Naval News website has some fascinating tidbits on the LCS. Let’s take a look.
More Studies. The LCS must lead the league in Admiral-chaired studies. The Navy regularly forms groups to study the LCS with results that accomplish … nothing useful. Changes are made but none are worthwhile. For example, one study group recommended changing from 3 crews for 2 ships to a Blue/Gold (2 crews per ship) scheme. Okay, one can debate the merits of each approach but, in the final analysis, the change accomplishes nothing. It doesn’t make the LCS better or more effective. It just changes the crewing construct. It’s just churn.
Unbelievably, the Navy has now formed yet another study group with the catchy name, LCS Strike Team, to analyze the maintenance, reliability, and lethality issues regarding these small warships.(1) Maybe this team will recommend switching up and forward to down and aft … you know, something meaningless.
The “LCS Strike Team” is also in charge of a few studies, such as a “2016 LCS Study” addressing LCS issues with the crew, maintenance, and training. This study is set to conclude soon while another study will address the lethality of the LCS. (1)
So, studies that study studies? Sounds productive.
Maintenance. This one is interesting. Everyone except the Navy has known from day one that eliminating a crew’s ability to conduct maintenance and repairs aboard ship was an idiotic decision. Maybe that will change …
RDML Casey Moton, USN, envisions giving more self-sufficiency to the LCS crews to make their own repairs and hopes to make quick progress addressing these maintenance issues. In addition, the U.S. Navy announced late last year that it would test Spearhead-Class EPF USNS Burlington as a maintenance and repair vessel for Littoral Combat Ships.(1)
Of course you want more maintenance and repair self-sufficiency onboard ship, Admiral. It should take all of ten seconds to come to that conclusion although it took you and the Navy a decade and a half. The problem is that you’ve painted yourself into a corner with the mandated design requirement of minimal manning. More onboard maintenance and repair means bigger crews, more parts storage, and fabrication shops and the LCS design has no more personnel berthing and hotel services capacity for additional crew and no room for shops unless you start cutting into module space and weight margins. Face it, you concocted a bad design and now the consequences are coming home to roost. There’s just not much that can be done to fix the LCS because the original design was so flawed.
The interesting aspect of this maintenance tidbit was the mention of a potential tender in the form of the Joint High Speed Vessel (now EPF in one of the Navy's ridiculous renaming ventures). The LCS has cried out for a tender from the start and this could make deployment of the LCS more viable (neglecting the inherent lack of LCS capabilities, of course). We should get rid of the LCS but, failing that, this would be a significant step forward in getting whatever use we can out of the LCS.
Mission. How many years in and the Navy still doesn’t know what mission(s) the LCS can perform???
Nonetheless, the Vice-Admiral did state that the U.S. Navy has to determine what missions the LCSs are suitable for to accomplish. (1)
This is what happens when you design and build without a CONOPS. A decade and a half into the class’ service life and you still don’t know what mission it can perform. Here’s a hint: it can’t perform any mission!
MCM. Mine Countermeasures was always an idiotic idea for the LCS. In the MCM role, the ship is far too large, far too expensive, has useless speed for the slowest task in the Navy, and has limited unmanned vehicle handling and storage capacity and the situation is made worse by the fact that none of the MCM components work.
Stunningly, none of those things are the worst problem with the LCS MCM concept. The worst thing is that even if everything worked perfectly, the concept is too slow to be useful. The Avenger minesweeper, which the LCS is trying to replace, is several times faster and it is too slow to be useful. We’ve documented in several posts the problems with the LCS MCM concept but now the Navy is finally, publicly, admitting it.
Compare the LCS to the MCM Avengers. If the Avenger acquires a mine via sonar, it can do a run to detonate the mine. With an LCS using unmanned systems, the LCS sends out the drone, gathers the data, analyzes it, and if questionable, sends out the drone again, do a different pattern to gather more data and then analyzes it again, and then send out a system to neutralize the mine. So, for an Avenger that can detect and destroy a mine in four hours, it might take the LCS an entire day and that is because the LCS cannot do a single sortie to detect and engage and relies on unmanned systems. So, it’s like comparing apples to oranges when you look at the LCS and the Avenger. But looking forward, I think that the LCS, when compared to the LCS itself, the LCS [of today] can clear [mines] faster [than an LCS five years ago with immature and untested MCM packages].” (1)
The LCS MCM process involves, at minimum, a three pass process to eliminate a single mine. You don’t have to be a MCM expert to understand why taking three passes at a mine takes longer than a single pass and why such a process would be absolutely useless in combat.
Conclusion
Well, there you have it. The Navy is finally catching up to where we’ve been since day one. Yes, it took the Navy a decade and half but they’re slowly realizing just how bad this ship is. While I applaud the Navy, ever so slightly, for trying to fix the problems and improve the class, the reality is that the original design is so badly flawed that no significant improvement is possible. Weight margins are gone, berthing is max’ed out, the ship’s structure is weak, stability (Freedom class) is an issue, and so on. There’s nothing to work with and no significant improvement is possible due to the inherent design flaws. Tragically, the only logical thing to do is retire the entire class and cut our losses.
Even more tragic is that the entire debacle could have been avoided if the Navy had listened to … well … absolutely anyone outside the Navy because absolutely everyone outside the Navy could see the problems with the LCS right from the start. The tragedy of the LCS was that it was entirely avoidable and that’s the real tragedy.
__________________________________
(1)Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Program”, Peter Ong, 4-Feb-2021,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-program/
"Nonetheless, the Vice-Admiral did state that the U.S. Navy has to determine what missions the LCSs are suitable for to accomplish."
ReplyDeleteTurn those things into Seamanship Training Ships or something similar.
At least they'll be useful by teaching folks how not to collide with huge cargo ships.
I love the "studies"... As if nobody knows the capabilities or lack thereof... Even someone totally clueless could go aboard for a day, asking questions about everything, and write a factual report about ship, sensor, and weapons range. Reveiw maintenance and failure logs. Listen to the crews pros and complaints. But at the end of the day, it'd be nothing we all don't already know...!!! That we have a perfect example of what NOT to do, and how NOT to do it. In any other organization, it would prompt mass firings and reorganizations. Anyone even remotely involved in producing this nightmare should find themselves unemployed. The fact that they are still being built, when their worthlessness is well known, is beyond comprehension!!!
ReplyDeleteLCS' problems are two folds:
ReplyDeleteFirst, strategic blunder! Scenarios behind LCS is they attack on nations without serious air power nor missile capabilities so a few LCS can approach their coasts. LCS themselves have very poor air/missile defense. You know, none of this kind nation now worth any US attack. Iran is not one as it does have certain air power and missiles although not very advanced.
Second, technology development failure! Many fancy stuff talked during R&D failed to materialize.
If China is the next war then how about using the LCS as missile boat destroyers? China has a lot of small missile boats and since China would be attacking with everything carrier aircraft would be fully engaged in air to air combat as would the Aegis ships in anti missile defence.
ReplyDeleteDestroyers started out as torpedo boat destroyers for the purpose of dealing with short range, high speed torpedo boats and China's Type 22 missile boat is the modern equivalent.
By WW2 destroyers had become to big and expensive to be used to deal with German E-boat's so the UK built motor gun boats carrying multiple 6 pounder (57mm), 2 pounder and 20mm Oerlikons to kill them.
Could the LCS with the naval strike missile and more guns do that job?
If an LCS can get through to pluck a type 22 so can an MH-60. I'd send MH-60s or even MQ-8s all day long if nothing is shielding their missile boat.
DeleteWouldn't the LCS Endurance and maintenance model directly excludes that? It probably can't even make it to the battlefield in current conditions. On the other hand, if we could see a missile boat, couldn't we just take them out with a tomahawk? Why even send out a ship for the Hassel?
DeleteLook 2020 national navy total service tonnage rank (% means % of the world):
DeleteNo. 1, China -- 139,360 (37.87%)
No. 2, USA -- 80.860 (21.95%)
No. 3, Russia -- 62,150 (16.89%)
No. 4, Japan -- 14,450 (3.93%)
No. 5, France -- 13,700 (3.72%)
No. 6, UK -- 11,400 (3.10%)
No. 7, Singapore -- 8,400 (2.28%)
No. 8, Egypt -- 7,905 (2.17%)
What does the first number represent?? Whats the source for this...? Im a bit sceptical of the numbers. While China outnumbers the US, I dont believe their tonnage is greater, and in fact believe it to be less. China has nothing close to 100k ton ships, and the US has nearly a dozen. So their having nearly twice the tonnage is unrealistic at best.
Delete"how about using the LCS as missile boat destroyers?"
DeleteThis would work only if the Chinese missile boats come outside the first island chain and that would seem to be unlikely. Their job, presumably, is to stay inside the chain and deter/attack US ships attempting to enter.
Inside the chain, China would enjoy superiority in surveillance and the situation would be turned around. China would likely see the LCS first and attack.
Also, the LCS would be operating 1000-2000 miles from any base which would give it only a few days on station, at best.
"I'd send MH-60s or even MQ-8s all day long if nothing is shielding their missile boat."
DeleteQuite right except that Chinese missile boats would be operating inside the first island chain which gives them extensive aerial and surveillance coverage. A US helo operating inside that chain would likely be quickly spotted and dispatched.
What would work, if the targeting issue could be overcome, is a long range anti-ship cruise missile (LRASM) launched from Hornets (or ships but that capability does not yet exist).
"Look 2020 national navy total service tonnage rank"
DeleteI don't recognize those numbers. Do you have a source?
I also don't recognize the units. Is it thousands of tons?
Anonymous, you posted a link that is not English so I've deleted it. If you'd like to post an English version or summarize some points from the link, feel free.
DeleteTo be fair, the graph had an English translation, but the numbers looked really suspicious.
DeleteUnless it's only about ships launched/commissioned in the year 2020, perhaps?
If we can make the propulsion system reliable can we get some use out of those boondoggles by attaching them to an ARG? The have modest mission bay, helo facilities and some limited self defense capability.
ReplyDeleteYou would need to tear out the whole gearbox and drive train first.
DeleteThe propulsion system is an example of the consequences of a quest for extreme performance with no CONOPS that justifies it.
DeleteThe LCS is the fastest minesweeper in the world, since mines are shifty little guys.
DeleteTHere's an argument for that speed, or even faster, since if your ESM detects an AShM's active seeker emissions before it crosses the radar horizon, speed gives you a change to escape the seeker cone's field of view: not much, perhaps, but still better than nothing. Being able to sustain travel at 40+ knots is also useful for being able to surge LCS deployed all over the pacific/Med on other tasks to arrive at the Strait of Hormuz and switch to MCM. An Avenger minsweeper cruises at 5 knots, afterall.
DeleteBut this is arguably one of those Good Idea fairy moments. There's an argument to be made for the 40 knots requirement, but it's not technically viable. It's telling that no other nation with green water corvettes has a 40 knot requirement, it's all being kept to more modest, achievable speeds in the 25-30 knot range.
"sustain travel at 40+ knots"
DeleteA few problems here. DOT&E tests have demonstrated that the LCS highest trial speed is on the order of 37 kts. One of the major failings of the LCS is that it has been unable to achieve the specified speed.
"sustain travel at 40+ knots is also useful for being able to surge LCS deployed all over the pacific/Med on other tasks to arrive at the Strait of Hormuz and switch to MCM."
This is operationally incorrect. DOT&E testing has shown that high speed cannot be sustained. Beyond that, sustained high speed would deplete fuel in a matter of hours and require a high speed tanker to be nearly continuously refueling the LCS!
"speed gives you a change to escape the seeker cone's field of view: not much, perhaps, but still better than nothing."
No, not really. From the horizon (say 15 miles), an incoming high subsonic missile would arrive in around 30 seconds. In 30 sec, a ship could travel around 1/4 mile at 40 kts or so and that's only if the ship was already at that speed to begin with. If the ship had to come up to speed, it would do well to cover a couple hundred yards.
No one has yet found a tactical use for the LCS speed requirement even setting aside the inability to actually meet the requirement.
@ComNavOps: I mean, all I'm saying is that if the concept worked, you can argue for uses for that speed - I'm looking at it purely from the angle of "assuming we can get up to this speed, what can we use this for?"
DeleteLike I said, it's telling that every other corvette operator has stuck to a more reasonable speed.
"No, not really. From the horizon (say 15 miles), an incoming high subsonic missile would arrive in around 30 seconds."
I think your assumptions are a little more pessimistic than mine, haha. I'll just show my assumptions and workings below:
- ESM picks up the active seeker emissions from the missile, before it crosses the radar horizon, giving LCS time to get to 40 knots.
- The YJ-83 missile travels at 690 miles per hour, or 0.19 miles per second, which means that crossing the horizon at 15 miles, it'll take 79 seconds to arrive on target (an LCS already at 40 knots would travel 1 mile in that time).
For the sake of this thought exercise, I'm asuming that:
- ESM picks out the seeker emissions when the missile is 30 miles out.
- The YJ-83 will impact in 157 seconds. 0.19 mps divide 30 miles = 157 seconds.
- LCS is at 15 knots cruise speed and immediately goes to flank. For the sake of abstracation i'm giving it an average speed of 25knots for this 157 second duration.
In that 157 seconds, the LCS will move 1.25 miles from the start point.
Like I said, it's not much, but it's better than nothing, and every bit of distance you can put between yourself and the missile helps with softkill measures (ECM, decoys).
Now, if you could go up to 50 knots, or 60, that speed gives you enough of an advantage over 60 tht you can do things... but like they say, if wishes were horses. Alas, we're bound by the rules of reality - this isn't Warship Gunner 2! :P
Delete"but it's better than nothing"
DeleteOnly in the isolated abstract. In reality, there's a penalty (opportunity cost) associated with everything. The LCS sacrificed much at the altar of speed to achieve 'better than nothing' according to you. By any reasonable assessment, the internal volume, complex combining gear, overly large engines, extra weight, and extra cost that went towards speed could have gone to other things that would have been much more useful.
Also, you recognize that your scenario is optimistic in the extreme. I'm unaware that the LCS has any ESM gear capable of OTH detections. You're also assuming literally instantaneous ship reaction. If, realistically, the sensor operator (assuming there was a sensor) sees a possible contact, spends some time confirming it, calls out a report to a supervisor who, in turn, asks for confirmation and then relays the report to the Captain who, likely, asks for confirmation and then assesses the situation for a while and … well … times up. It would be an incredibly well trained crew that could go from initial detection to action in less than a minute.
Your assumptions were also a little pessimistic in the other way - a flight time of 30 seconds to cross the radar horizon is Mach 2.4, definitely not high subsonic. ;D
DeleteAnyway, this was just a thought excercise. It's like economics as a discipline: I had an idea and did my workings with the math to see how far it could go (with all the assumptions and abstractions that are part and parcel of the discipline of economics). All in the name of being a constructive commentator.
I think at times it's worth taking a step back to see whether things can indeed give a benefit, and then seeing what it takes in order to get that benefit, and then we look at whether such a thing is technically feasible. The math helps us quantify this, and we can see how the figures change with the variables. (Of course, the math also makes it a lot clearer just how ridiculous the speed requirements are if you want to purely rely on speed as a defense.)
I don't actually disagree with you on the opportunity cost for LCS, but I'm just playing devil's advocate for a moment. As iron sharpens iron, so we test our ideas against each other, for the edification of all who read.
"Your assumptions were also a little pessimistic in the other way "
DeleteNo, they were ballparked and accounted for a degree of realism (see points below). Thus, the actual response time is from the horizon to the missile's detection range (again, see below) so, maybe, a travel distance of 5-10 miles(?).
I would point out a few other limitations to the scenario that render the speed issue even less effective and relevant.
-ESM generally provides a bearing and only a weak approximation of distance, if that. It does not provide course and speed, at least not initially. By tracking the signal over time, those can be derived but with only a minute or so to react, there just wouldn't be enough time. Unless the LCS is hair-trigger poised to sprint off every time a signal is momentarily detected, the time required to determine whether the signal is a real threat will consume all the evasion time and then some, most likely.
-The travel time of the incoming missile that is relevant is NOT the time to impact on the vessel but, rather, the time to the missile's detection range. For a missile seeker head that might be a mile (several miles???? I have no idea) which drastically shortens the reaction/action time even further. Once the seeker has detected the LCS, assuming it does, the missile will alter course to intercept and then the LCS speed is useless (37 kts versus 600-700 mph).
-Turing 90 degrees away from an incoming missile presents the broadside aspect of the evading ship which, presumably, offers the largest radar return. This might or might not be a wise tactical response to an attacking missile depending on weapons locations and various other factors.
Just from a google search.
ReplyDeleteThe world's largest navies by tonnage:
United States (3,415,893)
Russia (845,730)
China (708,886)
Japan (413,800)
United Kingdom (367,850)
France (319,195)
India (317,725)
South Korea (178,710)
More items...
Largest Navies In The World 2021 - World Population Reviewhttps://worldpopulationreview.com › country-rankings › l...
buy number of hulls
ReplyDeleteAt 300 warship hulls, the PLAN is the largest navy in the world, counting aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines, and amphibious assault ships. The U.S. Navy trails at 287 hulls, Russia has 83 hulls, the U.K. 75 hulls, and Australia at 48 hulls.May 20, 2019
If I recall, one of the concepts the LCS had was taking on Fast Attack Craft in a 'streetfight'. As the Battle of Bubiyan Island in Desert Storm showed, a well trained combination of helicopters and fixed wing can obliterate them.
ReplyDeleteDo a youtube search for: 'Desert Storm - The Annihilation of the Iraqi Navy at the Battle of Bubiyan' and get a great video.
"As the Battle of Bubiyan Island in Desert Storm showed, a well trained combination of helicopters and fixed wing can obliterate them."
DeleteI'm not exactly sure what point you're making but before you draw any great conclusions about the effectiveness of helos over small vessels (if that was your point?), you should recall that the battle was not a battle, it was target practice against mostly auxiliary vessels with almost no defensive capability, no combat ship support, and no aerial coverage. The 'battle' was just a live fire exercise against a defenseless, seventh rate navy with no support. I don't think there's any great conclusions to be drawn from that.
While the blog owner does have a certain blindspot towards things that are not Major Combat Operations, and while Bubiyan itself is not a good example because the ships attacked had no real way of threatening helicopters, this isn't to say that concepts we can take away from this.
DeleteThe theoretical argument here is that armed helicopters would provide a significant capability to LCS in the role of defeating fast attack craft. This is not an inherently wrong idea, because most fast attacks don't have SAMs, and while MANPADS are a legitimate threat against helicopters, getting off a shot from a wildly maneuvering Boghammer against a Seahawk, let alone a Cobra*, is a challenging proposition, especially now that modern helicopters are being fitted with IR jammers to deter heat seeking MANPADS, which are pretty much the only compact short range SAMs there are.
On the other hand, downtime is an issue. The helicopter can only fly for so long before it needs maintennance, which takes so many hours, so there is a chance that it may be down when you need it, in which case you're back to where you started.
(* There was some talk, years ago, of deploying USMC Cobras on LCS to give heavier punch for the anti-Boghammer role, but this seems to have gone nowhere, and it's arguably questionable if there's a point when Hellfires and APKWS (laser-guided Hydra 70 rockets) will hit just as hard from a Seahawk, Knighthawk or Cobra.)
It's interesting to look back at South Korea, which faced a similar consideration of North Korean fast attack craft entering South Korean warters and hovercraft racing from the sea onto shore to deploy North Korean commandos and saboteurs. The ROKN solution was to go to the PMKR patrol boat and use guided rockets, the rationale being that they didn't have a huge fleet of helicopters that could be turned into ghetto gunships, and so it was better to build their patrol boats to be able to counter this threat, because rockets don't get downlined for maintennance in quite the same way as helicopters.
There is, of course, the obvious caveat that this is a Korean solution for a Korean problem, but it's still interesting to see other ideas in the wild.
Correction: "This isn't to say that there are no concepts we cannot take away from this."
Delete@JMD, didn't the South Korean vessel get replaced with a more advanced version of itself a few years back? The choice seems to be fixated on a vessel with more firepower as that probably have worked well for them considering their experiences.
DeleteOddly enough, I do think that South Korea might benefit a lot from a helicopter. North Korea isn't actually the most amazing as AA defense and I suspect they lack the skills or the ability to even provide local AA support. A helicopter would quite literally go ham in this condition. On the other hand, this means that any conditions with even relatively competent light AA would prove to be devastating to our helicopters. In fact, this does sound a lot like a war with China. I hope we could build the upgraded PKMR if time comes.
"While the blog owner does have a certain blindspot towards things that are not Major Combat Operations,"
DeleteQuite the contrary. I've got a focus on the Navy's MAIN responsibility which is peer war. Any other scenarios are subsets of the main and can be handled. In contrast, the Navy is far too focused on low end / peacetime threats and has wound up with a force that is not optimized for peer war.
A peer war force structure can scale down when needed. A peacetime force cannot scale up.
"@JMD, didn't the South Korean vessel get replaced with a more advanced version of itself a few years back? The choice seems to be fixated on a vessel with more firepower as that probably have worked well for them considering their."
Delete@Ipnam9114: PKG and PMKR, which I've been talking about, *are* those more advanced boats. You're thinking of the Chamsuri-class PKM boats. The PKG boats are also called the Yoon Youngha class, named after the CO of PKM 357 who was KIA in the Battle of Yeongpyong, while the PMKR boats are also known as the Chamsuri-211 class, since they're named Chamsuri-211, Chamsuri-212, and so on - as opposed to the PKG boats, which are named after sailors.
"A peer war force structure can scale down when needed. A peacetime force cannot scale up."
DeleteI don't understand. This seems at odds with your previous opinion that there needs to be two forces, one for peer war and one for peacetime.
"I don't understand. This seems at odds with your previous opinion that there needs to be two forces, one for peer war and one for peacetime."
DeleteWe absolutely need a two tier force - one war and one peace. While the war force CAN scale down for run of the mill peacetime work, it's not an efficient use of their time and ship/aircraft service life. Let the peace fleet use up hours on pirate patrol or show-the-flag or training with third world navies or whatever and let the war fleet work on high end training and maintenance.
Regarding fast attack craft AA capabilities: remember that the whole "Blackhawk Down" situation was caused by RPGs, not even MANPADS.
DeleteAs for IR jamming, small helos can only carry so many flares and so many directional IR jammers. Shooting a flock of MANPADs at a helo from different directions is going to eventually bring down a helo.
And we absolutely need a two tier force. It's extremely silly to use F-35s to drop iron bombs or Hellfire missiles on small groups of insurgents. It's extremely silly to use Burke DDGs for "show the flag' exercises (which pulls them out of strategic position if nothing else).
DeleteIf the combatant commands think showing the flag and port visits are vital missions, then build ships to do that. It seems ridiculous that our CVNs are more heavily tasked at present than a decade ago despite the fact that we're not engaged in a major ground conflict at present, let alone in a conflict with a naval power.
@Jay Kay: I disagree with regard to your point on using F-35s to drop JDAMs on insurgents. Sure, it seems wasteful to use a 77.9 million dollar aicraft to drop a 25,000 dollar bomb on insurgents, but on the other hand, that 25,000 dollar smart bomb means one hit and then you go home. Gulf War Air Power Survey did a random sampling; 12 sorties with laser-guided bombs dropped 28 weapons and scored 26 hits; 12 sorties with iron bombs dropped 168 bombs and scored two hits. In order to get the same hit ratios, you'd need to fly another 144 sorties, which really eats up into your airframe life and spares and turnaround time... and I'm always going to come down on the side of the more accurate weapon, because I want my bomb to go right where I want it to. Circular error probable of 15 feet vs 500 feet.
DeleteThat said, I do agree that for COIN, in a permissive airspace, a lot of air to ground work can be done with LANTRIN and JDAM, you don't need fast movers for that, but I mean, the US already has a whole fleet of A-10s and F-16s and F-35s paid for, you might as well use them up - especially the older aircraft that you're going to have to replace anyway. Youngest USAF F-16 is pushing 30, average age of the F-15C fleet is pushing 40, ditto the A-10s, Strike Eagle fleet average age is about 25 years or so...
As for Blackhawk Down, while that's true, and Karbala '03 also shows us Apaches getting downed, it's worth noting that there are certain nuances. Mogadishu and Karbala were where helicopters were flying low, were operating in urban terrain, where people could duck out of doorways, shoot, and duck in back. It makes target identification and discrimination difficult, especially with ROE of varying restrictiveness. On part of the RPG gunners, they're firing at relatively close targets that they get to ambush, and they're on dry land, a solid, stable firing platform.
Meanwhile, out on a boat, it's a different matter. Target discrimination is a lot simpler because there's only so many boats you're engaged with, as opposed to flying over a city cluttered with buildings with an AK pointing out every window. RPGs are les viable because the boat itself is an unstable firing platform; it bobs and weaves and goes up and down and side to side from the water acting on the hull. Even with MANPADS, taking a shot from an unstabilised moving platform, against a moving target, is not an easy thing to pull off.
Anyhow, going back to the idea of using helicopters against small boats, it's not an inherently wrong idea, but it's something that's very execution dependant. Really depends on your doctrine and how you intend to execute said doctrine.
"Sure, it seems wasteful to use a 77.9 million dollar aicraft to drop a 25,000 dollar bomb on insurgents, but on the other hand, that 25,000 dollar smart bomb means one hit and then you go home."
DeleteThe issue, for me at least, is not the precision or number of bombs/sorties needed, it is the accumulation of service hours being racked up on front line aircraft doing seventh line missions. Each aircraft has a designed and specified number of flight hours after which it is retired. Using up those hours on humanitarian food delivery or plinking pickup trucks with suspected insurgents is a very foolish use of front line aircraft. THAT'S WHY WE NEED A TWO TIER FORCE.
We need the low end, Super Tucano-ish aircraft to go drop bombs on pickup trucks and save the flight hours on the F-18/35.
There's also the operating cost issue. The cost per flight hour for a F-18/35 is on the order of $40,000 per hour (I don't have exact numbers in front of me so don't bother jumping on me and saying it's a different number - the general magnitude is about right) versus a Tucan-ish type aircraft that has an operating cost of $1000 per hour or some such.
There's also maintenance. We need very highly skilled technicians to maintain and repair F-18/35 aircraft versus any semi-skilled mechanic with a wrench who can maintain a Tucano-ish aircraft (I mean no disrespect to Tucano-ish general mechanics - they've got skills I don't have!).
You need a supercarrier or high end, big deck amphib carrier to operate a F-18/35 which is stunningly expensive. A fleet of Tucano-ish aircraft could be operated from a WWII escort carrier which would be worlds cheaper.
And the list of reasons why we need a two tier force and why using an F-35 for low end missions is a bad idea goes on and on.
A two tier force is the solution to our overworked and undermaintained, undertrained current force.
The argument that I've seen against making a two tier force work is that pilots and maintainers don't grow on trees, and the low tier can't scale up to contribute in peer war. You're needing to maintain the necessary logistics and infrastructure for your peer war fighters and your COIN light attack aircraft, and there's only so many pilots a year that can be trained: you're limited by your training facilities and resources. Fuel still costs the same, salaries and benefits still cost the same. We can probably save somewhat on training the maintainers, but a squad of maintainers is still a squad of maintainers. I don't appreciably see much savings, if any, in pilots, because CAS and ground attack is a skill, and so they're going to be racking up as many hours on training.
DeleteThe other issue, to me, is that a low tier force can only do COIN, it can't meaningfully participate in major combat operations outside of permissive airspace. I'm reminded about efforts in the 80s for the Air Force to adopt light attack aircraft; the Air Force resisted these efforts by arguing that MANPAD proliferation from Soviet sponsors meant that these aircraft would be significantly more threatened than other aircraft (and a Super Tucano is mincemeat to the organic air defense assets the Soviets brought along with them). If we look back at Gulf War Air Power Survey, we see that A-10s, flying a low and slow profile, were the heaviest hit of all coalition aircraft, while F-16s flying a high and fast profile had a fraction of the hits and losses the A-10s suffered. Given Chinese activities in the rest of the world and how they've been acting, I think it's only a matter of time before they start making like the Soviets and sponsoring parties we oppose with more sophisticated arms.
We gave the Mujaheddin Stingers to use against Soviet Hinds in Afghanistan; it stands to reason the Chinese would do the same against US aircraft - if not outright supplying their clients with SHORAD assets. They're definitely eyeing Africa as a region of interest, for example.
"the low tier can't scale up to contribute in peer war."
DeleteTHEY'RE NOT SUPPOSED TO!!!!!!!!!!!! THAT'S WHY THEY'RE CALLED A PEACE FORCE. When war comes, they step aside. See, "War-Peace"
"pilots and maintainers don't grow on trees, ... and there's only so many pilots a year that can be trained: you're limited by your training facilities and resources. Fuel still costs the same, salaries and benefits still cost the same."
You're not grasping the concept, at all. We're not talking about maintaining a complete warfighting peace force of a million men and thousands of aircraft. By definition, a peace force would be EXTREMELY small and cheap. An aviation force of, perhaps, 50 Tucanos would be all that's required. A Tucano pilot can be trained in a fraction of the time and cost of a F-35 pilot since they'll ONLY be flying low threat scenarios using simplistic aircraft.
You mention fuel. Even if it costs the same, we'd use only a tiny fraction compared to a F-18/35 with fuel gulping jets and afterburners. It would be almost free by comparison. The same goes for spare parts. Maintainers would be similarly quick and easy to train.
" a Super Tucano is mincemeat to the organic air defense assets"
Again, you're not getting it. If there are air defenses, you use front line combat aircraft not peace force Tucanos. The Tucanos are for truck plinking and anti-terrorist work, not penetrating Russian and Chinese defenses. The vast majority of our F-18 truck plinking has been entirely unopposed. What a waste!
"You're not grasping the concept, at all. We're not talking about maintaining a complete warfighting peace force of a million men and thousands of aircraft. By definition, a peace force would be EXTREMELY small and cheap. An aviation force of, perhaps, 50 Tucanos would be all that's required. A Tucano pilot can be trained in a fraction of the time and cost of a F-35 pilot since they'll ONLY be flying low threat scenarios using simplistic aircraft."
DeleteI was actually thinking of the A-10 pilots in mind, not the F-35s. There's an argument that training an F-35 pilot is easier because of how automated all the functions are and PGM warfare is point and click, while an A-10 pilot still has to dive and do gun runs...
I disagree on the size though, I think 50 aircraft overall fleet is too small. That barely gets you one training squadron and 3 operational squadrons (assuming 12-aircraft Navy squadrons), and if you're following the 1:1:1 deployed/working up/refit cycle, that means we've only got one squadron available at any one time. Let's assume we need 30 aircraft in theater at any one time, that means we'd need 90 aircraft in operational squadrons and something like 12-24 aircraft in the training squadron, for a fleet size of 114 aircraft.
"Again, you're not getting it. If there are air defenses, you use front line combat aircraft not peace force Tucanos. The Tucanos are for truck plinking and anti-terrorist work, not penetrating Russian and Chinese defenses. The vast majority of our F-18 truck plinking has been entirely unopposed. What a waste!"
I think it's a mistake to continue to assume that truck plinking will continue to remain unopposed with Super Tucanos, or that SAMs won't show up in anti-terrorist work. The Houthis have already shot down two Predators with SA-6 systems supplied by Iran, and ISIS has been credited with 3 helicopter kills using Chinese MANPADS. The Wagner Group, operating a Pantsir system, shot down another Predator over Libya. We gave Stingers to the Muj to shoot down Soviet Hinds, so I fully expect China to be doing the same to stir the pot and destabilise the situation - if not outright giving their proxies serious SHORAD assets.
Six (6) A-10s were shot down by MANPADS in Desert Storm, and an A-10 is a much tougher bird than a Tucano.
https://www.patreon.com/blackpowderredearth/posts
Deletefor everyone reading the comments, not just yourself, I'd really suggest reading Hypernotes Scorch of Black Powder Red Earth. While it's a fictional setting bible for an upcoming graphic novel story, the ideas presented in Hypernotes Scorch with regard to Chinese activities are heavily based in reality, gleaned from significant research and consultation with active and former special forces soldiers deployed to the Middle East and North Africa. It's quite educational.
Admittedly there's a subscribtion cost, but for 5 USD you get acceess to all previous series of graphic novels, and the Hypernotes Ember and Hypernotes Scorch setting bibles. It's pretty educational.
The conflict depicted has the Chinese supporting the nation of Qasran as a client, and acting to destabilise the nation of Awbari, so that they can continue to exploit Awbari's natural resources. The Chinese supply arms via intermediaries to terrorist orgs based in Qasran, using them as proxies to attack and destabilise American-aligned Awbari, and provide early warning systems and air defense networks to Qasran in order to stymie Awbari attempts at cross border raids.
"I think it's a mistake to continue to assume that truck plinking will continue to remain unopposed"
DeleteIf SAMs (of whatever type) show up then you revert to front line aircraft. Thus far, during most of the Iran, Iraq, and Afg affairs, there has been little or no SAM activity once the initial combat phases passed. That's a LOT of routine plinking that could have been done by Tucano-ish aircraft.
"I was actually thinking of the A-10 pilots in mind, not the F-35s. There's an argument that training an F-35 pilot is easier because of how automated all the functions are and PGM warfare is point and click, while an A-10 pilot still has to dive and do gun runs... "
DeleteI feel like this is an underestimation to the extreme.
An A-10 or a Tucano-ish aircraft that CNO is proposing is designed to do one single thing:bomb terrorist back the to the face of the earth. Whether it may take a maneuver to learn to do so, it's something that Germany Stuka pilots learn in WW2. Aside from that, I assume based on previous conversations I have with him, he's likely thinking about a simplistic aircraft with incorporated modern design and benefits (The A-10 was introduced in 1977...) and as such will most likely easy to train, think the comparison in training between an F-15 Eagle and an A-10 in the 1980s.
"I think it's a mistake to continue to assume that truck plinking will continue to remain unopposed with Super Tucanos, or that SAMs won't show up in anti-terrorist work. The Houthis have already shot down two Predators with SA-6 systems supplied by Iran, and ISIS has been credited with 3 helicopter kills using Chinese MANPADS. The Wagner Group, operating a Pantsir system, shot down another Predator over Libya. We gave Stingers to the Muj to shoot down Soviet Hinds, so I fully expect China to be doing the same to stir the pot and destabilise the situation - if not outright giving their proxies serious SHORAD assets."
I believe it that while it will probably still plays a role, what's stopping us from supporting them with an EA-18G EW aircraft? If we are serious about protecting our aircraft, we likely could enhance its ability to stay alive almost as much as the current F-18. That's probably beyond enough for such aircraft in a limited opposed environment considering most shoot downs are against unmanned drones or low-level helicopters. Reading between the lines here, I am pretty sure that CNO is setting his mind on a new design with the same philosophy as a Super Tuscano. It might become an interim design until we get there but I assume the aircraft is not what he thinks we need.
Thanks for sharing your fictional stuff, it's fun to read about these :)
@ComNavOps:
Delete"If SAMs (of whatever type) show up then you revert to front line aircraft. Thus far, during most of the Iran, Iraq, and Afg affairs, there has been little or no SAM activity once the initial combat phases passed. That's a LOT of routine plinking that could have been done by Tucano-ish aircraft."
My point here is that essentially, we're confusing cause and effect. With frontline aircraft, the flight profile takes them out of the engagement envelope of MANPADS, which is why they're able to operate with impunity in Iraq and Afghanistan. Going to Tucanos means that the aircraft will be flying the same low and slow profile that A-10s used, and we know from historical combat records that A-10s are vulnerable in that flight regime.
Yes, we have not been seeing SAMs used en-masse by terrorists, but the Houthis have SA-6s, ISIS in Syria has MANPADS... I feel like this is a little complacent, assuming that the Chinese will not do to us what we did unto them.
At which point, if we're having to pull off the Tucanos and shift back to our frontline fighter, it starts begging the question of whether it was really worth it.
I just don't think it's prudent to assume that the Chinese are never going to arm their proxies the way we armed the Muj.
"I believe it that while it will probably still plays a role, what's stopping us from supporting them with an EA-18G EW aircraft?"
Delete@lpnam9114: An EA-18G does nothing against IR MANPADS like Stinger, Igla, Strela, Mistral- these are all heatseekers. There's nothing to jam because the operator points the tube at the target, waits for the lock tone, and pulls the trigger.
"Thanks for sharing your fictional stuff, it's fun to read about these :)"
Not mine, alas. All credit goes to Jon Chang, the series creator.
"With frontline aircraft, the flight profile takes them out of the engagement envelope of MANPADS,"
DeleteAs an example of a MANPAD, the Stinger has a vertical engagement ceiling of 3800 m, according to Wiki. The Super Tucano has a flight ceiling of 10,600 m, according to Wiki. We could fly Tucanos above the MANPADS, if we wish.
I would remind you of the endless stories of F-18 carrier aircraft plinking ISIS trucks, day after day. The F-18s would launch with one or two bombs, hit a pickup truck, and recover. They did that for months. It had almost no effect on ISIS but it used up lots of airframe hours. This entire task could have been done by a Tucano-ish aircraft.
There is also some debate about whether an IR missile can lock on a small prop plane. I have no idea but it's an interesting question.
The short of it is that there is no reason why we should be foolishly using entire carrier groups to plink trucks in low threat environments.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a35270362/navy-littoral-combat-ship-problems/
ReplyDeleteAt least they've stopped accepting damaged ships?
I have seen that news but it seems like it's already too small and too late of a step. It also signifies the fact that we are not willing to cancel the ship class over these critical errors, merely halting the launching in anticipation of resuming(not the actual building).
DeleteIf the Navy could have recognized the lack of CONOPS, we would just ripped out the current gear and replaced it with a more reliable and slower version.
Nothing really new to add by this stage, so I'm just going to repeat that a possible use is a quick response disaster relief ship for the caribbean region. Container hospitals placed inside, possibly also flight deck for Indy Class. They aren't really optimised for this, since they need cranes, and there's no sea level doors, but still.....
ReplyDeleteAndrew
Maybe sell em to the Red Cross then?? FEMA maybe?? Humanitarian missions really have no business being considered as an even remotely important task for a WARship... They exist to kill people and destroy things, not save them. If they are handy and in the right place during a disaster, fine, have em help provide power or food or warm bodies...
DeleteBut disasters are not the Navys problem, and wasting a moment's thought about it, let alone actual assets and funds, is misappropriation to me.
Think of it this way: if war is politics by other means, then politics is war by other means. Humanitarian assistance missions are part of that.
DeleteIf Humanitarian Assistance weren't part of the military's mission, Pliny the younger would have been having dinner with his father rather than writing about him.
Delete" Humanitarian assistance missions are part of that."
DeleteNo, this is a flawed analogy. War is conducted against an ENEMY, to their detriment. Humanitarian assistance is conducted 'against' friends, to their benefit. Since they're already friends, additional help isn't going to change their opinion of you nor sway an enemy's opinion.
To the best of my knowledge, there has never been even a hint of any benefit in HA as far as creating fewer enemies and/or more allies.
I'd opine that the root cause of that lies more with the civilian leadership and its use of the military. Not getting into politics, but that's what happens when the military pays more than lip service to the ideal of civilian control of the military.
DeleteStill, it's definitely preferable to a place like thailand where a military coup is expected once a decade, or Burma where the civilian leadership exists at the sufference of the military.
Agreed, this has nothing to do with politics. It has a ton to do with modern Western military thinking and the trouble we have had with everything Eurasian since the end of WWII.
DeleteI'm not saying that disaster relief is a good use for warships. I'm just looking for ANY use for the LCS. Otherwise, they are simply 3000 ton paperweights which take up a lot of space (30 x 120m ships, which are wider than AB's!), man power, money, and very limited dry dock use, i n my amateur armchair opinion
DeleteAndrew
"I'm just looking for ANY use for the LCS."
DeleteThat's understandable but, at this point, probably the best thing we can do is cut our losses, retire the class, and save the manning and costs.
Yes, transfer some to coast guard and retire ALL rest LCS.
ReplyDeleteMaintain these ships cost a lot but they can deliver very little. I had experiences of a second hand car while I was a student. It costed me more to fix it (many times) than its purchase price.
Since Navy's offensive forces around aircraft carrier, build frigates and destroyers suitable.
The mission module issues aside, both LCS variants have decent aviation capabilities. Both have a hanger for 2 MH-60's, a large flight deck, and each hold more aviation fuel than the Perry-class frigates could. Lazarus did a post about 4 years ago and suggested using them as ASW platforms sending them out in groups of three. Though for extended operations away from port they would benefit from a tender to provide fuel, food, weapons, and spare parts.
ReplyDelete" both LCS variants have decent aviation capabilities."
DeleteThis is likely a misconception based on the area of the flight decks. I've been told by a couple of manufacturer's engineers that the flight deck structural supports were significantly reduced (weakened) during design/construction as a cost savings measure and, therefore, that the flight decks are not rated for two -60 type helos and are not rated for heavier helos. This is why you see the aviation as being 1x -60 type and a small UAV. I haven't officially posted this because I haven't yet been able to obtain independent verification but I have no reason to doubt the engineers.
There is also a potential stability issue. The Freedom class was found to be unstable during module swapping experiments with module containers having to be very carefully counterbalanced to avoid exceeding inclination limits. This is one of the reasons why the rapid module swapping was abandoned. For this same reason, I would assume that 18,000 lb -60 helo movements would have to be carefully handled which, again, renders the flight deck less useful that it would appear at first glance.
"the flight deck structural supports were significantly reduced (weakened) during design/construction as a cost savings measure"
DeleteThat's where they went cheap?
If true, ridiculously stupid.
"If true, ridiculously stupid."
DeleteWell, there's a lot of competition for the 'ridiculously stupid' LCS award. For example, you'll recall that they opted not to install galvanic corrosion protection as a cost savings measure and it resulted in almost the total destruction of the exposed propulsion components. For example, they opted not to install bridge wings as a cost savings measure and had to go back and retrofit them when it was found that they couldn't safely maneuver and dock the ships. For example, they opted to cut back on hull structure as a cost savings measure and wound up with vibration rendering the guns inaccurate above 10 kts or so. And the list goes on.
They painted themselves into a corner with their public assertion that the LCS would only cost $200M (yes, that was the first cost declaration, followed shortly after by $220M, followed shortly after by …). In order to meet the cost goal, many things were cut from the design. This is the problem with designing to a cost instead of to combat effectiveness. Ships MUST be designed to combat effectiveness with cost a secondary concern.
They still paint 2 landing spots on the deck looking at LCS-26 delivery photos. I think one challenge with Freedom is the placement of the door will make 2 H-60s tricky from a usability perspective. At least so long as the 2 containers are stacked forward of the current H-60 spot getting the second out of the hangar looks tricky. I think some of the Saudi and Greek frigate picks show the hangar door moved to the middle. The other problem with both designs is the MacGregor traversing system isn't a haul down system, just a system to move into the hangar. It also requires people on deck to do the hook up. No RAST or now ASIST. If these ships went with just diesels and planned for range at speed, they would have been the smallest 2 H-60 size ships in the world and could have been immensely valuable for their price and size. Absolutely no real thinking before committing to the current path.
DeleteI always thought the reason for one helo and one UAV was to minimize the size of the aviation detachment. Crew accomodations were always a problem with the LCS. As for the flight deck, I have to think that can be fixed.
Delete"As for the flight deck, I have to think that can be fixed."
DeleteThe only fix is to drastically beef up the structure which means (aside from tearing the ship apart and rebuilding it) adding lots of steel pillars, frames, and whatnot. The LCS, both classes, have no weight margins to play with. Also, it would seem highly unlikely that the Navy would want to spend money on a ship that even they are acknowledging has no mission and no combat effectiveness.
Sorry, but I don't see it happening.
The Freedom class LCS could be used as a "Block" or "module" in a new build ship. Cut the hull and use the top side and any other decks as a module that you add to a new ship. Use the module on top of a tanker/Maersk E-class ship and have a supertanker frigate. I don't know if the combat systems are even worth salvaging in this way rather than extracting the parts and installing in a new vessel.
ReplyDeleteAlso, why have we not rolled the first four LCS out for a SINKEX. I would love to see just how tough the Freedom and Independence classes are vs the Perry class.
"why have we not rolled the first four LCS out for a SINKEX"
DeleteThat's not a bad idea. Of course, the LCS was designed to be abandoned at the first hit so it's unlikely they'd stand up to much damage. Also, the Navy cut short the shock trial after acknowledging that even the reduced charges would damage the LCS test ship significantly if carried to completion. So, again, not much chance they'd stand up to much.
"Also, why have we not rolled the first four LCS out for a SINKEX"
DeleteBecause they can probably be sunk by a fishing boat (or just waiting), which would embarrass the Navy?
Keep them away from that cruise ship that sunk a Venezuelan navy ship.
DeleteHello, thought you might be interested to know that the Royal Australian Navy will be getting another 3 Hunter class frigetes and a ammunition ship. They will also get another 1100 sailers and officers.
ReplyDeleteFinally the Australian government is funding the military properly
Hey CNO, what's a good way to discuss me writing a guest post on Distributed Maritime Operations?
ReplyDeleteYou can start by offering a couple sentence summary of what you'd like to address, here, and we'll go from there!
DeleteBefore you do, I would suggest that you peruse the archives as I've done many posts on the subject. That will avoid duplication.
DMO appears to be an attempt to take good tactical ideas (evolutions of NTU and Aegis) and roll them up into a massive system for micromanagement of tactical decisions at theater level. It ignores long established concepts of span of control and the friction of war. It postulates that a theater commander will have the ability to control (not command) individual assets through a magic system of integrated sensors, communication, and AI. It presupposed that the theater commander has better tactical knowledge and skill than ship or TF commanders. Finally, it continues the long US military tradition of focusing on "a strategy of tactics" and "bomb them until we win" (aka the religion of firepower) in place of actual strategic and operational doctrine.
DeleteYour posts make good points at the tactical and asset levels. My focus is on examining the strategic and operational fallacy of DMO and Joint All-Domain Command & Control.
...ok...that's a bit more than two sentences, but that's my thesis. The rest is documenting and attributing.
All right, that's intriguing. If you'd like to pursue it, reply with your email address and I'll immediately delete it and contact you and we can go from there. Spell the address out (like, dot com, rather than the actual address symbols) to avoid spambots.
DeleteJay Kay, I've sent you an email and deleted your address comment. Let me know if you don't see it soon. Remember to look in spam folders if you don't see anything after awhile.
DeleteUnrelated post about F35 engine problems and excessive wear. Wonder how well the -B will tolerate operating in hot,humid, austere USMC bases? Or maybe thats why Berger isn't very found of the F35?
ReplyDeletehttps://theaviationist.com/2021/02/10/f-35-demo-team-forced-to-cut-airshow-appearances-due-to-fleet-wide-engine-issues/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
"The LCS must lead the league in Admiral-chaired studies."
ReplyDeleteWell, I have a Commander-chaired study that is very short.
They're junk. They cannot be redeemed. Get rid of them. ASAP.