USS Ford - Ups and Downs

As we all know, the new aircraft carrier, the USS Ford, has had many problems, delays, and cost overruns due, mainly, to the Navy’s use of concurrency in attempting to develop new technologies at the same time as production.  Predictably (well, for everyone but the Navy), the attempt has failed.  The EMALS launch system and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) have been two notable failures.  However, there is another new technology that has been just as problem plagued but has not received as much attention – the ship’s Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE).  These elevators are used on carriers to move munitions from the ship’s magazines to the flight deck and handling areas for subsequent loading onto the aircraft.  The elevators are quite small compared to the main aircraft elevators.

One would think that small weapons elevators would be straightforward, well known technology and one would be correct.  However, the Navy opted to abandon the well established elevators of the Nimitz class and, instead, develop a brand new electromagnetic elevator that works similar to the EMALS catapult system.  As with the EMALS, development has been difficult and the Ford was delivered with non-functional elevators, all 11 of them.

Here’s more evidence of the lack of elevator installation upon delivery of the Ford.  A NavSea official stated,

 

The Post Shakedown Availability is planned for 12 months, with the critical path being Advanced Weapons Elevator construction … (5)

Note the use of the word “construction” as opposed to repair or fine-tuning or modification or something similar.  The elevators appear to have simply not been installed or, at least, not in anything resembling a usable form!

And,

The Navy announced plans to repair the ship’s 11 “Advanced Weapons Elevators” — all of which have been non-functional since the carrier first took to the water.

Currently, two of those malfunctioning elevators are being used to help “to identify many of the remaining developmental issues for this first-of-class system,” the Navy says. They expect to bring the full suite of elevators online with this round of repairs, but were sure to include in their statement that all the elevator systems “should have been complete and delivered with the ship delivery” in May 2017. (1)

If the Navy acknowledges that the elevators should have been “complete and delivered with the ship delivery”, why did the Navy accept the ship?  They should have refused delivery until the elevators were installed and functioning. 

  

To review, the elevators were initially developed by Federal Equipment Company (FEC) along with MagneMotion and Northrop Grumman Newport News.  FEC received a contract from Northrop in 2005 to build 11 elevators for the Ford aircraft carrier.  To be clear, these are the smaller weapons elevators, not the three large aircraft elevators.

On paper, the elevators are quite impressive.  Of course, paper claims always are!

FEC’s Advanced Weapons Elevator demonstrates a 24,000-pound lift capacity, with 150% overload capacity. Designed to move at 150 feet per minute, it accelerates to full speed in 2 seconds. The state-of-the-art elevators increase capacity over 200% and speed by 50% compared to the legacy elevators.

Features include motor thermal protection, emergency braking, and [a] "smart control system" that estimates the payload weight. (2)

FEC has built a test facility housing a full scale elevator with 32 feet of travel. (2)

The Advanced Weapons Elevators are similar to the EMALS catapult system in that they use linear motors and magnetic effects to move the object - the elevator, in this case, instead of an aircraft.

Here’s a brief summary of how the elevator works: (3)

• Linear motors are attached to each corner of the elevator
• Magnets inside each motor interact with electric coils lining the shaft
• A current pulses through the coils, lifting the magnets and platform
• Magnets hold the elevator in place

Of course, all this capability comes at a cost.  The AWE is around twice the cost of existing Nimitz class weapons elevators. (3)

Interestingly, the government (Naval Surface Warfare Center) posted notice in Feb 2018 of their intent to award a sole source contract to Hunt Valve Actuator (Virginia) for an elevator unit, installation, parts, support, logistics, etc. (4)  I don’t know if this means that the Navy has gotten fed up with FEC and decided to switch suppliers or if they’re simply developing an alternate source (then why the sole source designation?) or some other reason.

Aside from the idiotic use of concurrency, which the Navy seems absolutely wedded to in the face of repeated, overwhelming evidence of its failure, there are other potential issues with the electromagnetic elevators.

Advanced Weapons Elevator

Electromagnetic Shielding.  One of the major faults of the EMALS catapult system is that it uses very large and very powerful electric motors which, unbelievably, are not electromagnetically shielded.  Former CNO Greenert once referred to them as “electromagnetic beacons” when discussing emissions control (EMCON) protocols.  The stray electromagnetic radiation will keep anyone who’s interested well informed about the Ford’s location. 

The question arises, are the AWE elevators shielded?  If a major component like the EMALS is not shielded, it is highly unlikely that the elevators are.  Of course, given the size and emissions of the EMALS, the additional stray emissions from the elevators are unlikely to matter much.

This is just another example demonstrating that the Navy has forgotten how to design ships for combat.

Repair.  Yet another major fault of the EMALS catapult system is that single catapults – there are four – cannot be repaired without taking all of the catapults down.  The electrical supply system was designed in such a way that a single catapult cannot be electrically isolated for repairs.  The catapults are all up or all down.  The inability to isolate and repair a single catapult is a breathtakingly stupid flaw for a combat system.  The question is does this same flaw apply to the weapons elevators?  I have no idea but it’s a question that demands an answer.

In summary, the weapons elevators are an all too common example of what is plaguing the Navy today.  The desire to rush non-existent technology into production is causing cost overruns, schedule delays, and serious credibility issues.  If the Navy would only show a little patience and let new technologies mature in the lab, where they belong, they would come out far ahead in the long run. 

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(1)News Rep website, “Repairs on the USS Gerald R. Ford engines and elevators to cost another $120 million”, Alex Hollings, 16-May-2018,

https://thenewsrep.com/103256/repairs-on-the-uss-gerald-r-ford-engines-and-elevators-to-cost-another-120-million/

(2)Federal Equipment Co. website,

http://military.federalequipment.com/products/Elevators/AWE

(3)WVXU website, “The Navy's Next Generation Of Weapons Elevators Was Designed Here In Cincinnati”, Ann Thompson, 9-Apr-2018,

http://www.wvxu.org/post/navys-next-generation-weapons-elevators-was-designed-here-cincinnati#stream/0

(4)https://govtribe.com/opportunity/federal-contract-opportunity/advanced-weapons-elevator-engineering-services-n6449818r0013

(5)The National Interest website, “The Reason the Navy Is Exploding Bombs Near Its New Nuclear Aircraft Carrier”, Kris Osborn, 14-May-2018,

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-reason-the-navy-exploding-bombs-near-its-new-nuclear-25813

Aegis Cruiser Retirement Schedule

As you know, the Navy has tried for several years to eliminate the Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers before their service life is even up.  The reason for this is a baffling mystery other than the Navy’s constant fixation on new hulls, no matter how useless (looking at you, LCS).

Congress has, thus far, thwarted the Navy’s efforts which has led the Navy to concoct a scheme of de facto retirements whereby Aegis cruisers are placed into “modernization” for multiple years and will only be brought back into the fleet on a one-for-one replacement for decommissioned cruisers.

Here is the retirement schedule for the Aegis cruisers and their service length at that point. (1)

Year      Ship                           Service Yrs

2020  Mobile Bay         33

2020  Bunker Hill        34

2021  Antietam           34

2021  Leyte Gulf         34

2022  San Jacinto        34

2022  Lake Champlain     34

2024  Philippine Sea     35

2024  Princeton          35

2025  Normandy           36

2025  Monterey           35

2026  Chancellorsville   37

You’ll note that the service life retirement ages do not agree with the recent ship service life extensions that have the Ticonderogas serving 42-52 years!  I guess we’ll ignore that little inconsistency since the service life extensions were nothing but wishful thinking anyway.

This accounts for 11 of the 22 Aegis cruisers.  The remainder will have undergone the “modernization” and displace the ships listed above.  Presumably, after 2026 the “modernized” cruisers will be retired in short order.  This is not at all what Congress intended.  Once again, the Navy has found a way around Congressional intent and direction.

The Navy is continuing to push to put around half the class into a reduced operating status but Congress’ earlier resistance and distrust continues.  Recall Congress’ earlier feelings,

Lawmakers made clear in hearings last year that they didn’t trust Navy leadership to bring the ships back into the fleet once they were taken out of service, particularly in bulk quantities. (2)

For the time being, the 2/4/6 plan remains in effect

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(1)Defense News website, “The US Navy will start losing its largest surface combatants in 2020”, David B. Larter, 8-Oct-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/09/the-us-navy-will-start-losing-its-largest-surface-combatants-in-2020/

(2)USNI News website, “FY 2017 Budget: Navy Wants to Modernize Last 7 Cruisers Instead of Following 2/4/6 Directive from Congress”, Megan Eckstein, 9-Feb-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/02/09/fy-2017-budget-navy-wants-to-modernize-last-7-cruisers-instead-of-following-246-directive-from-congress

No LCS Deployments

There are 12 LCS in commission.

Zero will deploy in 2018. (1)

Not much more to be said.

_____________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Navy May Not Deploy Any Littoral Combat Ships This Year

”, Megan Eckstein, 11-Apr-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/11/navy-may-not-deploy-littoral-combat-ships-year

Forward Base

Much traditional naval strategy and, indeed, military strategy, in general, is focused on forward bases at strategic locations.  For example, the famous naval theorist Mahan considered overseas bases to be one of the three pillars of sea power.  A base/fort could control critical naval and commercial passage through a narrow strait, for example.  The entire Pacific campaign of WWII was a series of assaults intended to seize ever more forward bases to enable ever more forward assaults culminating in the final assault on mainland Japan.  And so on.

Note:  We’re not talking about the Marine’s wet dream of hidden jungle bases operating a couple of F-35Bs.  We’re talking about major bases that allow the operation of significant military assets – Guam, today, for example.

From a naval perspective the historical purpose of a forward base was to place the fleet near a vital area of interest.  Why?  Because the fleet’s weapons and, thus, its sphere of influence, were short ranged – on the order of a few to twenty miles.  The forward base was necessary to allow the fleet, and its weapons, to operate near the area of interest.  The existence, today, of thousand mile cruise missiles within the fleet renders the need for forward base proximity moot or greatly modified.  With such greatly enhanced weapon ranges, forward bases do not need to be as near the enemy as in earlier times.  In fact, cruise and ballistic weapons may actually outrange the operational ranges of the ships and aircraft which, again, suggests a reduced need for forward bases. 

What do all these forward bases have in common?  They all are situated so as to allow their associated military power to be brought to bear on strategically vital locations.  Expressed another way, they enable military power to operate in strategically important areas far from home ports/bases.  Thus, there is both a firepower and logistics element to a strategically important forward base.  Of course, the military expert understands that the firepower and logistics are ultimately one and the same!

To better understand this, let’s look a bit closer at the Pacific campaign in WWII.  What was the defining characteristic of the forward bases?  What made Okinawa more desirable as a forward base than, say, some island in the Caribbean?  The answer is range – the operational range of the military assets of the time.  More specifically, it was the range of the ships and aircraft tied to, and supported by, the base.  How far could a task force operate and not lose the link to its resupply (see?  this is where the logistics enters into it)?  The at-sea resupply ships could only operate so far from safe haven without risking being sunk.  The task force could only operate so far from land based air support and resupply/repair (logistics, again) facilities.  The forward based air forces could only fly so far on a tank of fuel.

In pre-aviation times, forward bases used to be staging areas for fleet operations and amphibious assaults.  This changed in WWII and now, with the development of modern air forces, forward bases also exist to support air operations which, to be effective, means sortie rates.

One of the main range related driving factors behind the WWII Pacific forward bases was the range of the heavy bombers and, to an extent, their escorts.  Today, the Air Force likes to claim that they can reach any target on Earth from home bases in the continental US.  With lots of caveats and limitations, that’s a true claim.  So, does that eliminate the need for forward bases, at least so far as aviation is concerned?

No.  Even if we accept the claim of global reach for the US B-1/2 force, for sake of discussion, we need to keep sortie rate in mind.  While we might be able to reach any target on Earth, we certainly can’t do it on any operationally useful basis because the sortie rate is far too low.  Yes, we reached that target on the other side of the world but it required a 24 hour mission to do so.  With a B-2 bomber force of around 19 operational aircraft (if that many), a couple of sorties per week in a war is next to useless.  A forward base allows a significant increase in sortie rate.  So, strategically located forward bases are still needed for aerial strike purposes.

Of course, the ultimate range factor was not the operational ranges of the ships and aircraft but, rather, the range to the ultimate target – that being the Japanese mainland in WWII.  Thus, the selection of forward bases was predicated on reducing the operating range to the ultimate target.

In the case of bombers, what has changed today is the range of the bomber.  The B-29 Superfortress, for example, had an unrefueled combat radius of around 1000-1500 miles.  In comparison, the modern B-2 has an unrefueled combat radius of 3000 miles or so.  Thus, the forward base doesn’t need to be as close to the ultimate target as it needed to be in WWII – at least for large bombers.

We see, then, that the selection of strategically desirable forward bases was based on the operating ranges of the various ships and aircraft and the overall range to the ultimate objective.

We ever so briefly touched on another major factor in forward base selection and that is defensibility.  There is a balance between forwardness and defensibility.  It does no good to establish a base just off the enemy’s coast because they’ll destroy it faster than we can build it.  Thus, a base must be far enough away from the enemy to allow for defense by stretching out the enemy’s attack which allows time for defense.  It would also be ideal to be outside the enemy’s weapon ranges.  However, modern cruise and ballistic missiles with their thousand or several thousand mile ranges make it very difficult to find a place that is truly outside enemy weapon ranges!

So, where does all this leave us?

Understanding the purpose behind a forward base we can see that we still need forward bases – just not as far forward as they used to be. 

The two main driving forces behind base location are,

·         Attack (ship and aircraft) ranges that provide operationally useful sortie rates

·         Defense ranges  that provide an acceptable chance of successful base defense by reducing enemy attack types and numbers

On the surface, the immense ranges of modern aircraft would seem to suggest that bases can be well back from the ultimate target.  However, this is mitigated by the need for operationally useful sortie rates.  Thus, the base can be back but not so far as to reduce sortie rates to operationally irrelevant levels.

Interestingly, ship operational ranges have, in many cases, actually decreased since WWII !  Of  course, this is offset by the vastly increased range of ship launched cruise missiles which makes the overall operational range much greater than in WWII.

Unfortunately, the enemy’s weapon ranges have also increased which has the effect of driving the forward base further back from the area of interest.  The conundrum, here, is that in order to locate a base within operationally useful distance of the target, we have to accept that it is in range of enemy attack.  In WWII, in contrast, the Pacific forward bases were within attack range of the next, or ultimate, Japanese target but outside of Japanese counterattack range – the ideal situation!  The Japanese had no equivalent of the B-29, for example, and their naval forces after Midway were insufficient to mount a credible, decisive attack on the US forward bases. 

This operationally desirable situation does not exist today.  Chinese ballistic missiles, for example, can easily reach any useful US Pacific base.

Putting all of these considerations together we can see the need for forward bases that are close enough to the area of interest to generate useful sortie rates for aircraft – fighter aircraft with their shorter ranges being the limiting factor, as opposed to bombers – but far enough back to allow for defensive reaction time and some degree of limitation of the enemy’s attack options.  Given today’s aircraft and ships, this suggests forward bases located around 700-1000 miles from the area of interest.  Beyond around 1000 miles, the sortie rates for fighters drop unacceptably.

Unfortunately, given the number and range of enemy ballistic missiles, this leaves the forward base solidly within enemy attack range.  This leads to the final operational reality that we need to come to grips with: we will need to fight to defend our forward bases.  We have not had to do this since, well … Guadalcanal, maybe, and that didn't go well in terms of the success of air base.  The Air Force has never had to defend a base while simultaneously carrying out attacks.  The Navy has never had to defend a forward base the way the Japanese had to defend Truk or Rabaul, for example.  We do not have the institutional mindset of defending a base.  If we did, we’d immediately give up the fantasy of austere, hidden, forward bases – they’re simply not logistically sustainable or defensible.

Consider Guam – our major Pacific, anti-Chinese base.  Based on open source information, it’s vitually undefended.  It has no hardened shelters, no underground sub pens, no underground hangars, very limited ballistic missile defenses, no major defensive fighter presence, no permanent anti-submarine acoustic sensing system (SOSUS type) hundreds of miles out, no alternate runways, no hardened fuel depots and magazines, no dedicated protective submarine force, no dedicated anti-suface ship/aircraft force, limited anti-aircraft and anti-cruise missile batteries, etc.

To be sure, some of these defensive measures, such as underground pens and hangars, may not be possible given the physical size of the island and other measures, such as increased numbers of ships and aircraft, can be fairly quickly beefed up in the run up to war.  Other measures, however, such as hardened shelters and acoustic arrays, could and should be in place today.  Of course, it’s possible that some of the measures are in place and simply not recognized in open sources, however, I think that’s unlikely.  Our society is too open to have too much of that type of  capability that is 100% secret.

If we’re serious about facing the Chinese – and it’s inevitable that we will – then we need to start getting serious about establishing effective and defensible forward bases. 

USS Ronald Reagan and Force Z

Consider:  USS Ronald Reagan, CVN-76, is forward deployed and home ported in Yokosuka, Japan along with some escort ships as part of the troubled 7^th Fleet.  Yokosuka is just over 1000 miles from Shanghai, China – easy cruise or ballistic missile distance.

Consider:  Force Z was a British task force consisting of two battleships, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and four destroyers.  Leaving Singapore, the group was sent to sea where it was quickly spotted by Japanese submarines and aircraft and subjected to repeated attacks by land based aircraft.  Four attack waves of aircraft sank the two battleships on 10-Dec-1941 just a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  On paper, Force Z was a powerful group but it found itself operating in enemy territory, at the start of the war, without air cover.  It had no chance.

HMS Prince of Wales

HMS Repulse

So, what’s the link between the USS Ronald Reagan and Force Z?  Well, the parallels should be obvious.  When war with China starts, the Reagan will be forward deployed in enemy territory or, at least, within enemy reach, and if it attempts to move it will have limited air cover.  If Japan is part of the war, the Japanese Air Force will be too busy defending their homeland to provide aerial coverage for a carrier at sea.  If Japan is not part of the war, there will be no Japanese air cover at all.  Guam’s aircraft will be fully occupied (or destroyed!) defending their base and will be unable to provide air cover.

USS Ronald Reagan

No matter how you look at it, the Reagan will have limited air cover. 

Wait, what now?  Limited air cover?  It’s a carrier!  It has its own air cover.  Well, that’s technically true but for all practical purposes it’s nearly irrelevant.  You’ll recall that we’ve discussed the fact that carriers in war will operate in groups of 3-4 (4 being ComNavOps preferred number).  It will require 3-4 carriers operating together to mass sufficient air power to survive in combat.  A single carrier with, currently, only around 38 Hornets (another half dozen are required for tanking and unavailable for combat) is not exactly a powerful air force and would have a very hard time defending itself for very long against a sustained Chinese assault.  Those aircraft will be quickly attrited in combat or due to simple mechanical failings. 

The Reagan is forward deployed to Japan and would be faced with two unpalatable choices at the outset of war.

1. Stand and fight – and be sunk.
2. Run for safer waters around Guam or Pearl Harbor.

Running, the only real choice, would subject the carrier to repeated submarine, anti-ship cruise missile, and, possibly, anti-ship ballistic missiles.  The odds of successfully escaping are not great.

If running is the preferred, albeit poor, option, it leads to the question, why have the carrier based in Japan to begin with?

Is it for the carrier’s deterrent effect?  We’ve often discussed the concept of deterrence and concluded that there is no evidence that deterrence works.  In fact, the recent evidence is absolutely conclusive that deterrence does not work.  China, the obvious deterrence target of a Japan based carrier, has flouted international law and treaties, built illegal artificial islands and militarized them, used military intimidation against Vietnam and Philippines, seized the entire South China Sea, and begun laying the groundwork for seizing the second island chain.  If that’s deterrence at work, I’d hate to think about what China would have done without it!  Clearly, deterrence is not a valid reason to have a carrier forward based.

Is it for the carrier’s rapid response to a sudden outbreak of war?  As we just noted, there is nothing a single carrier can do in a peer war except go down fighting.  On a related note, if China opts to attack Japan at the outset of war, the addition of 38 Hornets to the total Japanese defensive effort isn’t going to make any big difference even assuming that the carrier isn’t sunk pierside in the opening shots.  Clearly, rapid response is not a good reason to have a carrier forward based.

So, why do we have a carrier forward based?  It makes no sense.

Now, just because a carrier is forward based in Japan doesn’t mean that it can’t be pulled out to safety in the run up to a war.  Peer wars simply don’t start with no warning.  However, if the plan is to pull the carrier out prior to a war and if deterrence isn’t effective then why is it there to begin with?

Unmanned Thoughts

The military has bought into the unmanned craze hook, line, and sinker.  They’re jumping on unmanned for every possible application with absolutely no thought given to whether it makes sense or is practical on the battlefield.  Unmanned vehicles can certainly make life easier during peacetime but what happens when the enemy starts shooting and unmanned vehicles find their comms jammed and their lifespans measured in minutes?  Well, we’re not going to dig into that.  Instead, here are just a few updated thoughts to help inform our opinions on unmanned vehicles.

Data

Picture swarms of unmanned land, sea, and air vehicles ranging across the battlefield with their various radar, IR, and optical imaging sensors.  We’ll have total battlefield awareness right down to how many buttons on each enemy soldier’s shirt!  I wonder what comes after quadra-giga-tetra-gazilla bytes of data, because that’s what we’ll have.  There won’t be anything we don’t know!  We’ll be unstoppable and unbeatable.

Of course, history, including very recent history, proves this to be completely false.  As noted in the recent post about the Yemen missile attacks on the USS Mason, despite having multiple ships with Aegis, IR, and optical sensors all backed up by satellite coverage and various airborne regional sensors, we don’t even know if any attacks actually occurred!  We had tetratons of data and yet no actual answer. 

How can we have that much data and yet no answers?  Let me ask you, what is the exact width of the lot your house sits on (renters, just play along)?  You have no idea, do you?  And, yet, you had a survey done as part of your purchase of the house (whether you were aware of it or not) so you have the data.  You just didn’t assign it any importance and probably have no idea where those documents/data are now.

You have the data but you don’t have the answer.

Or, consider that after every terrorist act the post-event analysis inevitably reveals that we had all the data points necessary to predict and prevent the event but no one was able to assemble the data and connect the dots.

More data is not the answer – better interpretation is.

A UAV can record images of a hundred fishing type vessels but which of those, if any, are carrying terrorists or disguised enemy forces?  Having the data isn’t the answer, interpretation is.  Someone has to interpret the images and decide which, if any, are threats.

Those swarms of unmanned vehicles roaming the battlefield and collecting data are, arguably, just making the problem worse!  We already have more data than we can intelligently interpret and now we’re envisioning more?!

We should not be working on putting more sensors over the battlefield (setting aside the fact they aren’t survivable), we should be working on putting more interpretation over the data.

Data without proper interpretation is, at best, a waste of time and effort and, at worst, distracts or misleads from what’s really important.  So, what’s the point of more UAVs?  We already have more than we can productively use.  We think more UAVs will help but we’re proving on a daily basis that we already can’t make good use of what we have.

UAVs are not the magic observation platforms that so many people believe them to be.

Commander’s Intent

Commander’s Intent is the Holy Grail of warfare - subordinates who can act on their own exactly as the Commander wishes with nothing more than the Commander’s Intent as guidance.  This has been repeatedly attempted throughout history with varying degrees of success.  At its best, Commander’s Intent allows a commander to direct a battle with a minimum of interaction with his subordinates.  Nelson’s guidance at Trafalgar is an outstanding example of this.  At its worst, it produces erratic, unintended actions due to failure to accurately convey and/or understand the intent.  Unfortunately, the latter has proven more likely than the former on the battlefield.

The reasons for failure to accurately convey intent fall on both sides of the commander-subordinate relationship.  Commanders fail to clearly convey their intent and subordinates fail to clearly understand the conveyed intent.

Presumably, we’d like to apply this same philosophy to our interactions with unmanned, autonomous vehicles.  However, if we can’t reliably convey Commander’s Intent to humans, how will we convey it to unmanned, autonomous machines?  How will an autonomous machine interpret and act on vague statements of intent like, “Hold out as long as you reasonably can.”?  Will we have to stop the war to write, test, and debug new software every time we want to issue a new statement of intent?

Yet, without some form of intent instructions to an autonomous UAV, we’ll have to “pilot” every UAV and then what have we gained (see, Manning, below)?  Currently, UAVs are incapable of “intent” guidance so we do have to pilot them and, perversely, unmanned platforms require more manning than manned ones!

Manning

Unmanned vehicles have been “sold” as reducing overall manning levels, among many other near-magical claims.  The reality, however, is just the opposite.  While we may, indeed, remove the pilot from the cockpit, we don’t eliminate him, he just moves to a different location.  Further, unmanned systems require more manpower to support.  From an Armed Forces Journal article,

Yet the military’s growing body of experience shows that autonomous systems don’t actually solve any given problem, but merely change its nature. It’s called the autonomy paradox: The very systems designed to reduce the need for human operators require more manpower to support them. (1)

The [remotely piloted aircraft] ... requires much more architecture than, say, an F-16 squadron, Kwast said.  While the ratio of people to aircraft in manned aviation is roughly 1.5 to 1, he said, it takes about 10 people to operate one UAV at any given time. (2)

Industry’s experience has been the same.  Automated systems may remove the worker from the immediate task but they create legions of new workers to maintain, program, troubleshoot, repair, and modify them.  Automated systems increase overall manning levels, not decrease them.

We saw a closely related example of this phenomenon with the LCS.  While not an unmanned platform, it was designed to operate with a bare minimum crew thanks to a large degree of automation.  The reality turned out quite different.  The number of “crew” required to support and operate an LCS is larger than if the ship were fully manned and the numbers are probably greater than for the older, less automated Perrys that they replaced. 

Conclusion

Unmanned vehicles offer some benefits but they are far from being the panacea that so many, including the military, believe.  The Armed Forces Journal article put it nicely, “that autonomous systems don’t actually solve any given problem, but merely change its nature”.  The military’s obsessive pursuit of unmanned vehicles is ill-considered and short-sighted and is distracting the military from larger, more serious issues like maintenance, readiness, numbers, and firepower.

_____________________________________

(1)Armed Forces Journal, “The Autonomy Paradox”, 1-Oct-2011,

http://armedforcesjournal.com/the-autonomy-paradox/

(2)military.com website, "Air Force Wants To Decrease Manning For Its UAVs", Oriana Pawlyk, 24-Feb-2018,
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/24/air-force-wants-decrease-manning-its-unmanned-vehicles.html

Return Of The Broadside

The 16”, 2200 lb shell arced up, reached its peak, and nosed over as it began its plunge towards the airbase on the artificial island that was its target.  It was one of 36 shells simultaneously following a similar trajectory and that collectively comprised the first salvo by the four battleships of the Battleship Strike Group (BSG).  None had been given a specific target.  This was an area saturation bombardment that would, literally, leave nothing behind.  The battleships hadn’t even slowed down to fire.  True, that degraded the accuracy slightly but accuracy didn’t count when the shells gouged out overlapping 50 ft diameter craters.  Firing at a leisurely rate of one salvo per minute, each giant gun fired 10 times.  The 360 total shells completely obliterated the artificial island.  There were no recognizable pieces of man or machine left when the battleships completed their fire mission. 

The battleship’s Tomahawk missiles had earlier temporarily incapacitated the airbase’s aviation capability and damaged or destroyed most of the anti-ship missile emplacements and radars as the BSG raced towards the island base.  The battleships had used dozens of medium range UAVs to pinpoint the specific targets for the Tomahawks.  Attrition of the UAVs had been severe but enough had survived to relay target data back to the group.  No one particularly cared about the UAV losses.  The UAVs were cheap and the battleships carried several dozen each.

Despite the Tomahawk attack, some mobile anti-ship missile launchers had survived and had fired their C-80x type anti-ship missiles when the group had gotten close enough for the badly mauled base to finally get a fix on the group via its own remaining aviation assets.  The couple dozen anti-ship missiles that launched against the group were intercepted, jammed, and decoyed by the group’s ten Burke and two Ticonderoga escorts.  One Burke had taken some superficial damage from the debris of an incoming missile that was shot down a hair too late and another had taken a clean hit by a missile that had defied the odds and gotten through the defenses unharmed.  With no armor to speak of and a crew that, while augmented somewhat for combat, was still too small to conduct effective damage control and lacked the expertise to repair the delicate electronics that comprised the heart of a modern ship, the unlucky Burke had been rendered a mission kill and was, even now, limping away from the group towards home and what would be an extensive stay in drydock.

The island base no longer existed and the group continued on toward the next base to repeat the process as the next step in its mission.

The Chinese had, of course, seized Taiwan in the opening hours of the war.  Resistance had been fierce but, ultimately futile and China was solidifying its hold on the large island.  America had resolved to retake the island and the Battleship Strike Group had been tasked with creating a major diversion by conducting a flank attack to the southwest of Taiwan with the objective of eliminating the southern arc of artificial island bases and then destroying China’s massive Hainan naval and submarine base.  This would divert Chinese forces away from Taiwan and open the southwestern flank to future penetrations and attacks.

As the group completed the destruction of the last island base and began the turn north towards Hainan, the battleships maintained a steady flow of scout UAVs out to a couple hundred miles in front and along the likely threat axes.  It was highly unlikely that the Chinese Navy would allow the group to approach their main naval base in the area without challenge and it wasn’t long before the far flung UAVs detected a Chinese surface group approaching.  The group consisted of six Type 052D destroyers and two Type 055 cruisers, one of the largest warships built since the old Soviet Kirov class battlecruisers.  The Chinese group was the epitome of missile-based combat with a combined total approaching 600 VLS cells and all manner of surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise missiles.

The American group also carried a heavy allotment of VLS but lacked any vertical launched anti-ship missile and had to depend on the small handful of eight Harpoons that each Burke carried and the 16 Harpoons on each battleship.

As the two groups approached each other, the U.S. group rearranged itself into the new defensive AAW tactical configuration developed just for a battleship group.  Instead of the conventional concentric rings of Burke escorts around the high value battleships, the Burkes dropped several miles behind the battleships which formed a line abreast out in front.

The longer range, subsonic, sea-skimming, Chinese YJ-100 anti-ship cruise missiles struck first.  Warned of the missile’s approach by their UAVs, the battleships executed a 90 degree turn just prior to the missiles appearance in order to present their broadsides.  This hugely increased their radar signature which, given their immense size anyway, wasn’t really much of a drawback and, on the plus side, it allowed the battleships to present their full broadside weapons capacity.  In moments, 93 incoming missiles crossed the radar horizon which, due to the battleship’s massive size and towering superstructure and mast, extended out to around 30 nm. 

The moment the missiles appeared, the trailing Burkes, using their cooperative engagement capabilities and the linked radar picture provided by the battleships, augmented by the circling UAVs, launched a massive salvo of medium range ESSMs over the top of the battleships.  The ESSMs destroyed 31 of the incoming missiles.

As the aerial debris began to settle, the four battleships fired a salvo of 36 of the new 16” AAW air burst projectiles.  The salvo was coordinated to produce an immense three dimensional cube pattern that literally created a gigantic wall of shrapnel with both area and depth.  The 62 remaining incoming missiles flew into the aerial wall and only 5 emerged.

Three of the surviving missiles were quickly dispatched by the nearest battleship’s SeaRAM mounts.  The remaining two missiles each became the focus of the battleship’s four starboard side CIWS mounts and were obliterated.

Broadside!

As the range to the Chinese group decreased, the BSG launched its own volley of Harpoon anti-ship missiles.  Unfortunately, the limited numbers and the slow speed of the Harpoons allowed the Chinese force to largely swat the missiles aside.  One Chinese 052D destroyer was hit by two Harpoons and dropped out of formation to fight extensive fires while another was hit by a single missile that caused no significant damage.

Another volley of anti-ship missiles from the Chinese group produced no significant results and depleted their inventory.  It was obvious that the engagement would turn into a gun match and with a closing speed of close to 60 kts, it didn’t take long to happen.

As the groups closed to about 40 miles, the Chinese launched a final, enormous volley of surface-to-air missiles in surface mode and anti-radiation missiles intended to destroy the battleship’s sensors and render the ships combat ineffective.  Again, the battleship’s 16” air burst patterns destroyed many of the incoming missiles but the missiles were too numerous, too small, and too fast to stop them all.  The battleship’s SeaRAM and CIWS defenses destroyed dozens more but each battleship was hit by five to ten of the missiles whose proximity fuses filled the air around the battleships with shrapnel.  However, the battleship’s main TRS-4D radar sensors were no longer exposed.  As the anti-radiation missiles drew near to their targets, the battleship’s main sensors “retracted” into their armored mast citadels which contained sufficient armor to protect against shrapnel.  Just as the old WWII era battleships had their conning stations enclosed in vertical extensions of the armored citadel, so too did their modern counterparts have their main sensors enclosed when needed.  The loss of the main sensor radar picture due to retracting the radars didn’t matter at this point since the incoming missiles were close enough for the individual SeaRAM and CIWS sensors to pick up.  Thus, the main sensors were protected while the scattered and numerous SeaRAM and CIWS units defended the ships on their own.

The missiles did damage many of the SeaRAMs and CIWSes but the vital main sensors all survived.  While the battleship’s topsides were bruised a bit, nothing critical was damaged.  Even the bridge was unaffected since there was no bridge.  The battleship’s “bridge” was buried deep inside the armored core of the ship and consisted of dozens of cameras providing 360 deg optical coverage.  Many cameras were destroyed in the attack but more than enough survived to maintain complete 360 degree visual and enhanced EO/IR coverage.

As the range approached 20 miles the battleships again turned broadside on and began firing their main guns with fire control provided by the now re-exposed main sensors.  The Chinese, having assumed that the battleships would be rendered blind were stunned to find that the battleship’s were not only firing but doing so with deadly accuracy.  The first hits by the battleship’s 16” guns occurred at about 18 miles and single hits proved to be catastrophic.  With the exception of the US battleships, modern warships have no significant armor and the Chinese ships were no exception.  The Chinese group was decimated and by the time the range closed to within 12 miles the entire Chinese group was sunk or sinking.  The firepower of the 16” guns combined with the accuracy of modern fire control systems proved devastating.

With the way now clear the BSG turned and accelerated towards Hainan and the naval and underground submarine base there.

Not unexpectedly, the Chinese submarines made every effort to protect their base.  Unfortunately, the Burke escorts, while equipped for ASW, had rarely practiced ASW during peacetime and were not proficient at it.  Despite their best efforts, two of the escorting Burkes were hit by multiple torpedoes and sunk. 

A Chinese Type 039A Yuan class diesel-electric SSK submarine managed to close to within firing range of the battleships and launched two salvos of 533 mm Yu-6 heavyweight torpedoes.  Two torpedoes hit the first targeted battleship and three hit the second. 

In each case, a number of the battleship’s bottom mounted, v-shaped, shock absorbing armor plates were destroyed but they served their purpose by absorbing and deflecting much of the initial shock wave from the torpedo explosions.  The more conventional alternating bottom layers of liquid and void spaces absorbed the remainder of the shock and both battleships sustained only minor flooding which slowed their top speed by several knots but did nothing to impair their combat capability.

The surviving escort’s MH-60R ASW helos quickly jumped on the Chinese sub and kept it occupied until the group ran past.

As the BSG neared the Hainan naval base, the battleships launched a final volley of UAVs.  This time, the battleship’s bombardment would not be an area attack but would be directed at specific targets.  First, the UAVs identified the Chinese air defenses and the battleships began slow, deliberate, long range fire, methodically destroying each anti-air battery in turn. 

With the way largely cleared for the UAVs to act as gunfire spotters, the battleships began bombarding their specific targets.

The major target was, of course, the underground submarine pens.  These were almost impervious to aerial attack but were ideal targets for the 16” guns using a combination of ground piercing (GP) and high explosive (HE) shells with the GP shells penetrating and creating openings that the HE shells widened.  The sustained bombardment eventually collapsed the entrance and tunnel passages, permanently trapping any subs inside.

With the destruction of the Hainan submarine base complete, the BSG turned away and began their withdrawal at maximum speed.  The United States had forcefully reintroduced battleships to modern naval combat.

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As with all ComNavOps’ naval combat stories, the writing is not intended as a true simulation of combat but, instead, as an exploration of equipment and tactics. 

The Battleship – The battleship in this story has a traditional heavy 16” gun fit and massive armor for protection from missiles and torpedoes.  The ship’s main mission is land attack including infantry gun support and long distance Tomahawk strike with a secondary role of anti-ship.  Naval and air base destruction would be prime missions.

As noted in the story, one of the key design aspects is the armored citadel which contains a wholly enclosed bridge and armored extensions containing retractable main radar sensors.  This preserves the command element and ship’s sensors during battle.  Closely related to this is the use of Phalanx CIWS and SeaRAM point defense.  Both weapons have their own radars and do not need fire control guidance from the main radar which allows the main radar to retract when under attack.

Construction of a modern battleship must go hand in hand with development of modern munitions such as the 16” AAW projectiles described in the story and new tactics.  This recognizes the changes that have occurred in naval warfare since WWII.

Here are some characteristics of the ship.

·        3x 16” triple mount

·        6x 5” single mount

·        16x Harpoon in Mk141 bolt-on mounts

·        12x Phalanx CIWS

·        8x SeaRAM

·        64x Mk 41 VLS (ESSM, Tomahawk)

·        TRS-3D/4D radar

·        SPQ-9B

·        EO/IR 360 deg