MEU could simply wait until the dispersed ARG reassembles but that negates the quick reaction concept which is the reason the MEU exists.

Quick reaction - what does that mean?  Well, it’s all relative.  If an embassy is suddenly attacked (Benghazi, for example), quick reaction means within the hour and the MEU will have only what it can instantly transport via helicopter.  If an unfriendly country is building up force for a cross border excursion, quick reaction might mean days or weeks in which the MEU can slowly assemble, unload, and prepare for combat.

Historically, the most common MEU actions are embassy defenses and evacuations, civilian evacuations, rescues, raids, and humanitarian assistance (shouldn’t be a military mission but it is).  These kinds of missions tend to crop up quickly and with little notice thus “quick reaction” tends to be on the order of hours.

So, what does “quick reaction” mean in relation to the dispersed ARG?  It means that an independently operating ship may well find itself in the position of having to conduct a mission on its own with only a third of the MEU’s capabilities.  That’s a sure fire recipe for getting in over one’s head – for getting involved in an action that is beyond the capability of the fractional MEU. 

In independent operations, an individual amphibious ship can carry several hundred troops.  That’s kind of an odd amount for operations – more than a Company, less than a Battalion.  Presumably, the MEU’s tanks and artillery would be evenly distributed if the ARG’s ships were disbursed.  That would give each ship one tank and an artillery piece.  Again, that’s an odd amount.  It’s not how tanks and artillery are organized, trained, or operated.  The embarked Marines would constitute a very lightly armed force, incapable of any kind of sustained operations.  The danger is that, eventually, they’ll get dropped into a situation they’re not equipped to handle and find themselves in over their heads with no help to call on. 

While we can probably get away with a light force for embassy evacuations or low end hostage rescues, those kind of situations have a way of spiraling out of control – witness the Somalia Blackhawk incident.  Further, we have all manner of forces that can do the same job without the added expense of operating amphibious ships.  Airborne divisions and Special Ops forces can deploy from the US for those rare occasions.

On the other hand, for the 99% of the time that the ARG, whether aggregated or disaggregated, is not actively conducting combat ops, the missions are well within the scope of a single amphibious ship:  show the flag, port visits, cross training with foreign nations, etc.  Of course, those missions are well within the scope of a yacht with an American flag or a Cyclone class PC – they don’t have to be conducted by one of the most expensive ships in the world carrying a third of a MEU.

Thus, there seems to be little benefit to disaggregating the ARG.  It splits the combat power of the MEU to a dangerous level and gains nothing that can’t be provided by an American flagged yacht.  Independent operations are a very questionable concept that is driven by budget rather than operational or tactical requirements.  In short, if it’s worth deploying a MEU/ARG, keep it together!