Monday, March 25, 2019

LST Development and Death

The LST was a WWII development intended to provide amphibious assault landing capability on a much larger scale than the individual, small landing craft.  In this role it was hugely successful.  So, given that the Navy has no LSTs anymore, what happened to its development that led to abandoning a combat proven, immensely valuable vessel?

Let’s briefly review the original WWII LST(v2).  As we know, it was purpose designed for larger scale beaching unloads.  As such, it was not normally part of the initial assault wave but was a key part of the follow on reinforcement and sustainment effort.  It was able to land a large quantity of troops and vehicles without requiring a port, artificial harbor, or other extraordinary effort.  With a bow door and ramp, vehicles were able to simply drive straight off the vehicle deck, across the ramp, onto the beach, and into the fight.  


WWII LST


The cargo capacity was 2,100 tons and approximately 200 soldiers. Its heart was a tank deck which was 230 ft long, 30 ft wide, and 12 ft tall. (1)  Well over a thousand LSTs were built during the war and hundreds served around the world for many decades after the war.

The LST was a nice balance of rapid construction (two months build time), low cost, low risk versus payload, and efficient delivery directly to the beach.

Post-war, in the late 1950’s, the US Navy built seven new LSTs designated the De Soto County class.  It was 445 ft long versus the WWII LST of 327 ft.  The main refinement seems to have been improved habitability for crew and embarked troops.  This class marked the beginning of the end for the LST in US Navy service.  It was a significantly larger ship that offered no new or improved combat capability and marked an unwise trend toward deployments over missions.


De Soto County Class LST


In 1969, the Navy finalized the ruination of the LST with the construction of the Newport class which was substantially larger, more complex in design and operation (a Mickey Mouse derrick/ramp, over-the-bow arrangement and bow thrusters), and incorporated a stern gate to launch AAVs and mate LCUs.


Newport Class LST - Note Over-the-Bow Ramp


Here’s a comparison of the WWII LST and the Newport LST.



LST
Newport
Length, ft
327
522
Width, ft
50
70
Crew
120
220
Transport, troops
140
400



Newport Class LST - Note Flight Deck


We see, in the LST design history, today’s trend toward deployment ‘cruise’ ships meant to house troops for extended periods instead of just for the duration of an assault. 

The trend towards deployments and permanent troop housing led to the explosive size growth of the type.  Compare the original LST at 327 ft long with the Newport class at 522 ft – with no concomitant increase in combat capability, just a larger size which made the ship a larger target and greater risk, contrary to the combat dictate of spreading the risk.  Yes, some small growth could reasonably have been expected given the increase in tank and vehicle size but much of the increase went to habitability rather than capacity.

Other than a core of LSTs maintained for training and tactics development, LSTs should never have been turned into ‘cruise’ ships.  They should have been tied up pierside and left until needed.  A simple rotational schedule for training exercises would suffice to keep the ships mechanically maintained and operable and core of crews trained.

Because the LST became a deployment asset rather than a mission asset, it had to perform more functions.  The LST became more of an amphibious ‘base’ ship than a single function landing vessel.  This is seen in the provision of a stern gate in the Newport class to allow AAV launches and mating with LCUs and the incorporation of a flight deck.  This eventually led to the amphibious fleet of today which epitomizes all the weaknesses we’ve discussed: concentration of risk, unaffordable cost, deployments over missions, and sub-optimal capability for the combined roles of aviation and transport.

By abandoning the single function, combat-focused design in favor of a deployment ‘cruise’ ship meant to house troops for extended periods, the Navy made the LST unaffordable relative to its other budget desires        and the LST vanished from the fleet.

There’s a larger issue, here, and that is that we’re peacetime designing warships out of existence by giving them non-combat features until they become unaffordable.  Once war ended and the sharp, laser-focus on combat capabilities vanished our ship designs began wandering into peacetime requirements of comfort and endurance rather than combat.  We now have a fleet of compromised designs intended for peacetime use rather than war.

We need to bring the LST back but only in its original form:  cheap, quick to build, mission oriented, and without peacetime frills.



____________________________


59 comments:

  1. Its interesting how I just tripped over this information and ended up even getting sidetracked by this in the last few days. I didnt realuze the huge number of LSTs we actually built!! The evolution(?) from LSTs and landing craft to todays aviation-centric ships with no actual "hit the beach" ability, built in small numbers, is certainly a step or three in the wrong direction.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Their are some countries that still use LST's

    ReplyDelete
  3. ComNavOps,

    I have some perspective on this issue, having served on a Newport-class LST under a skipper who had previously been CO of Vernon. He was constantly comparing the two, and he much preferred Vernon, although he did like having a stern ramp, and having two through decks (main and tank) made it handy for RO-RO type operations. We sold Vernon to the Venezuelans, and we did a combined training exercise with them, and he loved being reunited with his old ship.

    The over-the-bow ramp came about because of the same thing that drove the LCSs--speed. The Navy wanted a Phib Force that could make a 20 knot SOA. The fastest that a conventional blunt-nosed LST hull can be driven through the water is about 18 knots. No matter how much power you add, the hull just won't go much faster. So to hit 20 knots, the Navy came up with this clipper bow with an over-the-bow ramp. We could get a dry ramp on something like only 3% of the world's beaches, so we always had to carry causeway sections (the Brits call them Mexeflotes) lashed to the sides of the aft deck. Anyway, the bow ramp was a constant problem. My ETs had to help the electricians maintain it, because the controls were all solid state, and they were mounted on the bow and exposed to wind, waves, and weather, so every time we got to an AOA we had to trouble shoot and fix the ramp. One of the Little Creek T's, I think it was La Moure, actually launched their ramp into the parking lot one day doing PMS. And I never liked the way the ramp had to be operated from the top of the bow arms, which was a very exposed position.

    The Australians bought two of them and modified them as the Kanimbla class. They removed the bow arms and welded the bow doors shut, put a hangar between the stacks for 4 Blackhawks or 3 Sea Kings, removed the between-decks ramp, and put two LCM-8s, a 70-ton crane, and a third helo spot forward. They helo spots could handle Chinooks, although the hangar couldn't. They operated them mainly as helo platforms, smaller versions of LPHs.

    I've been wondering, what if you took the Newport, went back to the LST bow, giving up 2 knots of speed for versatility and beaching ability, and did something like the Kanimbla treatment topside. I'd hate to give up the tween-decks ramp, but with the helo configuration, you wouldn't be storing much topside, so I'm not sure how much use it would be. Maybe you could put an elevator in the old breezeway space, which would let you move vehicles to the helo platform forward or aft, but I'm not sure how much more capability that gives you. The hangar would mean adding high weight, and total weight would be an issue for beaching, but I'm guessing you could get some of that back by reducing the superstructure and getting rid of the 3-inch guns that could only shoot behind you.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Great information. Thanks!

      One has to wonder what operational or tactical advantage two knots confers? None that I can think of.

      Regarding helos on an LST, I see no purpose. An LST's task is to land troops and vehicles on the beach. A helo does not contribute to that task. We try to design in every capability in every ship design and all it does it drive up costs. Can you think of how a helo contributes to the LST's task?

      Delete
    2. In this day and age, I'm not sure you are going to get anything built by the Navy without a helo capability. We certainly used the heck out of them for all sorts of things. And we also found all sorts of uses for the stern ramp and the RO-RO capability. Maybe all of these were more peacetime useful that war useful, but we have peacetime missions, too. Certainly disaster relief is a big peacetime mission for amphibs, and one that is very important in getting civilian (voter) support for spending, which cannot be ignored in a democratic republic. And helos become almost indispensable in that context.

      I'm a little bit concerned about your concept of "war-peace" in the employment, or lack thereof, of the "war" ships. Keeping them garrisoned up most of the time, and operating them enough to train, was pretty much the French approach before Trafalgar, and that didn't turn out so well for them. I think ships have to be operated for crews to maintain proficiency. One thing that made an impression on me is that when I deployed on ships, the ships typically came back in better material condition than before they had deployed. I can think of one contra example, we lost pitch control in a shaft coming home from the Med, which was pretty dicey in the North Atlantic in December. But otherwise, being deployed got us in better condition than staying in port, and it definitely improved crew capability.

      Delete
    3. "Keeping them garrisoned up most of the time, and operating them enough to train,"

      You may not be grasping the degree of training I envision. I'm not talking about an occasional one day, out and back cruise. I'm talking about full fledged, all out combat exercises, as realistic as possible (including constant live fire exercises), spanning days or weeks at a time. Unlike today, the exercises would be 100% combat focused rather than humanitarian exercises or show-the-flag. The ships and crews would be stressed to the max, subjected to the maximum ECM we can muster, and forced to develop new tactics. We'll find out what works and what doesn't.

      When they return from an exercise, they'll enter maintenance to fix what didn't work while the crews undergo shoreside training.

      We'll emphasize live fire under realistic conditions. We won't do a staged launch of a single missile and assume that means we can fight off a saturation attack. Instead, we'll conduct actual saturation attack exercises with drones and let a ship shoot down dozens of incoming drones - if they can. The crews will quickly learn what works in combat and what doesn't.

      Yes, this will cost money but it will be paid for by the eliminated costs of deployments.

      You and I both know the French had a lot more problems than just their training regimen. I won't bother going into detail on that. The situation is not even remotely analogous.

      As proof, I'll simply cite our recent naval history. We've collided and run aground ship after ship. Clearly, our deployment model is not producing trained, combat ready ships or crews. Why you would want to continue that model is baffling. It's time to try something new and a combat focused model like I've suggested seems far superior.

      Delete
    4. Okay that makes more sense.

      I've kind of thought about planning ships for 40 year lives, with a 2 year major maintenance/upgrade/life extension around mid-life and 1 year major maintenance every 10 years. The cycle would work something like this:

      Years 10, 20-21, and 31 - major maintenance/upgrade, skeleton crew
      Years 1-3, 11-13, 22-24, and 32-34 - reserve status, 1/2 crew, 1/2 reserves, doing mostly 1 and 2 day ops
      Years 4-6, 14-16, 25-27, and 35-37 - regular status, working up to deployable status - full crews, doing the kind of operating tempo you set out for your "war" group
      Years 7-9, 17-19, 28-30, and 38-40 - deployable/deployed - 2 crews, blue and gold, 4 months on/4 months off deployments would be basically around the world, 8 months in WestPac, 8 months in Middle East, 8 months in Europe/Med, 8 months in Caribbean/South America/West Africa, 4 months transitioning between areas

      You'd need basically 3-1/2 regular crews for each ship, plus 1/2 reserve crew. You'd have some kind of short maintenance availability every year. Crew deployments would be 4 months. In the 4 months back at home, go to schools and get rigorous team training in simulators.

      Yes, I'm talking about money too, but the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.

      Delete
    5. "planning ships for 40 year lives,"

      Well, that's one approach. In fact, it's essentially the Navy's current approach (see the projected service lives of the various ship classes). The only problem with it is that it is an abysmal failure. The Navy winds up early retiring almost every ship class so never get our money's worth out of them. The upgrades that are done wind up costing far more than they should because, inevitably, the ships aren't equipped or suited for the upgrades (the Burke's lack power and cooling for the AMDR upgrade, for example).

      The better approach, which I've posted on (see, "Ship Service Life Reduction!"), is to only build ships for a 15-20 year lifespan. That way, maybe you'll actually achieve your projected service life. Plus, if you insist on neglecting maintenance, as the Navy routinely does, it won't matter since you're only planning to keep the ship for 15-20 years. Upgrades will be a non-issue because you won't do any! You'll simply stick the upgrade in the next new ship because you'll be building new ships regularly. No more worries about obsolescence.

      Now, that also means we need to build smarter and cheaper which means single function ships with a laser focus on combat and only their single task. If you build a AAW cruiser then you don't give it an extra 150 ft of length for a flight deck and you don't build a hangar on it and you don't give it an ASW suite. You build it for AAW and nothing else - cheap and focused. Then, you can afford to build another one in 15-20 years and that one will have every upgrade you want.

      My goodness, look at the incredibly complicated plan you came up with for a 40 year ship! Imagine trying to juggle that for an entire fleet. Keep it simple and cheap with 15-20 year ships. It will produce a consistently modern, new, up to date fleet.

      Delete
    6. "helo capability. We certainly used the heck out of them for all sorts of things."

      Hey, no is suggesting that helos aren't convenient and useful things. Of course, so is an elephant but we don't put them on ships. The question is whether a helo contributes to the LST's main function which is landing troops and vehicles on the beach. If it does not then it's just adding cost to the ship for no benefit to the main task.

      Delete
  4. LSTs are an option, but I think we should use ground-effect vehicles. They would have smaller crews and would give marines mobility that approaches that of paratroops. The Boeing Pelican could make the marines relevant again.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The Pelican was certainly an impressive transport aircraft. It would be of no use in amphibious assaults as it requires 5000-8000 ft runways for landing and take off. It seems to be tied to actual airfields which limits the tactical movement of troops.

      The Soviet Union developed some wing-in-ground effect aircraft and I seem to recall that they were amphibious. I may or may not be recalling that correctly.

      So, while the Pelican, specifically, could not function in an assault, it might be possible to develop ground-effect aircraft that could.

      Good thought!

      Delete
  5. A few other things.

    To get the power for 22 knots (nominal top speed) we had 6 diesels. Whenever we went anywhere, by the second or third day one of the diesels would go out, so we would be limited to about 18 knots most of the time anyway.

    The other is that the stern ramps were useful for launching LVTs. So we would proceed with the main phib force and for the first wave we would steam across the LOD dropping our LVTs out the stern. Then the other boat waves would follow. That was clearly not in the standard WWII LST operating procedure.

    The Brits operate their Ts as civilian ships as part of the RFA (like our MSC). They are not armed, and they can go into ports without the same diplomatic clearance as warships require. They had one in the Mideast when I was there, and they used it to send troops into places where there was some uprising that needed quelling, and the diplomatic status was helpful in that regard. I'm wondering if we could do the same with some of our amphibs, to reduce crewing requirements.

    The Kanimblas were apparently very useful but the Aussies did not retain them very long. They transfers were held up politically by a dispute between Clinton and congress, so they sat for a while after decom from the USN, and apparently they were in pretty poor material condition by the time the Aussies got them.

    The other thing the Aussies gave up in the conversion was the boat davits. We carried 3 LCVPs and a gig, and I would like to be able to retain them. I guess the tradeoff is a smaller hangar, although with the stack locations, I'm not sure there is any usable hangar space where the boat davits were.

    Anyway, I think the idea is one that deserves some further analysis. The performance of the Kanimblas in Australia, allowing for the maintenance issues, would be very useful information to have.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " I'm wondering if we could do the same with some of our amphibs, to reduce crewing requirements."

      This is a 'false' question. The issue is not manning amphibs, the issue/question is why we even have amphibs outside of war? An attack transport (to use the WWII vernacular) is a war-only vessel. During peacetime we should not be taking world cruises with amphib vessels that serve no peacetime purpose. Thus, manning should be a non-existent issue.

      But wait, you say, we need Marines in ships so that we can respond to a crisis!!! Un huh … How many times has that ever happened? Off the top of my head, I can't recall any but I'm sure somebody once or twice sent Marines ashore for some marginal purpose. The point is that, given the immense cost of building and operating amphibs, the justification for the very few times they've ever been needed is marginal, at best. Recall that we have aviation based ready-response Army units that claim to be capable of deploying to any spot in the world in under 24 hours. That takes care of the crisis response need. Paying to float Marines around the world on the million to one chance that they'll be needed AND HAPPEN TO BE IN THE RIGHT SPOT WHEN NEEDED is a flawed concept.

      Delete
  6. I agree that having Marines where you need them is a problem. But some things are pretty easy to anticipate. I'd have put Benghazi very high on that list. And if you have more (and cheaper) platforms you can do that a whole lot easier. I'm not sure that the real measure of effectiveness is how many times they have been used, but how many times they have been a deterrent. In the Benghazi example, I would think that seeing my old ship loitering offshore within visual range, and anticipating that it had a company of Marines ready to come ashore, would have meant one more living ambassador today, and that is certainly worth something. Off the top of my head I remember Incheon in Korea, Ike putting Marines ashore in Lebanon, obviously we did it at Cam Ranh Bay, we made plans to evacuate US civilians from all the Mediterranean ports during the Yom Kippur War, and that plan was executed later to evacuate US civilians from Beirut, Royal Marines did it in the Falklands, Reagan and Grenada, we did it in Somalia (with not great results), and there are surely a number of places where the threat was enough to quell trouble before it started.

    The trick is to be in the right place at the right time, and that is a heck of a lot easier when you have a number of smaller platforms than when everybody is loaded onto one LHA/LHD.

    I think you are focused more on being ready and able to fight that peer war, and I am focused more on the kind of limited engagements we found ourselves fighting over and over in the Cold War. The way I see it, the only ships that truly has value in a peer war are the boomers and the SSGNs, and they are pretty much useless for anything else. I don't think that kind of skirmish-fighting is going away (indeed with the rise of rogue states and terrorists, I think it will increase). I do think we need to find ways to get our allies to take on some of that load. But your idea of keeping the war-fighting forces garrisoned until we have a real war strikes me as too much like what the French did to prepare to get their rear ends handed to them at Trafalgar.

    One other comment that I have tried to post and for some reason the system won't let me in. I wonder about the idea of using the RFA Round Table class as a base model. The first batch was about 450 feet and 7800 tons, and the replacement Sir Galahad (after the first was lost in the Falklands) was about 460 feet and 8750 tons. Galahad II was operated by an RFA crew of 49 and carried 400 troops and 3400 tons of cargo. They made 17+ knots. The Newports with twice the horsepower got 4 more knots out of a 1000-ton bigger hull, so getting them to 18 knots would probably be doable. If you wanted to emulate the Kanimblas, you could convert most of the superstructure to a hangar, lower the flight deck to main deck level, and make up the space by either extending the superstructure forward or using the outside space below the main decks, which is now weather deck. They can still take a Sea King aft and a Chinook on the forward helo pad. I don't know if they have a tween-decks ramp (I'm guessing not because of the number of cranes, they probably get stuff on and off the main deck by lifting it). But I just think it would be an interesting model.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. We'll just have to disagree about the value of Marine cruise ships.

      You still haven't told me how a helo contributes to an LST's task?

      Delete
    2. Let me try…I am sure this will get deleted but while I agree with your assessment, “we’re peacetime designing warships out of existence by giving them non-combat features until they become unaffordable.”, I think your definition of an LST ("An LST's task is to land troops and vehicles on the beach.") is incomplete. Despite Churchill’s initial vision of getting tanks to the shoreline, I believe its US mission is to “load and transport cargo, vehicles of all types, and troops to a combat area." Why would I include cargo? Well its use in history…despite being “Large, Slow Targets”…see what I did there…LST…they were adapted for many missions such as the LST-H providing immediate medical care facilities, and evacuating over 40,000 casualties from Normandy. Other LSTs were converted to mini-aircraft carriers and actually launched fixed wing reconnaissance aircraft from their modified decks. This mission flexibility was a something these ships were known for. So the need for cargo to move from ship to shore shows a CONOPS for a helo, especially when (as in the case of medical…and I personally don’t feel the post-Normandy example I cite above qualifies as a “peace time humanitarian” mission) the cargo amounts are large.

      Delete
    3. Why would you think your comment would be deleted? I never remove a comment because I disagree with it. Read the comment policy page and you'll see why I remove comments.

      To the task at hand …

      The LST's primary function is to move troops and vehicles to the beach. That's the definition. As you point out, there are many secondary functions the vessel can, and did, conduct. The key word is 'secondary'. If you want to include every function or task any LST ever did then, yes, the definition is incomplete but such an all-inclusive definition would amount to a book.

      I also have no problem with a specialty version of an LST. So, if you want a few specialty LSTs adapted for cargo transport, that's fine. I still don't see how a helo assists even in that function, though. A helo's cargo moving capability is almost nil. It would take forever to unload an LST using only a helo. It would make far more sense to do what the LST was designed to do: beach it and then unload directly onto trucks that can drive on and off the ship.

      An analysis of a CONOPS for moving cargo from ship to shore would almost certainly exclude helos given their incredibly small cargo transport capacity. I mean, think about it ... if you had a LST full of cargo and you wanted to unload it expeditiously, the last thing you'd do is use helos. There's a reason why we have RO/ROs rather than HE/HEs (helos on/helos off). HE/HEs - see what I did there?

      Even worse … throw in the helo's inherent high demand for frequent maintenance and well deserved reputation for mechanical issues and that no-capacity helo becomes an only sporadically available, no-capacity platform. Helos simply make no sense for high volume cargo transport.

      If I haven't convinced you, do the calculation. Get the cargo capacity of a LST and the cargo capacity of a helo (bear in mind the spatial limitations of the helo's compartment as well as sling load limitations) and see how long it would take a helo to unload an LST. Don't forget to factor in the round trip travel time, pilot rest, routine maintenance for every few flight hours, and time required to load/sling the helo (a tricky evolution with load balancing requirements!). Let me know what you find. This blog is based on data so do the calcs and give us the data!

      Delete
    4. The helicopter deck performs the vital function of a place for the high ranking admirals/generals to land so that they can be video-taped before an operation making both vaguely encouraging and vaguely cautious statements. Said helo then takes these officers as far away from combat as quickly as possible. If the operation is a success the vaguely encouraging video will be played for the press to show their outstanding leadership. Should the operation fail, the video showing vaguely cautious statements will be shown as proof they warned their reckless subordinates about the operation which obviously failed because they didn't listen to the admiral/general.
      Thus regardless of the actual results of the operation their promotion to higher rank is still assured.
      As I said, a vital function.

      Delete
    5. "As I said, a vital function."

      You've convinced me!

      Delete
    6. Benghazi - We did not land Marines

      Incheon - this was a full fledged invasion with forces assembled over an extended period; there was no standby landing of Marines

      Lebanon - this was a long planned operation with no need for standby Marines although some were used; many other forces were involved; 2nd Battalion 8th Marines arrived on July 16 after a 54-hour airlift from Cherry Point, thus proving that standby Marines were not needed

      Cam Ranh Bay - no idea what operation you're referring to

      Beirut evacuation - if you're referring to the 1976 operation, Marines were not involved, to the best of my knowledge

      Grenada - this was a planned invasion involving many forces with plenty of time to assemble and did not require standby Marines

      Somalia - Amphibious Squadron 5 was in the area but did not participate in the operation, to the best of my knowledge

      Your examples actually prove my point that afloat, standby Marine forces have rarely, if ever, been used as the crisis response force that we justify them to be. Yes, some have taken part in planned invasions but those had plenty of time to assemble the required forces and standby, afloat forces were not necessary.

      Delete
    7. Stand by forces are generally rapid response commando like units for rapid extraction or reinforcement.
      Since the discussion is on the LST--the "T" being Tank--I don't ever recall Marine Raiders or Recon, SEALS, Rangers, etc. ever fielding 70 ton main battle tanks. I'm sure a SEAL team wouldn't mind an squad of M1 Abrams coming over the hill to the rescue, but any scenario requiring tanks also has the build up time you discussed above.
      We could use Marines that way, but at this point Special Operations Command is huge and their operatives will always get the first call for a standby force. Ranger Battalions for airborne/airmoble reinforcement or USAF Pararescue for extraction for example. Even coastal operations that Marine Raiders in WW2/Korea might have been called to do are now done mostly with SEALs.
      Personally I like it that way; special operations for stealthy rapid missions, but Marines when you positively, absolutely want an area pummeled, destroyed, and generally laid waste to which is what you want in an invasion force.

      Delete
  7. Australia had a fleet of three ex US Navy LSTs. 2 x Kanimbla and an older one. As happens frequently a large cyclone hit Queensland and all three amphibs were broken down. So we built 2 x LDH, and bought a British ship. We also found them too small in East Timor and the Solomons Islands.

    ReplyDelete
  8. I'm actually embarassed! I just assumed the Pelican was amphibious. I thought that's why they called it "Pelican". I should have checked before I commented. Sorry.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hey, no problem. The sheer transport capability makes it well worth a look. The military came close to adopting it at one point and maybe now's a good time to revisit the idea.

      The problem with an amphibious version, assuming one could be built, is that, like the LCAC, it would be non-survivable in the initial assault along with the fact that its prodigious capacity would concentrate far too much risk in a single vehicle. Now, as a follow on and sustainment supply vehicle it might well be enormously valuable.

      Delete
  9. One nice thing about the original LST's was that the hulls could be used for just about anything. Mobile HQ's, hospital ships, mother ships, ammunition haulers, artillery/rocket platforms, repair shops. You name it, the hulls could be turned into it.

    It might be nice to have a standardized hull that the builders could turn into anything.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You seem to be describing a common support hull that could be modified for the various support tasks you listed. I have no problem with that and it make a lot of sense.

      I wouldn't pattern a common support hull after the LST. The hull shape is wrong. However, the concept is valid. In fact, as I'm writing this comment, the idea is appealing to me more and more. I may have to consider a post on this. Thanks for the inspiration!

      Delete
  10. I'll admit up front that my knowledge of amphibious landings is limited... even though I'm fascinated by them.

    I wondered whether a modern LST, loaded with short range defensive and offensive kit could be part of the first wave, storming onto the beach, while defending itself and its cargo against short ranged threats. It would theoretically allow a load of heavy kit to be in the fight from the start.

    How would you envisage a realistic peer level amphibious landing happening? Perhaps one of your scenario posts is a possibility?

    Lofty.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "How would you envisage a realistic peer level amphibious landing happening? "

      I'm on record as stating that I don't believe an amphibious assault is a realistic possibility. That aside, the only way a successful peer level assault could occur is by returning to WWII doctrine. However, we lack major caliber gun support, close in (5") gun support, mine clearance, amphibious armor, etc. so I don't see a peer level assault as being feasible even if we wanted to. The fundamentals of an assault are completely absent. Probably not what you want to hear but that's the reality.

      Delete
    2. What's the point of building LSTs if amphibious assault isn't realistic anymore?

      Delete
    3. "What's the point of building LSTs if amphibious assault isn't realistic anymore?"

      I write on two levels: what should be (no amphibious assault fleet beyond a core) and what is. The 'what is' is that the Marines claim to have an amphibious assault mission and capability. That being the case, the Navy needs LSTs to support that mission.

      There is also the specific case of port seizure which I think is (should be) the Marine's main mission. LSTs might well be useful for that role.

      Delete
    4. @CNO,

      For clarity, the USMC points to the National Security Act of 1947 that created the JCS, USAF, and USMC as independent services as the requirement for amphibious operations. Then Marines try to beat the Navy and other services about the head and shoulders by elevating that requirement buried deep in the bowels of that "legislation" to the parity with the Constitution - it isn't.

      This game is played by the Corps for justifying force structure and end strength, ignoring that *no Congress is beholden to the directions of previous a Congress.* In fact, Congress eliminates or re-structures prior legislation on a daily basis.

      In other words, no one one the hill would care one bit about the amphibious mission, unless amphibious ships are built/maintained in their district. Laws and budgets are rewritten every day. And that is the real fear of the Corps, that Congress might write them out of existence if the really take a hard look and fresh approach to force structure.

      GAB

      Delete
  11. I would just reiterate here the Army's decision to eliminate its fleet of Landing Craft Utility (LCU) would seem to be a related issue.

    A bit smaller than a LST from the past they are however similar in concept

    https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/lcu.htm

    Funny thing is the army never built the number required/authorized by Congress. I mean maybe I am wrong but I imagine moving stuff to shore via this type of ship is a lot less expensive than by airlift or hoover raft (and less accident prone).

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "I would just reiterate here the Army's decision to eliminate its fleet of Landing Craft Utility (LCU) would seem to be a related issue."

      This is, indeed, an interesting issue. On the one hand, over the last several years the Army has been making aggressive moves towards partnering up with the Navy to achieve naval based transport, movement to shore, and operations from naval ships. It almost seemed as if they were moving to nudge the Marines out of their amphibious role. Then, the drop the LCU. It seems logically inconsistent. I'm baffled and have no explanation.

      I'd love to do a post on this except that I have explanation or conclusion to offer.

      Delete
  12. My comment won't add anything to this excellent conversation, but I have to say I often rider on what I believe is the last WWII LST hull in operation, on the car ferry line between New London CT and Orient Point NY. She took part in the Invasion of Normandy. The original hull is still going strong today. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_LST-510

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thanks for sharing that. It also points out the fallacy behind the Navy's claims that ships can't even make it to their projected lifespans.

      Hit the beach!

      Delete
  13. Maybe the role of the LST should be provided by an autonomous/optionally manned vessel. The vessel could deposit the payload on the beach and if the payloads were also optionally manned they could drive themselves to an inland position where a bunch of US Soldiers/Marines, who happened to be on holiday, could catch a ride.
    They could also man the LST at the last minute if you staged at sea and delivered the crews with amphibious C-130 float planes or transfer crews from other vessels.
    C-130 amphibian
    https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/a-c-130-hercules-amphibian-makes-too-much-sense-to-be-t-1716610531

    Retractable floats for amphibian float plane - reduced drag- company appears defunct.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDg37UuNxMg
    https://fireaviation.com/2016/03/27/a-design-concept-for-a-c-130-with-floats/

    ReplyDelete
  14. An autonomous/optionally manned, 2-3X enlarged(250-300 foot) L-CAT shore to shore should be be able to fill the LST/LCU role with greater speed and seakeeping ability, since they function as a catamaran most of the time.

    CNIM L-CAT shore to shore
    https://cnim.com/en/businesses/defense-security-and-digital-intelligence/l-cat-shore-shore#

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. There's nothing wrong with the L-CAT, per se, but you're missing the two key aspects of any assault transport: it's got to be survivable and it's got to distribute the risk.

      The LCAC, LST, L-CAT, whatever are non-survivable in the initial assault. They're all large, non-stealthy, slow targets.

      Being large, they carry a LOT of troops/vehicles which concentrates risk. If an LST or enlarged L-CAT is hit, you lose a LOT of troops/vehicles for a single hit.

      Ideally, you'd like each soldier and each vehicle to have its own tiny transport. That would be the ultimate in distribution and minimization of risk. Of course, that's not practical. There's a balance point. In WWII, we found it to be around 30 troops in a landing craft and INDIVIDUAL armored vehicles (LVT(A) amphibious 'tanks').

      An LCAC, LST, L-CAT, whatever, would be fine for follow on reinforcement and sustainment but, at that point, almost anything would work because the immediate threat has been eliminated.

      By the way, this isn't just my opinion, although I share it, it's the Navy/Marines official doctrine which has deemed the LCAC non-survivable and unsuited for the initial assault effort.

      Does that make sense?

      Delete
    2. Makes perfect sense. Risk reduction was on of the reasons I was thinking Unmanned.
      It just reinforces port seizure as the sanest way ashore. The lack of big gun artillery support from a battleship will make port seizure difficult.

      Delete
    3. "Risk reduction was on of the reasons I was thinking Unmanned. "

      Well, that saves a few crew but the many dozens (hundreds?) of troops or vehicles gain no risk reduction from the vessel being unmanned.

      By the way, have you read any of the reports, books, analyses of actual assaults? They paint a consistent picture of absolute chaos, confusion, split second changes in plan, etc. How is an unmanned vessel going to deal with all that?

      Delete
  15. In WW1 there was a plan (and it was trialled) to bolt 2 14" gun monitors either side of a large platform to land an entire battalion on the shore. Plenty of firepower and a very cheap barge in the middle!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Interesting. Large and slow. It would be incredibly susceptible to mines, missiles, artillery, mortars, and rockets while landing. If it gets hit, you lose a battalion. Amphibious assaults are based on the dispersion of risk philosophy given the high attrition rate among the landing craft. This would be the opposite of dispersion of risk. This would be the ultimate concentration of risk.

      Delete
    2. I wasn't suggesting we do it - I just loved the idea. There are pictures somewhere.

      I think going forward any opposed landing would have to have initial waves of drones of various types. Enemy land defence suppression as well as air plus minesweeping/engineering drones.

      Delete
    3. "any opposed landing would have to have initial waves of drones of various types."

      I hear variations on this theme, frequently. How many drones would be needed (tens, hundreds, thousands?) and what would they do given that, unless you're talking about mammoth Reaper size drones for couple hundred million dollars each, each drone could only carry one or two very small weapons?

      Compare whatever your answer is to the sheer volume of 8"-16" gunfire used in assaults in WWII and it was still barely enough or not enough, in some cases.

      Drones sound cool but what's the actual numbers and use?

      Delete
    4. Firstly, that would depend on the type of landing and size as well as the expected opposition. I agree that in almost every conflict naval gunfire (or airpower) has not eliminated opposition and has degraded it far less than anyone would imagine.

      Leaving aside recon and the standard air attack vehicles which have been discussed many times, I would be looking first at mine/obstacle-clearing UUV types to get you to the beach. Perhaps also deploy an EMP pulse generator to kill enemy sensors and electronics. A second type that deploys onto the beach - I'm thinking something like a BMP-T terminator that can be dropped offshore and drive along the seabed to the surf line and form a fire base. You would need a third type that was a lot smaller (maybe based on some of the EOD robots) to get into buildings and passageways and hunt for heat sources (humans) and eliminate them - given that the Russians and Chinese are both using flamethrowers fairly extensively, I would look at those plus a mix of shotguns and placed explosive charges as principal weapons. A fourth type to bring replacement weapons & fuel to the beach to allow the 2nd and 3rd types to refuel/re-arm.

      As for numbers, the more you deploy, the less Marines get killed in the succeeding waves - it would be foolish to assume you'll wipe out all the opposition with just drones at this stage of evolution. I would expect Tomahawks & air etc to take out the usual targets and the new drone types to focus on smaller stuff like MGs/missile posts and start reducing the enemy soldier numbers whilst allowing the the Marines to land behind them whilst the enemy is suppressed. The smaller EOD-type drones might well be able to be parachuted in from high altitude and then set loose on rear areas, artillery & AA support etc.

      Delete
    5. THe British actually built a number of Monitors in WWI and WWII by re-purposing battleship main guns.

      These monitors provided excellent service.


      I believe the last two were HMS Abercrombie and HMS Roberts.

      GAB

      Delete
    6. Roberts-class monitor

      https://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/class.html?ID=233&navy=HMS

      GAB

      Delete
    7. "Leaving aside recon and the standard air attack vehicles"

      Okay, now you're in the realm of non-existent science fiction! Hey, nothing wrong with that. Today's scifi is tomorrow's reality.

      Of course, if you're going to imagine assault drones, you might also want to imagine what kind of defense drones the enemy would have. Suicide UUVs to stop mine clearing UUVs? Mobile mines that lay themselves in front of BMP-T vehicles? EOD-type robots to guard entrances into buildings? Quadcopters to hunt down assaulting drones? An EMP weapon to disable drones, sensors, and electronics?

      Delete
    8. Indeed - and what happens to our current amphibious capability if the enemy develops those first?

      Delete
    9. I'm of the opinion that we have no credible amphibious capability so seeing the enemy develop those capabilities first is not really an issue but I do take your point. That's just the constant combat technology race that has been in progress since the first caveman picked up a spear as an improvement over a club.

      We witnessed an outstanding example of what happens when one entity develops a significant advancement before another: stealth. The US was the first, by a wide margin, to develop practical stealth and used it to dominate combat for a couple decades. There are definite advantages to winning the technology race even if only temporarily.

      Delete
  16. The L-CAT shore to shore only has a range of 800 nm, so not really in the same league as LST/LCU but it is only 118 feet long. Double or triple the length and it should have sufficient fuel to go 3,000 to 4,500 nm at a higher speed than the LST/LCU.
    The catamaran mode at cruising speed allows it to tolerate a higher sea state without needing to slow down.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You are comparing a vessel that can carry a single MBT to a ship class designed to carry an entire Company plus of MBTs, plus the logistics systems (potable water, and fuel), plus a helicopter pad, and a dozen or so small craft like causeway lighterage, Mike boats, etc..

      I like the LCAT, it is just not remotely the same as an LST, which is an open-ocean *ship*.

      GAB

      Delete
    2. I realize the size difference. That is why I stated it was not in the same league as the LST/LCU and recommended a vessel 250-300 feet in length.

      Delete
  17. How much would a modern, cheap to build, LST cost?

    The Army Besson LSVs cost $32 million years ago, but they are significantly smaller and slower than an LST.

    Damen has a line of LSTs up to 120m, haven't sold any of the larger ones.

    https://products.damen.com/en/ranges/landing-ship

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "How much would a modern, cheap to build, LST cost?"

      If today's Navy built it … $8B.

      If ComNavOps Navy built it … $75M. It wouldn't be a warship. It would be built to commercial standards with a few military adaptations thrown in. Let's be real, as along as we don't add a bunch of useless add on functions, an LST is just a big hollow commercial cargo ship. Industry can build a 100,000 t supertanker for $100M today. A hollowed out tanker that's a quarter that size ought to be buildable for well under $100M, right?

      The key is what NOT to put on the ship. Here's what you DON'T PUT ON THE SHIP:

      -flight deck
      -hangar
      -radar other than small navigation radar
      -high speed
      -habitability beyond bare bones
      -missiles other than 2x SeaRAM
      -sonar
      -ECM
      -stern gate
      -bow/stern thrusters
      -computers (no EMP susceptibility if everything is mechanical!)

      What does that leave? A ship that is totally focused on one task and one task only: delivery of troops and vehicles onto the beach. That makes the ship cheap and quick to build.

      Delete
    2. Simple is fine but some of those things are needed.

      It'll need a certain degree of habitability for a ship that can go trans-oceanic with passengers.

      SeaRAMs are $10M each. Two consumes a quarter of your overall budget.

      Stern gates are very useful to speed loading, and useful for some unloading situations (AAVs out the back). Not really saving much here anyway.

      Bow/stern thrusters are likely valuable for station keeping and fine-grained maneuvering near shore. Probably not saving much here either.

      You aren't getting away with no computers in this day and age, though clearly it doesn't need AEGIS.

      If Marines are carried aboard, they'll need some way to coordinate with the rest of the task force, and get latest intel, threats, and battle plan briefs. That means digital comms & computers.


      Delete
    3. "It'll need a certain degree of habitability for a ship that can go trans-oceanic with passengers. "

      We've forgotten what an LST is for. It's not a trans-oceanic cruise ship. It travels, unloaded, to a forward staging area, picks up its load, travels to the assault site, and unloads. Troops are only aboard for a brief period. Habitability is not required beyond the bare necessities. We did this in WWII. Nothing more is needed.

      "SeaRAMs are $10M each."

      Good point. We'll cut it to one.

      "Stern gates are very useful to speed loading, and useful for some unloading situations (AAVs out the back). "

      Loading is not a speed operation. We can take all the time we need to load. Stern gates add nothing to unloading. It's far faster to just drive off the vehicle deck, over the ramp, and onto the beach.

      "Bow/stern thrusters are likely valuable"

      And yet we managed to land thousands of LSTs in WWII without them. They're unnecessary. Unnecessary items are how costs go up.

      "computers in this day and age, ... digital comms & computers."

      And yet we managed to routinely coordinate entire invasions in WWII. We've simply forgotten how.

      You build an affordable ship not by adding everything that would nice but by eliminating everything that isn't absolutely essential to the primary task. Nothing you listed is absolutely essential.

      Delete
    4. "We've forgotten what an LST is for. It's not a trans-oceanic cruise ship. It travels, unloaded, to a forward staging area, picks up its load, travels to the assault site, and unloads. Troops are only aboard for a brief period. Habitability is not required beyond the bare necessities. We did this in WWII. Nothing more is needed"

      For Okinawa, the Marines staged in the Solomons, almost 3,000nmi away. It'd take 8 days at 15kts to make that trip, assuming a direct path, with no tactical maneuvers. Add a day or two spent mustering at the staging area and potentially a day or more at the landing area.

      Designing habitability for at least two weeks at sea seems prudent.

      "Loading is not a speed operation. We can take all the time we need to load. Stern gates add nothing to unloading. It's far faster to just drive off the vehicle deck, over the ramp, and onto the beach."

      It is very important if LSTs are being used as ferries between staging areas and the landing zone (e.g. Normandy). It directly impacts the time needed to make a round trip. It's the reason many Ro/Ro ferries have both stern and bow ramps.

      It also impacts how quickly you can load all of your ships from the staging area ashore. There probably aren't unlimited numbers of piers available to load every ship at the same time. So you have to pull up each LST one at a time (or two or three) and load.

      I doubt you save much by omitting it.

      "And yet we managed to routinely coordinate entire invasions in WWII. We've simply forgotten how. "

      And planners were stuck with recon photos and assessments that were weeks or months old.

      The EPFs are a potential cost analog. They are $180M each. They don't have extensive habitability or electronics and are unarmed. They do have a helicopter platform, and high speed does have its costs.



      Delete
    5. "Designing habitability for at least two weeks at sea seems prudent. "

      Exactly. I didn't say no habitability, I said the bare essentials. That means a bunk but it doesn't mean a game room, wifi connections, sauna, exercise facility, lounge, etc. We did it in WWII and, guess what?, the troops survived the voyage!

      " It's the reason many Ro/Ro ferries have both stern and bow ramps."

      A commercial vessel often DOES depend on speed to make a profit. That is not the case for an assault. We can take as long as we need to load. Even doing round trip resupply operations, a few more hours isn't going to matter. In short order, at Normandy, we wound up with stacked up supplies creating bottlenecks at the beach. The limiting factor wasn't LST round trips but movement of the supplies off the beach! Round trip speed was not an issue.

      "I doubt you save much by omitting it."

      You save quite a bit. By omitting it, you have a design that is easier to construct (absolutely vital in wartime production - the LSTs were built in 2 months!), easier to maintain (no complicated seals, hinges, motors, etc. which require maintenance), require fewer crew since the maintenance need is reduced, present less of a hull weakness to weapons and explosive shocks, are less of a flooding threat due to damage, and so on. Witness the LCS stern gates which have been documented to cause all the problems I listed and are a major source of corrosion issues in the LCS well area.

      "And planners were stuck with recon photos and assessments that were weeks or months old."

      For initial planning, perhaps. Once an assault was committed to, up to date information was collected and distributed in sufficiently timely fashion. We never conducted an assault based on information that was "weeks or months old". Anything that was considered critical and changeable was monitored right up until the moment of the assault and the information was transmitted to the appropriate units in whatever fashion was appropriate.

      "The EPFs are a potential cost analog."

      Not even close. As you note, their high speed imposes significant costs, as it does for the LCS. A flight deck adds costs in the form of aviation support, maintenance (even without a hangar), fuel storage (I assume they refuel helos), extra crew for flight quarters, comms, structural reinforcement for the flight deck (a weakness in the LCS), etc. The unconventional hull form imposes construction cost increases. They have a complicated swiveling ramp system that imposes additional construction costs and maintenance costs. From Wiki, "reclining seats with overhead televisions" and "a greater level of comfort for the crew than larger Navy ships. The stateroom-style berthing areas for the ship's crew have private features like toilet stalls, outlets, air conditioning, and even thermostats." and "ship's electronic systems including; ... remote surveillance system (?), and entertainment (!!!) & training system."

      This is the farthest thing from a cost analog for a combat-focused, basic, single function LST.

      Delete

Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.