Large Unmanned Surface Vessel Rationale

Why is the Navy pushing so hard for the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV)?  That’s always been a bit of a mystery to me.  I know the Navy has an obsession with minimal manning due to personnel costs but, even so, the push for unmanned ships was puzzling.  Well, Defense News website has made the reasons clear to me and I’d like to share the reasons and my analysis with you.  There are two main reasons: 

• Manning
• VLS Cells

 

Let’s look closer at each reason.

 

Manning – Reduced manning expense has long been the Holy Grail of Navy leadership in an utterly misguided attempt to reduce operating costs and, ultimately, shift that budget money to new ship construction.  The ironic aspect of this drive is that it’s completely unnecessary and the problem, itself, has been deceitfully, almost fraudulently, presented.  The Navy would have us believe that the main portion of a ship’s operating cost is manning and that it is unaffordable.  As we’ve demonstrated, this is pure nonsense (see, “The Manning Myth”) and yet it drives the Navy towards unmanned vessels despite no Concept of Operations, no analysis of alternatives, no fleet exercises to prove the validity of the concept, and no public wargaming to support the concept.

 

 

VLS Cells – While not officially stated in this way, the Navy is, quite literally, replacing 22 Ticonderogas containing 122 VLS cells each with 20 Constellation frigates containing 16-32 VLS cells each in the near future.  Yes, a cruiser (large surface combatant) is supposedly coming sometime down the road but that will be many years from now, if ever, and it has already been described by Navy spokesmen as, potentially, a family of assets rather than an actual, single cruiser size ship so that suggests even more small, unmanned vessels as the Ticonderoga replacement.  In any event, we’ll soon be retiring Ticonderogas, Burkes, and SSGNs and the only replacement surface warship program currently active is the Constellation class frigate.  So, soak that in:  the Constellation frigate is the replacement for the Ticonderoga.  Let’s say it again because I know some of you are going to have a hard time accepting it so here it is again:

 

The Constellation frigate is the replacement for the Ticonderoga.

 

Don’t believe me?  Here’s what former Navy destroyer captain and noted naval analyst Bryan McGrath had to say,

 

… on the horizon there is a situation where we’ll be trading guided missile submarines, cruisers and destroyers for Constellation-class frigates. (1)

 

 

Let’s do the math.  We have 22 Ticonderogas with 122 VLS cells retiring for a total loss of 2,684 cells.  We have 20 replacement frigates with - let’s be generous and use the higher number – 32 VLS cells for a total replacement of 640 cells.  That’s a net loss of 2,044 VLS cells from the fleet.

 

It gets stunningly worse when one factors in the imminent retirement of the Burkes and SSGNs.  By the early 2030’s, the Navy will have retired 22 Ticonderogas, 21 Burkes, 4 SSGNs for a total loss of around 5,500 VLS cells and the only replacement on the books is the Constellation class frigate.(1)

 

What is the Navy’s solution to this looming, gaping VLS cell shortage?  Why, it’s the LUSV which the Navy envisions as being, essentially, a missile barge.

 

The LUSV is supposed to be the Navy’s answer to a troubling problem: How does the service quickly and cheaply field hundreds of new missile tubes to make up for dozens of large-capacity ships due to retire over the coming years? (1)

 

The idea of the LUSV is that unmanned vessels will be cheap enough to be procured in large enough quantities to fill that 2,044 VLS cell gap.  The problem, however, is that the LUSV will not only be replacing VLS cells, it will be replacing the associated sensors, targeting, and fire control systems that are also on the Ticonderogas and Burkes and are necessary for the missiles to function.  The desperate hope is that the Navy’s fantasy-based regional network of sensors can take the place of the retiring Ticonderoga’s sensors and fire control systems and support the unmanned vessels.  However, if the enemy can disrupt our data sharing networks (a distinct possibility, as we’ve discussed many times), the LUSV VLS cells will be useless as they will lack any form of organic sensing, targeting, or fire control.

 

We see, then, that the LUSV missile barge is the salvation that the Navy is grasping at to overcome sustained and stunningly bad force structure planning over the last two decades. 

 

Unfortunately, the Navy’s problems are not limited to the technical aspects of the LUSV.  The Navy also has to contend with a very suspicious Congress.  Congress is most definitely not on board with the Navy’s plan.  After multiple stunning acquisition disasters (LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, and others), Congress has lost faith in the Navy’s integrity and ability to execute an acquisition program.  Regarding the LUSV,

 

… Congress is not convinced the Navy did the proper analysis prior to launching into a technically risky, 2,000-ton robot ship.

 

Before going any further, the Navy must conduct a full study examining alternative approaches for fielding missiles downrange.

 

The LUSV has become a flashpoint for a larger problem: After two decades of high-profile problems with programs such as the littoral combat ship and the Ford-class carrier, Congress’s faith in the Navy to make significant technical leaps without close supervision has all but evaporated …  Furthermore, it is unclear that, even if the Navy managed to make the LUSV related technologies work, it would be the right answer for the missile tube problem. (1)

 

Demonstrating that doubt, Congress slashed funding for the LUSV and placed severe constraints on the program, such as prohibiting the addition of VLS cells to any unmanned ship design.  Congress has also taken note of the Navy’s habitual failure to examine alternatives and has mandated that the Navy conduct a yearlong analysis of alternatives, as noted in the quote above.

 

In the 2021 appropriations and policy bills, lawmakers eviscerated funding for the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) development program and laid in stringent requirements for the Navy to work out nearly every component of the new vessel before moving forward with an acquisition program. In all, lawmakers slashed more than $370 million from the $464 million the Pentagon requested. (1)

 

ComNavOps is not alone in questioning the operating concept (CONOPS) for unmanned vessels.

 

… sources both inside and outside the service, as well as analysts who spoke on the record, agreed the Navy has not come up with a convincing concept of operations for the ship. (1)

 

Summary

 

So, we now understand the rationale behind the Navy’s bizarre and obsessive push towards unmanned vessels despite all their attendant flaws, lack of validity, and high programmatic risk.  It cannot be stressed enough that the VLS cell shortfall is not a problem that suddenly manifested itself overnight, without warning.  The problem is a force structure issue and has been obvious for close to two decades.  The Navy clearly knew the retirement schedules and what that would mean for VLS cell counts.  This is a scathing indictment of Navy leadership over the last two decades.

 

The LUSV is a very high risk program.  Setting aside any ship-specific technical issues, the heart of the concept is the assumption of a 100% reliable, uninterruptible, unshakeable, real time data, sensor, and fire control network.  It is this that the Navy should be focused on, not the unmanned ships.  Until this fantasy network can be proven to work and work in the face of all manner of jamming, disruption, cyber attacks, spoofing, etc. there is no point pursuing LUSV missile barges.  Without the network, the missile barges will be just barges.

 

 

 

 

_______________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Unclear on unmanned: The US Navy’s plans for robot ships are on the rocks”, Part 1, David B. Larter, 10-Jan-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2021/01/10/unclear-on-unmanned-the-us-navys-plans-for-robot-ships-are-on-the-rocks/

New Aircraft Frequency

For generations, we’ve built multiple aircraft at a time and had many more waiting in the wings of industrial research and development.  Now, however, we’ve devolved to the point where we produce only one new aircraft every forty years or so.  Consider the frequency of introduction of new Navy combat [meaning fighter or attack] aircraft as demonstrated in the tables below.  I’ve tried to list them all but I’ve likely overlooked one or two.

 

 

 

	Introduced
F4F Wildcat	1940
TBM Avenger	1942
F6F Hellcat	1943
SB2C Helldiver	1942
F4U Corsair	1942
F7F Tigercat	1944
F8F Bearcat	1945
A-1 Skyraider	1946
FH Phantom	1947
F2H Banshee	1948
F9F Panther	1949
F7U Cutlass	1951
F9F Cougar	1952
FJ-2 Fury	1954
A-4 Skyhawk	1956
A3D Skywarrior	1956
F3H Demon	1956
F11F Tiger	1956
F8U Crusader	1957
A-5 Vigilante	1961
F-4 Phantom II	1961
A-6 Intruder	1963
A-7 Cosair	1967
F-14 Tomcat	1974
F-18 Hornet	1983
F-35 Lightning	2019

 

 

 

Now, if we take that data and tabulate the number of new aircraft introduced by decade, the declining frequency trend jumps out, as shown in the table below.

 

 

 

Decade	Number of New Aircraft
1940’s	11
1950’s	8
1960’s	4
1970’s	1
1980’s	1
1990’s	0
2000’s	0
2010’s	1
2020’s	0

 

 

And here it is in graphical form:

  

 

 As we can clearly see, the frequency of new aircraft introductions has dropped dramatically from several per decade in the 1940’s through the 1960’s to nearly non-existent now. 

 

Incredibly, stunningly, unbelievably, we’ve introduced only one new aircraft since the Hornet in 1983.  That’s one new aircraft in the subsequent 38 years.  One aircraft in nearly four decades.  I’m going to pause for a second to give you a chance to let that sink in …   …   …  

 

As a result of the reduced frequency, we’ve gone from having multiple aircraft to choose from and new technology introductions occurring on a regular basis to one mammoth aircraft program every 40+ years and with no possibility of significant new technology introductions.  All we can do is apply peripheral upgrades around the margins of obsolete aircraft in an attempt to keep them even a little bit relevant.

 

We’ve lost the flexibility and adaptability that came from having multiple aircraft types to choose from.  You say the F4U Corsair turned out not to be a great carrier aircraft?  That’s okay, we had other aircraft to choose from and we could make the Corsair a land based aircraft where it was better suited.  We had options.

 

Today, if we were to find out that the F-35 is not well suited for the anticipated Pacific theatre role (spoiler … it’s not!) we have no other choice.  Our next new aircraft is going to be 10-20 years down the road – if we fast track it ... longer if we don’t.

 

When we had multiple aircraft, the aircraft manufacturers engaged in internal research and development and developed new aircraft on their own dime because they knew that new aircraft would be purchased every few years and that they had a good chance of being a provider and making sales.  Now, with only a single aircraft purchased every 20-30 years, there is no incentive for the manufacturers to develop a new aircraft on their own.  The odds are that they won’t get any sales and, if they do, the quantities will, inevitably, be cut and they’ll be lucky to break even on their investment.

 

We’ve also lost the variety that comes from having multiple manufacturers developing multiple aircraft on their own.  Now, we get one aircraft and no variety.  This must change and I've described how (see, "How To Build A Better Aircraft").

There's also the issue of preserving a robust industrial base but that's a topic for another post.

Striking Power of the Fleet

The Navy’s striking power has steadily changed throughout history. 

 

Guns - Initially, sailing ships carried their cannon right up alongside the enemy and then proceeded to pound away until the enemy submitted (sinkings were relatively rare).  With the passing of the age of sail and the advent of steam and armor, the only thing that changed was the range of the guns and the speed and maneuverability of the ships.  The objective was still the same – to batter the enemy until they sank (submitting was no longer an option). 

 

Aircraft - With WWII, the primary striking power of the fleet began to shift from naval guns to aircraft and the aircraft carrier emerged as the new strike force.  This continued through Vietnam and the Cold War.  So called ‘alpha’ strikes were the primary striking power of the fleet.  The battleship was retired without replacement and the largest gun in the fleet was the 5” and most ships have only one of those.

 

Missiles – More recently, missiles have begun to replace the aircraft.  Modern anti-air systems have grown too deadly for manned aircraft, even stealth aircraft, to be considered the primary striking force.  Not only does the Navy not have any survivable strike aircraft but even the limited buy of F-35Cs does not appear to be intended as strike aircraft but, instead, as surveillance and targeting nodes in the Navy’s fantasy network of sensors and missile shooters.  Thus, the Navy appears to envision the F-35C as a missile enabler/supporter rather than a strike asset. 

 

Just as importantly – and perhaps more so – defender’s anti-ship missiles have forced the carrier to stand off to such ranges as to nearly invalidate the use of strike aircraft.  Without a doubt, the new striking power of the fleet is missiles:  cruise, ballistic, hypersonic.

 

 

 

This, then, is the state of affairs, currently.  We are in the final stages of transforming from a carrier strike navy to a missile strike navy.  We already see more than ample proof of this in the form of Tomahawk missiles which have become the main strike weapon of the Navy.  Even the remnants of carrier aviation are geared not at delivering bombs but at launching missiles such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and the developing hypersonic missiles.  As ComNavOps has repeatedly stated, the new role of the carrier is not strike but, rather, escort and protection of the true striking force of the Navy which is the Tomahawk (hopefully, soon to be LRASM) armed Burkes.  SSGNs, until they are retired, also constitute a significant portion of our naval strike power.  While we are not replacing the SSGNs with dedicated replacements, we are expanding the missile carrying capacity of new Virginia class subs so as to provide a replacement in the aggregate.  One can question the wisdom of this but the trend towards missiles as the strike power of the fleet is clear enough.  Just slightly further in the future, one can readily see the movement towards hypersonic missiles on ships and aircraft.

 

While this ends the discussion of the development of naval striking power from its beginnings until now, I offer the next, predictable, future step in strike development for your consideration.

 

AI/Robotics – Though not available in any useful form, yet, one can easily imagine the next step in striking power to be artificial intelligence (AI) enhanced robotics.  Mere missiles will be rendered ineffective by AI-enhanced defenses and lasers which will require AI-enhanced strike weapons to overcome the defenses.  Such strike weapons will run the gamut from individual, small ground robots to AI-enhanced cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles.  The logical extension of this would be AI-enhanced swarms of missiles acting as a single striking entity but with the intelligence to actively and intelligently modify their attack in response to the defenses and targets encountered.

 

 

Lessons

 

Before we discuss what all this means, let’s list the lessons from the preceding discussion:

 

• Aircraft have been replaced by missiles as the striking power of the fleet and Tomahawk cruise missiles have become the standard strike weapon of the fleet.
• The Navy has no stealthy (survivable) strike aircraft.
• The role of the carrier has changed from strike to escort.  Carrier aircraft now exist to defend the Burke strikers.
• Carrier aircraft cannot perform naval strike even with long range anti-ship missiles like LRASM due to the targeting problem.
• Burkes, and SSGNs until they’re retired, are the new striking power of the fleet.

 

 

Implications

 

Now, what do those lessons mean for the future of the Navy?  What are the implications for force structure and operating doctrine?  Here are the issues and implications:

 

We should be adapting the carrier and the air wing to the new role of escort for the real missile shooters, the Burkes/SSGNs.  This means emphasizing long range, air superiority fighters which means that the current F-18 and F-35 are ill-suited and have no place in the future air wing and should no longer be procured.  We’ve already discussed how to obtain a new aircraft in just five years so ceasing procurement will not result in aircraft shortfalls (see, “How to Build a Better Aircraft”).

 

Even trying to use aircraft as LRASM shooters is only marginally effective due to numbers.  For example, a strike aircraft can only carry two missiles for any appreciable distance.  Thus, it would require huge numbers of aircraft to mass enough missiles to create an effective strike.  We’ve noted that it required nearly a hundred Tomahawks to partially destroy a single, undefended Syrian airbase in the recent past.  A full strike against a peer defended target would require 300 missiles or more.  That would require 150 aircraft or the entire combat air wing of four carrier air wings (and that would leave nothing for tanking or carrier defense!).  By comparison, a single SSGN can launch 150+ missiles and two SSGNs meet the requirements for our illustrative strike of 300 missiles.  This is why retiring the SSGNs without replacement is such a mistake.

 

Air wings need to be mainly fighter aircraft with a single shorter range strike squadron that can be swapped out, as needed, to further increase the fighter complement.  The strike aircraft should be a new, simple, low end design conceptually similar to the A-4 or A-7.

 

We need a new, very long range, very long endurance, air superiority fighter.  Conceptually, this would be akin to the F-14 and would encompass a combination of the best features of both the F-14 and F-22.

 

We desperately need a new cruise missile to replace the obsolete Tomahawk.  Presumably, this would be the LRASM which is being developed for aircraft launch and we should be working, right now, on a vertical launch, shipboard version (VL-LRASM), as well.  The Navy has discussed a desire for a VL-LRASM and done some preliminary work but development seems to have ground to a halt.  Further, we should be starting development of the LRASM replacement which should be an AI-enhanced, very long range missile.  The LRASM should be viewed as just a stopgap measure.

 

New missiles need to be self-targeting.  They need to be capable of being fired in a general direction and actively implementing their own search and targeting without the need for traditional surveillance and contact tracking and targeting.  This is a research effort that needs to begin immediately.  Pieces of the concept are already under development but a focused, integrated research effort is needed.

 

We need very long range, stealthy, survivable sensor assets to complement the very long range missiles that we currently have.  Million mile missiles are useless when paired with 20 mile sensors!  Our current UAVs, P-8s, helos, and whatnot that we are depending on for surveillance and targeting are not survivable over a peer battlefield. 

 

We need large caliber naval guns.  Are guns obsolete?  Of course not!  Naval gunfire is overwhelming and superior in every way to aircraft delivered munitions except in range.  There will still be circumstances where close range, overwhelming firepower is needed and large caliber naval guns are still be best solution for those scenarios.

 

 

Summary

 

Understanding the evolution of naval striking power enables us to see the current and future realities.  This allows us to properly design our force structure and assess which assets we currently have that will prove useful in combat and which won’t.

 

For far too long, our force structure design has been based on technology rather than strategy.  We’ve procured whatever new technology we could get without regard to its usefulness – hence, the useless LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, etc.  We need to return to combat needs-based asset design backed by a clear understanding of how naval combat and striking power is evolving.

 

We need to develop a force structure that will actually be useful in the war with China.  Our previous follies have already given us an LCS that has no use, whatsoever, in high end war along with Fords, Zumwalts, JHSVs, etc. that have little relevance or use.  Let’s not keep repeating that same mistake.

The Purge

As we begin the Biden purge of extremists (meaning, conservative white supremacists as opposed to black lives matter or other radical liberal groups) from the Navy, it is interesting to ponder the historical lesson of another naval purge:  the French navy at the time of the French Revolution.

 

The French navy was at a peak around the end of the American Revolution.  However, the French Revolution, 1789-1799, resulted in a purge of ‘elitist’ officers and organizations from the navy as ably described in the following excerpt:

 

The French navy suffered considerably due to the French revolution. Having finished the American War of Independence on something approaching a high (comparatively speaking), the French navy suffered a reverse that it never fully recovered from until well after the finish of the Napoleonic Wars.

 

Like most other European navies of the time, the officers were often from the upper-classes and, as you probably guessed, there was a large-scale purge of these officers in the early period in question. Their replacements were rarely of high quality and, too often, had little or no experience of commanding a warship at sea, much less a warship in combat. Many of the aristocratic officer class fled the country (or failed to return) and these emigrés wound up in the navies of Britain, Austria and Russia fighting against their former homeland.

 

Also the fervor of revolution and its ideal of equality meant that these replacement officers often had little control over the ship's crews. As an example, at the start of 1793 Vice-Admiral Morard de Galles took a small squadron to sea from Brest, upon their return he commented on the crew:

 

“The vaunted ardour which is attributed to them, consists uniquely of the words of ‘patriot’ and ‘patriotism’ which they repeat ceaselessly, and the acclamations of ‘Vive la Nation’, ‘Vive la République’ when they are flattered. Nothing can make them attend their duties.” (1)

 

Another consequence of the revolution was the disbanding of the Marine Artillery Corps (over 5,000 men), whose skilled crew men were considered too elitist. This left the navy with untrained men servicing the guns and the result was to limit the navy's fighting ability considerably.

 

In addition, the dockyards were not immune to the revolution and were centres of uprisings as much as the big cities. After the revolution, like the new ship's officers, the dockyard managers and commandants found that the workforce wasn't as keen on taking orders as it had been. This lead to a loss in efficiency in building and repairing vessels (and an increase in other losses), with the natural result that fewer ships in the navy were fully fit to go to sea. (1)

 

The purges crippled the French navy and left it unable to effectively combat the British navy in the ensuing years.  The lessons from this should be blindingly obvious but are clearly lost on the US Navy, today.  We’re conducting purge after purge of our own and each is further degrading our already hollow force.

 

Wait … purges??  We haven’t conducted any purges, you say.  What is ComNavOps talking about?  Well aside from the Biden ‘extremist’ (conservative) purge which is currently on-going, the Navy has conducted other purges.  Let’s recall …

 

We’ve already purged warriors from the military with our campaigns to feminize the military, lower standards to accommodate women, promote sensitivity, and create a warm and fuzzy, all-inclusive, feel good military.  Remember the Navy slogan, “A Global Force For Good”?  If that didn’t epitomize the ‘warrior-downing’ of the Navy, I don’t know what did!  The standout example of the result of this purging of warriors was the Iranian seizure of two riverine boats and crews by a substantially inferior Iranian force which saw the US Navy boats surrender without resistance by the crews (in direct violation of the US Armed Forces Code of Conduct, see ref (2) ) and the specter of sobbing crew members in captivity. 

 

The Navy has purged any officers with an ounce of combativeness, fortitude, and determination as evidenced by the number of commanding officers relieved each year for ‘loss of confidence’ for piddly, non-naval reasons.  The latest example was the commanding officer relieved for trying to make a celebratory plaque for his ship out of a captured AK-47 rifle from a weapons seizure his ship successfully conducted. (3)  We’ve ensured that the only commanding officers left are those who timidly get along, go along, and take no chances.

 

We’ve purged discipline from the fleet by neutering the Chiefs and their ability to apply one-on-one informal ‘corrections’ to worthy sailors.

 

And, of course, the current Biden purge seeks to remove conservatives who support politically right-leaning organizations.  Left-leaning organizations like black lives matter appears perfectly acceptable to the Navy as a summer of riots, destruction, killings, and seizure of government buildings went unremarked by the Navy. 

 

Merely ‘liking’ a post is now grounds for removal.(4)

 

Just by posting, retweeting, or liking an offensive post on social media — you could be participating in extremism,” Nowell (Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Adm. John Nowell Jr.) said. (5)

 

This is unconstitutional thought-police taken to an Orwellian level.

 

The Navy, supposed defender of the Constitution and free speech, seems to have bought into the Biden purge with an almost religious zeal:

 

“You may not personally know any shipmates with extremist beliefs,” Nowell said. “But I assure you that those forces of darkness are among us.” (5)

 

‘Forces of darkness are among us’ ????  What’s next … burning at the stake?

 

By the way, do you know which Constitutionally guaranteed free speech is most important to defend?  That’s right … it’s the speech you most vehemently disagree with.  Biden and the Navy are doing the opposite and purging the speech they disagree with.  When you join the Navy you accept certain limits on your ability to act but you do not forfeit your basic Constitutional rights.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

As with the French navy, we’re systematically purging our fleet of the very warriors we so desperately need.  Much as I despise bringing politics into this blog, it seems we’re going to have to address the issue because this administration seems determined to turn the Navy into a political and social issue rather than a warfighting organization.  Biden’s purge is pretty transparently a purge not of extremists, in general, but of conservatives who disagree with the Democrat party line.  The speed with which the Admirals have lined up behind the Biden purge is appalling and frightening.  The Navy is losing future battles, today.

 

I really, really, don’t want to be writing these kinds of posts but the Biden administration is forcing politics onto the Navy and it must, therefore, be addressed.

 

For obvious reasons, comments will not be allowed. 

 

 

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(1)https://history.stackexchange.com/questions/20501/what-happened-to-the-french-royal-navy-during-the-french-revolution

 

(2) US Armed Forces Code of Conduct, Article 2. :  “I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.”

 

(3)https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/01/28/navy-destroyer-co-fired-after-trying-make-his-crew-plaque-seized-ak-47.html

Fire Scout ASW - Promise and Challenges

Northrop Grumman (NG) recently conducted an internal test of an ASW (anti-submarine warfare) configured Fire Scout MQ-8C UAV (actually, a modified Bell 407 simulator of the Fire Scout) in Oct 2020.  The test was declared a success (it could have crashed on takeoff and it would have been declared a success – that’s the way these staged tests work) but the real point is that after years of commentator speculation about the benefits of UAV ASW, someone finally made an actual effort, regardless of the real degree of success or failure.  Yes, I’m aware of the 2017 MQ-9A sonobuoy tests but that was sonobuoy integration testing, not ASW testing. 

 

Moving on, let’s take a closer look at both the promise and challenges of UAV ASW.

 

A NG spokesman claimed that the Fire Scout could operate 100 miles from the host ship and with up to 12 hours endurance.(1)  Concept art and verbal descriptions depict a Fire Scout with two sonobuoy dispensers holding a total of 40-48 miniature sonobuoys although testing was apparently conducted with a single, smaller, sonobuoy dispenser.

 

Artist's Concept of ASW Fire Scout

 

Some advantages of an unmanned ASW platform include:

 

Extended Range/Endurance – The MQ-8C can, under the right conditions, extend the ASW range from the host ship and, again under the right circumstances, the endurance of the ASW effort.  The Navy/manufacturer claim 100 miles and 12 hours endurance, however, those are predicated on minimal loads and minimal sonobuoy usage – hence, the ‘right conditions’ and ‘right circumstances’. 

 

If the payload increases (carrying torpedoes, for example), the range and endurance drop dramatically.  NAVAIR lists endurance as 12 hours with a 300 lb payload (2) although this is somewhat misleading since transit time has to be accounted for (an hour out and an hour back, for example, at the 115kt cruising speed(2)).  Throw in reserve fuel/time and the endurance is further reduced.  Add heavier payloads – like a 600 lb Mk 54 torpedo – and endurance will drop drastically.  Still, several hours of loiter time is potentially useful and impressive.

 

Far more importantly, if the sonobuoy usage is heavy, the endurance becomes meaningless.  Once the sonobuoys are gone, the helo has little else to do but return to the host ship.  Yes, it can hang around and listen for a while but with no active contact, that would be largely pointless.  If sonobuoys are dropped in strings of, say, 5, a Fire Scout with 40 sonobuoys would be able to lay only 8 strings.  In a combat scenario, where every slight sonar twitch demands investigation, 8 strings would be used very quickly.  One might recall that S-3 Vikings, acting in the extended hunting role, tended to deploy sonobuoys in chevrons resulting in heavy sonobuoy expenditure.  Assuming a Fire Scout would behave similarly, sonobuoy depletion is an issue.  Thus, endurance is probably a misleading and meaningless claim. 

 

 

There are also some potential challenges to unmanned ASW which include:

 

 

Weapons – Currently, there are no plans to put weapons on an ASW Fire Scout.  This makes the Fire Scout only partially effective and requires two platforms (a second, weapon carrying platform) to perform the function of a single manned helo or P-8.  The lack of weapons also means that the Fire Scout will have to maintain contact until another platform can arrive which is no easy feat.

 

Communications – Operating at a range out to 100 miles puts the Fire Scout well beyond line of sight communications.  It will either have to climb to higher altitude to maintain communications or depend on some kind of satellite communications or other methods which are less likely to be available in combat.  This also raises the issue of the communications broadcasting the helo’s location.  The communications requirement to transmit the kind of data intensive packages involved in ASW detection and tracking – and from multiple sonobuoys! – is enormous, I would assume (not being a combat communications expert).  Add in the requirement that the data be near real time and the comm load is immense and continuous.  This just screams out detection of the Fire Scout.

 

Not to be ignored is the control communications link.  UAVs have a disturbing tendency to lose command link and wander off, never to be seen again.  There will be a certain degree of attrition attributed to command link loss.

 

Off-board Processing.  The communications discussion leads directly to the issue of off-board data processing.  Unlike the old S-3 Viking, SH-60 type helos, or P-8s which have sonar analysts aboard the aircraft, the Fire Scout will, of course, be unmanned and data processing will have to occur aboard the host ship.  This causes the communication issue just described and introduces a degree of lag between the Fire Scout and the host ship.  Of course, ASW is, generally, a pretty slow affair so this will likely not be a severe problem.

 

Payload – Fire Scout is a small helo and payload capacity is uncertain but limited.  I’ve seen widely varying claims but NAVAIR lists the payload as 700 lbs (2).  By comparison, a Mk 54 lightweight torpedo is around 600 lbs.  NG demonstrated a very small, very lightweight, 220 lb torpedo drop from a Bell 407 in 2016.(3)  Of course, it’s highly questionable whether such a small torpedo would be effective against a submarine given that our largest, Mk48 torpedoes, were deemed to be of questionable lethality against Soviet Union submarines.  Smaller diesel subs, less stoutly constructed, might be hindered by such a small torpedo but that, too, is questionable.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

We see, then, that unmanned ASW potentially offers benefits for range and endurance but those benefits exist only under certain conditions and are potentially offset by the challenges such as limited payload, communications, lack of weapons, and off-board data processing.  The ability to potentially push the ASW outer layer further away from the host ship is useful and, to a limited extent, makes up for some of the capability we lost when the S-3 Viking was retired without replacement.

 

The major challenge seems to be the lack of weapons which means that any prosecution requires two aircraft to equal a single Seahawk or P-8.  The ability of an unmanned aircraft (or any platform, to be fair!) to hold contact on a submarine for an extended period until a weapon carrying platform can show up is highly suspect.

 

On balance, I’m not seeing sufficient justification for an unmanned ASW Fire Scout to replace a full size Seahawk helo.  Now, a very small, UAV carrier with a bunch of Fire Scouts might well be a useful addition to any naval group and this is the developmental direction I’d explore. 

 

 

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(1)USNI News, “Northrop Grumman Pitching Fire Scout Helicopter Drone for ASW Missions”, Sam LaGrone, 16-Feb-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/02/16/northrop-grumman-pitching-fire-scout-helicopter-drone-for-asw-missions

 

(2)NAVAIR,

https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/mq-8c

 

(3)The Drive website, “Northrop Grumman Reveals New Mini Torpedo Aimed At Arming And Defending Navy Submarines”, Joseph Trevithick, 21-May-2020,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/33606/northrop-grumman-reveals-new-mini-torpedo-aimed-at-arming-and-defending-navy-submarines