SSGN - The Navy's Best Strike Platform

I’d like to talk about what I feel is the Navy’s best platform, the guided missile submarine (SSGN).  Their existence is not a secret by any means and yet relatively few people are aware of them or have a good feel for their capabilities.



SSGN - 154 Strike Missiles



There are four SSGNs and they were converted from Ohio class ballistic missile subs.  These are pure Tomahawk land attack missile platforms.  Of the original 24 Trident missile tubes on the Ohio, 22 were converted to hold 7 Tomahawk cruise missiles each, giving a strike capacity of 154 missiles.  The remaining two tubes were converted to swimmer lockout chambers for special ops.



Think about what these SSGNs provide.  A massive land attack capability is contained in a single ship which is the hardest platform to find in the world.  When we discuss ways to overcome the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threat this has got to be the main answer.  An SSGN can penetrate the A2/AD zone with relative ease and deliver an entire surface group’s worth of cruise missiles with near impunity. 

The only drawback is that the Navy has only four of these subs.  While that is plenty during peacetime, the Navy will certainly wish for more if war with China occurs.



VPM with Seven Missiles



The other problem is that the SSGNs are scheduled to be retired starting in about ten years and the Navy has indicated that they will not produce a direct replacement.  The currently discussed solution is the addition of a Virginia Payload Module (VPM) to stretched versions of the Virginia class.  Four modules would be added to each Virginia.  Each module holds 7 missiles which would add 28 missiles to the 12 already present in Virginias for a total of 40 missiles per sub.  Thus, four of the stretched Virginias would provide the same strike capacity as a single SSGN.  The Navy estimates that the conversion would add about 20% ($400M) to the cost of a Virginia.  Bear in mind that Navy cost estimates are notoriously underestimated. 



On the plus side, distributing the strike capacity among four subs instead of one spreads the risk and decreases the impact of losing a single platform.  On the minus side, having to send four subs to do the job of one makes for a crowded launch area and increases the risk of detection.  Whether it’s better to have four strike platforms versus a single one depends on a detailed understanding of submarine operations that I just don’t have.  The Navy built the current SSGNs as a single platform because that’s what they had to work with.  They’re looking at building multiple, smaller platforms now because, again, that’s what they have to work with, at least until the next generation Ohio replacement, the SSBN(X), becomes available. 

The SSGNs are our single most potent and effective strike platform.  While the cost of providing replacements in the form of stretched Virginias is high, this is one area where the cost is fully justified.

JSF - As Good As A Hornet?

I was going through some older references and came upon this quote from a Defense Industry Daily report (1) that stunned me.

“The F-35’s explicit design goal has been stated as being the F-16’s equal in in air to air combat …”

 

What?!  We’re spending a gazillion dollars on a plane that’s only supposed to be as good as an F-16?

OK, I’m not an expert on the JSF program by any means so I’m not going to attempt any further analysis of that statement.  I’m simply going to leave it there for you to consider.



I will, however, give you a couple of related thoughts cited in another Defense Industry Daily report (2).



JSF - Equal to a Hornet or F-16?



- The F-35C, the carrier version, has no internal gun and will have to make use of a gun pod mounted externally in a stealth-ish container.  Didn’t the Navy learn its lesson about the lack of an internal gun with the F-4 Phantom in Viet Nam?  Apparently not!  External mounting, even in a stealth-ish pod, means easier detection (for an airframe that’s already considered to be only somewhat stealthy), more drag, less range, and greater fuel consumption.

- The F-35C will have a slightly lower maximum G-force maneuvering limit than the current Hornet.  Again, the suggestion is that our next generation fighter is going to be as good as our current Hornets.

I’ll be fair and say that the F-35 has some advanced technology built in that other aircraft don’t but whether those balance out the apparently mediocre air-to-air performance remains to be seen.  As I said, I can't fairly analyze this further but these kinds of snippets aren't exactly encouraging.  I've thought from the begining that the F-35 was just a stealthier version of the Hornet with no significant performance enhancements and these tidbits tend to confirm that impression.  Anyone have a different take on it?

  

(1)   Defense Industry Daily, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-F-35s-Air-to-Air-Capability-Controversy-05089/, 12-Oct-2008

(2)   Defense Industry Daily, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/F-35-Lightning-The-Joint-Strike-Fighter-Program-2012-07501/, 14-Aug-2012

Fleetwide Maintenance - Improving?

Most people who follow the Navy know that the Navy has a severe readiness and maintenance problem stemming from multiple poor decisions over the last couple of decades.  Things got so bad that the Navy finally commissioned an internal investigation headed by Admiral Harvey.  The findings were published in a report in Feb 2010 and confirmed the sad state of neglect that the Navy had fallen into. 



Improved Maintenance?



On the plus side, the Navy appears to have responded to the report by implementing a number of changes and (hopefully) improvements.  Adm. Harvey has just issued a memo (1) documenting the actions taken and, in some cases, benefits that are already becoming evident.



It is worth noting the scope of the issue by reviewing some of the problems as highlighted in the summary of the Feb 2010 report included in the memo.

-         The various maintenance centers saw a reduction in billets from 8,000 to 2,500 during the several years prior to 2010.

-         The 9 week availability schedule proved insufficient to accomplish needed maintenance.

-         Optimal manning of ships and reduction of grade levels for billets led to loss of knowledge, experience, and oversight aboard ships.

-         Training was found to be insufficient with C-School being 35% underutilized. 

-         At-sea training was found to be lacking in time and quality.

-         Backup systems were being systematically allowed to degrade so as to save money on repairs.

-         Housekeeping, preservation, and corrosion control standards declined over time.  As the report noted, “Over time, the ignored standard becomes the new norm.”

-         Surface ship maintenance was significantly underfunded over the previous decade or more.

-         Aegis systems have experienced fleetwide degradation in performance, maintenance, and spare parts availability.

The memo goes on to describe the administrative, organizational, and policy changes implemented to address the issues.

-         Increased emphasis is being placed on the process of certification of completion of maintenance work to ensure that the work is done properly.

-         Increased emphasis is being placed on ship assessments of various types to ensure that the scope of needed maintenance is being accurately understood and planned for.

-         Increased emphasis is being placed on maintenance to ensure that a ship’s estimated and designed life span is met.  This is an attempt to ensure that forced early ship retirements due to lack of maintenance do not occur.

-         Corrosion control is being emphasized with the assistance of outside experts.

-         Increased emphasis on daily maintenance standards.

-         Manning, both military and civilian, is being increased at the various maintenance centers.

-         Increased emphasis on the use of C-Schools.

-         Implementing Maintenance Assist Teams to directly assist the ships with higher level maintenance.

-         Increased emphasis on shipboard training.

-         Provision of expert level support for Aegis systems.

-         Increased stocking of spare parts.

-         Increased support and training for propulsion systems.

-         Increased frequency and effectiveness of INSURV inspections.

All of the steps taken and documented in the memo are long overdue and the Navy is to be commended for beginning to reverse the maintenance decline.  I hope these are sincere efforts and not short term “look good” steps that will be soon abandoned and forgotten. 

What the memo does not address is the root cause behind why the fleetwide maintenance debacle occurred in the first place.  If the root cause is not addressed and corrected, the problems will simply resurface.  As we’ve previously discussed, the root cause is the Navy’s fixation on funding new construction above all else.  Reduced manning, training, and maintenance were all implemented to free up more funding for new construction.  Until the Navy recognizes this and changes their philosophy the problems are going to continue.  The improvements described in the memo are at risk of being just temporary band-aids that will soon be abandoned.

Another troubling aspect of the attempts at improvement involves the extensive focus on policy changes and documentation.  I’ve found throughout my career in industry that when policy becomes the focus it’s because common sense, initiative, and accountability have disappeared.  Rather than empowering people to do what’s obviously needed and then supporting with them with the required resources, policy takes the place of responsibility, action, and accountability.  Leadership fails to step forward and do what’s right, instead they fall back on policy, doing only what’s dictated.  Policy inevitably becomes self-defeating by being inherently limiting rather than encompassing.  Consider the following quote from the memo.

“There are 350 separate instructions under review in 20 categories gathered from the RMCs spanning the maintenance end-to-end (E2E) process.  The review will result in 12 standard “role-based” desk guides for use at each RMC that act as Maintenance Team Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS) for the maintenance E2E process.”

 

This is just churning of documentation into different forms.  It doesn’t provide for initiative or a sense of responsibility.  It’s the typical result of a paper study:  more paper!

Still, the Navy has taken at least some steps towards improving the maintenance situation.  Let’s hope they take the lessons to heart and continue to focus on maintaining the fleet at a combat-ready level.  We’ll watch and see!

(1) Dept of the Navy, Memo: Surface Ship Material Readiness Improvements, Adm. Harvey, 3-Aug-12

What's Old is New Again

The current issue of the USNI Proceedings (1) reports that China has reached a deal to license-produce Tu-22M Backfire bombers.  The arrangement will initially result in 36 bombers which is regimental strength from the old Soviet days and was believed to be the amount needed to defeat a US Navy carrier group.

As you recall, the Navy’s response to the Soviet bombers was the long range, high speed Tomcat with its load of AIM-54 Phoenix missiles guided by the plane’s AWG-9 radar.  Tomcats made up the outer layer of the carrier group’s layered defenses.  I bet the Navy wishes they had Tomcats now!



Tu-22 Backfire - Bigger Threat than Ballistic Missiles



The Navy’s current front line fighter is the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet carrying AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles.  The Hornet has a combat radius of 390 nm compared to the Tomcat’s 500 nm.  The latest version of the AMRAAM has a 100 nm range which is comparable to the Phoenix but has a lighter warhead, 40-50 lbs versus the 135 lb warhead of the Phoenix.  Given the massive size of the Backfire, the much larger warhead of the Phoenix will be missed.



There are a couple of interesting points in all this.  First, the acquisition of bombers strongly suggests that the Chinese have realized (or known all along) that the magic, carrier-killing ballistic missile that has the Western media so frightened is only half the equation.  The other half is targeting.  Trying to produce launch quality targeting data on moving ships 500-1000 nm away is a challenge, to say the least.  We can’t do it and I highly doubt the Chinese can, either.  That renders the carrier-killing missiles ineffective.  Bombers, on the other hand, carry their own radar and generate their own firing solution.  The only question is can they survive long enough to get within radar range and launch? 

This is the Cold War scenario all over again and that brings us to the second point.  The Navy was misguided, to put it kindly, to abandon the long ranged, hard hitting Tomcat for the short ranged, light hitting Hornet.  This decision is further compounded by the decision to reduce the size of the carrier air wings based on the rationale that newer planes are superior to older ones.  If you’re going to fight an outer air battle to protect the carrier, you probably want as many airframes as possible to carry your missiles.  Instead of developing the marginally effective Hornet, we should have developed a new airframe with the characteristics of the Tom/Bombcat.  Oh well, at least we have the long range, weapons-dripping JSF coming soon and that will …  ah … well, it's not really long ranged, actually, and it can't carry much of a weapons load but still it can, ah …  Oh crap, we’re screwed!

(1) United States Naval Institute Proceedings, “Back(Fire) to the Future?”, Norman Friedman, Aug 2012, p. 90

New Anti-Ship Missiles

Some good news on the anti-ship missile (ASM) front! 

As you undoubtedly know, the Navy’s only ship launched anti-ship missile is the venerable Harpoon.  Aside from being slow, not stealthy, and limited in capability, the missiles are reaching the end of their shelf lives.  Because of this, the Navy is being very judicious in its deployment of the missile.  Many ships don’t carry any, some carry the minimum of two or four, and only the ships deployed to high threat areas are being loaded with the maximum of eight.  Of course, even a loadout of eight represents a very small anti-ship capability.

Harpoon also suffers from an incompatibility with the Mk41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) resulting in the Harpoon having to be placed out in the open on deck thus rendering it susceptible to battle damage.  The manufacturer has offered a vertical launch Harpoon but the Navy has, puzzlingly, opted not to pursue it.

The Navy has desperately needed a new ASM for many years - one that is faster, stealthier, more intelligent, capable of autonomous or semi-autonomous targeting, has advanced electronic counter-measures, and so forth.  Well, the current issue of Proceedings (1) reports that NAVAIR is looking to award a contract to Raytheon for development of an anti-ship missile based on the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk.  Operational capability is scheduled for 2015 and appears to be a bridge solution until more advanced ASMs become available.  The Block IV is capable of in-flight retargeting using a two-way datalink, has a jam-resistant GPS receiver, and carries a camera for damage assessment.

Interestingly, there was a previous ASM version of the Tomahawk, the TASM, which used inertial guidance and an active radar for terminal guidance.  TASMs were withdrawn from service in the early 1990’s.



Long Range Anti-Ship Missile



In addition, Defense Update reports that the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) has awarded Lockheed Martin a $157 million contract to develop an advanced long range anti ship missile (LRASM) (2).  They have this to say about it,

“Unlike current anti-ship missiles LRASM be capable of conducting autonomous targeting, relying on on-board targeting systems to independently acquire the target without the presence of prior, precision intelligence, or supporting services like Global Positioning Satellite navigation and data-links. As an autonomous weapon LRASM will rely exclusively on on-board sensors and processing systems. According to DARPA, these capabilities will enable positive target identification, precision engagement of moving ships and establishing of initial target cueing in extremely hostile environment. The missile will be designed with advanced counter-countermeasures,to effectively evade hostile active defense systems.

…

LRASM will comply with existing weapon launchers and storage systems, fitted to match existing the VL-41 Vertical Launch System carried on board all modern U.S. Navy combat ships.

…

Two LRASM concepts were assessed - LRASM B, a high altitude, supersonic, ramjet-powered cruise missile. This design leverages prior ramjet development activities and a suite of supporting sensors and avionics to achieve a with balanced speed and stealth for robust performance. The second LRASM design is stealthier, low-level cruise-missile designated LRASM A. This design utilizing the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range (JASSM-ER) airframe, added with additional sensors and systems to achieve a stealthy and survivable subsonic cruise missile. LRASM A is considered more suitable for air launched applications.”

 

The article goes on to report yet another possible ASM in development.

“While LRASM is positioned as a direct successor for the Harpoon, the development of a more ambitious weapon known as ArcLight is also under evaluation at DARPA as a quick reaction weapon hitting time critical targets at a distance of 2,000 nautical miles within 30 minutes. ArcLight will employ a rocket booster, sustainer accelerating the weapon to hypersonic speed, from where the strike vehicle will glide at high speed, carrying a warhead weighing 100-200 pounds to strike the target with pinpoint accuracy. ArcLight, like LRASM, will also be stored in, and launched from existing Mk 41 VLS.”

Though late in coming, it appears that the Navy is finally begining to get serious about surface warfare.  Now, if only they'll get serious about mine warfare, naval gunfire support for land forces, and anti-submarine warfare!

(1) United States Naval Institute Proceedings, “New Tomahawks Ordered, Offensive Antisurface Weapon Planned”, Edward Walsh, Aug 2012

(2) Defense Update, http://defense-update.com/features/2010/november/18112010_lrasm.html, “Next Generation Missiles – LRASM”

LSD Class Life Extensions

Well, here’s a bit of good news.  As reported by the Defense Industry Daily website (1), the Navy is performing mid-life extensions on the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships and, in fact, has been doing so for several years.  These ships were commissioned between 1985-1998 and, with the extension, will serve until 2038.  Two ships per year are being upgraded with all modernizations scheduled to be completed by 2014.



LSD Class Upgrade - A Good Idea !



Costs for the upgrade appear to be quite reasonable by shipbuilding standards.  For example, USS Oak Hill (LSD-51) will be upgraded under a $115M contract.



The Navy should be doing far more upgrades instead of constantly wanting scrap perfectly usable ships to build ever more expensive new ones.  The Perry FFG class is a prime example.  The Navy made the conscious decision to forego maintenance and life extensions under the assumption that the LCS would be available to take over.  Of course, as it turned out, the LCS is not available in the anticipated numbers and has no capabilities.  Had the Navy extended the FFGs they would have capable ships for anti-piracy and Mid East merchant escort and patrol while buying time for the LCS program to get past its teething problems.

Let’s be fair and congratulate the Navy on a wise decision to extend the LSDs.

(1) Defense Industry Daily, http://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2012/06/ship-construction-and-naval-armor.html, 1-Aug-2012

Warship Design

The Navy no longer builds warships.  The Navy builds fragile weapon delivery platforms but not warships.  A warship is a vessel that can stand and fight;  one that can take damage and continue to fight;  a ship that is designed to mitigate the damage it receives.

In WWII the Navy built superb warships that could deliver immense amounts of damage, were built to resist damage, and were designed to continue fighting when damaged.  Consider the destroyers on the Pacific picket lines towards the end of the war.  There were numerous examples of these small ships absorbing multiple bombs and kamikaze hits and yet continuing to fight.  Or, what about the cruisers and destroyers involved in the battle for Guadalcanal?  They absorbed tremendous amounts of damage from torpedoes and shellfire while continuing to fight.  Yes, many eventually sank but only after extensive damage and while continuing to fight to the end.

Current Navy ships have almost none of the characteristics of their WWII predecessors.  Armor, other than small amounts of shrapnel protection around key areas, has been abandoned.  Manual/local fire control is largely absent though, to be fair, trying to shoot down missiles in manual control is probably a pointless exercise.  Torpedo protection in the form of blisters is non-existent.  Manning, the most important damage control factor there is, has been “optimized” to the point where damage control has been seriously compromised.  And so on …

Having just touched on some of the features that make for a good warship design, what are the characteristics that would make for a good modern warship design?  Here’s a good starter list.

Separation.  Key pieces of equipment should be physically separated to the extent possible.  The modern Burke, for instance, has all of its Aegis arrays mounted within about a 30 ft diameter or so.  A single hit there would likely take out every array.  The arrays should be separated as on the Ticonderogas which have two arrays on the forward superstructure and two on the aft.  Similarly, two of the three target illuminators are within ten feet of each other on the aft superstructure.  The Harpoon Mk141 rack launchers are always installed in side by side pairs.  A single hit would cost a ship its entire Harpoon loadout.



Note the Aegis Arrays Clustered on the Forward Superstructure



Redundancy.  Redundancy is almost non-existent.  Consider the modern destroyer as typified by the Burke class.  It has a single 5” gun versus the WWII Fletcher’s five 5” guns.  The modern Burke has no redundancy in gunfire.  The main radars of modern ships tend to be single installations with no significant backup. 

Armor.  Modern armor, such as it is, is limited to shrapnel suppression around a few key electronics areas.  There is no general hull or deck armor.  The modern gun mounts consist of fiberglass/composite shells  which provide no protection whatsoever as opposed to their WWII counterparts which were largely proof against shrapnel and ranged from a couple inches for 5” guns to the massive armor of the battleship turrets which could shrug off almost any hit.

Single Point of Failure.  Closely related to redundancy, single points of failure can incapacitate a system or multiple systems.  The example of the single 5” gun illustrates the single point of failure concept wherein an entire magazine of ammo is useless if the gun fails.  More commonly, single points of failure relate to ship’s utilities.  For example, electrical power for multiple systems routed through a common cable run represents a single point of failure.

Damage Control Requires Lots of Manpower

Manning.  As has been vividly demonstrated repeatedly since the start of WWII and through today, manning is one of the most important features of a warship.  Adequate manning allows battle casualties to be replaced.  Most importantly, successful damage control is a function of manpower more than any other factor as demonstrated even today by the Stark or the Cole incidents.



Steel.  WWII ships were built tough.  All ships were armored commensurate with their size.  Today’s ships have only isolated armor segments for protecting electronics from shrapnel.  Modern gun mounts are protected only by fiberglass type enclosures that offer no protection for the gun, whatsoever.  Even setting aside the issue of armor, per se, today’s ships are built with aluminum, composites, plywood cores, and very thin steel skins.  They are built to hold out the elements but that’s about it.  Simply using thicker and stronger steel would be a vast improvement as shown in the earlier post about the Cole.

In summary, if the Navy were serious about building WARships, we would not have the LCS, the Burkes, or for that matter, any of our current ships.  Given the enormous cost of modern ships, it’s puzzling why much greater survivability and toughness aren’t built in.  Ships represent far too big an investment not to make every attempt to ensure that they can fight hard and, if need be, fight hurt.