Following are some tidbits from the current June 2025 GAO
annual weapon systems report.
Air and Missile
Defense Radar (AMDR) – Radars are being produced and delivered while
testing is ongoing. This kind of
concurrency is what’s behind so many development and production cost overruns
and schedule delays as problems are uncovered during production and reworks
have to be performed. I simply don’t
understand what’s so hard about grasping this concept but the Navy seems
absolutely unable to get it. In this
case, it’s even worse because we’re producing the radars faster than the ships
they’re intended for and the Navy is having to warehouse the radars until
there’s a ship ready for them. Why
produce untested, undeveloped systems when we don’t even have a use for them?
Ford Class – GAO
reports the unit cost for the four Ford class carriers as $16.3B. Yikes!
CVN-79 is struggling with weapon elevator installation (what a stunning
surprise!) which will delay delivery.
The Navy may defer ‘non-critical’ work like painting until post-delivery
… yet another example of accepting an incomplete product.
F-18 IRST –
Remember back in 2007 when the Navy came up with the bright idea of attaching an
IRST sensor to the front of a fuel tank for the F-18? A simple, if less than optimal approach,
right? Well, 8 years later and they’re
still working at it and it’s still not ready.
From the GAO report,
The rest of the world has had functional IRST systems for decades.
Constellation –
Remember how the Navy has been saying for a year or more that the design of the
ship is over 90% complete? Well, they’re
now revised that down to 70% after GAO previously called them out for,
essentially, fraudulent reporting. The
program is going backward! Only the Navy
could start with a 90% design and, after years, regress to 70% … and you have
to believe even that number is probably less than honest.
Weight growth is also an issue.
Medium Landing Ship
(LSM) – The LSM is the key to the Marine’s concept of forward, hidden bases
of missile shooters but the Navy has yet to really embrace the idea of buying
the ship. Initial cost estimates from
industry apparently shocked Navy officials and they’ve been forced to start
over.
That’s surprising given how accurate Navy cost estimates usually are.
Mk 54 Torpedo –
The Mk 54 Mod 2 Advanced Lightweight Torpedo has run into cost and development
issues.
MQ-25 Stingray UAV –
The unmanned tanker has run into lots of problems.
Obsolescence???? How do you run into obsolescence problems for a brand new aircraft that hasn’t even been delivered yet? You do it by having a program take forever to get fielded. Development started in 2018 and here we are, seven years later with nothing to show for it. So, yeah, you screw around for years and you wind up with obsolescence issues before you’ve fielded the first unit.
FYI … first flight has not yet occurred … seven years
later. What’s happened to us?
You may recall that, in a first in recent times, the Navy
opted to act as the program integrator instead of industry. Well, they failed.
ORCA XLUUV – The
unmanned submersible program is sinking.
This is what happens when you develop something without a CONOPS.
Ship to Shore
Connector – This is a near duplicate replacement for the LCAC. It should have been a simple and quick
project.
Well, that’s not good but at least we aren’t building these things without having solved the problems … right? Right?
I was afraid of that. So, each problem we encounter and each solution that’s implemented will require all the previously built and delivered craft to undergo rework.
Columbia SSBN –
The price tag now sites at $10.5B each. The delivery schedule has slipped by a full
year and is likely to slip another year, according to the Navy.
Concurrency rears its head again.
Virginia SSN –
The construction rate is woefully short of what we need.
A goal of 2.3 subs per year versus the current reality of 1.1? Hmm … doesn’t seem like that’s going to happen.
Costs are higher than the Navy estimated? The Navy has underestimated every project it’s ever embarked on. At some point, don’t you have to admit that you’re incompetent to generate cost estimates and start applying something like a 100% fudge factor? Before anyone tries to defend the Navy by saying that it’s very difficult to estimate costs, note that other agencies seem to routinely estimate Navy project costs pretty accurately. Further note that ComNavOps also estimates Navy project costs pretty accurately (Constellation, for example; you can check it in the archives).
T-AGOS Surveillance
Ship – Scheduling and design issues, again.
Several years???? It’s essentially a commercial ship!
Conclusion
Who’s running these clown shows and why haven’t they been
fired yet? Wake up, Hegseth! The GAO report is telling you, loud and
clear, who to fire. Quit screwing around
and start firing people.
… while the IRST pods demonstrated capability at tactically significant ranges during operational testing, the pods were extremely unreliable. … only managed to achieve 14 hours mean time between operational mission failures—short of the 40 hours required.
The rest of the world has had functional IRST systems for decades.
In October 2024, the Navy reported 759 metric tons of weight growth from initial estimates—nearly a 13 percent increase …
Program officials said the offers they received were hundreds of millions of dollars higher than budgeted.
That’s surprising given how accurate Navy cost estimates usually are.
Program officials stated that contractors’ estimated costs to complete system development and testing were significantly higher than expected.
The MQ-25 Stingray program continues to report cost and schedule challenges that have led to a funding shortfall of $291 million. The program’s decision to delay the low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to September 2025, and its efforts to accelerate testing replacements for at least seven components with obsolescence and other issues, contributed to a significant increase in development costs since our last report.
Obsolescence???? How do you run into obsolescence problems for a brand new aircraft that hasn’t even been delivered yet? You do it by having a program take forever to get fielded. Development started in 2018 and here we are, seven years later with nothing to show for it. So, yeah, you screw around for years and you wind up with obsolescence issues before you’ve fielded the first unit.
… the program’s software costs increased substantially since last year. Program officials attributed this increase to their 2021 decision to switch from a government-furnished ground control station to one provided by another contractor …
It is now unclear whether the Navy will transition the XLUUV to a program of record because there are no clear requirements that the XLUUV can meet ...
This is what happens when you develop something without a CONOPS.
… the program delayed its IOC date in each of our annual assessments since its originally scheduled IOC in August 2020—a total delay of more than 5 years.
Well, that’s not good but at least we aren’t building these things without having solved the problems … right? Right?
As the program continues to delay key events in its schedule, it continues to construct and deliver craft—with 25 craft either under construction or delivered to date.
I was afraid of that. So, each problem we encounter and each solution that’s implemented will require all the previously built and delivered craft to undergo rework.
The program attributed particularly slow periods of construction to out-of-sequence work that significantly disrupted planned construction events and led to large amounts of rework. According to program officials, the out-of-sequence work resulted from missing instructions in some design products that detail how to build the submarine.
Concurrency rears its head again.
The program’s 2024 construction rate fell to 1.15 submarines per year from 1.2 per year in 2023, short of the Navy’s goal of 1.5, according to program officials. …The Navy has a goal to deliver 2.3 submarines per year by the early 2030s.
A goal of 2.3 subs per year versus the current reality of 1.1? Hmm … doesn’t seem like that’s going to happen.
Construction continues to cost more than planned.
Costs are higher than the Navy estimated? The Navy has underestimated every project it’s ever embarked on. At some point, don’t you have to admit that you’re incompetent to generate cost estimates and start applying something like a 100% fudge factor? Before anyone tries to defend the Navy by saying that it’s very difficult to estimate costs, note that other agencies seem to routinely estimate Navy project costs pretty accurately. Further note that ComNavOps also estimates Navy project costs pretty accurately (Constellation, for example; you can check it in the archives).
… the program will likely miss its goal for fielding T-AGOS 25 in 2027 by several years.
Several years???? It’s essentially a commercial ship!
Ah, yes. IRST. Per NAVAIR: The U.S. Navy declared IOC for the F/A-18 E/F IRST Block II system in November 2024.
ReplyDelete(Link to NAVAIR: https://www.navair.navy.mil/news/US-Navy-FA-18-fleet-gets-enhanced-target-tracking-IRST-IOC/Tue-02042025-0944)
And from the archives: https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2017/12/tomcat-eyes.html
The major difference here is that the AN/AAS-42 IRST was part of the design of the F-14D, it wasn't a post-production equipment modification. That approach (the smartest one, I might add) allowed for the whole sensor system to function from the get-go, with any tweaks that may or may not have to be done.
The Virginia-class SSN. I get the premise behind AUKUS, but I don't think the powers-to-be thought the US portion out all that much. How can we commit to producing SSNs for another country's navy when we are struggling to fulfill the demands of our own navy?
I believe that we are at 49 deployable SSNs with a formal requirement of 65-66.
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/05/09/us-navys-submarine-fleet-is-too-small-heres-how-selling-some-may-help/
"SSNs for another country's navy when we are struggling to fulfill the demands of our own navy?"
DeleteCongress has attempted to fund additional SSNs the last few years but the manufacturer has not had the production capacity. With that in mind, it seems sheer idiocy to commit to producing subs for someone else, as you note.
What does 1.1 or 1.3 submarine look like? I remember whole numbers. With AUKUS, I would almost defer to the UK to build them for the RAN. Correct me if I'm wrong, but aren't the Columbia SSBNs the bigger priority than the Virginia's? Call me crazy, but if the Ohio SSBN are unable to be extended until the Columbia's start to come on-line, wouldn't that be more of a reason to develop a SLCM-N
Deleteso the SSNs we have can launch them as a bridge or stop gap measure?
"What does 1.1 or 1.3 submarine look like?"
DeleteIt actually takes multiple years (I think it's something like 5 or 6 - or maybe slightly more) to build an SSN. But they're working on several at the same time. So divide the number of deliveries over several years by the number of years, and you get 1.1 per year. I think what's been happening recently is that many of them take longer than planned.
That makes a bit more sense. TY.
DeleteIt appears the backstabbing Angus deal is dead. Neither the US nor UK will be able to supply modern submarines to Australia - there will be an enormous capability gap in the Pacific for western forces.
Delete"backstabbing Angus deal"
DeleteI assume you're referring to the AUKUS submarine deal.
We'll leave the politics out of the discussion. That said, the deal is not cancelled. The US is simply reviewing the project, as it's doing to all major defense projects. Whether any of the three partners wish to alter or cancel the deal remains to be seen.
Note that the latest iteration of planning calls for the UK and Australia to construct the 8 SSNs. The US will not be sending new construction subs to Australia. However, the US has agreed to provide up to 5 Virginia class subs to Australia as interim replacements.
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational sense, whatsoever. A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic situation and I assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the subs given their submarine history to date. Australia will come to find out that establishing and maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry.
A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks. That would actually be a strategic and operational benefit for the US and Australia and the support industry already exists in Australia. Crewing and maintenance remain ongoing challenges, of course.
I totally agree with your analysis that Ankus never made any sense, since Australia was on the path of acquiring a significant modern SSK force (12 to replace the 6 obsolete Collins) - with the assistance of France.
DeleteI'm surprised that Canada did not partner up with Australia on new submarines as Canada is looking at up to 12 SSKs. That would have made more sense than AUKUS, plus look at how many other weapon programs that Europeans partner up on (FREMMs, Eurofighter, etc.).
DeleteHow long did the USS Boise remain laid up before they decided or were able to overhaul her?
IMHO Australia doing a deal with Japan for Subs would be best all round. Their new ones are a good halfway house between old style SSK and SSN, with a rumoured submerged time of up to a month. Hopefully it would build better political ties between them both. Crucially it would bean (I believe) boats in the water quicker and cheaper. This does not stop them going SSN next time when hopefully US & UK have capacity to build / help.
DeleteWhoops, forgot to sign. Clive F
DeleteF-18 IRST
DeleteThe struggles with that are really disheartening.
I would really like the military, and especially the navy, to be putting an emphasis on passive systems like IRST and EO/IR.
Instead they are spending money, focus, energy and (most importantly) time on unmanned fantasy tech to fight I guess an outerspace alien invasion in 2050.
The lack of practical focus is just infuriating.
Lutefisk
"F-18 IRST ... The struggles with that are really disheartening."
DeleteThe rest of the world mastered IRST decades ago. I really don't know what the problem is. Probably we're trying to cram all kinds of extraneous functionality into it instead of just letting it be an IRST, plain and simple.
"A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks."
DeleteThis would be the logical thing to do, except that the RAN has decided, in its infinite wisdom, to base its SSKs in Darwin, on the complete opposite side eastern of the continent, instead of Perth on the west, where they'd have a clear shot to their patrol zone and significantly shorter distance.
Because of this decision, their SSKs are spending almost all of their endurance on transit, leaving them with very short patrol durations.
The australian government decided that somehow, it would be easier to go to nuclear subs, instead of building a submarine base at Perth.
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-navy-budget-ships/#:~:text=The%20Navy%20is%20currently%20struggling,skilled%20workers%20at%20those%20shipyards.
ReplyDelete"The Navy wants to order more ships than it has in decades. But with aging shipyards and program delays, is that realistic? "
"Nearly every major program, including Virginia-class submarines and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, is now years behind schedule. The reasons include a lack of shipyards with enough space to facilitate the Navy’s requests and a shortage of skilled workers at those shipyards. "
But even with nearly a billion dollars set aside to modernize its shipyards, the Navy faces a steep climb. Aging dry docks, outdated layouts, and workforce shortages are not problems that can be fixed quickly, these are issues that will take years to sort out. "
I read that a number of subs & surface ships in for refits/repairs are taking time to implement. ( My source indicated that public documents on the mattter of the number of ships in dock for repairs & refits is a fair number ! ). You covered this some time ago & it is egregious that navy leadership did not address this problem a decade or so !
( My source indicated that public documents on the mattter of the number of ships in dock for repairs & refits is a fair number ! ). Meant to say that a different source stated that public documents are scarce on the ships & subs sidelined due to refits,repairs..... but this source stated that the #s are too many ! PB
Delete"public documents are scarce on the ships & subs sidelined due to refits, repairs"
DeleteI've read regular, though not frequent, reports on the repair/refit/overhaul backlog of the Navy. The figures are stunning. Seemingly half the Navy is waiting on maintenance availability! Unfortunately, I read hundreds of reports and I can't recall the exact title or publishing organization to give you a quick reference. If I recall it, I'll add a link to this thread.
With a 7000 mile Trident D5 range (yea, reduced payload), couldn't the aging Ohio class ships sit 10 miles off the USA coast puttering around slowly saving their reactors while providing coverage of Sino assets and thus satisfying strategic deterrence...all the while, negating the need for immediate replacement?
ReplyDeleteThere's more to it than just reactors. For example, submarines are subject to lifetime dive limits due to the flexing of the structure. That said, it would certainly provide at least a stopgap bridge to the Columbia.
DeleteThe Soviet Union had the concept of SSBN bastions. Perhaps the US could establish bastions somewhere? Not sure where.
RE: the Ohio's in very safe waters
DeleteMy understanding is that the fatigue is related to depth of dives. If the ships stay in safe waters (as the commenter suggested), could they possibly be used longer if restricted to shallower depths? Or perhaps to only go deep very rarely in a true emergency?
I've been thinking about this kind of thing for a while. More specifically the SSGNs... taking them out of use, and putting them in a "very ready" reserve, and keeping them rather indefinitely, saving their remaining life (dives, reactor life, whatever) for major war use only. And bastioning the SSBNs in order to lengthen the time they have left is an excellent idea that we should likely implement immediately, since we have no real idea when the Columbia's will be actually deployable.
DeleteThe US and Russia are truly a perfect pair of rivals.
ReplyDeleteOne builds new weapons, which become increasingly expensive and poorly made.
The other repairs old equipment, which becomes increasingly worn out and never gets finished.
"China runs"
DeleteComment deleted. This is not a China cheering site using unsubstantiated claims. Getting tired of this. Fair warning.
"pair"
DeleteI don't mind an occasional rant if it makes you feel better. Having unburdened yourself, do you now have something substantive to offer?
Rear Adm. Kevin Smith in charge of frigates and unmanned programs, previously as Capt. was PMO for Constellation was fired end of May by Dr. Brett Seidle, the new acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition. Seidle reported to Congress early June on Constellation saying ship design was now 83% complete. Now whether Smith was fired for his total incompetance in management of Constellation over the years or other reasons is unknown, but may be reasons to hope.
ReplyDeleteFincantieri is suing the Navy via five requests for equitable adjustment, used when claiming for government modification of the contract, cause an increase in contract performance costs, relating to government change orders and significant design changes from the Constellation parent ship design. The Navy is refusing to disclose the amount of the five claims (on contract signature Constellation went from 85% commonality with the IT FREMM to less than 15%).
This is extremely depressing. It seems like we cannot do anything right. We can barely build any ships or weapons. We’re struggling to build a frigate, and it’s not even very good. Even torpedoes are giving us challenges. And $125 million unit cost for an F-15EX?
ReplyDeleteIt seems that if we ever get a program to work out, we should just keep producing that ship or weapon until a successor exists, all the bugs are worked out, and it can be produced in reasonable numbers. Not always ideal I know, but it seems better than not being able to produce much of anything.
Does it make sense continuing to have private defense contractors, or to just nationalize them at this point? Weapon systems are different these days, but the de facto nationalization of defense contractors during World War 2 seemed to have been remarkably efficient.
DeleteNo way. If anything, WW2 production was more competitive than now. How? Because the government was buying from multiple sources. Liberty ships were built by multiple shipyards with multiple owners and supplied by many different supply chains.
DeleteThe problem now (partially stemming from The Last Supper) is that everything effectively has been nationalized already, except the profits. But formally nationalizing the industry won't improve efficiency because it won't introduce any competition or eliminate the (many) single points of failure across defense (and especially naval) production.
"It seems that if we ever get a program to work out, we should just keep producing that ship or weapon"
DeleteNo. That's just a formula for mediocrity and eventual obsolescence as is happening with the Burkes. The correct approach is to ruthlessly fire the incompetent people and go find some good ones. Somewhere in the entire country, uniformed or civilian, are people who can run a ship or weapon program properly.
"have private defense contractors, or to just nationalize them"
DeleteWhat nationalized government organization (Post Office, VA, IRS, etc.) is working well? Why would you even momentarily imagine that a nationalized defense contractor would work any better than any govt org we have now?
The reason the WWII mode worked is that the govt DIDN'T take over the private industries. They redirected their outputs but they left the management alone.
"If anything, WW2 production was more competitive than now."
DeleteNice comment!
"GAO reports the unit cost for the four Ford class carriers as $16.3B. Yikes!"
ReplyDeleteFor the price of a Ford you could do a pretty nice update on all four Iowa class ships and add that capability to the fleet.
Just sayin'.....
Lutefisk
That'd make Ryan really sad...
Delete( if you dont know, New Jerseys museum curator is Ryan Syzmanski. He does YT videos regularly about the ship on the "Batyleship New Jersey" channel. I highly recommend it for anyone who loves WWII history, battleships, etc, and can totally nerd out about ship designs and details). Sadly I don't think we could man the ships- certainly not the engineering depts. I think the knowledge base has aged out. Plus, I really cringe to think what the Navy might do to them!!
'Battleship New Jersey' on youtube...great content!
DeleteHere is my plan for bringing back the Iowa class:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sFajU_No1mhof6Jn-bZX3-AZV4I3WRUu/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=103353243479675170382&rtpof=true&sd=true
CNO gave me some good feedback in the comment sections of the thread linked below. I haven't had time to incorporate them yet (real life and all).
I also picked up Norman Friedman's book about US Battleship development which I am picking at slowly, but is chocked full of information.
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2025/04/where-did-i-leave-that-plane.html
Let me know what you think if you have time.
Lutefisk
"Here is my plan for bringing back the Iowa class:"
DeleteI read through it. Lotsa work!
I think to replace the propulsion would be an incredibly massive undertaking. Not so hard to cut up the old systems and remove in smaller pieces. But with a 6" bomb deck, and even the funnels having perforated armor within, you have to do a lot of cutting and removing to get those GTs in there! As far as that goes, the amount of old machinery that'd need "skylights" to remove and replace would be pretty high. And a lot of the superstructure would have to change amidships, basically rebuilding everything between the fore and aft fire control tower down to the 01 level, probably having to remove both funnels and move/recreate new ones entirely to get enough intake volume and make everything fit in the right place. Huge job.The old 5"38s should all go, as you suggested. I'm torn between the idea of replacing with 5"54s, or 76mms. Using 155s for ammo commonality is a nice thought, but getting a navalized model would take time n money, so I'd go off the shelf, and focus the secondaries on closer-in engagements. I wonder how hard it would be to create a new twin 5"54 mount(??) Then two per side would give decent firepower, and still leave amidships room for some VLS, intake/exhaust plumbing, and lots of CIWS/SeaRam. And while the overpressure from the big guns is certainly a concern, I wonder if CIWS couldn't be mounted atop turrets 2 and 3... somewhat like when there were originally 20 or 40mm there.
This is such a fun rabbit hole. I can't believe I let you pull me in LOL!! (And apologies for getting further off track CNO. It's just almost impossible to ignore anything BB related LOL)
I work at the Iowa museum. Reactivating the Iowas is a romantic ideal, but it'd be a modern day Don Quixote. The ships are 80 years old at this point. They've been sitting in salt water for 80 years. Trying to do a deep modernisation would involve massive invasive surgery that's just not worth it, compared to building new, purpose built ships for a specific purpose.
DeleteWe brought the Iowas back in service in the Cold War because they were big enough to mouth 32 Armored Box Launchers and 16 Harpoon missiles. But now we have VLS, so you don't need the Iowa for that. The VLS Spruances could bring 64 Tomahawks to the table. As designed, the Constellation can equal the Iowa's missile throw weight with 16 mounted NSMs and 48 VLS cells.
Note that all of the above is in the context of an antiship missile thrower in an ASuW fight where missiles are being launched beyond the radar horizon. The guns would be useful weapons for naval gunfire, and would seriously hurt any warship in a gun duel, but that would require quite specific circumstances to occur.
Also, I prefer not to have my eggs all in one basket. As much as I adore the Iowa, I will always hold an affection for cruisers. I think it was a missed opportunity that we didn't continue development of the 8" gun, which would have afforded us better range and payload over existing 5".
DeleteIt's a pity the Zumwalts failed so spectacularly, because as originally conceptualised, they really were the closest thing we had to a new, modern Iowa, with long range guns for fire support and a large missile battery.
Did anyone have any thoughts on the crewing model that I am suggesting here, or did nobody make it to those last pages ;) ?
DeleteLutefisk
Agree with all the above - if we really wanted a new battlewagon better to dust off the old blueprints for the Montana Class.
DeleteI'm just saying, given the stated CONOPS in Lutefisk's link is for land attack, primarily with cruise missiles, we can do that much more simply and cheaply with a Spruance refresh rather than reactivating the Iowas. The Spruances had 64 missile cells, afterall. Hell, if we _really_ wanted pure missile throwers, we can do that with basic Burke hulls at 96 cells, and since we don't expect these ships to do AAW or ASW, we can get cost savings from deleting SPY-1 and AMDR, and get a smaller superstructure.
Delete"...land attack, primarily with cruise missiles..."
ReplyDeleteI'll need to look at how I wrote that.
My intention is that the primary purpose is land attack with the big naval artillery...something that we can't currently do.
The ability to bring large amounts of explosive down on coastal targets with persistence and without depleting precious missile inventories is the intent.
The tomahawks are just a happy additional capability that I feel dovetails nicely with the primary mission.
Lutefisk
"primary purpose is land attack with the big naval artillery...
DeleteThe tomahawks are just a happy additional capability that I feel dovetails nicely with the primary mission."
Be careful not to fall prey to the 'do-everything' mindset that afflicts current naval ship designers. Bombardment and cruise missile strike are two different tasks/missions. Any Burke, with 96 VLS cells can perform the cruise missile strike mission much better than a battleship with some add-on VLS. That's why we have escorts - so that one ship doesn't have to try to do everything by itself. Leaving the cruise missile strike with the escorts (or, the perfect use for an accompanying arsenal ship?) saves weight, internal volume, stability, possible deck armor penetrations, crew, engine power (lighter ship), etc. for the battleship. Let the BB do what BBs are good at: short range devastation.
Just something to think about.
"Let the BB do what BBs are good at: short range devastation."
DeleteThat's really what they would be for.
But one of the legitimate criticisms of the battleships is the limited range of their guns.
They can reach out about 24 miles at their max range. Considering that they are off the coast, that limits their maximum range to about 20 or so miles inland.
It is important to keep in mind that there are A LOT of valuable targets within 20 miles of the world's oceans.
But it would still be nice to be able to reach out and touch high value targets farther inland; things like runways, fuel storage, command and control sites, electrical generation, ammo dumps, bridges, dams, etc.
The most readily available way to do that would be to use an 8" shell as a sub-caliber round. The 8" shell is not as devastating as a 16" shell, but still packs an enormous wallop.
And considering that the 16" gun has more than double the megajoules of the eight inch shell, and the 8" has substantially reduced drag, it would not be insane to anticipate a doubling of range out to maybe 50 miles.
And for very high value targets it might be worth using a RAP sub-caliber 8" round with GPS guidance. That might see ranges of 75-100 miles.
Lutefisk
The idea for using Tomahawk cruise missiles is that is what the navy seems to use.
DeleteBut for what I want the battleships for, CNO is right that you don't need a 1500 miles cruise missile.
And adding the VLS to accommodate the cruise missiles is problematic. The first option would be to place the VLS above the armor deck, which would require armoring the VLS assembly. This would raise the center of gravity of the ship, especially after removing the heavy boilers and replacing them with gas turbines.
The second option would be to penetrate the deck, placing the VLS tubes below deck level. This is good for stability but introduces enormous amounts of potential explosive inside the armored citadel.
As an Anon poster said in the previous thread's comments, you don't want to be the HMS Hood.
There is a possible solution, and that would be to adapt the ATACMS used in the HIMARS system for naval use.
The ATACMS has a range up to 186 miles, and the new Precision Strike Missile is expected to range out to 310 miles.
The problem would be finding space on the deck.
There is only about 40' between the funnels, which would accommodate 4 to 5 launchers.
Maybe if you could stack them two high and have two rows of them you could achieve reasonable firepower.
Reloading would seem to be problematic.
High proficiency army crews can supposedly do this in about 5 minutes, but that is on the ground. It would likely be a good deal more challenging in the cramped confines between the funnels on a rolling ship's deck.
The fantail could be a possibility, especially since the launchers would be armored anyway.
Really interesting possibilities.
Would love to see some smart people in the navy be given this job to update these ships.
Lutefisk
I just remeasured the distance between the funnels and I was a little bit off.
DeleteIt looks like it is about 60', which would give 50% more space, making this more reasonable.
(It would be really nice to have this in a CAD program to measure all of these spaces.)
Lutefisk
"But it would still be nice to be able to reach out and touch high value targets farther inland"
DeleteRespectfully ... NO! That's the one-platform-does-everything approach, again. If we've already taken care of all worthwhile targets within 20 miles then we own the land, for practical purposes, and we can turn deeper strike over to Army artillery and Air Force strike.
"use an 8" shell as a sub-caliber round"
DeleteRespectfully ... NO! Every sub-caliber round for the 16" guns is one less full 16" round from an already quite limited magazine of around 120 rds per gun. Not worth the trade off!
Let BBs do what they do best and let the Army and AF do what they do best.
"And for very high value targets it might be worth using a RAP sub-caliber 8" round with GPS guidance."
DeleteRespectfully ... NO! Very high value targets justify the use of cruise missiles with their thousand pound warheads not some sub-caliber round that, again, takes away from the BBs main magazine capacity.
"ATACMS ... The problem would be finding space on the deck."
DeleteNo, the problem is that would necessitate deck penetration for the magazine and reload mechanism which, again, weakens the overall armor scheme. Of course, you could have no reload but what would be the point of just two rounds (MLRS carries two ATACMS per launcher)?
"If we've already taken care of all worthwhile targets within 20 miles then we own the land, for practical purposes, and we can turn deeper strike over to Army artillery and Air Force strike."
DeleteYes and no. The problem with this is that modern artillery guns on the global market can easily do 31 miles, which means that they can be sited outside of that 20 mile radius that our notional battleships can devastate. We can devastate the beach and its immediate defenses, but the enemy still has fires that can engage the beach to disrupt the landing and unloading. Yes, we are doctrinally supposed to be able to surge forces up past the beach to move forward, but the enemy has a vote. The Army's fires assets still need to get off the transports, onto the beach, and off the beach, all while being vulnerable and under fire. Yes, the air force doctrinally has promised that they can by flying artillery, but as OP Allied Force showed, the Air Force can also be suppressed by air defenses. Even if the strike fighters aren't outright killed by the SAMs, that doesn't matter: the SAMs just need to keep the strike fighters away long enough that they can't provide CAS or airstrikes in support of the ground force, allowing the enemy ground forces to counterattack and defend freely.
AirLand Battle in the Cold War called for the Air Force to be able of conducting Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction in a contested non-permissive battlefield, but the current Air Force is a fraction of its Cold War strength.
The Air Force's greatest strength is that it can bring more fighters to the playpen than the Navy can, but conversely, it also has significantly more limited basing requirements than the Navy. Air Force strike fighters are unlikely to be able to contribute much to a fight in and around the Spratlys or the first island change, due to their range issues.
That said, it's worth noting that improvements to shell design and propellants have allowed us to extend the range of full caliber projectiles. Modern 6" guns (155mm) now shoot out to 50 km/31 miles, exceeding the 24 mile range of the Iowa's 16" guns. That's a 69.5% increase in range over WW2 6" guns, purely from improved propellants and aerodynamic design for FULL CALIBER projectiles.
So back of the napkin math suggests that with modern propellants and shell designs, we can make 8" guns that can be able to fire out to 42 miles. Not only does this give us more options in terms of our attack range, but it's a lot easier to build a large destroyer to carry 8" guns rather than a battleship to carry 16" guns. A somewhat larger Spruance could carry two 8" guns in the aft and foredeck mount, while also having the space to carry a VLS for land attack missiles, and it should still have the deck space amidships or aft to carry containerised antiship missiles. A reinforced flight deck (no hangar, this isn't an ASW ship!) would allow space for a good number of container ASCMs to be mounted as per mission requirements, giving this ship a useful secondary mission capability that complements its main land attack mission (particularly given the NSM missile has a secondary land attack mode).
...of course, these same improvements could also be appled to battleships. It should not be inconceivable that improved aerodynamics and propellants let us fire full bore shells out past 40 miles.
I'm thinking through how these ships would be used as I am digesting all the feedback and considering what armaments would be best.
DeleteI can totally see the wisdom of eliminating the cruise missile or ATACMS capability as a form of mission creep.
It would also substantially uncomplicate the process of updating these ships and comparably bring down the cost.
I'm not sold, however, on the elimination of the 8" sub-caliber round.
The value of that is the extended range.
Let me give the scenario that is in my head about this:
These ships would have important roles to play during a peer war. But they would also be invaluable in less than peer war operations.
One of the extremely valuable characteristics of these ships is their intimidation factor. If you want to hold the attention of a potential adversary, the battleship sitting off the coast is near the summit of intimidation.
But that intimidation only extends 20 miles inland.
The potential to reach further inland keeps the other guy from getting too comfortable.
This capability comes without needing to make any structural changes to the ship, and through using technology that should be well understood and fairly easily implemented.
Ammunition loadouts would, of course, be tailored to the mission.
But a standard per-gun load might look something like this (assuming 120 rounds per gun):
- 85 high capacity HE
- 15 super heavy AP
- 10 DPICM submunition
- 2 copperhead laser guided
- 8 sub-caliber rounds of 8"
- 2 sub-caliber rounds of 8" with RAP and GPS guidance
These are niche munitions that extend the reach and capabilities without paying a substantial opportunity cost.
Lutefisk
" they can be sited outside of that 20 mile radius that our notional battleships can devastate."
DeleteI'll repeat, since you seem to be ignoring it, if we can devastate the 20 mile radius then we own the beach and can, with relative safety, move our fires onto and off the beach. If we're trying an assault that's out of range of the Air Force and can't be sufficiently covered by carrier air, then we have no business conducting the assault. So, assuming we 20 mile devastation and local air superiority, the assault IS a success and the occasional enemy artillery shot is just an annoyance, not a serious threat.
"extend the range of full caliber projectiles."
Hey, if we can extend the range of full size projectiles then, by all means, let's do it.
"The potential to reach further inland keeps the other guy from getting too comfortable."
DeleteThis is a never-ending proposition. If you extend the range to, say, 31 miles then what about the enemy who stands 32 miles in? If you extend the range to, say, 40 miles, then what about the enemy who stands 41 miles in? And so on. Leave the BB where it is range-wise and let the Army or Air Force deal with the deeper strike/interdiction. That's why we have an Army and AF. The AF, in particular, can handle ANY range so that eliminates the question about the enemy who stands one mile further in than the ship's guns can reach. Why must the BB fight the entire war by itself. We pay AF pilots to let's get some work out of them once in awhile!
Consider the cost aspect. Why embark on a gazillion dollar effort to develop a bunch of new sub-caliber munitions when the AF can already strike ANY range with no further investment? I'd rather put the munition development money towards something the Navy really needs (and the list of needs is very long!).
The widespread obsession with making every platform do every military task is foolish, duplicative, and unaffordable. I'm dedicated to stamping out that mindset!
If, for unfathomable reasons, one were absolutely wedded to the idea of a 8" extend range rounds for a BB, a more logical approach would be to make all or part of the secondary battery 8" guns like the Mk71. If we could fit those on a Spruance we could certainly fit 2-4 on a BB and the, perhaps, an additional 2-4 5" guns. I'm not advocating this; I'm just suggesting that this would be slightly less bad than sub-caliber 16" rounds.
I agree wholeheartedly in your approach there. That is the ultimate use for a battleship and there is no need for extended range.
DeleteAs you said, let the battleship do what it does best.
Within that peer war mission I could see the use for HE, AP, DPICM and copperhead.
The 8" sub-caliber rounds would be for less than peer war.
The scenarios might be like the Houthis. Most of their stuff is more than 20 miles from the coast.
It would be nice to be able to strike at them with the battleship instead of needing to call in airstrikes.
Or maybe some irritating despot is doing operations in Syria. You can reach out and touch his operations, again without risking an aircrew.
But these are niche missions as part of a non-peer war activity.
The important jobs that the Iowa battleships would do are the ones that you are describing.
Lutefisk
CNO, what would your arsenal ship look like? Presumably it would not be identical to the original concept.
DeleteFWIW, I think if the fleet includes battleships, the arsenal ship wouldn't need the failed 155 mm Advanced Gun System (AGS) or even a 5-inch gun. The arsenal ship wouldn't get as close to an enemy shore as a battleship. It might never get within gun range.
This blog has warned against putting too many missiles aboard one ship. If you lose your ship, you lose a lot of missiles. Perhaps the arsenal ship should have four or five 32-cell VLS modules. That would provide a lot of Tomahawks and free up cells in other ships for air defense, ASW and ASuW. There is room for discussion on the appropriate number of arsenal ship VLS modules.
An arsenal ship would not be used for carrier escort, so it shouldn't need a top speed approaching 30 knots.
An arsenal ship probably wouldn't have a big superstructure and thus, it should have a low profile compared to other warships. But the enemy might consider an arsenal ship a prime target. The arsenal ship could have four each of Vulcan Phalanx Gatling guns and SeaRAM launchers in case enemy missiles get past the AAW escorts. If there is s submarine threat ASW destroyers and/or frigates would be assigned to provide protection.
You realize what you're describing and justifying, right? You're not making the case for a BB with specialized, sub-caliber rounds ... you're making the case for an ordinary, run of the mill, gun cruiser whose STANDARD armament is 8" guns!
DeleteAgain, we try to make every platform do everything instead of letting a BB be a BB and, if we need it, let's acquire a cruiser and let the cruiser be a cruiser. There's a reason why our WWII fathers produced a variety of different ship types. We've abandoned that wisdom to our great detriment and, instead of wisely reproducing that wisdom and approach, we keep trying to cram every function into one platform.
"what would your arsenal ship look like?"
Delete?? I'm not in favor of an arsenal ship. Too much risk and cost for too little capability.
If I want to cram 150 or so VLS cells into a single ship, it'll be a SSGN not an arsenal ship.
"...you're making the case for an ordinary, run of the mill, gun cruiser whose STANDARD armament is 8" guns!"
DeleteMaybe I don't understand the physics involved here.
What I'm thinking about is the idea from the 80's where they extended the 16" guns' range by putting an 11 inch projectile in a sub-caliber round.
I'm working from memory though. I can't access Navweaps at the moment so I can't check it.
Wouldn't an 8" round fired from the 16" gun have longer range?
As I said, maybe I don't understand the physics at work with this.
Lutefisk
"If we're trying an assault that's out of range of the Air Force and can't be sufficiently covered by carrier air, then we have no business conducting the assault."
DeleteThis is a valid statement which has also ruled out any potential combat landing operations within Southeast Asia or the First Island Chain. In order to maintain local air superiority, the Air Force needs to be based one country over, so that its strike fighters have sufficient range to hit the target, and so that the pilot doesn't run out of endurance (as you've noted before, the limiting factor is the pilot's endurance). We have no good options for basing in Asia because every single country east of the Andamans has been courted by China and is highly unlikely to support us in any fight with the Chinese. Our bases in Guam, Saipan, Japan and Korea are too far away for strikefighters to participate in combat operations around SEA, the spratlys, Taiwan, or the first island chain.
The elephant in the room is that amphibious assaults stopped being viable against a peer opponent after WW2. Every successful amphibious operation since then has been a case of punching down at a weaker opponent.
"Leaving the cruise missile strike with the escorts (or, the perfect use for an accompanying arsenal ship?)"
DeleteThat is the statement that got me thinking. That's all.
"ruled out any potential combat landing operations"
DeleteNot at all! We did not have land based air for many/any of the Pacific island assaults. We used carrier air. If we had full size air wings (90+ aircraft) we'd have sufficient air power to establish local air superiority. Also, in WWII the battleships and cruisers that provided fire support took care of what we now think aircraft will do. What rules out amphibious assaults, today, is not the lack of aircraft but the lack of large caliber naval gun support.
"Every successful amphibious operation since then has been a case of punching down at a weaker opponent."
That's what an amphibious assault is! You create the LOCAL conditions that give you air, land, and sea superiority for the duration of the assault. If you can't create those conditions, you don't do the assault. Every assault in WWII succeeded because we were able to create local superiority.
""Leaving the cruise missile strike with the escorts (or, the perfect use for an accompanying arsenal ship?)"
DeleteThat is the statement that got me thinking. That's all."
If one was insistent on having arsenal ships, that might be the best possible use case. I'd still not want them, preferring SSGNs. Same function, different platform.
"The elephant in the room is that amphibious assaults stopped being viable against a peer opponent after WW2. Every successful amphibious operation since then has been a case of punching down at a weaker opponent."
DeleteI can't think of when an amphibious assault has ever been done against a peer enemy.
Lutefisk
"I can't think of when an amphibious assault has ever been done against a peer enemy."
DeleteI would consider Normandy, Guadalcanal, and all the Pacific island assaults to have been against peer enemies!
In the larger sense I agree.
DeleteBut in all of those we had air and sea dominance and were fighting dug-in infantry in prepared positions backed by arty and mortars.
Lutefisk
In the larger sense I agree.
DeleteBut in all of those we had air and sea dominance and were fighting dug-in infantry in prepared positions backed by arty and mortars.
Lutefisk
Taking Normandy, for example, we were fighting an enemy that had quite handily conquered all of Europe. If that doesn't qualify as a peer enemy, I don't know what does. The fact that we were able to build up a sufficiently large assault force over a period of years to [barely] secure the landing or that Germany made strategic mistakes doesn't negate their peer status. Ditto for Japan.
Delete'Peer' doesn't mean you have to only fight an enemy if you give them an even chance. In fact, if you find yourself in an even fight then you did a poor job of planning.
Germany and Japan were certainly peer opponents. That each made horrifically bad strategic mistakes leading to their eventual downfall doesn't make them less of a peer. It just makes them incompetent peers. For example, suppose Hitler had not attacked Russia. That would certainly have made our assault on Fortress Europe much harder.
I understand what you're saying and you're right. They were absolutely peer enemies in the larger sense. It took everything that we and our allies had to beat them. They had comparable air forces, navies, and armies.
DeleteBut locally they weren't peers.
In Normandy the Luftwaffe put up, if I recall correctly, two planes over the beach.
The U-boats weren't present, the superb German battleships didn't appear, even the panzers of the Wermacht were AWOL.
Of course, none of those things were there because we made it so.
In modern combat, it's also not possible to make an amphibious landing against modern weapons...if the enemy is able to bring them all to bear.
It is imperative to keep the enemy from bringing all of those deadly weapons to the fight, just like we did in every other amphibious landing that I'm aware of.
Please don't be offended, I enjoy this blog and greatly respect your opinions and analysis, I don't really want to argue about something that we fundamentally agree on.
Lutefisk
"Please don't be offended"
DeleteNo worries. I'm not that delicate!
"Of course, none of those things were there because we made it so."
THAT'S how you deal with a peer! You create the conditions that will give you temporary, local superiority to accomplish your assault or mission. It took us years to create the set of conditions necessary to give us a chance to succeed at Normandy and, even then, it was a close thing.
here's a question tho: what ARE the likely amphibious landing targets we'd go for in a war against China?
DeleteChina's island bases? we can service them with 5" guns due to how small they are. The Chinese mainland? That's not stacking the deck against us, that's just an overly elaborate suicide. An amphibious landing to reinforce Taiwan? same thing, we'd be landing at the beaches and exposing our ships to chinese fires.
The only potential reason for an amphibious landing I can see is delivering marines to reinforce Taiwan's defenders, approaching form the western side and using helicopters to transport infantry. Which 1) does not give us much transport thoroughput and 2) does not deliver supporting assets to those infantry.
I would rate our current amphibious force as enough to seize China's island bases, which IMO are the only valid target set for any amphibious landing operation.
I've stated repeatedly that I don't see any need for amphibious assault in any reasonable scenario.
DeleteChina's island bases are not suitable for assault because they're far too small and vulnerable to cruise/ballistic missiles. They're political tools not combat assets.
If there is no need for amphibious assault in any reasonable scenario, then there is likewise no need for naval gunfire support. Why all the wistful longing for short ranged battleships with obsolete guns then?
DeleteIf we have no need for amphibious assaults, then we have no need for naval gunfire, ergo we have no need for battleships.
Delete"Why all the wistful longing for short ranged battleships with obsolete guns then?"
DeleteYou're either new to the blog in which case you need to come up to speed on the many battleship discussions about roles and tasks or, if you're a longtime reader, you need to recall the many times we've posted the long list of tasks ideally suited for heavy naval gunfire.
Lutefisk, I made some comments for your battleship article here before realizing the post is several months old. I hope the information is helpful.
Deletehttps://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2025/04/where-did-i-leave-that-plane.html
As an aside, I've wondered about putting MLRS launchers on surface fire support ships. Today I think if we had something like CNO's independent cruiser, it could use its 8-inch guns to saturate an area quickly.
"MLRS launchers on surface fire support ships."
DeleteFor what purpose/mission? For example, if the purpose is suppression fire in support of an amphib assault, the old WWII rocket launchers on the LSM(R) (I did a post on them) offer an overwhelming pulse of fire far surpassing anything we have today and far more cost effectively. If, on the other hand, as another example, the purpose is deep strike then MLRS with ATACMS might be a viable choice but at only two rockets per full size launcher, it would be a very limited amount of firepower. And so on. As you ponder weapons for ships, it is vitally important to have a firm understanding of what the purpose is. Too many people are enamored of a particular weapon and just want to see it mounted on a ship - the MLRS being a good example of that.
So, what's the purpose/mission?
The idea was to hit a target multiple times, quickly. I concluded the 8-inch gun cruiser firing up to 60 rounds per minute was fully capable of that.
Delete"hit a target"
DeleteWell, that's as generic, non-specific, and uninformative as you can get! I'm not being mean or sarcastic, just trying to point out that you need actual specifics if you want to render an informed decision. For example, are you talking about fixed concrete buildings? Infantry in the open? Port facilities? How many? Over what period of time? For what reasons (suppression, destruction, etc.)? As can imagine, each of those requires different size/type of munition. Then there's the targeting issue ... do you have any or are you talking about area bombardment?
Answer those questions and you'll have a rock solid idea of what type of weapon you need, how many, and what type of platform they ought to be mounted on. This would also put you dangerously close to having a CONOPS!
ReplyDeleteI am a bit concerned about the total number of U.S. Navy ships in the next 15 years.
1. In 15 years, the five aircraft carriers from CVN-68 to CVN-72 will all be over 50 years old. Since the USS Ford (CVN-78) was commissioned in July 2017, the U.S. Navy has not commissioned any new aircraft carriers for eight years. The second ship, the USS Kennedy (CVN-77), has been delayed until 2027, meaning it takes approximately ten years to build a new aircraft carrier. If the U.S. Navy continues at this pace, it will lose four aircraft carriers over the next fifteen years. Currently, the third ship of the Ford class, the Enterprise, has already been delayed by 18 months before even being launched, which is even worse than the Kennedy at the time.
2. In 15 years, only the destroyers commissioned after DDG-110 will have less than 30 years of service. The ships that need to be retired include 11 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 60 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. If the U.S. Navy commissions one new destroyer per year, it will lose a net total of 56 guided-missile destroyers.
3. Fifteen years from now, the U.S. will have 18 Ohio-class, 38 Los Angeles-class, and 2 Seawolf-class submarines exceeding 40 years of service. If submarines are built at a rate of one per year, the U.S. will lose a net total of 43 nuclear submarines in fifteen years.
4. Regarding future ships, the Columbia-class has been delayed, the Virginia-class has been delayed, the DDGX project has been delayed, and the Constellation-class project has been delayed. From aircraft carriers to destroyers to submarines, the entire U.S. Navy cannot find a single project that can be completed on time.
The U.S. is racing down the path of Russia and India, which take a decade to build a single ship.
"concerned about the total number of U.S. Navy ships in the next 15 years."
DeleteNice analysis although objectively pessimistic. For example, you've postulated the lowest build rates even though our demonstrated build rates are somewhat higher. Still, your point is valid.
Have you examined the Navy's current 30-yr plan? It differs significantly from your scenario being decidedly optimistic. Reality will fall somewhere in between.
The biggest problem, as I see it, is the carriers. We're designing bigger carriers at the same time our air wings are shrinking. That's a logical disconnect which is costing time, money, and resources. At this rate, someday we'll have a billion ton, mile long carrier with a single airplane! We need to go back to Kitty Hawks.
"... if we really wanted a new battlewagon better to dust off the old blueprints for the Montana Class."
ReplyDeleteBy the time the navy got done with it there would probably be some problems with the design;
-the ABMs would interfere with the landing pattern for the F-35Bs landing amidships
-the single 16" gun would keep knocking the bow mounted sonar offline
-the ASW helicopter pad would be too small after accommodating the well deck for disembarking the MEU
-the UUVs launched from the aft underwater nacelles keep fouling the towed array and VDS
Lutefisk
I've done a couple of posts on the characteristics of a modern battleship.
ReplyDeleteModern Battleship v.2
Modern Battleship
The recent conflict with Yemen proved the value of battleships, which could move close to shore and ignore drones and anti-tank missiles that would just leave scratched paint. No multi-million dollar missiles needed. Might be a good guest post by someone here.
ReplyDeleteThe state of the Virginias is disappointing. I remember a time when they were being delivered a year ahead of schedule and a million dollars underbudget. Those days are long gone.
ReplyDeleteThe Virginias have always struggled with costs. For example, the famous '2 for 4 in 12' public relations push was an attempt to reduce the half a billion dollar cost overruns back down to the original $2B cost.
DeleteThe Navy has played accounting games to try to make the costs look better than they were/are.
Delivery times have definitely gotten worse.
"It is now clear"
ReplyDeleteComment deleted. This is not a conspiracy website. If you have definitive proof, which you don't, present it. Otherwise, we'll skip the conspiracies.
Your comments about the state of shipbuilding are a valid topic if you care to present any useful information.