Chinese Type 05 Amphibious Assault Family

We’ve frequently noted that the US amphibious doctrine cannot be executed for a variety of reasons.  It’s pure fantasy.  China, on the other hand, is building a very capable and credible amphibious assault capability and is seemingly leaping right over the obstacles that have plagued the US. 

One example of a problem that has stymied the US is as basic as amphibious vehicles themselves.  Sure, we have the AAV/ACV but it’s a landing craft that, once landed, becomes a poor man’s Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) of sorts.  It has no significant firepower and little armor.  It’s not a combat vehicle by any stretch of the imagination.

The Marines played around with a high speed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) for many years before finally admitting failure and cancelling the program.

We’re left, currently, with an AAV which is slow, has no significant firepower, is limited to a few miles of effective swimming range, and lacks significant armor.

Leaping right over these problems, the Chinese have developed and are fielding a family of amphibious vehicles that put what we have to shame.  The vehicle family is the Type 05 which is made up of multiple, specialized variants all based on the common Type 05 chassis. 

Characteristics common to all the variants include:

• Planing hull powered by two water jets
• Diesel engine with 1475 hp water / 550 hp land
• 15 kts (28 km/h) water / 40 mph (65 km/h) land
• Hydraulic actuated, hinged bow plane that deploys out from the vehicle to create a low drag, hydrodynamic effect for high speed; steering is accomplished via water jets and transom flaps
• Standard hull armor provides (1):

• protection at the front against 12.7 mm AP round up to 100 m
• protection at the sides against 7.62 mm AP rounds
• protection at the rear against 7.62 mm AP rounds

Production began in 2006.  Production numbers are difficult to come by but estimates suggest 200+ vehicles deliver as of 2016.  The breakdown of variant types is unknown.

Let’s take a bit closer look at the major variants.

ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle

This is essentially an amphibious Bradley and gives the Chinese the ability to land a mechanized, semi-armored infantry force with mobility and serious firepower and anti-tank capability.

• Front engine,  rear passenger compartment
• 30 mm turret;  300 rds/min
• HJ-73C Anti-tank guided missile launcher; 2x single rail launchers each side of the turret
• 7.62 mm co-axial gun
• Crew of 3
• 7-8 troops (reports vary with some suggesting a carrying capacity of 10 troops)
• 2x 4-barrel smoke grenade launchers
• Rear troop door
• 58,422 lb (26,500 kg)
• Rated for Sea State 4 (2)

ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicle

ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

This gives China an initial assault wave, heavy firepower vehicle that is very similar in concept to the US WWII LVT(A)-4 amphibious tank.  The US found this type of vehicle to be absolutely essential for amphibious assaults and I see no reason why the requirement has changed today.  In fact, given the absence of naval gun support, an initial wave heavy firepower vehicle is even more essential.

• Front engine,  rear passenger compartment
• 105 mm low recoil, stabilized, rifled gun

• armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS)
• high explosive (HE)
• high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds
• 105mm laser beam riding anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM); indigenous version of the Russian 9M117 Bastion anti-tank missile

• Capable of firing at sea
• 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun mounted on the turret
• 7.62 mm co-axial machine gun
• 2x 4-barrel smoke grenade launchers
• Turret face armored against 25 mm (3)
• Crew of 4

ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

ZTD-05 Amphibious Tank

Type 05 Command Vehicle

Type 05 Recovery Vehicle

Summary

Consider what this family of amphibious vehicles gives China.  It provides a complete package of amphibious capabilities ranging from heavy firepower (105 mm tank gun) to lethal mechanized infantry (IFV with 30 mm and anti-tank missiles) and including command and control and vehicle recovery – all able to swim ashore IN THE INITIAL WAVE.  The US Marines have nothing comparable although they have publicly expressed a desire for a 30 mm turreted variant of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) as well as command and control and recovery variants.  At the moment, however, the Marines have only the old AAV while China is building and deploying the entire family of vehicles.  Perhaps it's time to start copying Chinese assets like they've been copying so many of ours?

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(1)Defense Updates blog, “Chinese Amphibious Type 05 / ZBD05 / ZTD05 Family of IFV / AAV”, 8-Jan-2013,

https://defenseupdates.blogspot.com/2013/01/chinese-amphibious-type-05-zbd05-ztd05.html

(2)https://www.janes.com/images/assets/045/88045/Red_seas_Chinas_advancing_amphibious_force_capabilities.pdf

(3)http://ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AAAV.html

Radar Fallibility

I constantly hear from commenters about the infallibility of radar.  For example, I’ve repeatedly stated that it is quite likely most missile defense engagements will start at the horizon and yet there are always people quoting some maximum radar range and stating, with absolute certainty, that an E-2 Hawkeye, for example, will unfailingly detect the missiles and enable engagements hundreds of miles out.  Well, here’s a documented example of a Hawkeye’s (two actually!) failure to detect a low flying, inbound target. (1)

Note: thanks to Navy Matters commenter, “FM” for the link. (1)

The exercise in question occurred shortly after Desert Storm.  A B-52 bomber was tasked with attempting to reach attack range, inside 200 miles, against the USS Ranger and its air wing.  The defending force consisted of two E-2 Hawkeyes, F-14s for CAP, EA-6Bs, S-3s, and A-6s.  The short version is that the B-52 got within 20 miles of the carrier before being detected and announcing its presence.

This was a giant, hulking B-52, not some small, sleek, wave-clipping missile!

Radar is NOT the infallible, all-seeing, omniscient eye that so many believe. 

This is analogous to the documented Cold War exercise of a carrier group sitting off the Russian coast and remaining undetected for an extended period.

In the real world, detection of any object by any means is a challenge.  We need to keep that reality firmly in mind as we discuss the various Navy plans and concepts that all assume perfect situational awareness on our part and zero awareness on the enemy’s part.  The reality will be quite different and that reality strongly suggests that many of our plans and concepts desperately need to be re-evaluated.

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(1) Username: FM, Navy Matters, “USS Boxer – A Second Drone”, August 5, 2019 at 11:36 PM

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25572/confessions-of-an-e-2c-hawkeye-radar-operator

Freedom of Navigation Versus Innocent Passage

The US Navy engages in a practice they refer to as Freedom of Navigation (FoN) exercises as an attempt to enforce international rights as regards the movement of ships on the high seas.  While the term, ‘Freedom of Navigation’ is derived from the UNCLOS treaty (1), UNCLOS defines no such FoN procedure.  Thus, as practiced by the Navy, the procedure has no legal backing and is not a recognized enforcement act.  As such, it has no legal standing and accomplishes nothing from a legal perspective.  What it attempts to accomplish is the normalization and acceptance of the FoN rights related to a specific body of water as granted under UNCLOS.  Legally, there is no need to do this as FoN rights cannot be lost by failure to exercise them.  In a practical sense, the Navy procedure attempts to remind other countries of the FoN rights so as to prevent the acceptance of abridgement of those rights by countries making fraudulent claims to international waters.  The practice is intended to ‘send a message’ disputing the subject country’s fraudulent claim.

The US Navy’s FoN procedure is quite simple.  A ship passes through the disputed area, generally within 12 nm of the associated land. 

This passage is intended to demonstrate the UNCLOS FoN rights.  Ironically, the procedure actually reinforces the disputing country’s fraudulent claim because the procedure actually meets the requirements and definition of Innocent Passage, as described in UNCLOS (2).

Summarized, Innocent Passage is the right of a ship to pass through another country’s territorial waters in an ‘innocent’ manner.  The requirements of the passage are laid out in UNCLOS and, essentially, require that the passing vessel proceed in a continuous and expeditious movement with no prejudicial actions.  Thus, the passing ship cannot stop, land or launch aircraft or boats, use sensors to collect information (spy), exercise weapons, fish, or conduct research.

With this definition in mind, we can see that the Navy’s FoN exercises actually conform to the UNCLOS Innocent Passage definition.  Given that Innocent Passage can ONLY occur within a country’s territorial waters, the FoN can be construed as granting de facto territorial status to the waters in question, thereby reinforcing the disputed country’s territorial claim rather than disputing it!

If the Navy really wanted to dispute the territorial claim, the FoN procedure should be modified to have the passing vessel stop, exercise weapons, launch and recover aircraft, and operate sensors.  That would clearly demonstrate that the ship was NOT engaged in Innocent Passage but was, instead, exercising its Freedom of Navigation in the disputed waters.

Thus, sailing past one of China’s illegal, fraudulent, artificial islands actually reinforces China’s claim of sovereignty rather than disputing it because the passage meets the requirements of Innocent Passage which can only be associated with a valid territorial land mass.  The Navy is unwittingly granting and acknowledging China’s claims!



Discussion points:

1. If FoN doesn't work, what can more effectively accomplish the purpose?
2. How do you evaluate Iran's seizure of our riverine boats and crews in light of the legal requirements of Innocent Passage?
3. Does FoN accomplish anything?
4. Should we be using Innocent Passage to 'tweak' China and Russia's noses?  Before you answer, consider that they've done that to the US in Alaskan waters.
5. Is the actual FoN message, perhaps, that we're too weak willed to contest the Chinese expansion?

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(1)UNCLOS, Part VII High Seas, Section 1. General Provisions, Article 87 Freedom of the High Seas

(2)UNCLOS, Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Section 3. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea, Subsection A. Rules Applicable to All Ships, Article 19 Meaning of Innocent Passage

USS Boxer - A Second Drone

It is now being widely reported that the USS Boxer, which reportedly downed an Iranian drone using jamming, also engaged a second drone, at the same time.

U.S. Central Command says that one Iranian drone crashed into the sea after the USS Boxer took what Central Command called "defensive action" against it last Thursday. It said the Boxer also "engaged" a second Iranian drone at the same time, but could not confirm it was destroyed. (1)

Set that aside, for a moment, and recall that the Navy wants to operate a distributed lethality concept which is based on a vast network of all-seeing, all-knowing data links assembled into a master picture and then distributed to all the ships in the region.  Thus, every ship, whether it uses its own sensors or not, will know, with unerring accuracy, the location and targeting information about every enemy asset in the region.  This will allow the distributed ships to co-ordinate and mass their fires on the unsuspecting and hapless enemy fleets.

The Navy is applying the same basic concept of vast networks and data links to AAW defense in the form of an advanced co-operative engagement capability (NIFC-CA).

Now, let’s return to the Boxer engagement.  According to the Navy, one drone was downed and the Navy doesn’t know what happened to the other.  Consider the implications of that statement … they don’t know what happened to the other drone.  The ship had all manner of radars, sensors, optical sensors, EW equipment, Mk1 Eyeballs, and who knows what else applied to a drone that was, by all accounts within a thousand yards so of the ship, and they don’t know what happened to it.

Recall the Burke destroyer that supposedly engaged several incoming anti-ship missiles off Yemen a while ago?  Despite Aegis and all manner of other sensors, the Navy couldn’t say whether any of their missiles hit any targets or what happened to the targets.  In fact, careful analysis of the reporting revealed that they couldn’t even say for sure that there were any actual incoming missiles.

Recall the giant hulking cargo ships that two Burke destroyers never saw and collided with.

Are you seeing the pattern?  Despite the manufacturer and the Navy’s claims of omniscient sensing, we can’t actually keep track of ships, UAVs, and incoming weapons right next to us!  So, how are we going to achieve this regional, distributed lethality, all-seeing, all-knowing master sensor picture or the perfectly networked NIFC-CA AAW defense?

We’re basing our naval offense and defense on a claimed capability that has been proven, time and again, to be woefully inadequate.  When you can’t keep track of a drone a thousand feet from you under non-combat, perfect conditions, how are you going to track every enemy asset in a regional distributed lethality network under electromagnetically challenged conditions?  The answer is obvious – you’re not!  And yet, we’re proceeding with the assumption that we can and will.  At what point do you stop believing unfounded claims and start believing actual field performance evidence?  I think that point is now.  The Navy needs to stop believing in Unicorns and Fairy Dust and start looking at reality.

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(1)Miami Herald website, “US now says it ‘engaged’ 2 Iranian drones, not 1”, Associated Press, 23-Jul-2019,

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article233033167.html

Amphibious Assault - Port Seizure

I’ve previously discussed amphibious assaults and stated that I consider the need for such assaults to be extremely unlikely under any foreseeable strategy.  Sure, there could be the odd small scale raid or diversionary feint but there just is no need for large scale assaults. 

However, the Marine Corps insists that such a capability is needed so let’s address what I consider the most likely amphibious assault scenario: a port seizure.  The Marines refuse to discuss it or even consider the possibility so we’ll do it for them. 

Short of a massive, multi-year buildup there is just no possibility of logistically sustaining a sizable invasion across a beach.  That only leaves the option of seizing an existing port to support the unloading of cargo ships at a rate sufficient to sustain a major invasion.  The astute historian will note that this is exactly what the objective of the WWII Normandy D-Day assault was.  Since all ports are associated with city structures and infrastructures, the roads leading to and from the port will prove every bit as critically important for quickly dispersing the unloaded supplies as the port itself.

Here are the main aspects of an amphibious port seizure and the more detailed points associated with them.

Initial Seizure

Port – The port, itself, must be seized, obviously.  The key is to seize it as quickly as possible, to minimize the time the defenders have to destroy the facilities such as cranes, piers, docks, ramps, and warehouses.  The best method of seizure is an initial airborne assault to quickly place infantry in and around the port to seize the facilities.  Simultaneous with the airborne assault must be an amphibious assault with heavier weapons, artillery, and armor to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the port.

Roads – Airborne troops should also be used to seize key roads leading in and out of the port so as to prevent immediate counterattack.  As with the port, additional amphibious troops will be required to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the roads.

Warships – It will be necessary to operate warships in the closed and congested waters of the harbor/port to provide cruise and ballistic missile defense, gun support, and counterbattery fire.  This is completely contrary to current Navy doctrine and will require new doctrine and tactics.

Mine clearance – It is hard to imagine that any modern port will not be heavily defended with mines.  Given that speed is the key to successful assaults, in general, and seizure of an, at least, semi-functioning port, mine clearance must be accomplished extremely rapidly to allow warships, supply ships, transports, and repair vessels access to the port.  For example, the WWII D-Day assault involved hundreds of minesweepers to achieve the necessary clearance in a combat-useful time frame.  Currently, we utterly lack the capability to perform this chore.

Holding/Defending

C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) – Being a known, fixed location, a seized port will be subject to intense mortar and artillery fire.  Mobility, the mantra of modern militaries and the presumed solution to mortar and artillery fire, does not apply to seizing and holding a port.  Our forces will be static and fixed.  Uh, oh!  That’s an operational and doctrinal oversight!  C-RAM protection will be required. 

Missile Defense – Aegis warships will be required to establish a protective missile defense umbrella over the port.  This may be complicated by large buildings obscuring the radar view of the ships and may require an offboard, networked sensor.  However, we currently lack a communications and network system that is proven capable of functioning in the face of electronic and cyber countermeasures.

Road Defense – Roads are simultaneously the avenue for enemy counterattacks and the means of moving supplies out to the main invasion effort.  Defending the road system, especially early on, will be manpower (infantry) intensive and require large quantities of armor for mobile defense.

Repairs and Rebuilding

Barring some incredibly good luck, the enemy will likely destroy the port facilities to a very large degree.  We will need to rebuild most of the facilities.  We will need the ability to unload with only minimal port support while repairs are on-going.  We will need to rebuild under fire.  Who will do this?  How will they be protected?  What equipment is needed?  Are we trained to rebuild port facilities while under fire (hint:  we aren’t)?

Loading/Unloading Operations Under Fire

Since the port’s cranes will have likely been destroyed, we’ll need ships with their own large cranes as a stopgap unloading measure until we can rebuild facilities.  A dedicated crane ship or two would also come in very handy.  We’ll also need large numbers of fork lifts, trucks, etc. for quickly moving the unloaded supplies out and to the invasion force.  Initially, all of this will occur while under fire.  Are we prepared and trained to unload and disperse supplies while under fire?  Are we prepared to disperse supplies very quickly so as to avoid the buildup of large stockpiles (meaning very attractive targets)?

Dispersal

The key, and the entire point, to seizing and using a port is the ability to quickly disperse incoming, unloaded supplies out to the main invasion force.  The dispersal (meaning transport of supplies) will be complicated by the fact that there will only be one or two routes and those routes will be known to the enemy and, thus, subject to continual attack.  Are we prepared to fight our supply convoys through?  Do we have the necessary doctrine to secure roads, establish defended zones around the roads, and protect convoys?  Are we mentally prepared to inflict the degree of collateral damage on the surrounding areas that will be required to clear them of enemy forces?  Ironically, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines, the bane of our Iraq/Afg efforts, will be a non-threat in this scenario since, presumably, we’ll kill anyone/anything even remotely approaching the transport roads – unless, you know, we try to fight a zero-casualty, zero-collateral damage type of war which would be incredibly stupid but is exactly what we’ve done in Iraq/Afg.

Summary

Other than for occasional small scale raids, over the beach assaults are neither feasible nor operationally warranted.  Port seizure, however, is mandatory.  There is simply no other way to logistically supply a modern, major assault force with the required volume and tonnage of supplies.  I believe that this is, or should be, the Marine’s core mission. 

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that port seizure requires a specific and specialized force with specialized equipment, doctrine, and tactics – almost none of which exists, today.  Being amphibious, the Marines are ideally situated to provide much of this capability although it would require a complete rethinking of their purpose and a complete rebuilding of their force structure. 

The issue of airborne troops, alone, is an interesting one.  Would these troops come from the Marines or from existing Army units?  Would the preferred airborne delivery be parachuting or helo insertion?  These are the kinds of questions that need to be explored in realistic exercises.  Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there has never been a port seizure exercise by the US military in recent decades.

If port seizure is as important as I believe it to be then we need to begin developing the force necessary to do it.  If one would argue that port seizure is not important then I need to hear how we’ll logistically support a major invasion force.

Commandant's Guidance

The new Commandant of the Marines, Gen. David Berger, has issued his “Commandant’s Planning Guidance” document (1) which sets the course for the Marine Corps.  While all Commandants do this, this one is stunning in its bluntness and rejection of established practices and policies. 

Note: page number references are provided in the following discussion, for your convenience.

The document seems to be starting from the premise of Berger’s predecessor, Commandant Neller, who stated,

The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment. (p.1)

This Commandant seems to be taking the statement to heart and looking to modify the Corps to be able to meet the requirements of future combat, as he sees them.  Fair enough.  Let’s run through some of the major changes.

Force design is my number one priority.  …  We will divest of legacy defense programs and force structure that support legacy capabilities. If provided the opportunity to secure additional modernization dollars in exchange for force structure, I am prepared to do so. (p.2)

This seems to be suggesting that extensive termination of legacy equipment and capabilities is coming.  Potentially, this is a very good thing as all the services have extensive legacy equipment and capabilities that are ill-suited to our next war – with China directly or Chinese proxies.  The danger here is that what Berger deems unusable legacy capabilities may actually be quite useful.  One such example is tanks.  The Marines have been shedding tanks both from inventory (meaning active units) and from deployment with tanks being left out of the inventory of deployed ARG/MEUs.  There is a worrisome trend in the military, today, to eliminate or de-emphasize firepower in favor of data and networks.  As we’ve discussed repeatedly, this is misguided, to put it politely.  Since the guidance document offers no specifics, we’ll have to wait and see what gets cut and what gets emphasized.

This also raises a larger question.  The changes called for in the guidance document look to be substantial, sweeping, and revolutionary.  That begs the question, are they wise?  This is all going to happen based on the views of one person, Gen. Berger.  If he’s right that’s great but if he’s wrong we could see the Corps irreparably harmed for decades to come.  For example, this Commandant seems to be continuing and reinforcing his predecessor’s attempt to become part of the naval campaign – a very questionable proposition that duplicates many existing naval capabilities to no good purpose.  An example of the duplication is Berger’s statement that he sees value in the ‘Lightning Carrier’ (the F-35B LHA) (p.3).  This is an attempt to move in on the carrier budget with a decidedly inferior capability compared to the Nimitz/Ford.

There has been no discussion of the proposed changes nor has the Commandant invited any discussion.  In fact, the tone of the document strongly suggests that discussion will be actively discouraged.  That’s never a good thing.  This is the Emperor’s Clothes scenario.  Given the history of Navy and Marine leadership, my confidence that this one person has the right vision for the Corps is very low. 

Moving on …

The Commandant describes the organizational force emphasis.

The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) will remain our principal warfighting organization; … III MEF will become our main focus-of-effort, designed to provide U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (U.S. INDOPACOM) and the Commander, 7th Fleet with a fight-tonight, standin force capability to persist inside an adversary’s weapon systems threat range, create a mutually contested space, and facilitate the larger naval campaign. (p.3)

Nice to see that he recognizes that China is the main threat.  Disturbing to see, again, the attempt to move in on the Navy responsibilities by ‘facilitating the larger naval campaign’.  Commandant, you’re not in the naval campaign business.  Stay in your lane.

Forward deployed forces are addressed.

The majority of defense professionals continue to support our conclusions regarding the efficacy of forward deployed forces …

This is not intended to be a defense of the status quo as our forces currently forward deployed lack the requisite capabilities to deter our adversaries and persist in a contested space to facilitate sea denial. (p.3)

Again, good and bad.  The good is that the Commandant recognizes that our currently forward deployed forces are incapable and bad that, despite that evidence, he wants to continue the practice.  The key will be how and whether he can make those forces more capable. 

One avenue the Commandant suggests, and another example of duplicating capabilities, is using HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) to launch anti-ship missiles. (p.3)  I have yet to hear anyone elucidate a viable CONOPS for such a capability.  Sensors, in particular, are a weak link that no one has addressed.

Regarding the amphibious force structure, the Commandant makes a noteworthy and wise statement.

We must continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future amphibious portion of the fleet. (p.4)

He recognizes that our forces are too concentrated and represent too big a risk,

… illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the preferred option. (p.4)

and calls for more numerous and lower end transport ships so, good for that.  However, he then continues his expansion into trying to run the Navy with this statement,

…  the Navy and Marine Corps must ensure larger surface combatants possess mission agility… (p.4)

I’m sorry but when did it become the Marine’s job to define larger surface combatant capabilities?  He then blatantly states that he’s looking to expand the Marines by absorbing some traditional Navy responsibilities.

… we must engage in a more robust discussion regarding naval expeditionary forces and

capabilities not currently resident within the Marine Corps such as coastal / riverine forces, naval construction forces, and mine countermeasure forces. We must ask ourselves whether it is prudent to absorb some of those functions, forces, and capabilities to create a single naval expeditionary force whereby the Commandant could better ensure their readiness and resourcing. (p.4)

He’s flat out saying that he thinks the Marines should be running chunks of the Navy and that he, the Commandant, is the person best able to run portions of the Navy.  Simply stunning!  The various services have always had a battle for budget slice and responsibilities but this is a naked power grab.

The Commandant then rules out traditional amphibious assaults.

Visions of a massed naval armada nine nautical miles off-shore in the South China Sea preparing to launch the landing force in swarms of ACVs, LCUs, and LCACs are impractical and unreasonable. (p.5)

Okay, that being the case, why are the Marines buying ACVs?  Why are we maintaining a large amphibious fleet that costs untold billions of dollars to buy and operate?  To be fair, the Commandant notes that the current amphibious fleet is not ideal.

He also correctly notes the vulnerability of the MPF fleet.

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) … our MPF ships would be highly vulnerable and difficult to protect. (p.5)

Disturbingly, the Commandant seems totally committed to the mythical, hidden, forward operating base, dubbed Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).

EABO enable naval forces to partner and persist forward to control and deny contested areas where legacy naval forces cannot be prudently employed without accepting disproportionate risk. (p.11)

This is exactly the kind of vague, near-magical capability that the Marines have been claiming without ever explaining how such a base will be maintained, supplied, and conduct significant operations all while remaining hidden and immune from enemy fires.  Until someone can explain that, this concept will remain pure fantasy.  The belief that this kind of base can perform all manner of combat miracles while ‘legacy naval forces cannot be prudently employed’ is wishful thinking at its most extreme.

The intrusion into naval matters continues,

We must develop capabilities to facilitate sea denial and sea control … (p.13)

Again, the Marine’s responsibility is forcible entry and actions from the sea, not sea denial and sea control.  The Marines lack the ability to execute their own responsibilities let alone intruding on the Navy’s.  Again, this intrusion is a budget grab, pure and simple.

In summary, the Commandant clearly has a vision for the Corps – a significantly different vision than any of his predecessors and he makes it clear that he has no interest in entertaining any discussion of his planned changes.  That’s a very risky position to take.  Dissent or disagreement is stamped out and rigidity is codified.  If his changes are all correct then … great.  If not, no one will tell him and, even if they do, he’s making it clear that he won’t listen.

To be fair, there is much to like in the document.  Many aspects of it have been discussed in this blog and I wholeheartedly approve.  However, there is much that is quite disturbing.  The systematic grab of naval responsibilities is the most troubling and is already leading to inefficient duplication of capabilities while neglecting core capabilities and missions.

For better or worse, this Commandant seems determined to radically change the Marine Corps for decades to come.

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(1)Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 2019, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant's%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700

Mining Hainan

Given the near complete absence of mine countermeasure assets in the US Navy, the nightmare scenario in a war is an enemy that uses a few submarines to lay a handful of mines in mainland American ports and then has only to sit back and watch the Navy convulse in an effort to race back from the war front to clear and protect our ports.  Our entire MCM fleet - all 6-8 LCS (and the few Avengers and HM-53E helos that we might not have yet retired) – would have to be brought back from any overseas missions to conduct port clearance.  Even then, we’d only be able to clear and maintain a maximum of 8 ports even using the minimal, and inadequate, tasking of one LCS per port.  Unfortunately, the US has many dozens of ports.  While this mammoth convulsion was on-going, our commercial shipping would be brought to an abrupt standstill.  A clever enemy – and no one is accusing Russia or China of not being clever! – would be able to institute a total blockade of the entire United States via a handful of submarine laid mines.  How’s that for a return on investment in low cost mines and a few subs?

Such a move would have the added benefit, for the Chinese, of depriving the US fleet of its overseas MCM capability which means the fleet would be unable to go anywhere that mines were even suspected – which would be almost everywhere!  Thus, in one stroke, the Chinese could paralyze both our commercial shipping and our naval actions.

So, clearly a bad news scenario for us.

Fortunately, we are frantically working to build lots of additional dedicated minesweepers and new MCM helos.  Oh wait … we’re actually not doing that at all.  We’ll set aside the staggering stupidity of our non-existent MCM plan and force and press on to a related aspect .

Having recognized the catastrophic nature of this scenario, why can’t this scenario be turned around?  Why can’t we use our subs to lay a few strategically placed mines in and around the Chinese Hainan base/port, for example?  Why can’t we mine the various chokepoints around the South China Sea through which Chinese merchant shipping must pass?  Why can’t we mine the Taiwan strait?  And so on.

Theoretically, there is no reason why we can’t turn the scenario around.  Of course, the reality is that we no longer have the capability or weapons to achieve such a scenario.  Our mines are nearly obsolete and our subs almost never practice mine laying (see, "Offensive Mine Warfare - Operational Usage").

The attractiveness of being able to apply against our enemies the same mine warfare that we dread encountering is so blindingly obvious that one can’t help but be stunned by our near total neglect of offensive mine warfare.  What little mine awareness we have is directed towards the ill-suited and ill-conceived LCS MCM module.  We need to remember and regain our offensive mine warfare mindset and capability.