MQ-8C Fire Scout

The MQ-8C Fire Scout is a helicopter-type unmanned aircraft intended to act as a scout asset for the LCS.  The aircraft is based on the commercial Bell 407 helicopter.  The MQ-8C represents a substantial improvement over its predecessor, the MQ-8B, although the improvements come with drawbacks such as increased size which impacts stealth and survivability.  Let’s take a look at what the MQ-8C can do and how it might be used.

MQ-8C Fire Scout

MQ-8C Fire Scout Specifications (1)
Maximum Speed	135 kts
Cruise Speed	115 kts
Service Ceiling	16,000 ft
Std Day Max Endurance w/ 300 lb Payload	12 hrs
Hot Day Max Endurance w/ 300 lb Payload	10 hrs
Empty Weight	3200 lbs
Length	34.7 ft

Note: Wikipedia cites endurance of 15 hours, max speed of 140 kts, max ceiling of 20,000 ft, a range of 150 nmi (170 mi; 280 km), and a payload capacity of 701 lb.  These claims appear to be largely unsubstantiated and, more importantly, unrelated to each other.  For example, if the claim of 700 lbs payload capacity is true, it would significantly affect the speed and endurance as indicated in the table.  In short, the table values seem much more realistic than the Wiki values.

As of the 2018 GAO annual report, the Navy apparently plans to procure 55 operational units with a program unit cost (production and development) of $46.25M each. (2)  Contracts are being issued as fixed-price, incentive type contracts.  It should be noted that the commercial airframe is being provided to the primed contractor as Government Furnished Equipment and the cost for the airframe may not be included in the GAO unit cost estimate. (2) I’m unable to determine whether that is the case or not.

The somewhat limited procurement quantity impacts CONOPS in that it means that the MQ-8C cannot be considered expendable as there would be few or no replacements.  With 30 or so LCS, there are less than two aircraft per ship.  Thus, the inherent non-stealthy character of the aircraft combined with the need to actively broadcast, thus giving away its location, would seem to severely limit the aircraft’s use to very low threat scenarios.

The acquisition program has been run under an accelerated approach which has bypassed many of the normal risk reduction actions and reviews.  Further, the Navy is acquiring the aircraft totally under low rate initial production (LRIP) status which violates Department of Defense acquisition practices.  LRIP acquisition is limited to 10% of the total acquisition.  No surprise that the Navy is ignoring acquisition practices since they routinely do so.

… the program has yet to demonstrate that its critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control—an approach inconsistent with best practices. (2)

The MQ-8C is being equipped with Leonardo-Finmeccanica’s Osprey AESA radar in a 2-panel configuration which provides a 240 degree field of view.  The unit has a maritime surveillance, small target mode, among other modes.  The radar uses a Line of Sight (LOS) communications procedure and is, apparently, intended to operate at high altitudes to enable longer distance communications (longer LOS).

Operational Considerations

Communications.  The radar’s LOS communications requirement means that in order to achieve useful extended coverage range from the host ship the aircraft must fly high and thus be very visible to enemy detection (the MQ-8C being decidedly non-stealthy) and highly susceptible to destruction (having no speed, maneuverability, or countermeasures).  Alternatively, the aircraft can fly very low and decrease its chance of being detected but then the useful coverage range becomes not much more than the 15-20 mile horizon due to the LOS communications requirement.

How a large, slow, non-stealthy, high flying aircraft will survive long enough in high end combat to perform its function is a mystery that the Navy has not yet explained.  Such an aircraft seems very useful for no-threat scenarios but not viable for high end combat.

Detection.  If equipped with radar, the aircraft will be continuously broadcasting its presence.  Radar is like the flashlight analogy – you can see the flashlight much farther away than the flashlight can see you.  So too, with radar.  While there are claimed low probability of intercept radars, the low probability is accomplished by significantly reducing the radar’s power output.  Unfortunately, significantly reduced power output also means significantly reduced range and capability.  So, the radar user is faced with the choice of either broadcasting at full power to achieve significant range and announcing his presence/location or reducing power which reduces range and capability.

The other sensor option for the MQ-8C is EO/IR sensors.  Being passive, these sensors would allow the aircraft to remain as stealthy as its non-stealthy airframe allows by not broadcasting its location.  This offers some potentially useful tactical possibilities although the data communication back to the host ship still requires LOS which means high altitude or short range.

An alternative mode of operation would be the use of passive EO/IR sensors and low altitude with no data transmissions.  The data would be collected and stored onboard the aircraft for download upon its return to the host ship.  Of course, this would require a degree of autonomy from the MQ-8C in identifying and stealthily maneuvering around threats that does not currently exist.  It would also impose a significant lag in data analysis and would negate any chance of using the aircraft for real time targeting.  Still, it would allow the establishment of general situational awareness.

Risk.  As noted above, the limited acquisition quantities render the MQ-8C decidedly non-expendable.  Unfortunately, as also noted above, the aircraft is non-stealthy and non-survivable which means that to be effective the aircraft must be considered expendable and large numbers of replacement aircraft must be immediately available onboard the host ship.  There is an obvious conflict of requirements, here!

In a war, it is possible that production could be ramped up to the point that the aircraft could be considered expendable.  However, that only solves half the problem.  The more immediate problem would be the number of aircraft available onboard the host ship and the LCS simple doesn’t have the room to carry more than a couple.  Thus, the inexorable conclusion is that the MQ-8C must be considered non-expendable and must be operated under a risk-averse doctrine to avoid having the host ship become ‘blinded’.  This suggests that the Navy’s concept of using the MQ-8C as a long range scout using its radar is not viable.  This is why ComNavOps has repeatedly called for large numbers of much smaller UAVs to fill the scout/surveillance role.


Conclusion

The Navy views the MQ-8C as the key to enabling the LCS as a viable anti-ship threat and yet it is difficult to see how the aircraft can effectively and survivably perform the intended scout/targeting function.  The non-stealthy nature of the aircraft combined with the communications constraints simply preclude any effective tactical utilization. 

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(1)Naval Drones website, “MQ-8C Fire Scout”, retrieved 2-Oct-2019,

http://www.navaldrones.com/MQ-8C-Fire-Scout.html

(2)Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Apr 2018, GAO-18-360SP

(3)https://www.leonardodrs.com/media/5350/osprey-mm_data-sheet.pdf

Sonar Performance

There is a strong tendency in the military observer world to accept manufacturer’s claims at face value and, worse, to assume that those claims are absolute and unvarying even as real world conditions vary.  One common example of this tendency is the discussion of sonar performance.  Observers tend to believe that a manufacturer’s maximum range claim is gospel, is always achievable regardless of real world factors, and every object within the claimed range will be unerringly detected.  Of course, nothing could be further from the truth.

Let’s look a bit closer at sonar performance.

I assume that readers have a basic understanding of sonar types and mechanism of operation.  Sonobuoy Tech Systems website provides a good summary of the various sonobuoy/sonar types. (3)

Passive sonar simply listens to all the noise that impinges on its receiver.  It is up to the operator to determine which bits of noise are naturally occurring and which, if any, are manmade.  So, for passive sonobuoys, a target submarine is detected when its noise level rises above that of the background noise for a sufficient period of time and at a sufficient level to be recognized by the sonar analyst (human or software).  Complicating factors include thermoclines, overlapping noise sources such as other ships or biologics, sound reflecting objects, flow noise from water movement over and past objects or over the sea floor, wave noise, channeling phenomena, etc.

In the real world, a single buoy cannot even determine a reliable distance range for the sub. The reasons for this are 1., that the source level is usually not known and 2., that the sound propagation circumstances could differ significantly between positions that may be located only some hundred meters apart. For example, in good conditions, a 100 dB source level could be heard over a distance of several kilometers while the same source level may only be heard over a distance of a few hundred meters at a position where the conditions are poor. (1)

We see then, that passive sonobuoy detections provide a target bearing only – no range, course, or speed.  Over time, and with multiple detections, range, course, and speed can be developed.  Of course, since sonobuoys are fixed locations, either the target has to move or additional sonobuoys have to be deployed to obtain the cross-fixes necessary to develop the target data.

Active sonar suffers from many of the same problems although, in this case, the source noise level and timing is known.  Active sonars provide bearing and range, under good conditions – but not target course or speed.  Over time, with multiple detections, course and speed can be developed.

While sonar detection ranges are classified, we can get some hints from public source data although such hints are exceedingly rare.

DelBalzo and Stangl modeled active sonobuoy performance using detection ranges of 2-8 nm and, in another scenario, 0.6-1.6 nm. (2)

SSQ-15 (B-Size) active sonobuoy (circa 1960) had a range of 2500 yds. (4)

It is important to understand that manufacturer’s claims are valid only under perfect conditions with all physical and environmental factors being favorable in the extreme and no acoustic countermeasures being employed.  It is also necessary to understand that the claims are based on laboratory tests and software simulations.  To the best of my knowledge, no manufacturer has their own modern naval submarine for use in testing.  At times, they may be allowed to take part in Navy sponsored testing but even that, to the best of my knowledge, is rare and only involves submarine surrogates, not real submarines.  DOT&E has repeatedly reported on the lack of fidelity of submarine surrogates so that offers the manufacturer little realistic information.

A further complicating factor is acoustic countermeasures. 

One such measure is the now ubiquitous anechoic tile that all modern submarines are coated with.  Designed to absorb sound, the US Navy believes that a submarine with anechoic tiles has a good chance to remain undetected even by active sonar at all but very short ranges.

A similar measure is the use of bubbles which trap and ‘deaden’ noise.  This can be either air bubbles injected into the water, as in the Navy’s Prairie/Masker system for surface ships or embedded in paint-like coatings which are applied to vessel hulls.

What this means for the purpose of this discussion is that claimed sonar detection ranges are unrealistically optimistic since none take into account acoustic countermeasures.

We see, then, that manufacturer’s sonar detection claims are unrealistic to the point of uselessness.  Divide a manufacturer’s claims by a factor of 10 and you might begin to approach the realistic sonar range performance.

Considering all factors, it seems likely that realistic sonar detection ranges against modern submarines are something on the order of 0-5 miles for active sonar and zero to dozens of miles for passive sonar although we have to note that passive detection at extended ranges requires just the right combination of factors.

The commonly held belief that a single active sonar ping will instantaneously provide a 100% perfect, target quality data picture for many dozens of miles around is pure fantasy.  This belief was epitomized in some of the comments in the previous ASW corvette story (see, “Shallow Water ASW Story”) wherein commenters objected to the use of active sonar by ASW corvettes in the story, believing, incorrectly, that a single ping by the corvette would instantly provide perfect and complete target data with a submarine torpedo launch occurring seconds later.

All of this discussion should also reinforce the negative ‘review’ of the Sea Hunter in a recent post in which I expressed the utter disbelief that a small, low powered Sea Hunter sonar could continuously track a modern submarine when our very best, large, high powered, ship mounted sonars operated by the best analysts backed by state of the art software could not (see, “The Sea HunterMyth”).

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(1)“Submarine Tracking by Means of Passive Sonobuoys”, Kristian Johansson and Per Svensson, FOA-R-97-00440-505-SE, June 1997, ISSN 1104-9154, Div. of Command and Control Warfare Technology, SE-581 11 Linkoping, Sweden,

https://www.foi.se/download/18.3bca00611589ae7987881/1480076259197/FOA-R--97-00440-505--SE.pdf

(2)“Design and Performance of Irregular Sonobuoy Patterns in Complicated Environments”,

Donald R. DelBalzo, Technology Solutions Group, and Kevin C. Stangl, OPNAV N874, 0-933957-38-1 ©2009 MTS,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a527878.pdf

(3)Sonobuoy Tech Systems website,

https://www.sonobuoytechsystems.com/products/

(4)“The Evolution of the Sonobuoy from World War II to the Cold War”, Roger A. Holler, U.S. Navy Journal of Underwater Acoustics, Jan-2014,

http://www.navairdevcen.org/PDF/THE%20EVOLUTION%20OF%20THE%20SONOBUOY.pdf

More Ships For Europe? Why?

Has any naval commander, anywhere, ever, said he needed less ships?  Of course not!  Commanders always want more ships whether they need them or not.  If nothing else, command of more ships enhances their personal prestige.  So, in a stunning utterly predictable development, the commander of US naval forces in Europe, Admiral James Foggo (Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa – how’s that for a title?) has announced that he wants more ships.

The head of Naval Forces Europe is making a pitch for more ships to provide presence, training and crisis response capability in his area of the world, even as tensions are rising globally.

Adm. James Foggo told USNI News that he’s seeing more Russian ships, submarines and aircraft in the Atlantic and Arctic oceans and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean seas, as well as words and actions from Russians that can ratchet up tensions in the region.

U.S. 6th Fleet, which falls under Naval Forces Europe, has four destroyers, two expeditionary fast transports and a command ship at its disposal on a routine basis. Foggo said he needs more. (1)

So, the good Admiral needs more ships?  Why?  What will more ships do that we can’t do now? 

From what I’ve observed, our ships are doing nothing productive now.  We’re not physically confronting Russia.  We’re not drawing any lines and then enforcing them.  We’re not preventing their presence anywhere.  We’re not harassing their submarines.  We’re not harassing their aircraft.  We’re not employing any countermeasures, whatever form that might take.  Thus, more ships would just mean more ships being unproductive and racking up maintenance wear and tear.

Instead, we just sail around, raising tensions by our very presence. 

Foggo cites 125 days of 6^th Fleet naval presence in the Black Sea as something positive.  How, specifically, is that of benefit?  Have we modified Russian behavior, in a positive direction, by being there?  I know we’ve angered them so we’ve modified their behavior in a negative direction.  I’m not against angering or confronting the Russians but only if we gain something from it and I can’t see anything we gain from mere presence with no force backing it up.  Our default policy is appeasement, as we’ve discussed many times.  Well, appeasement combined with presence merely produces resentment by the target with absolutely no benefit.

Would more ships in the area have prevented the Russian annexation of Crimea?  Would more ships in the are have prevented the Russian invasion of Ukraine?  Would more ships in the area have persuaded the Russians not to violate the INF treaty?  Would more ships in the stop the ongoing unsafe harassments of US ships and aircraft by Russian aircraft?

… Foggo said, the threats in the region are serious and growing … (1)

So, Foggo acknowledges that the threats are growing.  Wait a minute …  We have a permanent naval presence there that was supposed to prevent threats from growing and yet they obviously did not.  So, having proven, by Foggo’s own statement, that the presence of naval assets doesn’t diminish threats and, instead, actually increases them, why would more ships produce a better result?

“They have militarized Kaliningrad, there is a lot of hardware in the form of anti-access/area-denial capability, anti-ship cruise missiles and [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] systems that allow targeting of NATO forces while they’re in the Baltic,” he [Foggo] said.

The Russians have done the same thing in Crimea after annexing it from Ukraine. (1)

Again, we had a naval presence and it clearly accomplished nothing as far as reducing threats and may well have provided the motivation for the Russians to increase the number, type, and prevalence of threats.  So why would we want to send more ships to accomplish nothing?  Can’t we accomplish nothing with the ships we already have there? 

He [Foggo] came back to the need for more ships as a remedy, saying, “our strong presence in the theater is a deterrent in and of itself.” (1)

Clearly, Admiral, our presence is deterring nothing.  More ships are not the answer – a better geopolitical strategy is the answer.  We need specific, achievable objectives.  If ships can contribute to the accomplishment of those objectives then, sure, we’ll give you more ships.  However, absent any coherent strategy or objectives, more ships are pointless and a good argument can be made that they are counterproductive.

Having thoroughly debunked the Admiral’s desire for more prestige ships, let’s now turn our attention to another major reason why more ships is a bad idea: Europe should defend Europe.  While we needed to support Europe as they recovered from the carnage of WWII, that time is now gone.  It’s long past time for Europe to defend itself.  If Admiral Foggo is genuinely concerned about Russian threats to Europe, he should be calling for Europe to step up and defend itself.  I won’t belabor this because we’ve covered this in previous posts (see, “Europe – Why?”).

In short, absent a viable strategy and specific, achievable objectives, there is no good reason to ask for or grant more ships for Europe. 

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(1)USNI News website, “Admiral: U.S. Needs More Ships in Europe to Counter Growing Russian Threats”, Megan Eckstein, 1-Oct-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/10/01/admiral-u-s-needs-more-ships-in-europe-to-counter-growing-russian-threats

Heading Off The Tracks

At its most basic, our armed forces exist to fight and win wars of existential concern: true threats to our national security and existence.  This means peer wars. 

Yes, we assign many other tasks to our armed forces but those are lesser concerns and, frankly, the wisdom of many of them is suspect.  But, I digress …

Our armed forces exist to fight and win peer wars.  Every plan we make, every item we buy, and every exercise we conduct must be run through the filter of, ‘how will this enhance our peer war capability?’.  If we can’t answer that with a good, solid rationale then we shouldn’t do it.  Yes, we can plan, equip, and train for lesser contingencies after we’ve completely nailed down our peer war capabilities and nothing we do should detract from our peer war capabilities.

With that in mind, let’s take a look at the latest nonsense and drivel being put forth by the Navy/Marines.

Consider this statement,

The Navy and Marine Corps recently used a new Littoral Combat Force concept to command and control units spread over 2.2 million square miles of land and sea, in the latest demonstration of what a future operation near and on the shore might look like. (1)

Outstanding!  A demonstration of future peer war combat capabilities!  I mean, what else could such a momentous effort be geared towards, right?  But, hey, how about some more detail?  Okay, there’s this:

After the two services signed out the Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) concept in 2017, they’ve been trying to understand what gear they’d need to support moving small units of Marines around the littorals to take a beach, establish sea control from ashore, and more. (1)

Uh, wait … what now?  Small units of Marines?  How is that related to a high end, peer war with China?  How are small units going to defeat China?  I’m getting a bad feeling about this.

There was also no command and control model that adequately reflected that, under LOCE, there would no longer be a traditional blue-in-support-of-green or green-in-support-of-blue relationship. Rather, ships at sea would provide cover for Marines trying to get ashore, who could then set up temporary anti-ship missile launchers and contribute to sea control from ashore … (1)

Ships at sea provide cover for Marines trying to get ashore who then establish sea control???  This is classic Catch-22, circular logic and we've discussed it before (see, "Land To Enable Landings????").  We have to land Marines in order to establish sea control but if we can land Marines don’t we already have sea control?  The Marines have stated before that they envision landing and establishing sea control so as to enable landings.  Landing to enable landing?  Again, circular logic!  If you need to establish sea control to enable landings (and you do!) then how do you land the Marines who will establish the sea control?  I know … I’ve got a headache, too, but this is the Marine’s latest vision of future war.

Surely this major concept and core foundation for future war can’t all be about small units, can it?  Well, there’s this,

Last year, the Navy and Marines first tested out a key tenet of LOCE: the Littoral Combat Group, which would combine a traditional ARG and embarked Marine force with at least one surface combatant … (1)

So … a key tenet … an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MEU) plus one escort ship?  That’s the big game changer for future war?  This is not peer war combat power.  If we’re going to war against anything more than an irate Boy Scout troop we’re going to be in trouble! 

I think the real problem and the real goal is incorporated in the following statement.

He’s [CNO Gilday] certainly intrigued by that, and I [Expeditionary Strike Group 3 Commander Rear Adm. Cedric Pringle] owe him a few things as we capture all of our lessons learned and try to rewrite and organize the Navy’s integrated maritime power and talk about how we fight and how we also render assistance” in a disaster relief type of scenario. [emphasis added] (1)

You see it right there at the end of the statement.  I think this is all geared towards the ‘render assistance in a disaster relief type of scenario’ because it sure isn’t geared towards peer war!  Troublingly, the Navy does not seem to see peer war as a either a responsibility or a likelihood.  Instead, they seem focused on very low end threats, humanitarian response operations, and budget expansion.

Of course, what would all this be without some good buzzword bingo?

“I suspect that when he [Marine Commandant] comes out with his guidance here real soon, there’s going to be a heavy portion of it that discusses naval integration and how the Navy and Marine Corps and the Coast Guard can work better as an integrated American seapower team.” (1)

An ‘integrated American seapower team’!  I’m bursting with pride!  In fact, I think I just wet myself a little.

What a bunch of garbage all around.  We have no concept of how to wage a peer war and, far worse, we seem to have absolutely no interest in trying to develop a concept.  The Navy and Marines seem to believe that peer war is not even a possibility which must make the Chinese very happy.

The part I don’t understand is why the Navy is allowing the Marines to drive this effort.  It’s the Marines who came up with the Catch-22 ‘land to enable landings’ idiocy and they’re, somehow, getting the Navy to play along.  Baffling.  Our Navy and Marines are most definitely headed off the tracks.

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy, Marines Practice ‘Littoral Combat Force’ Construct in Alaska”, Megan Eckstein, 23-Sep-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/09/23/navy-marines-practice-littoral-combat-force-construct-in-alaska

LCS Giffords Naval Strike Missile

Here's a picture of the LCS Giffords with the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) angled box launchers.  The ship is carrying 8 missiles, one in each box, as shown in the photo below.  I apologize.  The photo image probably exceeds the normal blog display space (at least it does on my PC) but I wanted to display it as large as possible and the Blogger engine does not handle images very well.

NSM on LCS Giffords

I'm highly critical of the LCS, as you well know, but I have to be fair.  The NSM finally gives the LCS some actual punch.  Of course, targeting remains the challenge.  The NSM far outranges the ship's sensors.  The LCS will have to depend on an off-board sensor of some sort.

By the way, does anyone have any idea what that green discharge down the side is?

There's no particular point to this post.  It's just an interesting visual of the NSM mount on an LCS.

The Sea Hunter Myth

The unmanned Sea Hunter vessel has already assumed near mythic proportions in the minds of many observers – and, apparently, the Navy! - despite that fact that it has yet to demonstrate any actual performance whatsoever and despite the complete absence of any performance specifications and despite the lack of a specific mission and Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

Even by US military standards, the excitement surrounding Sea Hunter, a prototype unmanned submarine tracking vessel developed at a cost of $20m by US defence research agency DARPA, is startling. Variously described as “a highly autonomous unmanned ship that could revolutionise US maritime operations” and “a new vision of naval surface warfare”, the drone was developed through the agency’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ASW ACTUV) programme. (1)

Wow!

‘startling’

‘revolutionize US maritime operations’

‘a new vision of naval surface warfare’

That’s some lofty praise and expectations for a vessel that has not yet demonstrated any capability, whatsoever.

Sea Hunter

Here are some of the claims being made for Sea Hunter:

-It has been described by the Navy as being capable of finding and following submarines indefinitely using a high frequency, fixed sonar array. (1)

-It has been suggested by observers as being capable of conducting complete, independent ASW operations.

-It has been suggested by commentators as being capable of conducting AAW/ASW wide area surveillance while, apparently, being undectectable.

“The drone boats could also scout well ahead of manned ships for the enemy… and get close to particularly high value assets, such as aircraft carriers or amphibious assault ships.” (1)

-It has been suggested as a replacement for capital ships.

“ACTUV represents a new vision of naval surface warfare that trades small numbers of very capable, high-value assets for large numbers of commoditized, simpler platforms that are more capable in the aggregate,” said Fred Kennedy, director of DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office (TTO). (1)

-It has been suggested as a mine countermeasures vessel and was tested in the role by DARPA. (1)

-It has been suggested as a harbor protection vessel.

-It has been suggested as a logistics supply vessel.

-It is planned to be used as an intel collection vessel.

… plans already in the pipeline include equipping drones with anti-submarine weapons and additional sensor suites to gather visual and electronic intelligence. (1)

As a refresher, the $20M Sea Hunter is a moderate size vessel (Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel, MDUSV) of 132 ft in length, capable of 27 kts, and was designed by DARPA to operate unmanned and autonomously.  The vessel appears to be non-stealthy in the extreme.  It is designed to be modular with regard to payloads.  DARPA indicates the vessel can operate for 90 days with a range of 10,000 miles. (1)

DARPA has developed Sea Hunter, a prototype unmanned submarine tracking vessel with the ability to autonomously patrol the seas for months on end at a fraction of current costs. (1)

DARPA tested the Sea Hunter with the Towed Airborne Lift of Naval Systems (TALONS – a tortured, contrived acronym if ever there was one!) which is, essentially, a parasail carrying a sensor or communications package aloft via a cabled parasail. (1)

Operating costs are reported to be in the range of $15,000-$20,000 per day versus $700,000 per day for a destroyer. (1)

Sea Hunter was transferred from DARPA to the Office Of Naval Research (ONR) in early 2018.

So, there’s the background.  Now how about some analysis?

ASW – The small size and low power of whatever sonar array the vessel has suggests a very limited sonar range.  Also, the vessel has no helo which, on this blog, nearly every commentator has stated is mandatory for successful ASW (ComNavOps, of course, does not believe helos are mandatory for successful ASW – useful, yes; mandatory, no).  Despite this, the Navy claims that the vessel, with a low powered, small sonar array and no helo, will be able to find and track submarines indefinitely despite that fact that our very best full size, high powered sonars on Burke destroyers, with the benefit of human interpretation of data and anticipation of submarine behavior and tactics and using helos to help search and prosecute, cannot reliably detect and track submarines.  Does it really make sense to you that a $20M vessel with a small, low powered, unmanned sonar can outperform our Burkes?  If that was really true and if that was what testing has already demonstrated (and I’m unaware of any realistic testing having been performed) wouldn’t the Navy be engaged in a crash program to replace the Burke sonars with these small, low powered sonars that require no manning and yet are many times more effective?  And yet, they aren’t.  What does that tell you?

Some commenters have suggested a swarm of Sea Hunters sweeping ahead of a surface group and clearing the path of submarines.  Again, the very limited range of the sonar fit precludes any useful ASW sweep capability unless several dozen such vessels were employed and who is going to control and perform data analysis on several dozen vessels simultaneously?

Surveillance/Intel/Scouting – The small size and limited power again limit the range of whatever sensors might be placed on the vessel.  More importantly, the vessel is non-stealthy, in the extreme, and would have a lifespan of minutes in a forward battle area.  How anyone thinks this vessel will sail ahead of a surface group and survive long enough to collect any useful surveillance data is beyond me.  Remember that to achieve any useful sensor range will require active radar which also pinpoints the craft’s location to the enemy.

Survivability – The vessel has no self-defense capability and is non-stealthy in the extreme.  It’s lifespan will be measured in minutes in a battle zone.

Control – Unless these vessels are going to operate 100% autonomously – and no one believes we’re at that level of software capability – then someone has to control the vessels and analyze any data they collect.  Given that most of the proffered applications call for many vessels, likely dozens, operating together, who is going to control the vessels and how will they do it?  It will require continuous, wide area, two-way communications which doesn’t exactly fit with combat EMCON requirements.

Logistics – The use of a Sea Hunter as a logistics transport vessel is nearly pointless.  It has no significant cargo capacity and no means to load/unload whatever it might carry.

Capital Ship Replacement – This is stupidity on a platter.  Our surface fleet is already too small and steadily shrinking and we would replace what we have with these combat useless vessels?  Claiming that the Sea Hunter is more capable in the aggregate is analogous to claiming that infantrymen are more capable in the aggregate than an armored unit of tanks.  Infantry have their uses but they are not more capable than armored units.

Patrol – This is the one application that is potentially useful.  Such a vessel might well make an efficient and effective harbor patrol craft.  Of course, that’s a peripheral task rather than combat but it would still be useful if the vessel’s cost can be contained.

Conclusion

It is worth bearing in mind that for most of these suggested uses a MH-60R/S helo which costs about the same as Sea Hunter (helo costs are $28M-$42M depending on type and source) has much more mobility, speed, capability, and survivability than a Sea Hunter.  In fact, the only redeeming quality of the Sea Hunter compared to a helo is the endurance and even that is only valid under certain defined circumstances.  The helo’s endurance is unlimited in the sense that it is carried by a host ship and so can travel as far and as long as the host ship.  The helos endurance becomes a factor only when it’s in the air – for example, dropping sonobuoys.  In comparison, given the Sea Hunter’s utter lack of survivability, its endurance is likely to be a non-factor!  All things considered for the helo vs. Sea Hunter, it almost seems as if we’re reinventing the wheel just to be able to make it unmanned.

Any reasonable analysis of Sea Hunter capability reveals the vessel to be very heavy on hype and very light on any useful function.  As I’ve harped on so many times, this is what a CONOPS does – it lays out, in detail, how a vessel will be used.  Sea Hunter has no CONOPS and, therefore, it can do anything and everything, or so its proponents would have us believe.

Sea Hunter, as it currently exists, is a hyped-up myth, nothing more.  That’s not to say that it isn’t worthwhile as a research program.  By all means, let’s continue to explore autonomy and unmanned vessels.  However, the Navy has already committed to a fleet of these vessels (specifically, their small and medium displacement unmanned vessels) with absolutely no CONOPS and no idea of how to use them or what their capabilities are (hint to the Navy: I’ve just told you what their capabilities are; they don’t have any!).  Does this sound eerily familiar?  It should.  It’s exactly what the Navy did with the LCS and you see how that turned out.  Remember all the projected uses for the LCS?  Why it was going to revolutionize the Navy and win wars single-handed.  The reality is that they have no use, are a drain on resources, can’t seem to sail two days with a breakdown, require more manning than the Perrys they replace, and have no place in combat.  It appears as if the Navy is now committed to building the unmanned version of the LCS.  Well, no one ever accused the Navy of being able to learn lessons!

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(1)Naval Technology website, “Sea Hunter: inside the US Navy’s autonomous submarine tracking vessel”, 3-May-2018,

https://www.naval-technology.com/features/sea-hunter-inside-us-navys-autonomous-submarine-tracking-vessel/

Another Pointless Fatality Investigation

The Marines have released their findings on the Dec 2018 crash of a KC-130J tanker and a F/A-18D Hornet which resulted in the death of all five Marines on board the tanker and the death of the pilot of the Hornet.

The findings were the usual collection of “pilot error, inadequate oversight of training and operations and an unprofessional command climate”.  I won’t bore you with the details because we’ve covered them many times – every time there’s an incident, it’s always the same litany of problems and they never get fixed.

Here’s the part I want to focus on:

“The many findings of the investigation reconfirm our need to constantly evaluate risks, identify unsafe conditions, and ensure internal controls are being followed,” reads the summary.

Commanding General of III Marine Expeditionary Force Lt. Gen. H. Stacy Clardy wrote, when signing off on the investigation, that “we must all learn from these failures and not repeat them,” according to the summary. (1)

These statements make me want to vomit because of their meaninglessness.  We’re not going to learn from the incident.  We’re not going to make any true corrections.  We’re just going to repeat the mistakes in the next incident.

Hey, Marines, here’s a radical thought … your report says you should constantly “evaluate risks, identify unsafe conditions, and ensure internal controls are being followed”.  How about, just for shits and giggles, instead of waiting for the next incident and then repeating the same report results almost verbatim, why don’t you investigate BEFORE an incident occurs?  That’s right – before.  Pick any unit and any operation and investigate it as if an incident had occurred and I guarantee you’ll find all the same failings.  Do that and you can correct the problems BEFORE they become the next fatal incident.

Hey, Gen. Clardy, if you care so much, why don’t you investigate your force now, before they die?

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(1)USNI News website, “Marines: Lack of Training, Command Problems Contributed to Fatal 2018 Crash off Japan”, Megan Eckstein, 23-Sep-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/09/23/marines-lack-of-training-command-problems-contributed-to-fatal-2018-crash-off-japan