Thursday, February 19, 2026

New Swedish Frigate

ComNavOps has long considered the Swedish Visby class corvette as the gold standard of modern, total stealth warship design (not perfect ... just the best out there).  That makes the conceptual design for the next Swedish frigate, a larger vessel than the Visby, seemingly obvious:  simply upsize the Visby and add a few more weapons.  However, that seems not to be the case.  The candidates for the next Swedish frigate appear to be the existing (parent??) designs listed below:
 
  • Saab/Babcock - Arrowhead 120 (variant of the Arrowhead 140)
  • Naval Group (France) - FDI frigate
  • Navantia (Spain) - Alfa 4000 light frigate
 
As a quick reminder, Visby is 238 ft and 840 tons.  For comparison, the Arrowhead 120 is 406 ft and 4,650 tons.
 
None of the candidates exhibit anything approaching the maximum stealth and total signature reduction the modern naval battlefield requires and all would seem to be a significant step back from the Visby in that regard.  Honestly, the parallels between this and the US Navy’s failed Constellation program which attempted to build a “new”, 20+ year old, already obsolete frigate from a parent design, are eerie.
 
Sweden is looking to acquire four frigates from one of the companies listed above.  The contract for four ships is estimated to be between $4.5B -$6.7B(USD) which would be $1.1B - $1.7B(USD) per ship and, of course, no estimate ever comes in on budget so the real cost would likely be pushing $2B or more which seems excessive for relatively simple, dated frigates.
 
I assumed Sweden would simply scale up the Visby design for frigtes/destroyers.  That would be eminently logical and, indeed, that was the original idea for the Visby Generation 2 design.
 
Initially in 2021, FMV [Swedish Defence Materiel Administration] awarded Saab Kockums a contract for the product definition phase of the Visby Generation 2 corvettes, a new class based on the existing Visby-class stealth vessels … [1]
 
However, the program was canceled in 2023 amid Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Sweden’s push toward NATO membership (finalized in 2024), leading to Saab teaming up with Babcock for a new, larger design.[1]

Somehow, in moving from the world’s stealthiest corvette to a “new” dated frigate, Sweden lost sight of what’s important for survival and combat-effectiveness on the modern naval battlefield.  Did some US admirals join the Swedish navy?
 
Arrowhead 120


I fully support the idea of a larger ship than the Visby but why go for a less capable and less survivable one?  Surely, the Visby could be scaled up from a corvette to a frigate without violating any “laws” of shipbuilding.
 
I guess it’s not just the US Navy that engages in perplexing behavior.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Saab, Babcock bank on Arrowhead 120 design for Sweden’s next frigate”, Jonas Olsson, 13-Feb-2026,
https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/saab-babcock-bank-on-arrowhead-120-design-for-swedens-next-frigate/

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44 comments:

  1. AnonymousFebruary 19, 2026 at 12:54 PM

    Sweden is part of a bigger team now and are building some ships with range and endurance, similar to Finland.
    FDI started in 2015 and the first hull was just commissioned.
    Alpha 4000 is a concept only at this point.
    If you count Arrowhead as truly a scaled down Arrowhead 140, the 140 is to enter service this year or next. Sure, derived from Absolon/ Iver Huitfeldt class. CODAD is hardly obsolete.
    Reality is, there is little precedent for a larger composite ship. The largest composite hull to date is within 5 meters of length and beam of the Visby.

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 19, 2026 at 1:47 PM

      " there is little precedent for a larger composite ship. The largest composite hull to date is within 5 meters of length and beam of the Visby."

      You're aware of the Zumwalt, right? The entire superstructure is a composite. That aside, the Visby's achievement is its shape, lack of protuberances, and overall signature reduction, not its use of composites. It is unclear to what degree its composite materials contribute to that, if at all, and the same effect can be achieved with steel.

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    2. AnonymousFebruary 19, 2026 at 4:21 PM

      Well aware. Its 39.6 meters by 18.3 m wide. The facility that built it is also closed. I do see I need to revise by beam comment above to about 8 meters. The composites are great for absorbing radar waves and reducing heat signature. Skjold also being composite.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsFebruary 19, 2026 at 5:18 PM

      "Well aware."

      Then you know that there is no inherent reason why a larger composite or partial composite (Zumwalt-ish) ship could not be built. The entire vessel doesn't need to be composite. It can be partial steel plus composite where useful and appropriate.

      As I said, Visby's achievement was not composites; it was the focus on TOTAL signature reduction not just radar stealth. This focus is what Sweden should be scaling up to its next ship. Use composites if, and where, appropriate and you've got a scaled up Visby.

      Now, anything else you want to address?

      Delete
    4. AnonymousFebruary 28, 2026 at 1:55 PM

      While the first two ships (USS Zumwalt and USS Michael Monsoor) featured composite superstructures, the third ship in the class, the USS Lyndon B. Johnson (DDG 1002), was built with a steel deckhouse and hangar to reduce program costs.
      Its way way more expensive to built a composite superstructure . plus I dont know the finer details of Visby but they are similar in some ways but the Zumwalts were a complex layers for radar absorbing features with only a thin carbon fibre composite skin.

      Face Skins: Made of T700 carbon fiber fabric infused with vinyl ester resin.
      Core Material: The carbon fiber skins were sandwiched around balsa wood or syntactic foam cores. Balsa was chosen for its high strength-to-cost ratio and its ability to contain fire spread better than traditional foam.
      Syntactic Foam: Over 3,500 cubic feet of syntactic foam (containing microscopic hollow glass particles) were used in the deckhouse. This material was specifically designed to absorb and attenuate radar signals rather than reflect them.
      https://www.compositesworld.com/articles/destroyer-deckhouse-roof-meets-us-navy-fire-code-with-phenolic-composite

      Delete
  2. AnonymousFebruary 19, 2026 at 1:13 PM

    Visby was an anti-sub corvette this new ship is an air-defence frigate so the large air search radar alone is going to make it less stealthy.

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 19, 2026 at 2:01 PM

      "the large air search radar alone is going to make it less stealthy."

      Incorrect. Radars can, and should, be some type of flat array blended into the superstructure and, perhaps, behind a drop down cover if further signature reduction is required or placed behind covers.

      Various ship classes have placed their radars behind "transparent" mast covers for signature reduction while still allowing the radars to function.

      Clearly, you haven't been closely following the blog. We've discussed many aspects of signature reduction for weapons and sensors. Please make use of the archives!

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsFebruary 19, 2026 at 2:03 PM

      Have you studied the radar placement of Visby, San Antonio, Zumwalt, various Japanese classes, and others?

      Delete
    3. AnonymousFebruary 19, 2026 at 7:16 PM

      Wouldn't the active emissions of the radar counteract such stealth placement? In order to fight, an AAW ship has to turn its radar on, and that eliminates any stealth benefit.

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    4. AnonymousFebruary 19, 2026 at 7:48 PM

      The only time you would have active radar is when an attack is incoming which means the enemy has already found you so maintaining stealth no longer matters.

      Delete
  3. number9February 19, 2026 at 3:40 PM

    I have a question related to your Fleet Structure page, unrelated to the present post.

    My general understanding is that you assess AShM as generally unreliable ship-killers, or at least less than the magic bullet they are hyped as. Using them at maximum range requires finding a target, using active sensors is very dangerous. If you manage to find a target, achieving actual saturation against an enemy that is fully defensive with an Aegis-quality system is extremely difficult. So, guns are a very useful ship-killer: engagements might plausibly occur near visual range anyway, allowing fleets to rapidly close.

    If that's the case, shouldn't a Navy have more BBs? Why do you emphasize 5" gun destroyers instead of at least 8" gun systems? A 16" airburst or cluster shell is VASTLY more likely to strip enemy sensors and render him vulnerable to a follow up missile strike than a 5" gun, the blast radii and payloads are incomparable.

    What am I misunderstanding? Is there a smoking-gun post of yours that explains this better?

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 19, 2026 at 4:14 PM

      Honestly, I'm not completely sure what you're asking or what you're uncomfortable with. I'll attempt an answer and you let me know if I've missed your intent.

      The USN currently has no ship-killing missile in useful quantities, hence my general dismissal of them.

      Should a navy have more BB's? In an unconstrained budget environment ... sure!

      A 5" gun is the biggest a destroyer can effectively mount unless one opts to build Zumwalt size "destroyers". In my vision, a destroyer is closer to a Fletcher in size and, thus, cannot mount 8" guns (structural issues, magazine size, etc.). 8" guns are what cruisers are for. We need a balanced fleet with all types of ships.

      Destroyers do not fight alone (if we've planned properly!). They fight with support and that support will provide whatever ship-killing they lack. A ship (any ship) is designed to kill its counterpart. A 5" gun destroyer can effectively sink an opposing destroyer and provide useful damage effects against larger ships.

      If we had a fleet of hundreds of battleships, we wouldn't even need to discuss 5" guns. However, in the real world, there are going to be few BBs and many destroyers and most of the destroyer's tasks don't require 8" guns.

      Did I answer your question?

      Delete
    2. number9February 20, 2026 at 9:32 AM

      Useful clarifications.

      I would contend that USS Hull, briefly fitted with a Mk 71 8" gun, would still count as a destroyer. Heavier and longer than a Fletcher, but not by much. Much smaller than a Zumwalt or Tico.

      My thinking is that a Navy should be capable of AAW, ASW, and ASuW, and that your Fleet Structure lays out plenty of ships for the first two. But 6 BBs isn't enough to put one or two with every major surface action group, the same way you put a few ASW and AAW ships in every group. Are 5" destroyers able to fight effectively as the ONLY ASuW asset? Yes, they can sink themselves, but they don't provide overmatch the way you want, the way a 16" or even 8" gun provides.

      So I would just think that maybe 2-3 supercarriers/CVEs could be cut for 3-4 extra BBs. No point in carriers if the ocean is too hostile for them to approach.

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    3. ComNavOpsFebruary 20, 2026 at 10:25 AM

      "USS Hull, briefly fitted with a Mk 71 8" gun, would still count as a destroyer."

      The Hull experiment was just that - an experiment. The Navy wanted to see how small a ship the Mk71 could fit on. That didn't mean that they thought it was a good idea. As I've noted, 8" guns come with drawbacks as well as benefits. For example, the small size of a destroyer means small magazines for an 8" gun. For the kinds of tasks a destroyer would typically face, multiple 5" guns with large magazines would be far preferable to a single (two???) 8" gun with a small magazine. Ship killing, as I suspect you envision it, would be the least common task, by far, for a destroyer.

      "But 6 BBs isn't enough to put one or two with every major surface action group"

      You may not be grasping how navies fight. Battleships (or any ship type, for that matter) are not assigned in equal quantities to all task forces. They are best operated as small squadrons and assigned depending on the mission.

      Battleships offer relatively little benefit to a carrier group. In WWII, BBs were the epitome of anti-air defense (the Aegis cruiser of their day) and keeping them with carrier groups made sense. Today, BBs offer no significant area AAW and, aside from the few cruise missiles they might or might not have, offer no strike capability to a carrier group which wants to fight at a great distance.

      "So I would just think that maybe 2-3 supercarriers/CVEs could be cut for 3-4 extra BBs."

      Ideally, we'd prefer to see our enemy at a distance and fight at a distance using cruise missiles and carrier aircraft. A battleship is of relatively little use in that scenario. The battleship's strength is close range land attack and the ability to stand and fight and absorb damage. Those are the missions/task forces that we would assign battleships to.

      We currently lack land bases and land airfields in the Pacific. The carrier (with a full air wing, not today's shrunken wing) gives us the mobile airfield that we desperately need. If it comes down to a choice, one or the other, we need carriers more than battleships.

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    4. number9February 20, 2026 at 6:13 PM

      "You may not be grasping how navies fight. Battleships (or any ship type, for that matter) are not assigned in equal quantities to all task forces. They are best operated as small squadrons and assigned depending on the mission."

      I think I understand. Every CSG needs AAW, ASW, and ASuW or it won't survive to carry out its mission. A dozen Aegis destroyers offer overmatch against any likely air attack. Perry and Spruance analogues with support helos and Orion-analogues offer overmatch against any likely submarine attack.

      But 5" guns on destroyers are not overmatch. At best, they are parity. If the enemy has similar destroyers, it's a coin flip who wins. If the enemy has 8" gunned cruisers nearby, you lose.

      "Battleships offer relatively little benefit to a carrier group. In WWII, BBs were the epitome of anti-air defense (the Aegis cruiser of their day) and keeping them with carrier groups made sense. Today, BBs offer no significant area AAW and, aside from the few cruise missiles they might or might not have, offer no strike capability to a carrier group which wants to fight at a great distance."

      I mean, you've written many times, we should not expect to engage purely with missiles at great distance. Sensor denial, very good missile defense, et cetera. So if guns are a viable ASuW weapon, and you need ASuW assets to protect your carrier group, you need a big gun warship in the carrier group.

      Regarding WWII, the BBs would have been much more important ASuW assets if the enemy had carriers and planes that could match us. If they could carry enough interceptors to catch our strikes, and we had to devote more hangar space to intercepting their strikes, then BBs would have been critical surface combatants. Or so I suspect.

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    5. ComNavOpsFebruary 21, 2026 at 6:55 AM

      "But 5" guns on destroyers are not overmatch."

      You're not grasping how a carrier task force works. Attached destroyers don't need to "overmatch" anything because they've got a carrier to provide the overmatch. In WWII, destroyers provided no overmatch against anything. That wasn't their job. (Side note: do you know what the Fletcher's job was? If not, that may be why you're struggling to understand this.)

      " BBs would have been much more important ASuW assets if the enemy had carriers and planes that could match us."

      They did! They had carriers and battleships. Aircraft turned the war into a long distance affair which largely eliminated the battleship's anti-surface role except in unique circumstances. (Side note: Do you understand the significance of the WWII practice of dawn scouting?)

      "If the enemy has 8" gunned cruisers nearby, you lose."

      And if we have 8" gun ships and the enemy has 16" guns, we lose. If we have 16" guns and the enemy has a carrier, we lose. And if we have a carrier and the enemy has two carriers, we lose. We can do this kind of 'what if' all day.

      You seem to want a simple destroyer to be a 'win the war single-handed' ship that can defeat any enemy force, at any time, under any circumstance, by itself. That's absurd as well as being unaffordable.

      You lay out a concept of operations for a ship type and then ask yourself what is the LEAST equipment fit that allows the ship to successfully perform its missions and you build to that. Anything more is unaffordable.

      In WWII, the Navy had 6,000 ships. Ask yourself, why weren't they all battleships since anything less wouldn't provide guaranteed overmatch? Or, ask yourself why we didn't build our destroyers with 8" guns since we had the technology?

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    6. PhilFebruary 21, 2026 at 9:28 AM

      "The Navy wanted to see how small a ship the Mk71 could fit on. That didn't mean that they thought it was a good idea." I didn't know they were trying to figure out how small a ship could use that gun. Thank you. I recall you stating before that it was too much for destroyers.

      Were it up to me, the Zumwalt class would have been called the surface/land attack cruiser, with two, possibly three or four Mk 71 guns. Never mind the AGS debacle. It wouldn't have an ASW mission, though it might have some kind of sonar optimized for detecting mines. The aviation facilities would have been sufficient for a few spotter drones. At the end of a mission they could be recovered by a net on the fantail, as was done by the crews of Iowa class battleships.

      I agree the independent cruiser on the Fleet Structure page would be more capable, but this redesigned Zumwalt might have been more politically viable while still providing a significant improvement in naval surface fire support capability (NSFS) and ability to support blockades. It should have worked out better for the Navy than the real-life Zumwalts.

      Heavy cruisers (and especially battleships) coordinating with torpedo destroyers (link at the bottom) could lay to waste an enemy port. Only the truly desperate would attempt to break a blockade enforced by these ships.

      This has nothing to do with Swedish frigates (sorry) but this discussion got me thinking.

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/06/deadly-fish.html

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    7. number9February 21, 2026 at 10:57 AM

      I've got to keep pushing on this one because I think we're talking past each other.

      "You're not grasping how a carrier task force works. Attached destroyers don't need to "overmatch" anything because they've got a carrier to provide the overmatch."

      I don't mean this as a "gotcha," but if you don't need overmatch, why would a carrier group have 10x Aegis destroyers with 96 VLS each? That's overmatch for any likely air attack. Why do you need 12 ASW frigates in addition to the numerous ASW helicopters aboard destroyers?

      Because you can't flip a coin for defending the task force from these threats. If you need carriers to get forwards and clear the skies for a bombing mission, then you can't let a hasty missile strike of 40 missiles turn you around and sink a carrier. You can't let 4 submarines run you around. So you accept the need for overmatch in the air defense and ASW domains.

      In particular, I'm drawing from your own post https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/11/whats-old-is-new-again.html describing a battle between Chinese and American destroyers. Both are better at missile defense than missile attack, so it becomes a gun battle. The Americans win the gun battle because they bring 8" gunned cruisers.

      If missile defense is as good as they claim, this seems likely. An enemy squadron attempting to intercept a carrier group could defend itself from the missile strike a carrier group could launch, assuming the carrier planes have a different, more important mission and aren't loaded with AShM. Or is this the point of departure? Do you suppose that the guided missile destroyers defending a carrier group CAN shoot through the 1000+ self defense missiles plus CIWS that 6 Chinese destroyers would be carrying?

      Because if the CSG can shoot missiles and win, WHILE still carrying out its mission, then I concede the point. I have two assumptions, and that is one of them: AShM can be fought off by a fairly small number of Aegis-standard destroyers, which means a gun battle.

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    8. ComNavOpsFebruary 21, 2026 at 1:19 PM

      "why would a carrier group have 10x Aegis destroyers with 96 VLS each? "

      You're missing multiple key points.

      1. While the cumulative escort VLS/missiles might be overkill, that assumes that the entire quantity is instantly and EFFECTIVELY available against any attack and that is patently false. The escort for, say, a carrier task force will be spread around the periphery of as much as a 100 mile diameter circle around the carriers. For any given incoming attack vector, only a few of the escorts will be in position to engage so, yes, they need a fair number of VLS/missiles. That said, I've repeatedly stated that the Navy is overbuilding VLS into ships.

      This would be analogous to asking why we need 10,000 police in a city to stop one bank robber? Talk about overmatch! Well, at any given moment, there are only one or two (or none!) police near any given spot in the city. To cover the entire city we do, indeed, need 10,000.

      2. On the other hand, you're forgetting that VLS also provides offensive weapons (cruise missiles). At one cruise missile per cell and recognizing the need for hundreds of missiles per strike target, the need for large numbers of VLS is obvious.

      "Why do you need 12 ASW frigates in addition to the numerous ASW helicopters aboard destroyers?"

      Similarly, ASW will be spread over an even larger area since the goal is to detect and engage subs as far out as possible. Again, only a very few ASW assets will be available at any given location. As far as helos, there is no such thing as too many. Helos are notorious for downtime. Optimistically, only 1/4 of the helos will be available at any given moment.

      "Do you suppose that the guided missile destroyers defending a carrier group CAN shoot through the 1000+ self defense missiles plus CIWS that 6 Chinese destroyers would be carrying?"

      ??? I can only assume that you are new to the blog and have not thoroughly familiarized yourself with the archives. An attack does not need to overcome the thousands of missiles a defending force carries; they only need to overcome the half dozen missiles that the defender can launch in the brief engagement window. I've thoroughly covered this in past posts.

      "describing a battle between Chinese and American destroyers."

      You either did not read the post or failed to understand it. The story contained a number of caveats such as a very limited supply of anti-ship missiles on both sides, the Chinese expended their limited supply unwisely, the US destroyers did NOT engage the Chinese, the US had no anti-ship missiles, and US destroyers were protected by geography and an excess of alternate targets for the Chinese missiles. There was no stand up, anti-ship missile engagement between forces. Whatever conclusions you drew from that scenario appear to be incorrect.

      I'm getting the very clear impression that have only a cursory understanding of naval warfare. I urge you to spend some time studying the archives. It's a great way to come up to speed on naval operations and tactics.

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    9. number9February 21, 2026 at 2:02 PM

      Look, you keep saying things I already agree with. My point with bringing up the count of AAW and ASW warships was just that you NEED superiority. No need to rehash why, you explained it well. The disagreement is that I think guns are prime ASuW weapons, and you do not. Right?

      "2. On the other hand, you're forgetting that VLS also provides offensive weapons (cruise missiles). At one cruise missile per cell and recognizing the need for hundreds of missiles per strike target, the need for large numbers of VLS is obvious."

      "An attack does not need to overcome the thousands of missiles a defending force carries; they only need to overcome the half dozen missiles that the defender can launch in the brief engagement window. I've thoroughly covered this in past posts."

      I see these two statements as contradictory. Perhaps I should not. Can Aegis destroyers defeat large missile attacks or not? If they can, then obviously you need hundreds of missiles to saturate. If they cannot because they can only fire a few missiles before getting hit, then why does a saturation attack need hundreds of missiles?

      If each destroyer can only fire a few times, why does your ideal AAW destroyer mount a hundred VLS cells instead of 16? I've read your posts on missile defense, I assumed that you had changed your position since your Fleet Structure does not (seemingly) follow that engagement model. Are they expecting to survive multiple engagements without reloading? Or is it Fleet Structure that is out of date?

      Could you either elaborate or direct me to a post that does? I'm clearly missing something here. I've read a good number of posts, probably a hundred or so, and the impression I got was that we should not expect cruise missiles to penetrate Aegis-defended warships without either a massive saturation or some very clever operational use. Nor should we expect reliable detection much further than gun range; EMCON and hostile skies mean electro optical detection from relatively short range, much shorter than the maximum range of missiles.

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    10. ComNavOpsFebruary 21, 2026 at 2:28 PM

      " The disagreement is that I think guns are prime ASuW weapons, and you do not. Right?"

      Wrong. I'm completely in favor of larger caliber guns on ships but not 8" on a destroyer. 8" REQUIRES a cruiser size ship to be effectively employed (number of guns, magazine size). So, right weapon, wrong ship type.

      "I see these two statements as contradictory."

      ?? The two statements are, to an extent, mutually exclusive. The Navy does not have any VLS launched anti-ship cruise missiles (though the Standard missiles have a surface mode but that's not a ship killer). Every VLS cell occupied by a cruise missile is a land attack missile and subtracts from the anti-air cells.

      "Can Aegis destroyers defeat large missile attacks or not?"

      No one knows for sure since the Navy refuses to test. Do you understand fire control channels and radar clutter? If you do, then you already know the answer to your question about saturation attacks. If you're no aware of these considerations then you need to study and come up to speed. I'm sorry but I don't have the time to provide an education in naval warfare. As stated in the Comment Policy page, a certain level of naval knowledge is a requirement to participate in this blog (though you're welcome to follow along!

      "Are they expecting to survive multiple engagements without reloading?"

      I'll offer this one thought and then you need to go study. It all depends on the circumstances. If one hundred attacking missiles suddenly appear on the horizon simultaneously, a single defending ship can only engage a few and would have no hope of surviving. Alternatively, if one hundred missiles appear sequentially, the defender would have a chance to survive (how good a chance depends on how Aegis actually performs ... which no one knows).

      It's all about circumstances. How many attacking missiles? How simultaneous? How many defenders can engage? What's the engagement geometry? Who/where is the attacker missile's target? How effective will EW countermeasures be? Can we detect beyond the horizon and attrit the incoming missiles over time? And so on.

      "we should not expect cruise missiles to penetrate Aegis-defended warships without either a massive saturation or some very clever operational use."

      That is the operational assumption.

      I like your enthusiasm but you need to study some more. One good starting point is understanding the WWII kamikaze attacks and how/why the US defended the way they did. Much of that applies today even though the speed has greatly increased.

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    11. number9February 21, 2026 at 2:57 PM

      "That is the operational assumption."

      I'm not even sure what we're arguing anymore, because that's my only assumption. If DDG squadrons can't reliably sink each other with just missiles, then it's a gun fight. So you need boats with numerous or big guns as your ASuW asset. So to answer my original question, your assumption with the Fleet Structure page is that 2x 5" guns is good enough for a likely surface engagement, and cruisers mounted with 8" guns would be overkill.

      I understand and agree with just about everything in your comment, as with the previous comments. Lots of reasons why Aegis will have trouble, and lots of reasons why it will still be good enough (probably) to catch a hasty attack. Need a big magazine because the enemy is probably going to execute a hasty attack, need a lot of ships anyway in case they execute a more careful attack.

      "?? The two statements are, to an extent, mutually exclusive. The Navy does not have any VLS launched anti-ship cruise missiles (though the Standard missiles have a surface mode but that's not a ship killer). Every VLS cell occupied by a cruise missile is a land attack missile and subtracts from the anti-air cells."

      Yes. I was talking about your notional destroyers described on the Fleet Structure page, which fire LRASM from vertical tubes and are described as primary ASuW. Your AAW destroyer is also described as pure AAW, the 96 VLS split between SM and ESSM.

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    12. F-14 Tomcat LoverFebruary 22, 2026 at 2:55 AM

      As I've said previously, we can likely get 50 mile ranges out of 8" guns, looking at the range improvements that we see with current 6" guns vs their WW2 6" and 8" counterparts.

      Yes, radar guided rounds would bring up the cost of the rounds, but we can get this down to manageable levels with mass production. Assuming a notional value of 150 thousand dollars for radar guided 8" rounds, that still compares very favorably with RAM, ESSM, Harpoon, NSM, and pretty much every missile in our inventory. That's par value with TOW, Hellfire, and Javelin.

      Also, if we could blindfire million dollar Tomahawks and Harpoons on bearing only launches in the Cold War, we can absolutely blindfire radar-guided smart 8" rounds at grid squares 50 miles away to seek enemy targets on their own. Self-seeking radar guided artillery munitions are an old technology at this point: 155mm SADARM rounds began development in the 1960s, and demonstrate that it's possible to make radar seekers that can survive the acceleration stresses of firing.

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    13. ComNavOpsFebruary 22, 2026 at 7:23 AM

      "radar guided rounds would bring up the cost of the rounds, but we can get this down to manageable levels with mass production. Assuming a notional value of 150 thousand dollars for radar guided 8" rounds,"

      So, how do you explain the $1M cost per round of the Zumwalt's LRLAP? I'm not asking this argumentatively. I don't know what made the LRLAP prohibitively expensive. Perhaps you have some information about this? Whatever drove up the price, how would it be different for a guided 8" projectile to make it an order of magnitude less expensive?

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    14. F-14 Tomcat LoverFebruary 22, 2026 at 9:02 AM

      Zumwalt's LRLAP rounds had several problems with them: they were never in mass production with economies of scale, the developmental costs were amortised over 3 ships instead of the full 32 ship buy, and they were trying to make guided 6" projectiles that shoot out to 200 miles, which is just crazy and involves significant costs because you're running into diminishing returns in trying to force a 6" round to travel 7 times the distance it's meant to go.

      Meanwhile, if we look at other, more reasonable 6" rounds that had larger production runs than LRLAP:

      - the laser guided 155mm Copperhead round has a unit cost of 70 grand.
      - The BONUS smart round for 155mm guns had a fairly small production run of 9000 rounds and still managed a unit cost of 40 grand per round.
      - Excalibur guided rounds had a unit cost of 68 grand in 2016, which rose to 112 grand in FY 2021 because of costs involved in restarting the closed production line and amortisation of development costs for further Excalibur blocks with additional seekers.
      - OTO Melara's 76mm DART guided rounds have an estimated unit cost of 30 to 40 grand.

      And for fun, to just compare to our most produced ATGMs:
      - Hellfire has a unit cost of 117 grand.
      - Javelin has a unit cost of 197 grand in 2021; back during the GWOT, the unit cost was 100 grand, when we had larger and more regular production runs.

      So going by this historical precedent, I think 150 grand would be a pretty reasonable price for guided smart 8" rounds, given a sufficiently large production run.

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    15. ComNavOpsFebruary 22, 2026 at 5:52 PM

      I'm not quite as confident that a guided 8" shell could be produced for the cost you suggest. Each of the examples you cite has a caveat associated with it such as being much smaller, less lethal, or developed long ago.

      LRLAP was cancelled not due to developmental costs (although I'm sure that was a factor) but to anticipated production costs of $1M per projectile. It's hard to imagine producing an 8" round for an order of magnitude less but who knows. I'd really like to know what component or requirement caused the bulk of the LRLAP cost. Range goal was not 200 miles in any document I've seen. The common range goal was 70 (minimum) to 100 (ultimate goal) nm. Testing never got beyond around 40 miles, as far as I know, although that may have been due to test range limitations, as I understand it.

      I note that ERGM, BTERM, and other similar guided rounds failed due to costs, among other reasons.

      Delete
    16. AnonymousFebruary 22, 2026 at 9:08 PM

      Note that BONUS uses IIR, which helps bring the cost down vs a radar seeker. Excalibur Block 2 costs 112k, and this is a round with a radar seeker in it.

      It's also worth noting that ERGM was a technically ambitious rocket propelled projectile; rocket propulsion is a massive driver of cost because of the fuels and engineering.

      Tha said, I would still opine that at ERGM's last estimated cost of 191k, this is still price competitive vs our existing AShM inventory.

      Delete
  4. AnonymousFebruary 20, 2026 at 1:17 AM

    I am really curious what a medium sized frigate is going to do for Sweden. This decision smacks of 'we have got some now'. Sweden is basically a Baltic nation and the Baltic is about 3 things, Mines, Torpedo's and any thing that flies.

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 20, 2026 at 9:01 AM

      This goes back to strategy. What is Sweden's overall military strategy and what forces do they need to implement that strategy? I don't know their situation enough to assess the validity of their need for a frigate (or any other ship type). They also have NATO responsibilities which may be influencing their desire for a frigate.

      CONOPS! CONOPS! CONOPS!

      Delete
    2. AnonymousFebruary 21, 2026 at 2:38 PM

      The British could use them as escorts when one of their enormous Harrier carriers go north.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousFebruary 27, 2026 at 3:11 AM

      Presumably the Swedish Navy wants frigates to contribute to its new NATO responsibilities eg SNMG1. The ‘rule of 3’ probably led them to consider 4 the optimal number to ensure 1 ready to deploy immediately.

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsFebruary 27, 2026 at 8:12 AM

      "The ‘rule of 3’ probably led them to consider 4 the optimal number to ensure 1 ready to deploy immediately."

      I doubt that influenced the Swedish navy. The rule of 3 applies to the US navy because of its 6-12 month deployment habits. A local, territorial navy such as Sweden's is not subject to that extended deployment model. Their ships are never more than a day or two sailing from a "home" port so maintenance, supplies, support, etc. are always at hand.

      While the choice of a frigate - as opposed to a corvette - might be due to NATO demands, one can legitimately ask whether one (or even four) frigates is a worthwhile contribution to justify frigate construction.

      Delete
  5. NickFebruary 20, 2026 at 4:43 AM

    The Saab/Babcock 4,650 ton design has a standard steel hull but the first with an all composite superstructure one step beyond the first two stealthy Zumwalt's with only a composite deckhouse (third was all steel to save costs as Zumwalt program was massively overspent) plus the tumblehome hull.

    As the Zumwalt was designed as a very stealthy large ship and if you believe the USN claimes of 50x harder to detect, presume similar to the small Visby would not the Saab/Babcock all composite superstructure assist in reducing its RCS signiture be a compromise for a stealthier ship at a price that maybe affordable?

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 20, 2026 at 9:05 AM

      "would not the Saab/Babcock all composite superstructure assist in reducing its RCS signiture"

      This is an unknown in my mind. I've not seen any definitive information about composite materials and radar signature. How much of an effect, if any, does composite materials have on radar signature? Infrared signature? I just don't know.

      Balance the possible benefit against possible drawbacks such as structural strength, fire resistance, toxic gases from burning, more difficult production process, repairability at sea, etc.

      Are composites a good idea in a warship? I just don't know.

      Delete
  6. Bob NageleFebruary 21, 2026 at 4:30 AM

    On the stealth issue: My impression is that today our Navy does not really take EMCON very seriously. This is reinforced by the strategy for the future which is based on large numbers of unmanned vessels, which will require frequent (and sometimes extensive) communication for control, coordination, and for offboard analysis of sensor data.

    Here's my question: If we won't do EMCON, is there really any point in worrying about other forms of stealth, since any serious enemy will be able to detect and track our ships through our electromagnetic emissions?

    Obviously an exaggeration, but still ...

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 21, 2026 at 7:16 AM

      "our Navy does not really take EMCON very seriously."

      CNO Greenert publicly acknowledged that the Navy had dropped its EMCON and shock requirements for all equipment. Whether that position has been reversed, now, or not, I don't know but I haven't head that it has.

      " is there really any point in worrying about other forms of stealth,"

      When war comes, we'll learn within a few weeks that we have been horribly wrong and then, yes, total stealth will be vitally important. We start every war with the accumulated mistakes of peace and then quickly relearn how to do real combat. We'll pay the price in blood but we'll learn. If the Navy would read this blog and do what we say, they could avoid much of the initial blood price.

      Stealth is mandatory and we don't abandon it because we have idiots in charge. They'll be gone as soon as real war comes. This is just history endlessly repeating itself.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousFebruary 21, 2026 at 2:06 PM

      Radiate when it serves a purpose. When radiating doesn't serve don't radiate. When not radiating stealth wil matter greatly.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsFebruary 21, 2026 at 2:32 PM

      "Radiate when it serves a purpose."

      Exactly. Even more precisely, radiate when the potential benefits outweigh the risks.

      "When not radiating stealth wil matter greatly."

      Stealth matters even when both sides are actively radiating such as during an attack. An attacking missile still needs to lock on to a target and it will be harder to do that against a stealth ship then a non-stealth ship. A missile with a weak lock on a stealth ship is more easily decoyed than one with a strong lock on a non-stealth ship.

      Delete
  7. ExJuniorSailorFebruary 22, 2026 at 3:33 PM

    So-somewhat unrelated, but relevant to ship design and perhaps CNOs call for less creature comforts aboard ship (??).
    Adm Caudle, who's seemingly trying to self-style like Adm Zumwalt and his Z-grams (he is writing "C-Notes" to the Fleet ), talked about a program to move sailors off ships and ashore. I'd not heard about this program, and evidently it's well underway...

    https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-news/2026/02/navy-advances-effort-to-move-sailors-off-ships-and-into-shore-based-housing/?readmore=1

    Giving BAQ or providing base housing isn't going to be cheap. I agree with pay raises and such...but this is too far IMHO.

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    1. ComNavOpsFebruary 22, 2026 at 5:55 PM

      This seems to be aimed at sailors whose ship is docked for extended periods, typically due to long maintenance periods. I have no problem with that. My concern is the overemphasis on shipboard comforts.

      Delete
    2. ExJuniorSailorFebruary 23, 2026 at 1:18 AM

      Actually no- this is aimed at getting all sailors to live ashore, off the boat, when in port, not just for ships in a maintenance scenario.

      Delete
  8. AnonymousFebruary 22, 2026 at 10:22 PM

    You need a mission statement on what the new frigates' missions. If they are for escorts, then, stealth is not top priority but ASW is very important. If it is part of a carrier group, stealth is not important as carriers are not stealth. If it is everything for everyone, then, repeat the Constellation.

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  9. AnonymousMarch 9, 2026 at 3:52 PM

    The Visby has a different task compared to the new air defense frigate. It is supposed to be able to get fairly close to the enemy and strike first, ASW in an environment where there is no total air superiority etc.

    Due to budget constraints, it was used for all sorts of tasks. In a purely defensive strategy, this was acceptable.

    The need now is for mobile air defense and to protect trade. A different task for which Sweden will get a different tool.

    Visby and the new Luleå class will form a good toolbox for the Swedish navy in the Baltic and while I disagree that Luleå should be a stealthship I do believe the Visby replacement should be build around the Holistic stealth concept that resulted in the Visby class

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    1. ComNavOpsMarch 9, 2026 at 6:29 PM

      "Sweden will get a different tool."

      There are good tools and bad tools. A new ship that is only semi-stealthy, which is all of the candidate designs, is a bad tool. An AAW ship, especially, needs to be as stealthy as possible to avoid being taken out early in a fight, leaving the ships it was guarding without protection.

      "while I disagree that Luleå should be a stealthship"

      Why do you think any new build ship should not be as stealthy as possible given today's theats?

      "should be build around the Holistic stealth concept that resulted in the Visby class"

      Now you're confusing me since you just stated that you don't think the new ship should be stealthy.

      Delete

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