It is the job of the military to have contingency plans for
every conceivable scenario sitting on the shelf, ready to execute and to ensure
that the force is properly trained, maintained, and equipped to execute those
plans on a (figurative) moment’s notice.
When the Administration decided to strike Iran, it should
have required nothing more than to pick a plan off the shelf and assemble the
required assets. We should have been
ready and able.
Let’s digress for a moment. How many aircraft carriers did we use during
Desert Storm? The answer is 6. They were:
Compare that assemblage of power to the current Iran
conflict. How many carriers are active
for this? The answer is 2. They are:
And Ford was at the end of a long deployment and overdue to
return home. We should also note that
air wings during Desert Storm were larger than today’s air wings which makes
the two carriers for Iran more like one and a half carriers!
An obvious question arises;
did operational requirements only need two carriers or were there only
two carriers physically available? Not
knowing the detailed operational plan, we can’t say for sure but a common sense
assessment sure seems to indicate that we needed more especially when we
compare the needs of Desert Storm to this conflict.
Consider:
-We seem to lack sufficient air and naval coverage to keep
the strait open.
-We clearly lack the air coverage to protect our bases and our Middle East allies from Iranian drones and missiles.
-USS Ford is approaching its one year deployment anniversary which clearly says that the vessel was used because no other carriers were available.
Were we ready or were we caught unprepared?
A peripheral piece of evidence is the attempted deployment
of a MEU during the early Ukraine conflict.
Despite having around 30 amphibious ships, the Navy was unable to form a
ARG and provide ships for the MEU. This
suggests that the Navy is nowhere near combat ready and, further, has zero
surge capability.
One might also ask why the Japan based carrier was not moved
to the Middle East? It’s not as if
anyone believes that carrier serves any legitimated purpose in Japan.
I can’t offer any definitive answers but the circumstantial
evidence suggests that the Navy is woefully unprepared for combat.
- USS Midway
- USS Roosevelt
- USS America
- USS Kennedy
- USS Saratoga
- USS Ranger
- USS Ford
- USS Lincoln
-We clearly lack the air coverage to protect our bases and our Middle East allies from Iranian drones and missiles.
-USS Ford is approaching its one year deployment anniversary which clearly says that the vessel was used because no other carriers were available.
There are two plans, the Mossad's Bomb & Revolution plan.
ReplyDeleteThe USAF & IAF did a fine job of bombing, the Revolution
part, is still awaited.
The USN is working a plan from off the shelf, the Anaconda Plan.
Now, Im not saying it has anything to do without, just an observation BUT notice that all the carriers deployed for GW1 except 1 (Roosevelt) were non nuclear at the time which is pretty crazy to think of since in1991, I would assume we had a couple of CVNs in use compared to today, they are all nuclear and we only have 2 on site!!! One would be tempted to think that a nuclear CV would be more ready to deploy on quick notice but looks like the regular CVs did pretty good getting there when needed. I'm sure its not all about the nuke vs conventional, there's plenty of other factors, just an observation.....my 2 cents is maybe USN screwed up on the whole CVN fleet, maybe a mixed CV/CVN fleet would be better?
ReplyDeleteThat was the first thought that came into my head as well. Surely CVs must be cheaper and quicker to build, and Im not sure that "hulls in the water" does not make up for the perceived lack of "unlimited steaming". Historically, how was the decision made that all carriers had to be CVN's? Was it perhaps a remnant of Cold War limitations of fueling that may or may not be salient now?
DeleteTo be fair, in 1991, of the 12-15 carriers we had, only 6 (5 Nimitz + 1 Enterprise) carriers were nuclear.
Delete"unlimited steaming".
DeleteThis has never been a relevant factor in the conventional vs nuclear debate and never will as long as carriers require conventional escorts who require refueling.
"Surely CVs must be cheaper and quicker to build"
It all depends on how you look at it. In order to operate conventional carriers, you MUST build a gigantic fuel supply industry and delivery system along with a fleet of oilers. That is the mandatory, added cost of conventional powered carriers and MUST be included in any cost comparison. I've looked at this many times and once you include ALL relevant factors, there is very little cost difference between conventional and nuclear. The only difference is where and when you pay for it. Yes, conventional carriers have smaller construction costs but you eventually MUST pay for the oil industry, supply system, and oilers. The money is simply spread out. The same kinds of considerations hold for nuclear power.
Isn't the fuel supply system already paid for as you said the escorts and amphibs are already oil fueled. Is 10 carriers really adding that much when you have over 70 Burke's, other surface combatants and 30 odd amphibs plus all the resupply ships already requiring logistics for refueling.
DeleteRegarding the surface fleet, we are constantly altering, maintaining, and adding to the fuel storage and distribution system. For example, the Navy just shut down the entire Pearl Harbor fuel storage system and is in the process of attempting to build replacement facilities for that at some other location. Thus, the fuel system is constantly and repeatedly being paid for.
DeleteIn addition, our oiler fleet is continuously retiring old ships and building new ones. It's a never-ending cost of having conventionally powered ships.
What do you think the addition of, say, ten carriers (11 by law if we replace all our nuclear carriers) with conventional powered carriers would do to the fuel storage and distribution system? We'd have to significantly increase it, of course. I'm sure you're also aware that a carrier would require several times the fuel load that, say, a Burke would. We would need additional facilities and oilers among other components. And the additional costs go on and on.
I have no doubt you know all this so I have to ask, are looking to discuss something or start a pointless argument?
Admirals will ignore calls to end constant deployments. Yet they may agree to adding another phase in the cycle. Add a "ready" phase with trained groups on 72 hour standby at home. So you have: 1) Rebuild/Refit 2) Work up 3) Ready (a new one) 4) deployed. So you only have a quarter of the fleet deployed rather than a third, but can quickly double the deployed force in a few days when needed.
ReplyDeleteDon't forget that there were also two battleships along with those six carriers and their escorts. A couple of (modern) battleships or heavy cruisers would be handy over there these days.
ReplyDeleteSomthing else I wonder about- why the Ford? In my mind it's the least capable carrier we have, as it's new tech still seems to be working poorly. I read an article a few days ago that said EMALS was still hitting under 30% of the spec'd failure rate, and the context suggested that was during recent Iran ops. Now, no citations were given, and stupidly my copy of the statement/link got deleted from my clipboard... but, what reason do we have to doubt it, besides some Admirals rosy statements to the contrary?
ReplyDeleteI understand that the Iran ops probably came about on relatively short notice, and you only have the carriers you have during the rotation...but... did the Navy really send a carrier to war, that still can't do what a Nimitz does routinely??
"why the Ford?"
DeleteWell, this is the premise of the post. My strong suspicion is that we had no other carriers able to surge so it was Ford or nothing.
They just kicked the "planned" delivery of the fourth Ford carrier out two more years despite a massive budget increase. Now 15 years to construct her. Maybe this is part of a cancellation plot.
ReplyDeletehttps://news.usni.org/2026/05/08/future-aircraft-carrier-doris-miller-delayed-by-2-years
I believe they're doing a review of the Fords and.looking at the cost of them... and whether to continue or possibly look at lower-cost alternatives...
Delete"Now 15 years to construct her."
DeleteCome on, now, you know that isn't true. CVN-81 hasn't begun construction yet. It is scheduled to begin later this year. For a 2034 delivery date, that would be an 8 yr construction period. The 15 yr figure is using the Jan 2019 block buy date as the starting point and that's completely misleading. The block buy doesn't begin construction, it just reserves future funding and, perhaps, puts some long lead items on the account books.
There is much to criticize the Navy about but we have to be fair and factual when we do so.
"I believe they're doing a review of the Fords "
DeleteSomeone is always doing a review of carriers. This has been true since the very first carrier built. I'm unaware of any specific, credible review. Do you have a reference?
There is this:
Deletehttps://news.usni.org/2026/04/21/navy-reviewing-ford-class-carrier-design-ahead-of-future-contract-awards
And this:
Deletehttps://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2026/04/23/us-navy-is-reviewing-cost-of-future-ford-class-carriers-to-ensure-they-make-sense/
When the Trump administration took office, they initiated a review of ALL Navy acquisition programs for cost effectiveness and other factors. The intent was simply to justify the expenditures. This is that effort. It is not a serious examination of the combat effectiveness or value of the Ford class. I'm sure they'll use this to justify to Congress even bigger and "better" carriers that need bigger budgets. They're not looking at Fords in relation to operational plans which is what they should be doing.
DeleteCarlton Myers (G2Mil) had lots of light infantry ideas. Today your ideas are technically possible. But we don't hear them anymore.
ReplyDeleteThe Pentagon doesn't listen to anyone nowadays except defense contractors.
DeletePerhaps the military warned US government that resources were stretched thin, as well as that the blockade of Ormuz was a likely outcome, and were not listened to ?
ReplyDeleteOr perhaps not. Try to inject at least a modicum of facts and logic in support of your comments.
DeleteDid part of the Ford’s air wing redeploy to the two remaining on station carriers before it returned for its refit, or were the ships already carrying their maximum complement of aircraft, as you would expect in wartime?
ReplyDeleteTo the best of my knowledge, carriers don't transfer their air wings and the Ford did not do so. Our carriers are not carrying any increase in air wing size.
DeleteThank you.
DeleteThat sounds strange, but I expect there’s a good reason for it.
"I expect there’s a good reason for it."
DeleteThere's not. As a reader of this blog, you know that the Navy is famous for decisions that have no good reason.
"That sounds strange, but I expect there’s a good reason for it."
DeleteWell, here's one possible reason. Recall that the Ford had been at sea and in operation for a fair number of months beyond a normal deployment, and maintenance problems were building up. And of course the crew was also getting exhausted.
And of course the air wing was ALSO at sea and operating far beyond a normal deployment, potentially also developing delayed maintenance and related problems. So perhaps the aircraft (and crews) needed maintenance and rest just as much as the ship does.
Yes it was a long deployment but it seems unlikely that every aircraft in the Ford’s air wing needed extensive depot level repairs (major overhauls, heavy structural work, full engine rebuilds, etc.).
DeleteStill seems strange that the carriers didn’t sail with their air wings at maximum capacity, or why additional aircraft weren’t transferred during their transit to the area of operations.
Isn’t that a bit like the escorts’ VLS tubes only being loaded out to 75%?
"seems strange that the carriers didn’t sail with their air wings at maximum capacity"
DeleteAs far as I know, Ford did carry the maximum air wing. The problem is that today's air wings are only around 65 aircraft of which several are helicopters rather than fixed wing aircraft.
Aircraft are never transferred between carriers outside of the case where a carrier is sunk and some of its aircraft manage to land on another carrier.
"Isn’t that a bit like the escorts’ VLS tubes only being loaded out to 75%?"
Wow, you are not going to want to hear this ...
"seems unlikely that every aircraft in the Ford’s air wing needed extensive depot level"
DeleteThe Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate for Navy aircraft under the best conditions is on the order of 25-35% and the Mission Capable (MC) rate is on the order of 50%. After an 11 month deployment, it would be astounding if the air wing had two dozen MC aircraft left. Remember, it doesn't take a major structural issue to render an aircraft non-MC. Electronics failures are a common cause and today's parts shortages, especially at the end of a very long supply chain, mean replacement is a challenge. Without a doubt, the air wing was "rode hard and put up wet" by the 11 month mark.
Thanks for clarifying!
DeleteIn what world can mission capable rates like those be acceptable?
Nimitz was an easy-going, team-playing sort of a guy.
Maybe we should have called the CVNs the Halsey Class - he would have looked at those numbers and kicked some serious brass butt.
Check out the posts under the "Readiness" keyword in the archives. To get you started, here's a good one: "F-35C Reality Check"
DeleteI agree with the general thrust of this post. However, from an apples-to-apples standpoint, we should note that the Navy did have 5-6 months to get all those carriers deployed.
ReplyDeleteTthat is to say, 5-6 months when we were unambiguously, methodically building up toward launching an overwhelming attack that everyone knew was coming.
In the current instance, an attack on Iran has obviously been possible since, well, whatever date you want to pick. But as far as what's been publicly reported, it seems like the actual decision to go came rather quickly. If we'd started an overt, all-out buildup in February, could the Navy have had >2 carriers there by August 1. Maybe...?
Superficially, you make a valid point, however, Trump has been ratcheting up the pressure on Iran since he took office. In other words, conflict was not only a possibility from day one but an increasing probability for the last year. Any prudent naval commander would have been preparing carriers for combat deployment for many months.
DeleteThe PUBLIC announcement of hostilities was fairly abrupt but it is clear that, internally, the administration knew this was a probability for the last year which means the Navy knew it as well.
I read more and more rnews articles pretending that Iran has still a lot of intact missiles and drones stocks and production capabilities - maybe they were ready ?
ReplyDeleteInteresting topic; from a planning perspective: is there a requirement for carriers and even naval air power in the NAS and Persian Gulf?
ReplyDeleteThere is no shortage of runways, ammunition bunkers, or aviation fuel storage to support an air campaign. There was a huge build out of air bases in the region to support the air campaign for the First Gulf war. Since that war, those bases were continuously expanded, and there was another round of 'super base' construction in post-2003 invasion Iraq.
Given the expense and limitations of carrier-based air power (range/bomb load), the restrictive waters in the region making a CVBG more vulnerable, not to mention the (over?) construction of air fields in the region: why do we need any carriers at all?
GAB
It is an interesting topic. There are a few different ways of looking at it.
DeleteFrom a pre-conflict, planning perspective, those bases you note are all in foreign countries who have exhibited mixed behavior as far as being allies to us and they have often voiced displeasure with our actions in the region. It is quite plausible that they (all or some) might have denied us permission to use the bases to attack Iran.
After the fact, we now see that those countries seem to be cooperating with us and allowing use of the bases. Still, though, it is possible there could soon come a point where they think we should stop the war even if we're not ready to do so and they would deny us operations.
So, political unreliability is a major reason to at least have had several carriers ready to respond.
Another factor to consider is base defense. We seem entirely unwilling to fully embrace the idea of having to defend our bases against missile/drone/rocket attack. We've already lost some aircraft on the ground. A carrier is much better defended than a land base and nearly immune to such attacks especially given Iran's inability to target (not withstanding Russian or Chinese assistance).
I am totally perplexed by our seeming inability (or unwillingness?) to defend the strait. If keeping the strait open is important (and it sure seems like it ought to be!) we should be blanketing the area with air cover and we clearly aren't. Is it a lack of land bases/aircraft? If so, carriers would be an enormous help.
I know we have many potential bases but I don't know how many AF aircraft we actually have operating in the region. It seems as if the AF's aircraft are fully committed to strikes on Iran and do not have enough to cover the strait or do other tasks. If that's true, carriers would, again, be helpful.
To sum up, could we get by without carriers? Depending on our objectives, possibly. From a pre-planning perspective, it would have been folly to assume we'd have full permission to use the land bases.
Are we successfully operating with only two carriers? From my perspective, no. We seem to be lacking air cover over the strait and we seem to be taking longer to service viable targets than I would have liked or imagined. If the AF can't provide the coverage, carriers are needed to supplement the AF.
Remember, all the same potential risks, costs, and drawbacks of carriers for Iran applied to Desert Storm and yet we included six of them.
I think that this post shows the need to end the useless deployments like CNO has advocated for. Extended deployments are just a symptom of the overworked carrier fleet. Going into a relatively major engagement with only two, one of which had already been at sea for a long time, shows our inability to field significant combat power when truly needed- and the fact that two carriers went to war with their peacetime-sized complement of escorts is also worrisome for a lot of reasons, with the possible perceived threat to the carriers from Iran not being any excuse. If we learn anything from this, it's that in peacetime, the COCOMS need to be absolutely neutered, and the CVBGs need to be kept at home, their combat power preserved and guarded, not squandered, for when they are truly needed. With the delays in construction of the Ford and follow ons, Covid, and ongoing supply chain/worker issues, carrier availability is only going to get worse, and extensions of the life cycles of other Nimitz clas ships will be inevitable, and doing so is just a desperate stop-gap. The fact is, whether we can get carrier production "caught up" or not, it doesn't matter if we don't stop the endless useless deployments.
ReplyDeleteYears ago when I first started following this blog, I was skeptical. I was a believer in the deployment model. But now... and for a while, I've absolutely subscribed to the "bring and keep the fleet home" model. It's the rational thing to do.
"I was a believer in the deployment model. But now"
DeleteYou changed your paradigm. Outstanding. Few people are capable of that. Salute to you!