Sunday, February 8, 2026

Still Not Serious About Passive Sensing

Naval News website has an article, relevant to the US Navy, about the French navy installing electro-optical/infrared sensors on various ships.[1]  That’s a nice step but nowhere near enough. We’ve talked about the future naval battlefield requiring purely passive sensing systems and individual ships needing a dozen or more such sensors spaced around the ship for complete hemispherical coverage and battle damage resilience (redundancy and separation).  Adding one or two sensors to a ship is woefully insufficient and indicates a peacetime mindset where the threat level is low to non-existent.  In other words, it is an action by a navy that is not serious about war.
 
According to TRAKKA Systems, … The TC-375M [ed. one of the EO/IR systems the French are using] is ideally suited for long-range naval and coast guard missions including search and rescue, illegal immigration protection, drug interdiction, economic exclusion zone (EEZ) protection, anti-piracy, maritime patrol, naval C4ISR, and naval vessel force protection.[1]

That’s quite a list of suitable tasks and none of them have anything to do with combat.  Even the French navy’s “high end” threat is laughably weak, as indicated below.
 
… the French Navy previously moved to fit Safran’s Paseo XLR advanced electro-optic infra red (EO/IR) system on all FREMM frigates and Horizon type Air Defense destroyers. The decision was taken as part of an “urgent operational requirement” in response to the escalating threat posed by kamikaze unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).[1]

UAVs and USVs?  That’s not a threat, it’s an annoyance, at most, for a competent navy.  Saturation missile attacks are a threat.  Ballistic missiles are a threat.  Hypersonic missiles are a threat.  Submarines are a threat.  Believing that a few tiny, unmanned drones are a threat shows the absence of a combat mentality.
 
As we’ve previously discussed, the modern battlefield requires passive sensing.  Ships need long range, hemispherical passive sensors (see, “PassiveHemispherical Sensing”) that can search, detect, track, and provide fire control.  To radiate is to die unless you’ve got missiles coming at you and, if you do, you’ve already screwed up and are already on the losing side of the battle ledger.  Ships need to be able to sail, establish situational awareness, search for enemy assets, and engage, all while remaining passive and undetected (see, “The Passive Warship”). 
 
Ship designers need to regain a combat design philosophy.  Battle damage will occur and that requires significant redundancy and separation of all key equipment.  A single EO/IR sensor is not a combat fit – it’s a peacetime design failure.
 
I’m not picking on the French.  The US Navy is doing exactly the same thing and this should serve as a lesson for us.
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]Naval News website, “French Navy fits new EO/IR systems aboard Mistral-class LHDs”, Xavier Vavasseur, 3-Feb-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/02/french-navy-fits-new-eo-ir-systems-aboard-mistral-class-lhds/

96 comments:

  1. The need to be able to fight in a non-emitting posture seems so obvious.
    But the Navy seems to think that it is going to be able to both radiate and have full situational awareness, and that it is the winning approach.

    Is there something we're missing here?
    Are we just not getting it?

    Logic says that emitting is a beacon that shows where you are at a far greater range than you can see.
    So does the Navy know something that we don't?

    Assuming not...
    ...one of the types of weapons that I would want to have, and we may have these already, are those that track to radar emissions.
    I'm not talking about HARM missiles in a SEAD mission.

    What I'm talking about are Standard missiles and LRASM missiles that can be fired at a distant radar emissions source, that will track to the target, and then use EO/IR sensors to supplement terminal guidance.

    We should be prepared to fight in EMCON, and punish the enemy with those radar tracking missiles every time that they dare to power up their radar sets.

    I would expect an enemy to do that to us.

    Lutefisk

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    1. "So does the Navy know something that we don't?"

      I think the evidence overwhelmingly says ... no. Quite the opposite. The Navy has repeatedly demonstrated that it knows nothing.

      "Standard missiles and LRASM missiles that can be fired at a distant radar emissions source"

      Here's yet another problem. Standard missiles are simply not ship-killers. Not even close. LRASM is an almost non-existent missile in terms of inventory numbers and does not exist as a ship-launched weapon. So, even if they had home-on-radiate capability, they're not available and/or not a threat. We lack a powerful, ship launched, cruise missile.

      Delete
    2. "Standard missiles are simply not ship-killers."

      I had forgotten that they had an anti-ship mode. I was thinking of firing them at radiating air radars, like AWACS type of planes.

      "LRASM is an almost non-existent missile in terms of inventory numbers and does not exist as a ship-launched weapon."

      Kind of baffling, really. I suppose that the NSM could be used instead, but shorter range. And I like the stealthy characteristics of the LRASM.
      Oh well, goes on the list of things I think the navy could use (along with closed cell steel foam as a lightweight armor layer).

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    3. "I suppose that the NSM could be used instead, but shorter range"

      As with the LRASM, we have very few NSM in our inventory and precious few on order. The Navy is simply not serious about ship-launched anti-ship missiles. The Navy's main anti-ship missile, at the moment, is probably the Standard which is woefully inadequate, as we've noted.

      Delete
  2. 'Believing that a few tiny, unmanned drones are a threat shows the absence of a combat mentality'
    Yeah, if just a few and they're tiny, then agreed.
    But multiple drones launched simultaneously represent a potent threat to any warship regardless of 'combat mentality'.
    And some drones in current use are 'tiny' but many are not and can easily carry a payload equivalent to a 155mm M107 shell (or an actual M107 shell).
    This won't sink a warship (obviously) but a single hit would leave a sizeable hole in the 'armored' hull of a Burke which is < 1" thick.
    Or kill everyone on the bridge, or knock out the gun or the radar.
    A hit during refuelling (even underway) = potential catastrophe.
    Also bear in mind that a US warship operating anywhere in the Persian Gulf (or the Taiwan Strait) is well within range of a shore based drone strike.
    We shouldn't be too relaxed or dismissive about the threat from simple, cheap and expendable drones.

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    1. You are failing to grasp so many points about drones that I almost don't know where to begin.

      "But multiple drones launched simultaneously represent a potent threat to any warship regardless of 'combat mentality'."

      You (and almost everyone else) fail to grasp that there is no way to launch multiple drones at a warship at sea. Drones don't just magically appear near a ship. They have to be transported within range and no warship is going to allow a drone "carrier" (whatever that might be) to get anywhere near them during war.

      Drones also have the same targeting issue as missiles. Again, drones don't just magically appear. They need a target and a warship is difficult to find and target.

      "some drones in current use are 'tiny' but many are not and can easily carry a payload"

      Large drones that can carry large payloads, such as a Predator or Reaper, are very expensive, few in number, and land based. No country has "swarms" of large drones. Further, large drones are slow, non-maneuverable, easily spotted, and easily destroyed.

      "bear in mind that a US warship operating anywhere in the Persian Gulf (or the Taiwan Strait) is well within range of a shore based drone strike."

      If you are the Russian navy and are operating near shore while being totally oblivious then, yes, you're in danger. On the other hand, if you are a competent navy you have very long range sensors, air cover, various ranged weapons, AND YOU'LL BE STRIKING THE ENEMY'S POTENTIAL STAGING, MANUFACTURING, AND LAUNCH SITES PRIOR TO ATTACKS.

      You're also ignoring the best data point we have which is the US Navy operating off Yemen and routinely intercepting every drone that has approached, demonstrating exactly what I've been saying that a prepared, competent navy has nothing to fear from drones.

      "simple, cheap and expendable drones."

      Simple, cheap, and expendable means, by definition, SMALL. Small drones are simply not a threat to a ship.

      You desperately need to consider drones and warships from a REALISTIC operational and tactical perspective. You also need to acquaint yourself with the US Navy's experience off Yemen and recognize actual data instead of engaging in pure speculation.

      Delete
    2. Thanks.
      "....there is no way to launch multiple drones at a warship at sea. Drones don't just magically appear near a ship".
      I was referring to shore-based drones when I wrote
      "...... a US warship operating anywhere in the Persian Gulf (or the Taiwan Strait) is well within range of a shore based drone strike."
      ".....no warship is going to allow a drone "carrier" (whatever that might be) to get anywhere near them during war."
      The drone carrier would likely be a Hilux (the world's most common pickup truck).
      "...Predator (and) Reaper (drones), are very expensive, few in number, and land based."
      Yes; but they are Tier II+ drones, and I am not referring to those, but to cheap and expendable tactical drones with a range of 30 - 60 miles, and a payload roughly equivalent to a 155m artillery shell.
      "....They need a target and a warship is difficult to find and target."
      True, but if you can find, hit and destroy a 70 ton MBT from 50 miles away when it's travelling at high speed, I guess you could probably - sooner or later and with the help of all those hundreds of dhow-type fishing boats - find and make a lucky hit on a 9,000 ton Burke from roughly the same distance.
      "....the US Navy operat(ed) off Yemen and routinely intercept(ed) every drone that has approached.."
      So they said, but not sure how routine it was, and presumably the Carney was on full alert at the time. None of the couple dozen (?) Houthi drones hit a Navy ship but two or three got through and struck Israeli targets. A surprise attack on eg a T-AO may have had a different result; hence my point that we need to be alert to the threat.
      Hope that clarifies things.

      Delete
    3. I would think that the Phalanx CIWS would be the ideal weapon for ships to defend themselves against swarm attacks of drones.

      The slow-moving nature of the drones and their need to get in proximity to the ship should make them easy targets for the radar-directed 20mm Vulcan guns on the Phalanx.
      And the 20mm ammunition is relatively inexpensive compared to the cost of missile interception.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    4. "But multiple drones launched simultaneously represent a potent threat to any warship regardless of 'combat mentality'."

      Don't try to rewrite history. Here is what you actually wrote:

      "But multiple drones launched simultaneously represent a potent threat to any warship regardless of 'combat mentality'."

      Nothing in that refers to land or sea based drones. You may have meant only land based but you didn't say it. Later in your comment you did, indeed, mention land based drones as a separate point.

      "cheap and expendable tactical drones with a range of 30 - 60 miles, and a payload roughly equivalent to a 155m artillery shell."

      What drone are you aware of that meets those specs? The RQ-21 Blackjack, a medium size UAV, has a range of 58 miles but a payload of only around 39 lbs versus a typical 155 mm shell which weighs 100+ pounds. I'm quite dubious that your envisioned drone exists.

      "with the help of all those hundreds of dhow-type fishing boats"

      Do you really think there's a ship's captain stupid enough to sail withing range of an enemy fishing vessel during war? You're just making stuff up.

      "So they said,"

      You probably believe the earth is flat. There have been no reports or even rumors about any USN ship being hit so there is no reason to believe otherwise. Again, follow the evidence where it leads. Don't make up stuff to support a conspiracy theory.

      " presumably the Carney was on full alert at the time."

      You mean like any ship would be in a combat situation?

      "A surprise attack on eg a T-AO may have had a different result"

      Are you suggesting that an attack on a defenseless ship might succeed????!! That's some astute analysis.

      "Hope that clarifies things."

      It absolutely does. It clearly demonstrates that you have a pre-conceived idea, unsupported by any facts, and that you're willing to ignore actual data to try to argue your point. If you choose to comment again, please significantly increase the quality of your comment. I won't allow another substandard comment to stand.

      Delete
    5. "The slow-moving nature of the drones and their need to get in proximity to the ship should make them easy targets for the radar-directed 20mm Vulcan guns on the Phalanx."

      Assuming the software gates are adjusted to recognize something that slow as a valid target.

      Delete
    6. "Assuming the software gates are adjusted to recognize something that slow as a valid target."

      On the plus side, if they adjust the software gates it will probably engage Hamas paragliders.

      Lutefisk

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    7. Of course, they may also wind up engaging seagulls and pelicans!

      Delete
    8. Communist seagulls and pelicans? ;)

      Lutefisk

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    9. "I would think that the Phalanx CIWS would be the ideal weapon for ships to defend themselves against swarm attacks of drones."

      A last ditch defense for every ship.

      But for the Task Force.

      A reimagined "Atlanta" class anti aircraft cruiser... bristling with Phalanx and Rolling Airframe Missiles (SeaRam concept). I am suggesting a dedicated ship for this purpose. Designed, operationally integrated and built to counter the swarm. That's it. Two of these in the task force can vector towards where the swarm is approaching the group. Assuming these drones don't get so cheap you can literally 360 attack the task force.... and if this sounds suspiciously like naval anti air warfare in World War Two.... you would be right. For the developing threat of the drone swarm.

      Delete
    10. "A reimagined "Atlanta" class anti aircraft cruiser... bristling with Phalanx and Rolling Airframe Missiles..."

      I would imagine that the concern with this would be the limited range of the weapons.

      Phalanx uses a 20mm Vulcan gun with a range of only a couple thousand meters.
      Goalkeeper with its 30mm A-10 gun has longer range, but still less than double of Phalanx.

      I don't know that their engagement footprint would be enough to protect a task force/battle group.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    11. "Atlanta" class anti aircraft cruiser"

      That would provide effective defense for a one or two ships but, remember, a task force in war is spread out over a ten to fifty mile diam circle. One or two ships with close in weapons can only cover the 1-2 mile area around themself. All the other ships would be unprotected. That's why EVERY individual ship needs effective anti-drone weapons (electronic and kinetic).

      "swarm"

      We imagine a swarm of aircraft surrounding a single target ship such as a carrier but that's absurd unless the entire escort has been eliminated. Drones don't just appear out of nowhere around the target. They originate from somewhere (a ship, presumably, since we'll be operating well out at sea) and have to slowly fly past all the escorts to get to the center of the group they want to attack. If our escorts are properly armed, the swarm stands very little chance of reaching the main target. Further, if we are at war, NO enemy/unknown ship will be allowed to approach within a thousand miles of a task force without being instantly sunk. When we start thinking this drone issue through from an actual combat/war perspective, we quickly realize that the threat is nearly non-existent because it's operationally nearly impossible for the enemy to execute.

      Delete
  3. Here's another option for passive sensing that I haven't heard much about. Visual and infrared are both impaired by clouds and fog (to different degrees and depending on how thick the clouds are). Millimeter waves are affected much less. I've read that this frequency range IS affected by atmospheric absorption (effect varies by frequency) so the ranges are fairly short (maybe a few miles).

    The referenced article is about a system using passive millimeter wave microwaves to help pilots see the runway to land during bad weather conditions. Range seems to be a couple of miles. This might be useful for short range air defense. Does it seem worth doing?

    Here's the article:

    https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2019/october/30/see-through-clouds

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    1. The incredibly short range is of very limited use in a naval battle. If an enemy or weapon is withing a mile to two, you're either already dead or seconds away from it.

      Delete
  4. Tethered drones would be a proven and inexpensive advancement. Tethered means power is fed to them and no one needs to "fly" them.

    https://defence-blog.com/raytheon-develops-tethered-drone-system-for-ship-defense/

    G2mil

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    1. It's got some potential as a niche defensive weapon assuming the negative impact of adverse weather, rain, fog, etc. can be dealt with.

      Delete
    2. So... did I read that right?? Its supposed to be a drone...on a leash. Attatched to a boat... towed by a ship?
      Is there a quota for how many times you can say "unmanned" or "autonomous" in new projects??🤣
      I mean... DARPA has come up with some good stuff in the past... but that's been a while ago...

      Delete
    3. ComNavOps had a post about it in the comments below to re-quote him:

      ComNavOpsOctober 21, 2021 at 6:33 PM

      This idea keeps coming up and I keep shooting it down. A blimp/kite/whatever is a large radar reflecting beacon saying here I am and just below me is my ship! Offsetting a mile from the ship is nothing to anyone/anything looking for the ship.

      There are practical problems like power source, data transmission, field of view, deployment/retrieval time, etc.

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2021/10/passive-hawkeye.html

      Delete
    4. "DARPA has come up with some good stuff in the past... but that's been a while ago..."

      I truly can't recall the last successful DARPA project that turned into something useful for the fleet. Can you think of any relatively recent example?

      Delete
    5. Recently? No. The Sea Shadow could be considered useful as far as Stealth research maybe, but that's the last thing I can think of that could've had any big naval impact, and that was 40-ish years ago.

      Delete
    6. "Sea Shadow"

      Even that didn't really provide any benefit. The vessel was never developed into anything practical and we already knew about stealth so that wasn't anything new.

      Honestly, everything they do seems like just technological gimmickry with no practical application. I'd like to believe they develop SOMETHING that is of practical use to the fleet but I can't think of anything.

      Delete
  5. I think that systems like the Leonidas are going to be the end of the drone issue, as far as a naval context is concerned. I just wonder if they have a utility vs missiles as well(?). It'd be a last-layer defense like CIWS/RAM, but ( this is strictly a feeling) a more reliable defense than kinetic weapons, although being used in concert with them for layered defense seems wise.

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    1. My "concern" is that, yes, it sounds good but if it were that good and that easy, why is the military still investing so much time and effort into developing anti-drone weapons? Like most systems, is it not as good as it sounds on paper?

      Delete
    2. That's actually a good question. It's probably goes without saying that manufacturer claims are overstated- but it seems to me that an RF weapon vs laser is a fairly simple choice, since RF can be used in a broader swath, rather than having to focus on individual targets. I wonder how much of it has to do with the company being a relative newcomer vs the big established defense contractors? Could it be politics and industry/Pentagon inertia, rather than true capability? Im just thinking out loud, and don't have anything to support that.

      Delete
    3. "goes without saying that manufacturer claims are overstated ... I wonder how much of it has to do with the company being a relative newcomer vs the big established defense contractors?"

      This is reminiscent of DARPA's unmanned Sea Hunter vessel with its tiny, low powered, unmanned sonar which was claimed to be able to find and follow enemy submarines. Simple, inescapable logic instantly told us that was not true and the claim was overstated to the point of being pure fiction. If the tiny, low power sonar had been able to actually find and track submarines - something our largest, most powerful, computer assisted, manned sonar systems can't do with any reliability - then all of the Burkes would have been instantly put on a crash replacement program to rip out their enormous bow sonars, power generators, sonar crew, computers, and equipment compartments ... but they weren't which tells me with absolute certainty that the DARPA claim was fraudulent.

      Same here. As I said, if the microwave system was that effective, the entire anti-drone program would have already halted and some manufacturer would already have a contract for thousands of units ... but they don't ... so it's not as effective as the article suggested. That doesn't mean it can't someday be developed into something useful but it's not effective yet.

      Delete
  6. ofc, the elephant in the room issue is that pure passive EO/IR sensing, with some ESM, relegates you to line of sight of the horizon, which isn't really great thb. Otoh, the same issue affects the opposition.

    the doctrinal answer to the prblem, in the Cold War, was to use the carrier's air wing to prosecute targets, but this runs into the problem that our air wings are seeing a reduction by as much as a third; a Nimitz air wing could have some 70 combat aircraft, being a mix of F-14, F-18, A-6 and S-3, but nowadays we're lucky to have 4 full squadrons of 12 aircraft each. That's a maximum of 48 combat aircraft.

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    1. "pure passive EO/IR sensing, with some ESM, relegates you to line of sight of the horizon,"

      You seem to be making a distinction between optical/IR and radar when they're essentially identical in terms of detection limitations. Radar is horizon limited just like EO/IR. What you seem to be forgetting is that the horizon is dependent on target altitude and sensor height. Radar can see hundreds of miles if the target is at altitude and so can EO/IR. Even back in the F-14 Tomcat days, the aircraft's camera was capable of spotting Soviet bombers a hundred miles away and optical sensing has only gotten better. So, there is no elephant or, at least, none that doesn't exist for standard radar.

      "the doctrinal answer to the prblem, in the Cold War"

      No, not really. Carrier air required active radar on the individual aircraft and that gave away the carrier's approximate location. The doctrinal answer was stay silent and force the enemy to use active sensors, giving away his location. Also, remember, that "carrier air" as a solution to anything is a very limited solution. We have a maximum of 9 functional carriers (that's how many air wings we have) so that mean's that solutions that depend on carrier air can only apply to a maximum of about two carrier task forces. Every other patrol ship, convoy, surface task force, etc. requires a non-carrier air solution. Hence, the doctrinal solution of silence (EMCON). What we need to do is "extend" our silent surveillance as I've suggested with small, passive UAVs for surface ships and much more numerous and powerful passive sensors for ships and the use of passive scout ships.

      Delete
    2. of course, the corrolary to that is that the higher your mast, for greater EO/IR sensing range, the greater your chance of detection, since, yanno, we're raising a giant mast in the sky. Of course, you could mitigate this with a stealthy mast, such as on the Visby or the Mogami 30FFM.

      Delete
    3. "the higher your mast, for greater EO/IR sensing range, the greater your chance of detection"

      And the EXACT same consideration applies to radar height and it's far worse for radar in that radar MUST go active to function which means a free giveaway location for the enemy. You seem to be trying your best to denigrate passive sensing when, in reality, passive and active have the exact same constraints for the factors you've cited. What's your problem with this?

      Delete
    4. My biggest issue with passive sensing is that it's really reactive and defensive by nature. You have to go out and look for the enemy, and that means you need radar, because passive sensing won't cut it for area search.

      Of course if you're going to use a radar you might as well much higher than the height of a mast with an EO/IR sensor, but then that lets you fly your sensor at an offset so that it's giving the enemy a direct line back to you, the way a tethered sensor node would.

      Delete
    5. While I have never been the greatest fan of the IJN's pagoda masts, i have to say that having a mast be 40 meters up does give you GREAT visibility.

      Delete
    6. "My biggest issue with passive sensing is that it's really reactive and defensive by nature."

      It is clear that you have very little grasp of tactical sensor operations. Whether this is from a lack of technical understanding of the various passive and active sensors or a lack of understanding of naval tactics, in general, is an open but irrelevant question.

      Contrary to what you claim, passive sensors are for offensive purposes. The goal is to find and kill the enemy without him even knowing you're there. Active sensors (radar), on the other hand, are NOT used for searching during war as that gives away your own position. Radar is used when the enemy has found you and an attack is inbound - a purely defensive use.

      So, you pretty much have it backward.

      You need to do a great deal of research before you comment again.

      Delete
    7. " IJN's pagoda masts"

      These, and the USN's cage masts, were useful in the days of purely optical detection and fire control. They offered an elevated viewing platform (increased search range) in a very low observable form.

      Today, however, a raised active sensor (platform, tethered, mast, whatever) is a net negative in that it can be detected at a greater range than it can detect (the flashlight analogy). Elevated passive sensors have a slight negative impact (slightly greater chance of being detected depending on what the elevation mechanism is) while offering greater range.

      Of course, ANY elevated mechanism has other negative impacts in terms of stability, metacentric height margins, weight, equipment, etc.

      A much simpler, more logical approach is a hemi-spherical passive sensor and fire control system plus extensive use of small, passive, stealthy UAVs for extended range search.

      Delete
  7. As a founder investor in a South Africa based start up focussed on I was interested in some of these comments as drones are a subject about which I have some knowledge which may be of interest to your Blog community.

    I agree that small ground launched drones probably operated by non state actors and proxy forces are a significant threat to warships in naval bases, shipyards, repair facilities, during port visits and when operating in littoral waters with limited sea room - e.g the Persian Gulf - with the threat greater during periods of non active combat operations.

    A kinetic defence against drone attacks in such locations (when the ship is not at sea) is very problematic owing to the probable high level of collateral damage. Laser directed-energy weapon systems such as DragonFire offer some grounds for optimism here.

    Sea based / launched drones are not currently a serious threat to warships as opposed to commercial shipping although a prudent approach would recognise this situation may change.

    To my knowledge a drone with a 45 mile range and a 45 kg payload exists in prototype only but caveat we have little insight into the military development pipeline. Such a drone could be built on commercial scale without great difficulty (it does not contravene any laws of physics) but the compromises necessary would limit demand for its development and the manufacturers’ focus would probably be elsewhere. There are many drones with similar ranges but still effective payloads which would be similarly effective in putting warships out of action for months.

    I know nothing at all about Russian naval proficiencies but Russia is very much a leader in terms of drone development and operations and should definitely not be underestimated. The Rubicon Group has tight and fast feedback links to the Russian drone manufacturing industry and has been a highly successful model. Nb the Russian military is looking to double the number of personnel in drone units with a recruitment target of approximately 165,500 specialist troops in drone controller and EW roles by end 2026.

    Re fishing boats. Outside my area of knowledge but I assume in a conflict the adversary country would militarise large numbers of fishing boats and use them for intelligence gathering purposes. China’s SCS fishing fleet numbers in the hundreds of thousands.

    The data on recent engagements between US Navy ships and the Houthis (Operations Prosperity Guardian and Rough Rider) are in my view insufficient to draw firm or useful conclusions.

    Thank you.
    Michael S.

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    1. "small ground launched drones probably operated by non state actors and proxy forces are a significant threat to warships in naval bases, shipyards, repair facilities, during port visits "

      ANYTHING is a significant threat to a ship that is static and defenseless. A man with a rifle can do significant damage to a ship in those circumstances!

      "and when operating in littoral waters with limited sea room"

      The US Navy has already demonstrated that an alert, competent ship(s) have nothing to fear from land based, small drones. To dismiss this body of proof as "insufficient" is to ignore reality in favor of a false, pre-conceived notion.

      "A kinetic defence against drone attacks in such locations (when the ship is not at sea) is very problematic"

      It doesn't have to be. There are self-destruct rounds that can be used. For example, the Phalanx C-RAM as described by Wiki: "C-RAM uses the 20mm HEIT-SD (high-explosive incendiary tracer, self-destruct) ammunition, originally developed for the M163 Vulcan Air Defense System. These rounds explode on impact with the target, or on tracer burnout, thereby greatly reducing the risk of collateral damage from rounds that fail to hit their target."

      "To my knowledge a drone with a 45 mile range"

      A drone with that range is absolutely no threat to a ship at sea. The "carrier" vessel would have to approach the target within forty miles to launch the drones and no ship is going to allow an enemy/unknown vessel to approach that closely without having long since sunk it.

      "Russian military is looking to double the number of personnel in drone units"

      That's purely for land combat drone operations which are a completely different game and have no applicability to naval combat.

      "I assume in a conflict the adversary country would militarise large numbers of fishing boats and use them for intelligence gathering purposes."

      Good grief! This keeps coming up and I keep knocking it down. No naval task force is going to allow ANY kind of enemy/unknown ship/boat to approach within any sensing distance. Further, 99% of Chinese fishing vessels are short range boats operating well inside the SCS. The 1% that might be in the open ocean would be sunk long before they become a sensing threat. For a real world example of the fishing boat issue in war, read the Doolittle raid on Japan by the US. Japanese fishing vessels were sunk before they could report the US navy's task force. This was true throughout the war. Oblivious naval observers seem to naively believe that we would allow Chinese fishing vessels to operate with impunity. Nothing could be further from the truth. ALL enemy vessels, big or small, will be sunk on sight to deny the enemy whatever resources they might be collecting or carrying.

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    2. A quick search puts the total number of USN interceptions of missiles and drones at between 600 and 800, between Oct '23 to present. While the number launched vs intercepted is unknown, and many ( most?) weren't targeting USN ships, the fact that the Navy received zero hits suggests that the threat is minimal. Now, while the use of hundreds of multi-million dollar missiles to accomplish this shows a serious need for cheaper methods, it also seems to show that the systems in use work, and imho, it's not a stretch to conclude that the threat of drones to naval forces is hugely overstated.

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    3. " the use of hundreds of multi-million dollar missiles to accomplish this shows a serious need for cheaper methods,"

      It partly shows that, for sure, however, it also illustrates the importance of the "shoot the archers not the arrows" philosophy. A naval force under possible threat should be eliminating the source of the threat not trying to shoot down every individual drone/missile. Find the financial sources, manufacturing sites, storage locations, launch sites, etc. and destroy the threat (archers) before they become arrows. The USN did a little bit of this off Yemen but refused to wholeheartedly commit to it and, hence, foolishly, wound up shooting at arrows, instead.

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    4. Absolutely. And the same thought about costs applies there. What effect did the ~200+ Tomahawks achieve in Yemen for what...$250M???
      I wonder how many of those launch sites were within 15 miles of the coast... somthing that say, a resurrected 8in gun could reach easilly??

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    5. "...a resurrected 8in gun..."

      And we have 36 16-inch guns wasting away as museums.

      Lutefisk

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    6. I didn't go there, even if it crossed my mind lol! As much as I hate it, ( I had my dream orders to the Missouri before Desert Storm, changed at last minute) their time has passed. But they, and the other museum ships are doing stellar service keeping history alive, and inspiring future generations of sailors.
      My youngest boy joined the Army rather than the family Navy tradition. He has an absurdly big fear of the ocean. After AIT, he came home to collect his young family. I gave them an atlas with a prechosen course, and laid out a nice sightseeing tour of the US for his drive from WA to GA. I put the USS Alabama on his list. To say he was blown away by her, and that it made a huge impression is an understatement. "If the Navy still had these, then maybe...", was the closest he'd ever been to having an interest in the Navy haha... so... I think our old battleships in some ways are ... "still in service"!!

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    7. "their time has passed."

      Really? A ship that's nearly immune to modern weaponry, has unmatched lethal firepower, could provide the missing shore fire support the Marines crave, can effortlessly sink any ship in the world ... what about that says their time has passed?

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    8. Oh... I misspoke again!!! I was referring more to the lack of infrastructure, knowledge etc, to support using THOSE specific ships again, and the likelihood of ever using them again. The CONCEPT of battleships, with the specifics you mentioned, on the other hand, is very valid- no argument, and Im behind it 100%!!

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    9. That's probably why I'm constantly bringing up the 'ol 8in gun- because it's probably the biggest gun that could have a realistic chance of returning. It's just one piece of the "battleship" puzzle, and it'd take a lot of work to bring back the other elements, but its never far from my mind, and it's a start!

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    10. "the lack of infrastructure, knowledge etc, to support using THOSE specific ships"

      I don't understand that. Not just you but many people seem to believe that battleship technology is gone ... lost in the mists of time and can never be reproduced. We have drawings, blueprints, written descriptions, procedures, etc. Sure, that's not the same thing as actually producing some of that stuff but it wouldn't be hard to bring it back. There would be a short re-familiarization curve but we have all the information. We routinely create new factories with new technologies all the time. Is there some mystical, ethereal barrier that prevents us from bringing back old technology? Was all the old information written in the Elvish language and we can no longer read it?

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    11. There's a lot of institutional knowledge that's been lost over the years, especially with the business mindset of firing the old experienced senior staff in the name of cost savings. I'm reminded of the difficulty in reproducing FOGBANK - they kept the notes, the records, documentation in case they ever needed to make more FOGBANK, and when they did a test run it just straight up failed and didnt work, leaving the US without a means of producing nuclear weapons. NNSA had to spend years and millions of dollars reverse engineering FOGBANK so we could make more nukes.

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    12. “FOGBANK”

      This is not a valid comparison. Due to the extreme secrecy, there were almost no written records or documentation about the process. For battleships, we have complete documentation.

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    13. " Is there some mystical, ethereal barrier..."

      No, of course not. I dont believe there's any barrier that's insurmountable, besides perhaps cost. The Navy could absolutely reposess the Iowas tomorrow, and put them back to use. We could reproduce the factorys to build 16in gun barrels, and ammunition. We could reopen the BT rate and recreate the school. We could work with modern boiler manufacturers and merge legacy repair and maintenance programs for the boilers with modern techniques and materials. And we could do similar things with every system aboard- either replace with modern materials and practices, or relearn/rebuild the original ones. We could gut and modernize our hearts out. But what would that cost? Although the main battery may not even be the most expensive part of recreating the operational and support infrastructure for exhumed Iowas, that in itself would be a pretty big undertaking! For example, how long and how much to create a production line and refill all the magazines, plus churn out thousands more rounds? How long til we can produce a stock of barrels so they can be swapped out for a reline? Smaller details might cause problems too- for instance, how many of our shipyards even have cranes that are capable of doing a barrel swap? Maybe they all do... but what if they dont? So where do the barrels go to be relined... and how do they get there? Do we need to build the specialized heavy duty railcars to carry them again? Do railroad lines even exist that run from the shipyards to the gun factory/relining site? Again, yes, all things we can fix. No doubt. And perhaps building new ships would be the better use of all that rebuilt infrastructure, because then at least we wouldn't have to relearn the care and feeding of the old tech(??). On the flip side, if we build new, now we also need the ability to build heavy armor plates, lift and install turrets, machine massive turret rings, and countless other heavy industrial processes that are long gone. Either way- anything is possible with enough desire, urgency, and common sense. In spite of what i commented earlier, I'm not arguing, and actually agree with you.
      But heres my veiw. I've been a 60s Dodge/Chrysler restorer/hobbyist/ racer all my life- and after that lifetime of doing it, plus having a diesel/ heavy equipment career behind me, I have skills. If you bring me a VIN tag and a dustpan full of rust- I can recreate the whole car. IF... IF the pile of cash is big enough. And the Iowas are kinda the same thing. They could be brought back. But would it be worth the probable tens of billions? They'd be the hardest hitting, best protected, most survivable and potent ships afloat... without a doubt... but would it be worth it? Maybe back in the 90s, when they were retired, when more of the infrastructure still existed and could be built upon. But now? I'm sad to say, I'm not convinced.
      ( Again, as often, this convo is tough to have because there are the different perspectives of "what could be", "what should be", and the real life "what did/will actually happen ". )

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    14. I kinda think we have to walk before we can run. Look at the railguns - we keep trying to have a revolutionary leapfrog and jump straight to long range hundred mile railguns and then get confused when we can't make them.

      Meanwhile the Japanese decided to excercise project disciplne, pursuing a 40mm railgun purely as a point defense weapon, and now that they've gotten it working, then they consider scaling it up another notch.

      We haven't built bug guns in a long time. We should start with 8 inch guns and build our way back up. Certainly 8" guns are a relevant weapon for our destroyers and cruisers.

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    15. "We could reopen the BT rate ..."

      So many people want to present this as an almost infinite list of near-impossible technologies that we would have to recreate but is that true? How many technologies (pieces of equipment) would we really need to "re-create"? 16" guns and shells, yes. Armor, yes (though hopefully we can improve even that with modern advances in tank armor technologies?). But what else? We could replace the boilers with modern turbines. The optical range finders can be replaced with laser range finders. The 5" guns/ammo can be replaced with modern 5" guns/ammo. What else is there that we would need to re-create? Armor and guns is not a long list and we'd be starting from an advanced position since we have all the documentation and procedures. We make 5"-6" shells today so we wouldn't be re-creating from scratch. We already have the foundation of the industry in place.

      Would it be that hard or are we (the generic we, not you) just looking for excuses to not bring back battleships (for reasons I don't understand)?

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    16. @ExJuniorSailor

      Here is a possible way to update the Iowa class ships.
      This is an update of something that I have posted here before, with changes made after feedback from CNO and other posters here.

      https://docs.google.com/document/d/1v5iLSTdvqZVNIKsg2-8Ho0PLr5dfawmre57C_gScRHU/edit?tab=t.0

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    17. "Here is a possible"

      I'm unable to access the document.

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    18. AARRRGGGHHHH

      I'll see if I can fit it.

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    19. Hopefully this works.

      https://docs.google.com/document/d/1v5iLSTdvqZVNIKsg2-8Ho0PLr5dfawmre57C_gScRHU/edit?usp=sharing

      Lutefisk

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    20. "Hopefully this works."

      I can see it now.

      You didn't ask for comments but I'll take a chance and offer a few thoughts for your consideration.

      1. I like the conceptual powerplant. I'm not a mechanical engineer so I have no idea about the practical aspects but the concept sounds good.

      2. I like the separation of the turbines. The weakness is the cabling. Turbines may be separated and protected but the clustered cabling (eventually, all the cables come together at the shaft motors) is a weakness. Alternate cabling runs that can be cross connected (Zumwalt?) would be a good damage resilience idea.

      3. The amount (number, size, volume) of necessarily unarmored intake and exhaust ducting penetrations of the armor present a potentially serious vulnerability. Not sure what can be done to mitigate that. Could this, alone, invalidate the turboelectric concept? A battleship with thousands of square feet of unarmored penetrations is not a battleship (Hood, Arizona?)

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    21. 4. Do you really want to reduce the already quite limited number of 16" shells by replacing them with specialty (boutique) shells? The secondary battery might be a better option for cargo rounds and whatnot. Leave the big guns alone to do what only big guns can.

      5. Deep strike should not be a battleship mission. We have plenty of other ways to accomplish deep strike. Again, leave the battleship to do what only a battleship can. Piling up unarmored missiles/rockets on the exposed decks is asking for a major explosion and conflagration in the event of a hit. For comparison, a single Burke can carry 96 cruise missiles so there's a much better deep strike option.

      6. Missile arm launchers would be susceptible to shock damage from the 16" guns. Self-shock damage was a persistent problem throughout the battleship's career and modern arm launchers are quite weak and flimsy by comparison to WWII equipment.

      7. The CIWS numbers are woefully short of what's needed on a battleship. A BB should be the nearest thing to invulnerable we can build. If a couple of CIWS are damaged in battle, the ship should be able to laugh and carry on. You need 20-30 CIWS. Recall the numbers of 20mm and 40mm defensive mounts on the original ships. They were designed to laugh at damage. Also, shock damage would be a serious issue given the delicacy of modern electronics. It would require careful placement to shield them.

      8. CIWS deconfliction is not an issue. Overlapping fire is preferred! In WWII, every weapon that could be brought to bear on a target was used. There's no such thing as too much! What's needed is to ensure that the CIWS can effectively function with overlapping fire (I'm concerned about the radar tracking of outgoing rounds being confused when multiple streams converge).

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    22. 9. Battleships (almost any ship, for that matter) should never be "laid up". They should be continuously manned, constantly training. That way, when needed, you have four BBs and four crews intimately familiar with their ship, ready to go.

      10. You didn't discuss it but command should be the culmination of a naval career. A captain should be assigned for a multi-year period (4 yrs?). Captain and crew should be a stable unit with only occasional replacements, as needed. Instability in command is one of the problems our modern navy has.
      ____________

      As I said, these are unsolicited comments. Feel free to consider or ignore them, as you wish.

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    23. With regard to cargo rounds, it's worth noting that the significantly larger size of 16" shells allows us a significantly larger payload over the 5" battery (which can barely accomodate DPICM submunitions), which does mean that we can get a larger area bombardment radius. It's not too dissimilar from HIMARS or GMLRS in that regard.

      I would actually argue that we should eliminate the super heavy AP rounds and replace them with more DPICM cargo rounds instead. The fact of the matter is that today's modern warships, the Iowa's targets, are effectively unarmored, and 16" AP will do a through and through. Better instead for us to use HE and DPICM.

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    24. I guess I didn't expressly ask for feedback, but I am very happy to have it.

      Lutefisk

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    25. Bigger issue with CIWS deconfliction would be issues of radars interfering with each other. There have been upgrades made to the signal processing to reduce interference, but that's with 2 mounts in close proximity, not some 20 or 30 mounts as proposed.

      I would argue instead that this is where we should look into greater emphasis of lasers as our point defenses. Laser mounts are initially cued by the main radar, then engage purely via passive EO/IR tracking during engagement. This means that we can stage laser mounts with greater density than CIWS and SeaRAM because they have no radars to interfere with each other.

      On the other hand, there's no such thing as a free lunch - I've seen estimates that say that to get a 300 kilowatt laser, you would need 1 megawatt of electrical power generation, because you're always losing energy as it's transferred through the mediums and converted.

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    26. "radars interfering with each other."

      We've discussed this before. While interference is something for the engineers to be aware of, there is no direct evidence that this is a practical problem. There are many examples of identical radars sited very close together with, one assumes, no interference problems. As just one example, the Burke illuminators are almost stacked on top of each other!

      So, until there is some direct evidence that this is a problem, I'll assume it is not.

      "20 or 30 mounts"

      On a battleship, 20-30 mounts can be sited without actually being all that close to each other! Lots of room!

      "we should look into greater emphasis of lasers as our point defenses."

      As soon as someone fields an actual combat effective, functioning laser, I'll gladly re-examine the issue. We've been promised that lasers are just around the corner for several decades now and we still have nothing useful that can shoot down anything larger than a toy store quadcopter.

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    27. @CNO, 1-3

      I think the electricity powered ship is a useful idea. The electric motors are heavy, but don't require reduction gearing, and should provide a quick response in acceleration or deceleration.

      The air intake is a concern. I have struggled to find information about the amount of intake air that the oil burning boilers use on the ships. My son and I toured the New Jersey and they mentioned the volume (and showed the armored intake system), but I didn't note the air volume.

      I would think that the increase in air needed could be measured by looking at the output of power from the engines.
      Ten LM2500 gensets would produce 300 MW of power while the Iowa's boilers produced about 170 MW of shp and electrical power.
      That would probably be a good proxy for the amount of increased volume of air intake required.
      Your point is well taken about the amount of air needed for combustion.

      I wonder if they could use the same semi-armored air intakes that they currently use and improve their performance with turbochargers?
      Of course, as you've previously noted, that is just one more thing to break/malfunction/get damaged.

      Lutefisk

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    28. 4. 16" shell loadouts

      I would think it would be tailored to the mission.
      If it is a bombardment mission within a few miles of a coast you might not want to allocate any magazine space to anything but full 16" rounds.
      Or if it is a hardened target...more AP.

      If the potential targets are further inland (like Houthis or Syria), it might make sense to use the 8" sub-caliber 16" rounds.
      While an 8" round is not as devastating as a 16", if the 8" sub-caliber can reach 40 or 50 miles inland that 8" barrage should still be effective.

      The load out options should be tailored to the mission.

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    29. "If the potential targets are further inland "

      In theory, perhaps. However, if the targets are further than 20 miles inland, we have plenty of other options including using actual 8" shells instead of 8" sub-caliber 16" shells. Why use a precious 16" subcaliber shell when you can actually fire 8" shells since that's the secondary battery you specified?

      Beyond that, if you can guarantee that the battleship will not see any unexpected action other than the target on a mission, sure, tailor the load. However, in war, all too often the unexpected encounters occur and then you'll want every full 16" shell you can get. Again, see the previous paragraph about letting the 8" guns do the 16"/8" sub-caliber shooting and preserve the limited 16" magazine.

      The 8" secondary guns would likely have a magazine of 300-500 rounds. Let them be the source of specialty shells.

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    30. I guess what I'm looking for out of the sub-caliber shell is extended range.

      Unfortunately, I don't know how to calculate how far an 8" shell weighing 260 lbs will travel with 350-ish mega joules of energy behind it (16" shot).

      Whatever that range would be is why I would want that capability.

      If the increase in range is marginal, then it's not worth it. If the increase in range is substantial, then it probably is worth it for certain circumstances.


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    31. We can probably generate a range of a hundred miles but then the actual sub-caliber shell would be a 9mm bullet! At some point, the reduction in destructive effect is not worth the extension in range.

      Why do so many have this fixation with increasing the range (and reducing the destructive effect!) of a 16" gun when we can already deliver extended range munitions using ATACMS, forward deployed artillery, aircraft, cruise missiles, bombers, aircraft carrier air wings, howitzer/ERCA, M270 MLRS, M142 HIMARS, and drones just to name a few? Why the desire to downgrade the 16" gun and magazine to duplicate what can be accomplished so many other ways? I honestly don't understand the obsession.

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    32. It bears noting that current 6" full caliber artillery rounds have about a 40% increase in range over their WW2 counterparts, purely from improvements in propellants, barrels and shell design. In fact, they exceed the range of WW2 8 inch artillery gubs!

      So it does not necessarily mean that we need sibcaliber rounds to achieve greater range than what we got.

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    33. "Why do so many have this fixation with increasing the range (and reducing the destructive effect!) of a 16" gun when we can already deliver extended range munitions using....."

      I can't speak for anybody but myself, but the problem that I see is that the Navy only has 5" guns with a 13ish mile range, tomahawk cruise missiles with a 1500 mile range, and aircraft strikes.

      Even adding the Iowas as described only adds the 16" guns with 24 mile range and 8" with a range under 20 miles.

      In a peer war, the 20ish mile range is probably fine as there will be an abundance of targets within that coastal band, and there will be numerous other platforms available to strike deeper.

      But in a less than peer war operation (which is the vast majority of the time), that extended range would be very useful.
      One of the big benefits of the battleships is that they are intimidating. Cruising off a country's coast, day after day, sends a message.
      But if they can't hit beyond 20 miles inland, that is not maximizing the intimidation potential.
      With 8" sub-caliber and SRBM, there is a lot fewer places to hide in these geographically limited places.

      Even in a peer war those might, maybe, be useful depending on the mission.

      Lutefisk

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    34. @CNO 5. "Piling up unarmored missiles/rockets on the exposed decks is asking for a major explosion and conflagration..."

      That is a serious concern.

      If you recall, my original thoughts were to have VLS with the Iowa update to accommodate tomahawks. But one of the posters pointed out the danger of turning the ship into the HMS Hood. And your point questioning the need for that kind of deep strike from the Iowa was also a good one. But I wouldn't classify the ATACMS/PrSM as deep strike, just an extension of range, but regardless to that...

      I have a couple of thoughts about the use of the SRBM in a deck mounted launcher system.

      The first is the armor and protection.
      It is helpful to have the launchers on the main deck, above the armor deck and bomb deck.

      The launchers themselves should be sheathed in armor, but, of course, armor is heavy.
      One of the technologies that I'd like to see the Navy pursue is closed cell steel foam. It claims to have the same blast resistance as solid steel at 1/3 the weight.

      Encasing the launchers in 2 inches of STS, 6 inches of steel foam, 1 inch of standard steel, and 1 inch of Kevlar spall liner gives 10 inches of armor for the weight of 5.2 inches of solid steel.
      That is solid protection, but I don't know what that amount of weight on the main deck would do to the stability of the ship.

      Another possibility is that the Iowa ships might not load those SRBM if there was a high level of risk. That would likely be when going against a peer enemy, in which case the SRBM might not be a useful weapon system anyway (with the priority being the big-gun hammer).

      My somewhat random thoughts on the idea.

      SRBM are not a need-to-have for these ships, but they would be a solid nice-to-have that fits in with their mission profile.

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    35. bear in mind that the Europeans have 6" artillery guns that can engage with unguided rounds at 30 miles, which is a 50% increase in range over the 20 miles of WW2 8" guns (and this is why 8" disappeared from land artillery parks, 6" guns can now equal and exceed its range). Rough ballpark, we should therefore expect that 8" guns be able to engage at around 40-50 miles with full bore unguided ammo.

      I would also note that 8 inch rounds give us significantly more volume than 5 inch rounds, which means we have more room to pack in electronics for seekers and smart fuses, with less compromise to lethality because we can still carry a decent amount of HE filler. With guidance and proximity airburst fuses, we can add the 8" rounds to our point defense firepower to further thin the incoming missile herd and assist our CIWS mounts.

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    36. "should therefore expect that 8" guns be able to engage at around 40-50 miles with full bore unguided ammo."

      And where would targeting come from and how accurate would unguided rounds be at that range? This is like the million mile missile concept - a million mile missile is useless if targeting is the horizon.

      "8 inch rounds give us significantly more volume than 5 inch rounds, which means we have more room to pack in electronics for seekers and smart fuses"

      True, but only one factor. 8" rounds also take up more space in the magazine which means smaller magazines. 8" shells with more electronics means hugely more expensive shells which means fewer of them.

      Everything (meaning electronics) that goes into a 8" shell REQUIRES that a corresponding volume of something be removed and that "something" would be explosive filler. Thus, an electronic shell contains less explosive than a "dumb" shell. Is that worth it? Depends on the circumstances but, in general, no.

      Electronics are also subject to failure (the shock of being fired!) and electronic countermeasures.

      There's a LOT to be said for "dumb" munitions.

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    37. "9. Battleships (almost any ship, for that matter) should never be "laid up". They should be continuously manned, constantly training. That way, when needed, you have four BBs and four crews intimately familiar with their ship, ready to go."

      I think that what I would do with these ships is substantially different from what the navy has done in the past when they idle ships.

      The idea came from Ian Toll's 'Six Frigates', which discusses the early navy.
      The nation couldn't afford to keep in regular service the number of ships that they would need during war time like the Quasi War, Barbary Pirates, War of 1812, etc...
      What they would do is put ships (like the USS Constitution) in storage until they were needed.

      I think that we have a similar conundrum in that the number of ships that we would need for a naval war is greater than what we can afford to keep in the active fleet.

      So I would do a rotation with the four battleships with only one at a time in the active fleet.

      But the idled ships would not be tied up and stuck in the middle of the James River until they are needed.

      Instead, the Iowas would be kept in their own dry dock, flooded so that the hull won't spread or otherwise misshape.
      I might even build an aircraft hangar structure over the top of those dry docks so that work can be done on them without needing to consider weather (and the added benefit of being screened from observation by unfriendly eyes).

      These ships would not be neglected.
      They would be housed in pairs, two on the west coast and two on the east coast, with a full active duty crew assigned to each pair.

      The active duty crew would toggle between manning the active battleship in the fleet for a year, and then spending the next year putting the ship into idle status and then getting the next one ready to go in the fleet.

      To go along with the two active duty crews would be two full reserve crews. They would train alongside their active duty partner crew and also do their weekend drills and two-week annual trainings working on the ships.

      The idled ships would also get maintenance performed to include the upgrading of systems like the automation of 16" shell handling, as an example.

      In a time of national emergency, the reserve crews would be activated and blended with the active duty crews to fully man all four battleships, which could be rapidly spun up into the fleet.

      I think this would save cost and probably improve the maintenance performed on our ships.
      I would consider doing this for aircraft carriers as well (my fleet carriers would not be nuclear powered-simplifying this process).

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    38. "I think that we have a similar conundrum in that the number of ships that we would need for a naval war is greater than what we can afford to keep in the active fleet."

      Quite true! We began WWII with just a couple hundred ships, as I recall. We built the fleet we needed during the war. What we need today is not a fleet of thousands of ships but a "paper" fleet of ship's that are small, single function, simple, and can be built quickly in large numbers. The ships, and more importantly the crews, we have need to be exercised constantly, not laid up. We need to be exercising and figuring out how to command and control four battleships operating as an integrated unit. We need to be figuring out tactics, spacing, escort requirements, etc.

      We're doing essentially what you propose but with our carriers (unintentionally). All but two at a time are laid up and idle. That's preventing us from figuring out how to operate carriers in task forces of four carriers, how to control four carriers, how to manage the air space for four simultaneous air wings, how to assemble multi-carrier air strikes, how to best employ escorts for four carriers, and so on. Leaving ships laid up doesn't work.

      The early sailing navy had no choice but to lay up ships because the country had no money. We DO have money - more than we can possible use if we spend it wisely! - and don't need to lay up ships. We need to exercise ships and crews and figure out how to use them in the real world of combat.

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    39. Just a note on costs of guided rounds - the Copperhead guided round costs 70 grand. OTO Melara's DART rounds are estimated at about 60 grand apiece. Assuming a unit cost of 150k USD per 8" guided round, this still compares very favorably with RAM (905K USD) and our multi million dollar antiship missiles. 150k is peanuts for a PGM - Javelin costs that much, and it's a SQUAD weapon in the US Army.

      Also, while shooting out to 50 miles would induce some inaccuraccy, so what? It's an area bombardment weapon. You don't need pinpoint accuraccy when you're blindfire servicing a grid square. The gun just has to be accurate enough.

      Now, just because we can shoot out to 50 miles doesn't mean we HAVE to shoot at 50 miles all the time. In a a naval gunfire context, targeting would be provided by the ground force moving inland, calling in fires to destroy defensive lines and supprres enemy fires until the organic indirect fires are fully setup. In an ASuW context, we'd be getting our targeting from the offboard sensor UAV's you've called for, and taking our cues from ESM. And again, the Iowas, while not as tall as the pagoda masts, are still pretty damn tall, which affords us a great field of view for our passive sensing.

      Also, in a naval ASuW context, I think it's quite likely thay we're going to see a lot of meeting engagements between forces on EMCON that are passively searching for each other, which means a horizon range engagement - and our taller masts and bridges mean that we have a further horizon than our adversaries.

      You have a point on the mix of smart and dumb rounds. I would agree that the bulk of the 8" magazine should be plain simple dumb VT fuse HE, since that's the platonic ideal of a general purpose round. Smart rounds would be specifically only for specialty use cases, for AAW and ASuW.

      I should note that with a range of 50 miles, this also means that 8 inch AAW rounds are comparing favorably with ESSM! That said, I think engagement at that range would more likely be against enemy sensor assets, like surveliance drones or helicopters - the bulk of AAW engagements will be at the horizon, if we assume seaskimming missiles.

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    40. "50 miles ... targeting would be provided by the ground force moving inland,"

      This is an issue that so many people overlook. If the ground force is fifty miles inland then, presumably, they would have their own artillery already in place behind them and they can provide their own fire support.

      Naval gun support, in the amphibious scenario, is intended to provide fire support DURING THE INITIAL LANDING AND BREAKOUT. It is not intended to provide ongoing fire support for an entire campaign. If the ground force has moved more than twenty miles inland, beyond the range of large caliber naval guns, then the follow on forces, including artillery, take over the fire support.

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    41. A fifty mile range doesn't mean we have to park ourselves right against the shore. We can sit at an offset, some 10 miles offshore. This still lets us shoot 40 miles inland, which still lets us counterbattery and suppress enemy tube artillery, with their 30 mile 6" guns, while remaining outside of their range, and that of enemy mortars.

      To illustrate with some poor ASCII art:

      Battleship/Cruiser (10 miles)
      |
      Beach Landing (0 miles)
      |
      Enemy Mortars (5-10 miles)
      |
      |
      Enemy 6" guns (30 miles)


      Yes, the landing force is supposed to bring their own fires with them, but the USMC is quite light on organic fires because it is, essentially, a light infantry force. An MEU has one artillery battery of towed 6" guns, which are light and helimobile but literally unprotected and unable to keep up with the pace of maneuver warfare. Ukraine has showed that towed guns are only survivable if dug in and protected in bunkers, which is the complete opposite of a breakout.

      (An artillery battery is typically 4 to 6 guns, which is the broadside secondary battery on an Iowa.)

      The Army has mobile armored self propelled guns, but these are simply not viable in a beach assault because they take up as much space as an Abrams tank and have zero swimming capability.

      Basically, it's going to take time for the assault force tto hit the beach and push up past the first line of defenders and it's going to take time to bring up their organic artillery. Until that happens, we need our naval gunfire to be suppressing enemy artillery and counterbatterying them.

      Delete
    42. "Yes, the landing force is supposed to bring their own fires with them, but the USMC is quite light on organic fires because it is, essentially, a light infantry force."

      Correct! That's why the Marines are NOT a campaign force. That's the Army's job. The Marine's job is to secure the entry point (beach, port, whatever). The Army's job is to follow on with the heavy forces for the campaign push. Thus, there will ALWAYS be accompanying artillery after the initial assault (assuming the initial assault succeeds!).

      "it's going to take time for the assault force to hit the beach and push up past the first line of defenders ..."

      That's the assault and breakout phase.

      "Until that happens, we need our naval gunfire to be suppressing enemy artillery and counterbatterying them."

      Exactly right. Then, once that breakout occurs, the Army comes ashore with their heavy forces and takes over the subsequent campaign, whatever that might be, and they provide their own fire support.

      "counterbattery"

      Don't forget that in an amphibious assault, we'll also have extensive air cover providing deep strike, interdiction, and "counterbattery" support. If we don't have localized air supremacy then we have no business attempting an assault. We need to be constantly wary of the tendency to devolve these discussions into one-vs-one assessments. For example, so many people want to criticize the battleship for not being able to fire 30 miles (or 50 miles or whatever) inland while ignoring that in any real world scenario we'll have air support, cruise missile support, ?ballistic missile? support (another missing weapon!), global range bomber support, etc.

      Realistically, what is an additional 10/20/30 miles of range going to accomplish? A battleship already has 20+ mile range. Is an extra 10/20/30 miles really critical? A BB can already blanket pretty much any island in the Pacific and if we're fighting inland Africa, China, Europe, or wherever, no piddly 10/20/30 mile range extension will matter.

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    43. While you're correct that we will have air power, as you yourself have noted in the past, air power delivers ordnance in pulses. Battleships can deliver fire in sustained bombardments.

      I feel you're missing the point that the additional range gives us options. We can stay at a 50 mile offset, complicating their counterbattery fires, and pound the beach into oblivion. We can come closer into the beach and reach further inland to counterbattery enemy artillery. It's all a matter of how we choose to use this range.

      And yes, while we have long range fires in the form of cruise missiles, we have a severely limited inventory of them. These are weapons that are going to be employed on static high value targets. When we are conducting area bombardment missions to suppress grid squares, that is a mission that just can't be beaten by naval gunfire.


      "Don't forget that in an amphibious assault, we'll also have extensive air cover providing deep strike, interdiction, and "counterbattery" support."

      With the caveat that in order to achieve this, we're going to need to force a hole in the enemy's AD net first. Our air will need to deal with the two pronged attack vectors of enemy fighters and enemy AD, which means that they need to split their duties between CAP, CAS, interdiction, and SEAD.

      That said, working in coordination with our air, this would be another area in which battleships can be helpful. Our EW aircraft don't need to get a specific fix on enemy air defenses - they just need to give the battleship a grid square that we can hit with our bombardment.

      In all fairness, if we concentrate even 3 carriers, we're looking at deploying some 150 strikefighters, which is more fighters than most air forces have aircraft.


      "Exactly right. Then, once that breakout occurs, the Army comes ashore with their heavy forces and takes over the subsequent campaign, whatever that might be, and they provide their own fire support."

      The problem here is that the Army has very little in the way of sealift for an opposed landing. The Army's thinking always assumes that they'll have time to unload their heavy forces in a leisurely manner from transport ships at a friendly port in a neighbouring friendly nation, and they will then drive across the land border to attack the enemy. The Marines mythologise Iwo Jima, Saipan, Guadalcanal and all the amphibious landings in the Pacific and made it their identity; the Army seems to have forgotten that D-Day, the largest amphibious assault in history, was an Army show.

      I think it's ironic that the Chinese are more prepared for an invasion than the Army is, and the Chinese have recognised that their lack of sealift is an issue, and so have chosen to address that problem by transporting their army on ro-ros, with their plan being to use Mulberry Harbors and port seizure to offload their heavy forces.

      Meanwhile, there's a distinct lack of thinking from the Army about an amphibious fight. The Army seems oriented to fighting in the desert. Outside of the infantry and SOF, Big Army seems to have checked out from thinking about the Pacific fight against China.

      Truth be told, as much as it pains me to admit it, I'm not sure there really is a point to amphibious landings in the China fight. We're not going to invade the Chinese mainland and get bogged down in a land war in asia. I don't see any of their island airbases as worthwhile targets for capture when they could just be destroyed or suppressed (by eliminating their fuel stores, as you've pointed out before). We could reinforce Taiwan, but we don't need to do an assault landing for that: we can land on ports on the east coast and unload there, then move westward to defensive positions (which fits with the army's assumptions).

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    44. "Truth be told, as much as it pains me to admit it, I'm not sure there really is a point to amphibious landings in the China fight"

      I have posted on this and stated that I see no strategic need for amphibious assaults in any reasonable scenario against any enemy. Therefore, effort put into longer range battleship fire is pointless though it makes for an interesting discussion.

      "Battleships can deliver fire in sustained bombardments."

      Yes, and no. An Iowa class BB had around 120 rds per gun. At a leisurely firing rate of 1rd/min, the BB could sustain firing for only 2 hrs. In WWII, we rotated our battleships and cruisers during pre-assault bombardment because they COULDN'T sustain firing.

      During the actual assault phase, the battleships and cruisers did, indeed, fire in pulses beginning with suppresive fire during the actual landing and then they switched to calls for fire.

      " we have a severely limited inventory of them."

      One of the points that must be hammered home is that we are utterly incapable of conducting an opposed landing with our current force. Similarly, we were utterly incapable of conducting the Normandy assault at the start of WWII. It took us years to build up the force and munitions needed. In a future war, we have no hope of conducting an opposed landing with current forces and weapons. We'll build up what we need or we simply won't attempt an assault. So, any argument that we lack weapons or ships or planes or infantry or tanks or whatever is irrelevant. By definition, when we're ready for an assault we'll have everything we need in sufficient quantities or we won't attempt it.

      "means that they need to split their duties between CAP, CAS, interdiction, and SEAD."

      Which has always been the case and always will be.

      "the Army has very little in the way of sealift for an opposed landing."

      At the start of WWII, the Army had zero sealift. You seem to want to only consider an assault with current forces and equipment instead of recognizing the reality of buildup as the war progresses. This is how it's always been.

      "the Chinese have recognised that their lack of sealift is an issue, and so have chosen to address that problem by transporting their army on ro-ros,"

      There is no question that the Chinese are much more serious and realistic about future war than we are. Whether they are preparing correctly is a debatable question.

      "Big Army seems to have checked out from thinking about the Pacific fight against China."

      Unless we want to invade mainland China (we'd be idiots), there is little use for the Army in the Pacific. This goes back to geopolitical strategy and its derivative, operational strategy, both of which we lack.

      Delete
    45. "Yes, and no. An Iowa class BB had around 120 rds per gun."

      To clarify, I've been talking about 8 inch guns for shore bombardment all this time, not just the 16 inch guns. Assuming a magazine of 300 rounds per gun, and a broadside fit of 3 guns (for a total of 6 guns), and a firing rate of 10 rounds per minute, we could keep a steady bombardment going for 3 hours.


      " It took us years to build up the force and munitions needed. In a future war, we have no hope of conducting an opposed landing with current forces and weapons. We'll build up what we need or we simply won't attempt an assault."

      The elephant in the room question is whether or not our industry is capable of such wartime design and production, after the many failed procurement programs that we've run in peacetime. If we can't suceed in peacetime, I'm not sure we can suceed with the stresses of wartime.

      That said, you're right that naval gunfire and amphibious landings are a sideshow. There's a lot more benefit to 8" guns in the AAW and ASuW role. Some people might consider an 8" gun with a 10 rounds per minute rate of fire to be too slow for AAW, but consider: the Mk 13 launcher had a rate of fire of 7.5 Standard missiles per minute. That's 1 round every 6 seconds, which is pretty good!

      Delete
    46. "we could keep a steady bombardment going for 3 hours."

      Yes and no. If all we want is a single round delivered once every 10 seconds then, yes, your math is correct. Of course, a single round is not very effective in any real world combat scenario such as an assault. Firing ALL guns in salvos would deplete the ship's magazines in 30 minutes, using your numbers. And, just to make sure we're comparing apples to apples, if you apply the same criteria to a carrier air wing - meaning, a single munition applied every 10 seconds - then the air wing could sustain a "bombardment" for as long as the carrier's magazines held out - many hours worth, presumably.

      The value of naval guns is that they are ALWAYS just a minute away from effect (as opposed to aircraft which may or may not be available), they can RAPIDLY lay down a heavy concentration (pulse) of firepower (as opposed to aircraft which can only apply a fairly limited concentration of firepower due to deconfliction concerns), and they are immune to countermeasures (as opposed to aircraft that can be shot down and weapons that can generally be decoyed, shot down, or EW'ed).

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    47. "might consider an 8" gun with a 10 rounds per minute rate of fire to be too slow for AAW"

      What is your vision of how an 8" gun would work in AAW? I assume you're envisioning a fragmentation round with proximity fuse? The difference between an anti-air missile and an 8" frag round is that the missile is continuously guided to the target whereas the 8" round is fired to a predicted location and cannot guide itself to compensate for changes in the target. I believe that, barring dumb luck, no gun has the speed of fire to successfully counter a missile. There's a reason why CIWS weapons are all in the thousands of rds/min.

      I have seen no realistic testing of guns vs missiles that showed guns could be successful in the AAW role. Every test I've seen was so artificially scripted, perfected, and constrained as to be worthless. Perhaps you know of some realistic testing?

      Delete
    48. A firing rate of 10 rounds per minute is one round every six seconds, although what I'd rather do is stagger the guns in a creeping barrage so that one round is being fired every two seconds. That would empty the magazine in an hour, but that would be a very painful hour for the enemy, getting hit with a shell every 2 seconds!

      (In reality there are going to be pauses in the bombardment for fire control, as observers conduct BDA and shift fires to new targets.)

      "What is your vision of how an 8" gun would work in AAW? I assume you're envisioning a fragmentation round with proximity fuse? The difference between an anti-air missile and an 8" frag round is that the missile is continuously guided to the target whereas the 8" round is fired to a predicted location and cannot guide itself to compensate for changes in the target."

      I'm envisioning a round with a radar seeker, either passive RF like RAM*, or an active seeker, with the warhead being proximity fused HE-frag. What you describe is true of the typical UNGUIDED proximity fused dumb round that is the standard 5" armament, and which we would logically assume to comprise the majority of 8" rounds in notional future service (proximity fuse HE-frag makes an excellent general purpose round). With a guided 8" round, you would expect to see a design similar to RAM or DART, where the spin-stabilised projectile uses actuated control fins to continuously adjust its trajectory. Control fins on guided rounds aren't a new technology; Excalibur uses control fins to correct its trajectory against deviation, and Copperhead uses control fins to home onto laser guidance, for precise engagement of static targets and for popup engagement of moving targets.

      My vision of how an 8" gun would work in AAW is honestly not that dissimilar from a missile engagement. The gun can either be fired and the rounds guided all the way, or in case of a saturation attack, fired at a projected bearing and left to go pitbull and seek for targets on their own (which is one of the reasons ESSM blk 2 is moving to an active radar homing seeker, vs the current semi-active radar seeker).

      While an 8" round is unpowered and flying on a ballistic arc, it also has a substantial amount of energy behind it, at worst equalling the speed of RAM. (Full bore 5" projectiles have a muzzle velocity of 808 meters per second, which is 15% greater than RAM's velocity. DART has a muzzle velocity 73% higher than RAM (Mach 3.4 vs RAM's Mach 2).

      *RAM has passive RF and heatseeking, which adds to its cost.

      Delete
    49. "" "Big Army seems to have checked out from thinking about the Pacific fight against China."

      Unless we want to invade mainland China (we'd be idiots), there is little use for the Army in the Pacific. This goes back to geopolitical strategy and its derivative, operational strategy, both of which we lack.""

      I agree completely that the Pacific is a primarily a naval/air fight. However.......

      This is a naval centric blog. The best one there is! BUT the Pacific fight isn't going to happen without the Army. So this is just a note to remind the naval / air centric readers of this blog some of what the Army will bring to the fight.

      The Army Title 10 responsibilities, in sustainment let alone the number of ground combat forces it can provide (bodies, for fighting, occupation, etc) have the Army working furiously as part of the Joint Force on the Pacific fight against China.

      "The Army Title 10 requirements through its Executive Agent (EA) responsibilities tie it intimately into the fight. The Army ensures the other services have sufficient capacity and capability to execute their missions around the globe. Some examples:
      Army logistics is, and will be, foundational to joint operations in a multi-domain environment.

      External support responsibilities assigned to the Army fall under the non-doctrinal umbrella term Army support to other services (ASOS). Historically, the logistics support provided to other services, agencies, multinational forces, and non-governmental organizations has included ground transportation (both personnel and equipment), fuel (Class III bulk and package), food and water, munitions, medical supply and services, veterinarian services (food safety), contract support, and supply services." *

      * https://www.army.mil/article/246742/anticipating_joint_force_requirements

      Back to the conversation on Naval Surface Fire Support, because it is going to be needed!!

      Looking4NSFS

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    50. " guided 8" round, ... spin-stabilised projectile uses actuated control fins to continuously adjust its trajectory."

      I assume that a guided shell is actually a very minimally guided projectile. It can make effect minor deviations to its path so as to follow GPS coordinates or a laser beam (depending on the type of guidance) but cannot come close to matching the degree of course correction that a missile which can pull 30g's can do. Thus, in the AAW role, a guided 8" shell would be unguided for practical purposes. If the target missile remains on an unwavering path, this minimal guidance is probably adequate. However, all modern missiles use significant terminal maneuvers and I suspect an 8" shell would be useless. Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong about this and point me to references showing extreme maneuverability of guided shells.

      Delete
    51. "Army Title 10 responsibilities, in sustainment let alone the number of ground combat forces it can provide (bodies, for fighting, occupation, etc) have the Army working furiously as part of the Joint Force on the Pacific fight against China."

      As noted at the end of the comments section, comments for posts older than 7 days will be moderated. This is done to minimize spam and this is why your comment failed to appear instantly and why you repeated it. Rest assured, I check the comments several times per day and quickly approve them but there is an unavoidable lag. I'll delete your second, duplicate comment.

      As far as Army sustainment, if you have some insight beyond just the generic responsibilities list, I'd love to hear about it. For example, I'm not aware that the Army has any role in resupply of Guam but perhaps they do? The Army has no open ocean cargo ships for Pacific resupply so how would they be part of that effort? We have very few bases in the Pacific so, again, any Army contribution would be minimal, it would seem.

      Regarding actual combat, unless we opt to invade some island, there is no combat role. At the moment, China does not occupy any islands we would want. Should they seize Taiwan and we decide to take it back, that would, of course, involve the Army. Should China seize Philippines or Indonesia or somewhere then, again, that could involve the Army. As it stands, however, there is no immediate role for the Army unless I'm missing something.

      I'd love to hear more if you have any specifics or even reasonable speculation.

      Delete
  8. What are the limitations/drawbacks of Limited Probability of Intercept radars which would assume beneficial when bad weather puts major limitations on passive sensors.

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    1. In simplest terms, low probability of intercept (LPI) radar achieves its low probability be using lower power. It could equally be called a "low probability of detecting the target" radar. Power output is reduced which means shorter range and less chance of detecting a target. Other techniques than just reduced power are also employed. Wiki has a basic LPI article which you can read for more details.

      For example, a stealth aircraft which can barely be detected at a given range with a regular, full power radar, cannot be detected using LPI at the same range. So, the use of LPI is a tradeoff. You run less risk (not no risk!) of being detected but you also have less chance of finding your target. Full power, see the target, and give the enemy your position or less power, miss the target, but stay hidden from the enemy? Which to do? All depends on the circumstances of the moment.

      Delete
  9. Off topic but shocking:

    "USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group redeploying from Caribbean to Middle East"

    https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/national/military-news/uss-gerald-r-ford-carrier-strike-group-redeploying-from-caribbean-to-middle-east/291-bacd7d19-2854-430a-b3b3-ce2a0d26f22c

    Trump likes to threaten Iran but we only have one carrier there, we had six when we attacked Iraq. Now they are sending the USS Ford that has been deployed for EIGHT MONTHS! The Ford was kept deployed to bully Venezuela, but won't be replaced, so what happens there? But overall, does this mean the US Navy has no other carrier ready to send? Will the Ford crew riot?

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    1. It's certainly odd to send our least capable carrier... and the fact that it's already on extended deployment is terrible. Maybe the Navy thinks they can push a new ship further without incurring the maintenance penalties. It's just another example of mismanagement and a case for bringing the fleet home like CNO has suggested often.

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  10. Also shocking, I assumed the USS Truxton recently "bumped" a supply ship in bad weather. No, it swung hard starboard and rammed it.

    https://x.com/krassenstein/status/2022295213163577512?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2022295213163577512%7Ctwgr%5E3812fcefbaf858c51b467059cd314ba3ae24b916%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdisqus.com%2Fembed%2Fcomments%2F%3Fbase%3Ddefaultf%3Dsnafusolomont_u%3Dhttps3A2F2Fwww.snafu-solomon.com2F20262F022Fopen-comment-post-12-feb-26.htmlt_d%3DSNAFU3A20Open20Comment20Post.201220Feb2026t_t%3DSNAFU3A20Open20Comment20Post.201220Feb2026s_o%3Ddefaultversion%3D670b3f7229f9c5e11382076cc0d25eb5

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    1. Am dying to hear what actually happened. My whole time at sea was aboard an AFS, so UNREP was everything. I always was out on deck and got to watch, and never had an accident or anything close ( we did snap a highline on my last cruise, and were literally inches from two fatalities, but that's unrelated). Ive never seen two ships vary their distance by mire that about 15 feet. The Truxtun looked like it suddenly went HARD starboard- much more I think than the venturi effect would cause. I'd guess that there was either a rudder or prop pitch failure. While crew error is possible, that was a pretty violent turn, and it looked like the crew was on top of things, because it looks like they threw in in reverse in under a minute. Obviously we will have to wait for the investigation, but I've got $5 on a mechanical casualty.

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